Although American space intelligence is causing serious trouble for RussiaThe fighting in Ukraine highlights the trends in the development of modern combat systems, which appeared even before it began.
But now these hostilities significantly affect these trends.
Both sides are experiencing (to varying degrees, of course) a shortage of manned aircraft (" Who needs a small army ", see "HBO" from 21.10.22). And for this reason, they are trying to use missiles, artillery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as actively as possible. And ground-based air defense (air defense), respectively, must resist all this.
LESSONS FROM RECENT WARSAccording to the results of the military conflicts of recent years, it became clear that the rocket artillery wins over the receiver in most parameters.
In some ways, it wins even from aviation (" Preserving the divine status ", see "HBO" from 11/20/20).
No conventional weapon system has such a high destructive capability as a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). A rocket projectile is much easier to make controllable than a barrel artillery projectile, since the limitations on size, weight and overload are much smaller for a rocket projectile.
MLRS is much easier than barrel artillery to provide with means of aerial reconnaissance, since it is possible to launch a drone from the MLRS itself.
Finally, it is very convenient for MLRS to apply the modular principle of construction, installing different packages of shells of different caliber or even tactical missiles on the launcher (PU). The range of shells used by MLRS is also extremely diverse (for example, they can set minefields).
Reconnaissance drones provide missile systems with target designation, thereby further increasing their accuracy. And, accordingly, reducing the number of missiles needed to hit a single target.
Combat UAVs have become a full-fledged addition to missiles, and barrage ammunition (kamikaze drones) – "another missile." Moreover, they are extremely flexible in application, and sometimes with the possibility of reusable use (if a suitable target was not detected during the departure).
Unmanned means of destruction (missiles and combat UAVs) are becoming the optimal means of breaking through and suppressing ground-based air defense ("More precisely, further, scarier ", "HVO", 08/13/2011). The most serious problem of air defense has become high-speed small-sized high-precision ammunition, which is extremely difficult to hit precisely because of its small size and high speed.
In addition, the range of these munitions is constantly growing, taking carriers, that is, aircraft, out of the air defense zone. This makes the situation of air defense almost hopeless, because the fight against ammunition without the ability to destroy carriers will sooner or later lead to depletion of the ammunition of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM), after which both the SAMs themselves and the objects covered by them will be destroyed.
Another equally serious problem is drones. There are a lot of them, and this further aggravates the problem of the lack of ammunition for the SAM. In addition, a significant part of the UAVs are so small that no existing air defense systems can detect them, much less hit them, since neither radar stations (radars) nor anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) are simply designed for such purposes (" From a cannon on sparrows ", "HVO", 30.04.21).
ROCKETS IN THE UKRAINIAN CAMPAIGNIn the Ukrainian conflict, the most obvious example of the use of guided missiles with MLRS was the use of GMLRS M30 and M31 rockets of several modifications with GPS guidance and a flight range of 60-90 km with an American-made MLRS M270 MLRS and M142 HIMARS.
Apparently, of all the lethal weapons of Western production received by Ukraine this year, it was these two MLRS with GMLRS missiles that created the greatest problems for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation/DNR/LNR. The M30 and M31 were used for stationary targets (ammunition depots, bridges, airfields, etc.), including in the rather deep rear of Russian and Allied forces. The biggest problem for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and Donbass at the first stage of the use of GMLRS was the impact of these shells on ammunition depots. However, gradually this problem lost its urgency, as the Allied forces began to disperse the warehouses and withdraw them deeper into the rear. In addition, apparently, Russian electronic warfare (EW) began to distort GPS signals, thereby reducing the accuracy of American missiles.
Also, traditional air defense is used to combat these missiles (first of all, apparently, the anti-aircraft missile and cannon complex (ZRPC) "Pantsir-S1"). Which is facilitated by the rather large size of American missiles (length almost 4 m, caliber 227 mm) at a high, but acceptable from the point of view of air defense speed (about 2.5 M).
Of course, regular firing in packages of 6-12 GMLRS generates the aforementioned problem of depletion of missiles for air defense. However, the stock of the M30/31 itself is also not infinite, even for the USA. Moreover, one six-row package costs about $ 1 million. There are no confirmed losses of MLRS M270 and M142 by Ukraine at the moment, but they did not make any fundamental change in the course of hostilities (at least because of insufficient quantity).
DRONES IN THE UKRAINIAN CAMPAIGNThe Ukrainian campaign had a very serious impact on the concept of using combat UAVs.
Prior to that, according to the results of the wars of recent years, it was believed that strike drones were reusable "mini–planes", differing from conventional aircraft in the absence of a pilot, smaller size and, accordingly, less combat load. The price of a combat UAV is also much lower than that of a modern combat aircraft, although UAVs are no longer completely cheap.
Previously, the most famous shock UAVs built according to this concept were the American "Predator" and "Reaper", the Chinese CH-3/4 and "Wing Lung". Then the most popular combat UAV became the Turkish Bayraktar, which achieved significant success during the wars in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Already during these wars, it was noted that all these UAVs can be successfully used only with very weak enemy air defense or even in its absence. In Syria and Libya, a significant number of Bayraktars were lost (primarily from the Pantsir missile defense System). In Ukraine, Bayraktars achieved some success at the initial stage of the war, but then their use practically ceased.
14 "Bayraktars" were reliably destroyed (the last one at the moment – in early September). But, apparently, their real losses are many times greater (that is, almost all of these UAVs that Ukraine had were destroyed). In the conditions of saturated air defense of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, they, as expected, could not act effectively. On the other hand, the Russian Orion attack UAVs, built according to the same concept, which are also too few, have not achieved any noticeable success.
Under these conditions, kamikaze UAVs (barrage ammunition) began to be used extremely actively. The Ukrainian side uses American kamikaze "Switchblade-300", the effectiveness of which, however, is extremely doubtful due to the very low TTX: the UAV weighs less than 3 kg, the flight range is up to 10 km, the flight time is only 10 minutes. It is quite difficult to expect that this machine can hit at least some serious goal. In addition, the remote control signal of this UAV is successfully suppressed by electronic warfare. The more powerful "Switchblade-600" is still only being tested.
Various variants of the Russian kamikaze Lancet UAV can be in the air from 30 to 60 minutes, have a flight range from 40 to 70 km and a warhead mass from 1 to 5 kg. Thus, they are obviously more effective than "Switchblades". At the moment, more than 40 cases of defeat by "Lancets" of enemy equipment have been recorded. However, only in about half of the cases this leads to the destruction of the target, in the other half of the cases the target only receives damage of varying degrees. This is due to both the insignificant mass of the warhead (warhead) and the low kinetic energy of the UAV as a whole. Similar TTX has another Russian kamikaze "Cube-UAV", the results of its use are quite difficult to determine.
The most effective kamikaze drone of the Ukrainian campaign at the moment, of course, is the Shahed-136, used under the Russian name Geran-2. These UAVs can be launched in a volley from various PU. The flight range is at least several hundred kilometers (possibly up to 2 thousand km), the mass of the warhead reaches 50 kg (the total mass of the UAV is about 200 kg). At the same time, apparently, the car is extremely cheap. The disadvantages of the "Shaheds" can be considered low speed (although it is not lower than that of the American and Russian "kamikaze") and significant noise. But the advantages (high range, powerful warhead, low price) are much more.
The Shahed-136 has an inertial guidance system, which makes it almost unsuitable for hitting mobile targets – but also practically invulnerable to electronic warfare. In addition, the ZUR of any modern air defense system costs much more than the Shahed/Geran. That is, even a downed UAV benefits by depleting the enemy's air defense.
AIR DEFENSE IN THE UKRAINIAN CAMPAIGNGround air defense of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation performs its natural task – covering troops and facilities.
To do this, all available anti–aircraft systems (SAMS), SAM and ZRPK - S-400, S-300V/P, Buk of all modifications, Tor of all modifications, Osa-AKM, Pantsir-S1, Tunguska, as well as a portable anti-aircraft missile system are used (MANPADS) "Needle".
The most difficult targets for Russian air defense are the aforementioned GMRLS missiles, Soviet tactical missiles "Tochka-U", missiles from the MLRS "Smerch" and "Vilkha" (Ukrainian modification of the "Smerch"). The manned aviation of Ukraine is used only to a limited extent (although it has not been completely suppressed so far). The Bayraktar UAV, as already mentioned, was actively used only at the initial stage of the war, after which, apparently, they were mostly knocked out.
The Russian air defense is fully faced with the problem of fighting against weapons of destruction, not their carriers. Apparently, the consumption of missiles from the Russian side is very large, but at the same time, the task of covering troops and facilities as a whole is being solved quite successfully. Cases of Russian targets being hit by Ukrainian means of air attack are episodic.
Ukrainian ground-based air defense does not have S-400, S-300PM, S-300V4, Buk and Tor air defense systems of the latest modifications (" How terrible is Ukrainian air defense ", "HVO" from 11.02.22). An even bigger problem is that the country does not produce missiles even for existing systems, and there is almost no possibility of their deliveries from abroad (Slovakia and Bulgaria have only one S-300PS division, Finland has the Bukov division and Cyprus has two divisions, and the Slovak air defense system has apparently already been transferred to Ukraine).
At the same time, the warranty period of storage of the 5B55 missiles in the TPK is 10 years, and the ammunition of the Ukrainian air defense has not been updated for more than 30 years. Hence the massive falls of Ukrainian missiles on Ukrainian cities (the rocket either simply fails, or the illumination and guidance radar (RPN) loses a low-flying target, after which the rocket falls to the ground).
In order not to recognize this fact, a story has been invented in Ukraine about the fact that Russia is shelling Ukrainian cities with S-300P missiles. Although this air defense system does not provide shooting at ground targets. In addition, the flight range of the 5B55 is only 45 km, which is several times less than the distance from the front line – and even more so from the locations of Russian air defense systems to Ukrainian cities.
Due to the shortage of missiles, the Ukrainian air defense is engaged not so much in covering troops and facilities as in destroying Russian aviation – regardless of what tasks it solves and what damage it causes to Ukrainian facilities. At the moment, the losses of the Russian Aerospace Forces for all reasons amount to about 30 aircraft and the same number of helicopters.
These losses are by no means catastrophic, but unpleasant, therefore, to a certain extent, the Ukrainian ground air defense solves its task (Ukrainian fighters most likely either do not have aerial victories, or shot down only one Mi-8). Because of this, the Russian Armed Forces prefer to use missiles, and now kamikaze UAVs, rather than manned aircraft.
In general, it seems that no weapon system on either side is capable of providing a radical change in the course of hostilities. Their outcome will be decided by the complex involvement of all forces and means.
At the same time, of all the Western assistance to Ukraine, the biggest problem for Russia is not MLRS and UAVs, and especially not armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, but continuous satellite reconnaissance from American artificial Earth satellites (ISS) in real time in various ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum. The problem is compounded by the fact that it cannot be solved without starting a war against the United States.
Alexander KhramchikhinAlexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin is an independent military expert.
