In the event of a conflict in the Pacific Ocean, two archipelagos are not to be envied, relations between China and the ASEAN countries are extremely difficult.
Beijing is actively imposing "great friendship" on its southern neighbors (" Chinese patrimony ", see "HBO" from 07/20/18). At the same time, China's neighbors are quite justifiably afraid that this "friendship" will turn into aggression from the north. The main potential opponent of the PRC in Southeast Asia (Southeast Asia) is, of course, Vietnam. The scenario of a possible conflict between them was described in the article "An army built by people for people " (see "HBO" from 17.01.20). But problems with Beijing may arise not only in Hanoi.
A SWING IN A DISTANT ARCHIPELAGO, relations between China and Indonesia have experienced several ups and downs.
Apparently, they will continue to represent such a "sine wave". Moreover, with an increasing amplitude of fluctuations – from a strategic alliance to an open war.
The strategic alliance between Beijing and Jakarta already took place in the first half of the 1960s. Having gained independence from the Netherlands, Indonesia went to the maximum rapprochement with the PRC, and numerous ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia were granted dual citizenship. When the gap between Beijing and Moscow began, Jakarta made an unequivocal choice in favor of Beijing, although Indonesia had previously received significant assistance, including military, from the Soviet Union.
Already in 1962, during the border conflict between China and India, Indonesia fully supported China, while the USSR rather sided with India.
Beijing and Jakarta tried to take control of the Non-Aligned Movement and even create a "parallel UN". However, in the fall of 1965, the command of the Indonesian army launched repressions against local communists and ethnic Chinese (to a large extent they were the same people). After that, the union of Beijing and Jakarta collapsed. It came to the rupture of diplomatic relations, which were restored only after a quarter of a century.
In the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century, Sino-Indonesian relations seemed to have completely normalized. Economic cooperation has significantly strengthened. Indonesia has even acquired portable anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-ship missiles from China, although so far the volume of military-technical cooperation between the two countries is very limited.
At the same time, however, China's claims to almost the entire water area of the South China Sea gave rise to its conflict with all coastal countries, including Indonesia. Disputed is the Natuna archipelago (about 300 islands with a total area of 2 thousand square kilometers), located northwest of the island of Kalimantan (Borneo) and is the northernmost part of Indonesia. In the early 2010s, there were clashes near the islands between coast guard ships and fishing vessels of the two countries due to the unsettled maritime borders (although from the point of view of classical maritime law, there are no maritime borders between China and Indonesia at all).
In addition, despite the events of 1965, a very significant Chinese diaspora remained in Indonesia. It occupies a very strong position in the country's economy, which causes discontent among many Indonesians.
POSSIBLE CONFLICT SCENARIOS In addition, Jakarta is a fairly close ally of Washington in Southeast Asia.
Accordingly, the deterioration of relations between the United States and China may lead to the involvement of Indonesia in the conflict.
The Armed Forces of the People's Republic of China have absolute and overwhelming superiority over the Armed Forces of Indonesia in all components without exception. But in this case, the geographical factor plays a very significant role. If the presence of a maritime border between the countries and the line of its passage are controversial issues, then there is absolutely no land border between them (Indonesia is the world's largest state located entirely on islands, China, on the contrary, is one of the world's largest mainland states).
Therefore, the gigantic power of the PLA ground forces will not be of particular importance in the event of a conflict. Moreover, the equally gigantic potential of the PLA Air Force will be largely useless – the countries are too far apart from each other, beyond the combat radius of the vast majority of Chinese combat aircraft. The only exceptions are the H-6 bombers ("The sky darkens from red dragons ", see "HBO" from 03/18/12).
However, in recent years, the Chinese have built many different military facilities on the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands. Among them are airfields that can be used to "jump" the most modern fighter–bombers of the Su-27/30/J-11/16 family (" Through the thorns to the fifth generation ", "HBO" from 02/25/12).
It is unclear whether China will use the capabilities of the PLA Missile Forces in the event of a conflict with Indonesia. This issue is more political than military. However, it is clear that tactical and operational-tactical missiles from Chinese territory will not reach Indonesia. Beijing, of course, will not use intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMS) in nuclear equipment. But several BRSD with conventional charges can fly to Indonesia just to intimidate.
In any case, the main fighting will unfold at sea. The PLA Navy (" Celestial Armada ", "NWO" from 01.10.21) has an overwhelming superiority over the Indonesian navy – both quantitative and qualitative. The only factor that gives Indonesia some advantage is geographical. The fighting will unfold near its territory, which will allow all its Navy, including boats, as well as all the Air Force to be involved.
But this only minimally compensates for the overall Chinese superiority. The presence of at least two aircraft carriers in combination with the actions of the aforementioned H-6 bombers and fighter-bombers from the Chinese Air Force will very quickly neutralize and "reset" the Indonesian aviation. And the submarine and surface forces of the PLA Navy's Southern Fleet alone are unlikely to experience serious problems in battles with the Indonesian fleet, despite its proximity to its bases.
The sailors of both sides have no combat experience. But there are strong suspicions that the level of training of Chinese officers and sailors is much higher than that of their Indonesian colleagues. For the PLA marines, after the defeat of the Indonesian fleet, it will not be a problem to capture the Natuna archipelago. It is extremely difficult to imagine the landing of Chinese troops on the main Indonesian islands, especially since there is not much sense in this. However, there is no such thing in the capture of Natuna – the islands and the waters around them are not of critical value for Beijing.
And Jakarta is unlikely to actively seek a conflict with China. If she is drawn into the war by Washington, the scenario will be completely different. And Indonesia's role in such a scenario will be more than secondary.
At the same time, there is a scenario and the exact opposite: Beijing will gradually buy Jakarta, pulling it to its side in the global geopolitical confrontation. And then discussing the possibility of a Sino-Indonesian war will become completely meaningless.
TUG OF WAR AT A CLOSE ARCHIPELAGO Throughout the postcolonial history of the Philippines, this country has focused almost exclusively on the United States in its foreign, foreign economic and military policy.
The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines was signed on August 30, 1951 and obliged the countries to provide mutual support in the event of a threat from third States. Based on this document, United States military facilities were established in the Philippines. In 1999, and then in 2014, the agreement on military cooperation was extended, and the US military presence in the Philippines was expanded.
Manila's relations with Beijing have traditionally been quite cold. Moreover, they were aggravated by disputes over a number of islands in the Spratly Archipelago and over the corresponding waters in the South China Sea.
In 2012, there was a conflict between the two countries near Scarborough Atoll in this archipelago. Eight Chinese fishing vessels were discovered by Filipino ships in disputed waters with illegal catch on board. Attempts to arrest the fishermen were stopped by two Chinese patrol ships. Mutual protests followed near the consulates of both countries, bans on fishing, cyber attacks. The Chinese side installed a barrier at the entrance to the atoll bay and began patrolling the surrounding sea, expelling Philippine ships from disputed waters.
In January 2013, the Philippines filed a lawsuit against China in the International Court of Justice of the United Nations, which in 2016 recognized that China has no right to disputed islands in the South China Sea. However, China expectedly ignored this decision. In June 2013, the Philippine side tried to initiate consideration of the dispute at the UN International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but China refused to take part in it.
At the same time, despite the relatively small number of the Chinese diaspora in the Philippines, it is the local Chinese who play a dominant role in the country's economy. If we talk about the social composition of the ruling elite, members of the government and parliamentarians of the Philippines, most of them are not only of Chinese origin, but also belong to large Filipino-Chinese clans of entrepreneurs.
As for the business elite, which has a direct impact on the economic development of the country, mainly Filipino-Chinese companies prevail here. The heads of trading corporations are members of notable Filipino-Chinese clans and ethnic Chinese who have been living on the islands for a long time. China and Hong Kong account for more than 20% of the Philippines' exports.
The LAND POWER DOMINATES THE SEA Until the end of the twentieth century, the security of the country as a whole was ensured by a close alliance with the United States and the island position of the country, which in itself made it extremely difficult for an external invasion of the Philippines.
However, the situation has changed significantly recently.
China has radically strengthened both in the economic and military spheres. The economies of the ASEAN countries, including the Philippines, are gradually being dragged into the sphere of economic influence of Beijing, respectively, increasingly leaving the similar sphere of influence of Washington.
The PLA Navy can now easily organize a large-scale landing even on the main islands of the Philippines, not to mention the possibility of capturing all the disputed islands in the Spratly archipelago.
The armed forces of the Philippines are formally very large, but they are practically incapable of waging a classic war: in this regard, they are much worse than Indonesia. Even the insular position of their state will not help the Philippines against the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of China. Only the forces of the Southern Fleet and the aviation of the Southern Command of the PLA Air Force will do away with the Philippine Air Force and Navy within a maximum of a few days, after which they will be able to do whatever they want in the South China Sea. Landing on the Philippines itself won't even make much sense.
Now, for the first time in the history of its independent existence, Manila is beginning to acquire a certain number of modern weapons designed for conducting classical warfare. However, the gap in the military capabilities of China and the Philippines continues to grow rapidly. And if Sino-American relations continue to deteriorate, Manila, even regardless of its desire, may be at the forefront of the struggle between the two superpowers. In this case, the fate of the Philippines will be very sad.
As the August visit of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan showed, Sino-American relations will inevitably continue to deteriorate. At the same time, Beijing is not ready for a real confrontation with Washington. Probably just for now.
Alexander Khramchikhin Alexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin is an independent military expert.
