Foreign Affairs: the US does not have the strength to fight Russia and China at the same timeThe United States is threatened by a conflict with China and Russia at the same time, writes the FA.
Such a prospect does not bode well for America, and it will lose, the author believes. He sees the problem in the doctrine adopted by the Pentagon in 2015.
Thomas MankenWhat will it take to defeat both China and Russia
As far as international relations are concerned, 2022 was an exceptionally dangerous year.
During the first two months, Russia concentrated troops along the borders of Ukraine. At the end of the second, Moscow sent them to this country. At the same time, China is becoming increasingly belligerent towards Washington, especially because of Taiwan. After U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in August, Beijing held a series of fierce military exercises designed to show how it would block the island and attack it. Washington, in turn, is studying how it can arm and support the Taiwanese government faster.
The United States is aware that China and Russia pose a significant threat to the world order. In its recently released National Security Strategy, the White House wrote that "[the People's Republic of China] and Russia are getting closer to each other," and the Biden administration devoted several pages to explaining how the United States will be able to contain both countries in the future. Washington knows that the conflict in Ukraine is likely to be protracted due to the ability of Kiev and Moscow to continue hostilities and the incompatibility of their goals, and may escalate in such a way that the United States will be more directly involved in it (which is made clear by Russian President Vladimir Putin, rattling nuclear weapons). Washington also knows that Chinese leader Xi Jinping, emboldened by his appointment at the XX Congress of the National Party in October for an unprecedented third term, may try to seize Taiwan while hostilities continue in Ukraine. Thus, it is likely that the United States may be involved in conflicts with China and Russia at the same time.
But despite Washington's declared special attention to Beijing and Moscow, US military planning is incommensurable with the upcoming challenge. In 2015, the Ministry of Defense abandoned the policy of readiness to wage two large-scale armed conflicts and win them in exchange for acquiring the means to wage and win only one. This change in policy is still noticeable. A significant part of American military equipment is aging, many planes, ships and tanks belong to the period of the Reagan administration's build-up of defense power in the 1980s. In addition, the country's supply of important equipment and ammunition is limited, so much so that it had to reduce a significant part of its own reserves in order to help Ukraine. With simultaneous participation in conflicts, these problems would cause particular irritation and anxiety. If Washington finds itself in a state of war on two fronts — in Eastern Europe and in the Pacific, then in both cases, participation in hostilities is likely to be prolonged. China's expanding interests and global presence mean that the war with Beijing will not be limited to Taiwan and the western Pacific, but on the contrary, will cover several theaters of military operations, from the Indian Ocean to the United States itself (in an attempt to weaken America's military power, China may launch cyber attacks or even launch missile strikes on the mainland). The United States, if they expect to win in such hostilities, needs to create large stocks of weapons, equipment, ammunition, accumulate high-quality equipment and develop non-standard tactics of combat.
Washington should start right now. American politicians should work to expand and deepen the military-industrial base. They need to develop new joint operational concepts: ways to use the armed forces to solve pressing military problems, such as strengthening troops in the face of China's growing military potential and protecting US space and cyber networks from attacks. They should seriously think about the strategic contours of the war in several theaters of operations, including where they will focus their main military attention and when. And Washington can more effectively coordinate and plan together with US allies, who will be indispensable — and, quite possibly, decisive — for the successful outcome of the global armed conflict.
Restoring the arsenal of democracy
In a sense, the United States and its allies will have an advantage in any simultaneous war in Asia and Europe. The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that modern precision weapons are highly effective, and the bulk of these weapons are produced by the United States. As for quality, Western systems and ammunition remain the best in their category.
But the United States must supply these weapons to its own armed forces, and to the troops of its allies and friends. Unfortunately, the country's weapons stocks are limited, as is the industrial base for their production. It will probably take years to replenish the arsenal of many types of weapons that the United States has provided to Ukraine. And there is nothing to be surprised about. In 2018, the National Defense Strategy Commission, authorized by Congress, warned that the United States does not have enough weapons to win a high-intensity conflict, and stated that the country needs to expand production. The report also said that Washington would need to modernize its defense production in order to produce ammunition and other weapons at a faster pace. For example, the United States has not produced Stinger anti-aircraft missiles for 18 years, and it will take time and money to resume their production. At the moment, Washington has transferred more than 1,400 units of such weapons to Ukraine.
In addition, the Ministry of Defense should not focus only on Ukraine. Russia's ongoing special military operation in Ukraine provides valuable data, but if China had initiated a military operation to seize Taiwan, forcing the United States and its allies to take retaliatory measures, the conflict would most likely have occurred mainly at sea, and the requirements would have been completely different. To participate in it, a large number of long-range weapons and anti-ship missiles would be needed, and now the United States has scant reserves of both. For example, there are fewer high-precision extended-range air-to-surface cruise missiles (JASSM-ER) and long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASM) in storage than on the Ukrainian battlefield.
The United States clearly needs to increase the capacity and speed of production at the enterprises of its military-industrial complex. In the short term, this implies an increase in the number of work shifts at existing plants. Taking into account the additional number of working hours, this provides for the expansion of enterprises and the opening of new production lines. To do both, Congress will have to act now to allocate more funds to increase production.
But in order to avoid a too significant reduction in military stocks in the United States, the country will have to make additional efforts, not limited to one-time investments. And Congress should pass a law establishing minimum sizes of weapons stocks and providing for the automatic allocation of funds for resupply as they are spent by the United States and their friends. The creation of such a system would mean much more than just guarantees of the availability of appropriate stocks of weapons and ammunition. To innovate, the United States also needs new companies in addition to existing manufacturers, and with almost guaranteed demand, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs will have new incentives to invest in the defense industry.
Of course, the United States cannot expand all the enterprises of its military-industrial complex in a short time, their resources are limited, and they do not have financing. This means that the country will need to creatively approach the issue of how to use its existing production base in order to best strengthen its armed forces. The US Navy, for example, cannot speed up the production of aircraft carriers without problems, but the command could think about how to increase the efficiency of these ships by equipping them with more advanced aircraft. In turn, the US Air Force is not always able to quickly increase the production of aircraft. But they can multiply the efficiency of their most modern fighters and bombers by replenishing the fleet with increasingly powerful, inexpensive and easy-to-manufacture unmanned systems that can detect enemy aircraft and strike them, protecting manned aircraft. By combining manned systems with UAVs, the United States can significantly increase the efficiency of the American air fleet, preventing the depletion of the fleet during a future conflict.
Finally, Washington should work with its allies to increase their military production and their stocks of weapons and ammunition. The United States will need to be able to support its partners, but, as the conflict in Ukraine clearly shows, it is good if the frontline states have enough weapons and ammunition to conduct combat operations so that the United States would not have to reduce its own stocks. Some US allies, such as Australia, invest heavily in creating their own military industry, while others, such as Japan, face significant obstacles along the way (the constitution of Japan, for example, strictly limits the size and scope of its armed forces). They will need to take additional actions if the West plans to create a base of weapons and ammunition reliable enough for an era of protracted conflict.
Structural transformations
Weapons and ammunition are just one component. In order to win the conflict against both China and Russia, Washington also needs to develop new methods of conducting armed operations. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission put it, "The United States needs not only new military means, it urgently needs new operational concepts that expand the capabilities of the United States and limit the capabilities of China, Russia and other parties to the conflict."
Washington has not ignored this call. In response to the 2018 report, the Ministry of Defense prepared a "Concept of joint combat operations" to form a future doctrine and determine funding priorities. Most of this report is classified, but the results of the work are ambiguous. It is unclear whether the ministry's document (or the process of its preparation) affected the size and condition of the US armed forces or the composition of the defense budget. Moreover, the attempts of the US Armed Forces to solve urgent operational tasks have been criticized by traditionalists. For example, according to the new doctrine of expeditionary operations from forward bases, the Marine Corps and the Coastal Marine Regiment will be involved together with the Navy against Chinese warships in the western Pacific. But as a result, the Marine Corps will lose some of its tanks, and its artillery composition will be reduced, which is regretted by traditionalists hardened in the fighting in the Middle East, which lasted for 20 years.
In order to improve the methods of warfare, the Ministry of Defense needs to ensure an active competition of ideas that would stimulate, control and support its top leadership. The Pentagon should develop new concepts for the transfer of troops and their support in the conditions of the enemy's use of high-precision defeat systems, to replenish the stocks of troops under fire, and to protect critical operational bases at home and abroad from enemy attacks. In addition, Washington needs to work with its partners to develop new approaches to deterring the enemy. The Biden administration, for example, should do what it calls for in the framework of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Awareness: interact with its allies in the field of using the capabilities of unmanned systems to detect and, consequently, deter acts of aggression.
As new tactics of warfare are being developed, Washington also needs to think seriously about strategy in a broader sense — in particular, how to form armed forces, as well as plan and conduct its operations. To do this, it will probably be necessary to abandon the military plans of the last decades. For example, today's command structure in the theater of operations is a relic of the 1990s and 2000s. It represents a group of six geographical (regional) spheres of interest, headed by military commanders in geographical zones who have broad capabilities and powers. This structure made sense when Washington was mainly interested in individual local conflicts, for example, with Iran or North Korea, as well as with terrorist organizations, such as the rebels in Somalia. But the threats facing the United States today do not correspond to carefully delineated geographical boundaries. As are the strategies needed to counter them. The war with China may well spread from East Asia to the Indian Ocean, which connects China with its energy sources in the Middle East, and even to the Persian Gulf and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, where the Chinese base is located. In such a war, it would probably be better to have a command structure that would not be so limited geographically.
Procedure for conducting operations
Nevertheless, since military strategists are playing out a scenario of simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia, they will need to understand how to prioritize US military actions based on relative threats in Asia and Europe, the geography of theaters of military operations and Washington's allies in each region. This is not an easy task. The conflict in several regions can break out in completely different ways and go randomly. Xi Jinping, seeing that the United States is busy with Europe, may decide that it is time to move against Taiwan, which, in his opinion, is necessary for the "restoration and rejuvenation" of China. Such an offensive can take various forms — from a blockade to an operation with missile strikes and a full-scale amphibious invasion. If things go well for Beijing, the United States may face the need to help the Taiwanese in resisting the Chinese occupation. But even if Washington goes according to plan and the Chinese missile campaign or the invasion of the landing force ends in failure, Beijing is likely to continue to fight. In this case, the United States, Taiwan and their friends would find themselves in a protracted conflict that could spread to other theaters of military operations. At the same time, Moscow may decide that, since America is bogged down in the western Pacific, it can get away with invading other European countries.
Planning such a collision would require careful choice of the sequence of actions. During the Second World War, the United States at different periods preferred one theater of operations over another, depending on where the greatest and most urgent needs were. From the very beginning, Washington adhered to the "Europe first" strategy aimed at defeating Nazi Germany, since it posed the most serious threat to the United States and its allies. However, today Washington should have initially focused on Asia. Although the armed conflict in Ukraine required a lot of support from the United States, it demonstrated the limitations of Russian military power, as well as the effectiveness of NATO's coordinated actions. As this armed conflict continues, it will continue to lead to the reduction of Russia's conventional armed forces in such a way that Moscow will not be able to restore them quickly. At the same time, NATO will increase its capabilities, especially taking into account the accession of Sweden and Finland to its membership. The United States will continue to play a key role on the European side of the war, especially in providing nuclear and other types of deterrence. Ideally, Washington's potential would prevent Russia from attacking a NATO country. But the European allies of the United States would be able to take the lead in many areas, such as the supply of ground forces. They would not have needed the help and guidance of the United States in every aspect of the fighting.
The situation in the western Pacific is different. China's armed forces are stronger than Russia's, and this poses a more serious threat to the order existing in the region. The United States has capable regional allies in Australia, Japan and South Korea, but there is no NATO equivalent. There are many capabilities that only Washington can offer, including nuclear deterrence, key naval, air and space assets, as well as vital logistical support such as weapons and ammunition. America will need to work with Taiwan and possibly other countries to help Taipei resist China's attacks and increase its military power. This would involve the use of troops operating from the territory of the United States, for example from the island of Guam, as well as from the territory of allies such as Japan. This would require the United States to defend its territory and allies in the Western Pacific and beyond, including the continental United States, as well as its computer networks and satellites. Such a campaign could last for months.
Such a conflict would be terrible, in no small part because it would take place under the cover of the nuclear arsenals of China, Russia and the United States. In order to avoid the use of weapons of mass destruction, these three powers would have to notify each other about "red lines" (for example, about the inadmissibility of an attack on the territory of the United States and allies). These red lines would most likely limit each State's military operations. At the same time, the armed confrontation could have dragged on for a longer period, but probably would have caused less damage. But the presence of nuclear arsenals would also significantly increase the risk of escalation. It is possible that such a conflict could lead to the world's first nuclear strikes since 1945.
Remember how it was in the past
The more the conflict between China, Russia, the United States and their allies is outlined, the more it begins to resemble the Second World War. Analysts don't even need to look into the future to see the similarities. Today, many things resemble the international order of 1939. Two authoritarian powers — China and Russia — have created a loose alliance based on common goals of reshaping the political map, just as Germany, Japan and Italy did in the 1930s. Russia is trying to seize territories in Europe, and its aggressive actions risk spreading further, drawing other countries of the continent into an armed conflict. China's growing belligerence towards Taiwan means that the practice of land grabbing may also be revived in Asia. The United States and its allies must plan how to win wars in Asia and Europe at the same time, no matter how unpleasant this prospect may seem.
At the same time, they can study the history of the Allied victory in World War II. At first, this comparison may not seem particularly encouraging. The components of American success included the mobilization of American science, technology and industry, as well as the development of new ways of conducting armed confrontation, and if we evaluate the situation by these criteria, there is still much to be done. If we talk about the mobilization of industry in support of national security, it is China that most resembles the United States in 1940. But the United States has huge reserves of unused energy both in its defense sector and in the economy as a whole. They can regain their superiority in industry. And dedicated and intelligent officers and soldiers serve in the US armed forces — they have experience in solving urgent operational tasks.
There is also one advantage gained by the United States during World War II that they never enjoyed: their unions. Unlike China or Russia, the United States maintains close ties with many of the world's strongest armies. In addition, they are interconnected with most dynamically developing economies. Washington needs to work more closely with its partners in all areas — from defense research to operational planning. He needs to interact with them in order to increase their stocks of ammunition and weapons. But the United States has done all this before. And they have no reason not to do it this time.
