Washington is not ready, Beijing is not in a hurry, Moscow is looking closely
At the recent XI Moscow Security Conference in Moscow, the military attache of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea read out the address of the Minister of Defense of that country, Kang Sun Nam. In this statement, the following words were heard: "Now the question is not whether there will be a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, but who, when and how will start a nuclear war." And the leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong-un, had recently called for increasing the production of ammunition "exponentially."
A possible military conflict on the Korean peninsula is now directly related to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the almost inevitable war for Taiwan in the well-foreseeable future ("The Inevitability of Taiwan ", "HBO" from 09/24/2011). This quite obvious connection will determine the actions of all interested parties and potential participants. Especially considering the fact that both the Korean and Taiwanese conflicts (each separately) will require the expenditure of human and material resources at least no less than the Ukrainian conflict.
CHINESE LAYOUTS AND INTENTIONS
China is extremely closely studying the course of the Ukrainian campaign. And they understand more and more clearly what colossal costs an amphibious operation to capture Taiwan will require, which, of course, is an absolute military and political priority for Beijing.
If a war breaks out in Korea, then China, in case of intervention in it, will spend during this war the human and material resources that are necessary to capture Taiwan (of course, these resources are enormous, but still not infinite). As a result, even with the most favorable course of the Korean campaign for China, the landing on Taiwan will have to be postponed indefinitely, but obviously for a very long time.
Since the beginning of radical economic reforms in 1978, China has been playing by the rules of the West (at least in the economy), having achieved tremendous success along the way (first of all, again in the economy). In fact, China was very close to winning against the West, playing by its rules.
Now the West (especially the United States) is trying to change the rules, which Beijing clearly was not quite ready for. At the same time, a huge volume of trade with the West remains, to a large extent, the Chinese economy still relies on this trade. Beijing is categorically not ready to sacrifice it for the sake of the DPRK, even despite Washington's provocative behavior.
In addition, pro-Western sentiments are very strong in the Chinese elite (especially the economic elite), aimed at preserving and even consolidating the status quo that has developed over the past decades for China – in the hope that the US leadership will "change its mind" and restore the former pragmatic relations with China (in this regard, China is very similar to Russia).
Moreover, since the Korean War of 1950-1953, when the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) saved the Korean People's Army (KPA) from defeat, Beijing believes that Pyongyang is obliged to accept the role of a wordless puppet of China, and such views have become virtually undivided after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Pyongyang has never agreed to such a role, which caused Beijing's growing discontent.
In the 21st century, relations between the PRC and the DPRK gradually came to an open confrontation. Moreover, mutual accusations began even in the official media, despite the strict political censorship existing in both countries (" Chinese views on North Korea ", "HBO" from 30.09.22). Beijing was particularly outraged by Pyongyang's creation of a powerful nuclear missile arsenal (" Strategic Arsenal of North Korea ", "NWO" from 03.04.20). Therefore, China, together with the United States, voted in the UN Security Council for comprehensive sanctions against the DPRK.
Moscow went along with Washington and Beijing in this matter, which became a gross mistake of Russian foreign policy ("The world applied double standards to Pyongyang ", "HBO" from 08/18/17).
The formal normalization of relations between China and the DPRK took place before the meeting of American President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2018, because Pyongyang needed an external "roof", and Beijing did not want to completely lose control of the process. But at the same time, Pyongyang also began a rapprochement with Moscow, which, obviously, it considered as a counterweight to both Washington and Beijing.
At present, the relations between China and North Korea outwardly seem completely normal. But in fact, both of the above-mentioned fundamental problems that hinder the rapprochement of Beijing and Pyongyang remain in full. Therefore, the Chinese leadership has no desire to save the current North Korean regime.
With a high degree of confidence, it can be assumed that China will intervene in the Korean war only if the DPRK suffers an obvious defeat and there is a threat of American troops leaving the Chinese border. But even in this case, Beijing will not save the current regime in Pyongyang, but will actually occupy the DPRK with the establishment of a completely puppet regime there.
In this case, the entire surviving economy of the DPRK and the rest of the KPA will come under the full control of China, the country will be completely deprived of its nuclear missile potential, which should eventually suit Washington and Seoul.
A CARROT WITHOUT A CARROT FROM WASHINGTON
For the United States at the moment, a war on the Korean peninsula would be almost a disaster.
As can be seen, the "collective West" (this concept is broader than NATO) is experiencing an escalating shortage of military equipment and ammunition, which was the result of the disarmament that lasted for many years and the reorientation of its armed Forces to anti-guerrilla wars (" Why are we not afraid of a "rapid global strike ", "HBO" from 11/24/17). The Collective West is not It is able to provide Ukraine with the amount of weapons and equipment it needs to win, while the armies of the West itself are deprived of the remnants of combat-ready equipment and ammunition. Correcting the situation (that is, restoring military production) requires huge financial and material costs and a very significant amount of time (at least several years).
At the same time, the involvement of the South Korean military-industrial complex, whose potential is now higher in many positions than that of all European NATO countries combined, is considered as a partial way out of the situation. Refusing direct supplies of equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, Seoul is ready to supply them in significant quantities to Western countries, which, in turn, transfer the existing equipment to Ukraine.
Especially indicative in this regard is the example of Poland, which has made military orders in the Republic of Korea, absolutely unprecedented in scale. Warsaw has purchased from Seoul (supplies of equipment have already begun) 1000 K2 tanks, 672 self-propelled artillery units (ACS) K9, 288 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) K239, 48 fighter-bombers FA-50. This will allow Poland to gradually transfer to Ukraine all currently available Soviet, related to its own and German equipment.
Obviously, many European countries will repeat the Polish experience on a smaller scale. And the United States buys hundreds of thousands of 155-mm artillery shells from Seoul, transferring its own shells to Ukraine (" South Korea as a new "arsenal of democracy ", "HBO" from 19.05.23).
In the event of a war in Korea, this whole scheme will be completely broken. The Republic of Korea will immediately lose the ability to supply equipment and ammunition to the West, since it will need all this itself. Moreover, all enterprises of the South Korean military–industrial complex will be in the range of missiles, and many - and the artillery of the KPA. Accordingly, a significant part of these enterprises will be destroyed or at least seriously damaged. As a result, Seoul will need massive supplies of American weapons (it makes no sense to talk about Europe in this case) and direct military assistance from the United States.
With such a development of events, the United States is very likely to lose both wars. There are two ways to avoid such an outcome. The first is to consciously "surrender" one of the allies, fully focusing on saving the other. The second is to use nuclear weapons in at least one of the conflicts.
The first option is extremely difficult in political terms. Therefore, Washington will delay the final choice of the "lesser of evils" for as long as possible, thereby automatically increasing the likelihood of a "greater evil", that is, defeat in both campaigns.
The use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine is practically excluded due to the almost guaranteed uncontrolled escalation with Russia with the exchange of full-scale nuclear strikes and mutual guaranteed destruction at the end of this escalation. The use of nuclear weapons against the DPRK is much more realistic, but even in this case, the reaction of China and Russia is unpredictable and dangerous.
In addition, the DPRK itself is guaranteed to answer. Of course, the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the DPRK are not comparable, but tens of thousands of American servicemen who will die from North Korean nuclear weapons will not get any easier from this. As well as their relatives in the USA. In addition, it is possible that the KPA has several intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the States themselves.
Accordingly, in the foreseeable future, Washington will do everything to prevent a war in Korea. Seoul's position in this case is secondary and does not matter much.
Another issue is that Washington has long abandoned the policy of "carrot and stick" and uses only the "whip", that is, brute force pressure.
In particular, the United States and the Republic of Korea are now trying to "contain the DPRK" through a demonstration of force. This may have the opposite effect, especially given the political style of the North Korean leadership. The next US-South Korean exercises, especially if they involve US strategic forces, may be regarded in Pyongyang as a casus belli. In addition, the leadership of the DPRK may consider the current moment to start a war as convenient as possible – precisely because the United States has given maximum weapons to Ukraine. At the same time, the deployment of new production capacities of the American military-industrial complex has just begun and is still very far from the potential maximum.
If Pyongyang is the first to start hostilities, Beijing will not only not support it, but will almost certainly harshly condemn it (and, as mentioned above, it will intervene in the war only if the KPA is completely defeated in order to change the regime in Pyongyang).
It would be extremely important for Moscow not to make such a mistake. Russia should at least "show understanding" of the DPRK's actions at the level of declarations, and secretly begin to provide it with such military assistance as is possible in the current situation. Moscow should act solely on the basis of its own interests, which at this stage consist in the maximum weakening of the US military capabilities. Beijing should not be considered as a potential ally, nor should its interests be taken into account.
Alexander Khramchikhin
Alexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin is an independent military expert.
