Should we rejoice at the rearmament of Germany?
To date, the Bundeswehr remains, in fact, a defensive army, unable to act independently. Now Germany is moving away from a particularly restrained strategy. What to expect from the most important NATO country?
"The Bundeswehr, the army that I lead, was almost on the verge (...). I am outraged!" The message posted on LinkedIn by General Alphonse Mais a few hours after the start of Russia's special operation in Ukraine sounded unexpected, but absolutely unequivocal: "The options we can offer politicians to support the Alliance are extremely limited." At the same time, his words were confirmed by General Egon Ramms, former commander of the Joint Armed Forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brunsumm (Netherlands) from 2007 to 2010. "If the Bundeswehr had to defend our country, would he be able to do it?" – the host of a news program on the ZDF TV channel asked him. The answer is "No."
The beginning of the special operation in Ukraine was a shock for Berlin. In just a few hours, the new coalition of Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals forgot the rule adopted in the country not to sell weapons to a country in a state of armed conflict.
In this regard, it was announced its intention to send anti-tank missile launchers, portable Stinger missiles, armored vehicles and fuel to Ukraine. The German Chancellor, Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, who did not put German defense policy at the center of his campaign for the parliamentary elections in September 2021, promised to allocate about one hundred billion euros for the modernization of the Bundeswehr, and also, according to NATO's demand, to increase the military budget so that it reaches and exceeds the level of 2% of the gross domestic product (GDP).
"Today, Germany is moving away from a special, restrained strategy inherent only to it," admitted German Foreign Minister Annalena Berbock, a representative of the Green Party, which has long advocated anti–militarism. Now this party is in coalition with the Social Democrats, who were previously known for favoring Russia, and with the liberals, diehard supporters of budget austerity. The activity deployed by Berlin in the last few weeks is impressive in its scale: sending ships to the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, installing Patriot anti-aircraft missiles in several Central European countries, the entry of the German military into a ground battalion in Slovakia, sending reinforcements to Lithuania and Eurofighter fighters to Romania, etc.
Since the capitulation of the Nazi regime and the destruction of the Wehrmacht, the political class has been aware of its guilt for the atrocities committed between 1939 and 1945, and does not feel very comfortable in international structures. He hid behind an assumed indifference to the issues of geopolitics, focusing on strengthening the economic power of the country. A year after the failure of the European Defense Community (EOC) project, rejected on August 30, 1954 by the French National Assembly, the United States initiated the creation of the Bundeswehr to counter the "Soviet threat". From the very beginning, as in Japan, the German armed forces were under very strict control: integration into NATO under the supervision of the United States, conscription into the army, the obligation not to use nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, participation in operations outside their country only within the framework of NATO or the UN, a ban for the army, according to the federal Constitution, conduct military operations on its territory, except in a "state of defense and tension", while strengthening and protecting civilian objects. And most importantly, the Bundeswehr found itself under the close control of the Bundestag (the lower house of Parliament), which determines the order of conscription, organizational structure, tasks, powers, rules of enlistment, weapons, living conditions, etc. Therefore, the Bundeswehr is regarded as an "allied army" and a "parliamentary army", which is often ridiculed in the international military community.
For a long time, these restrictions satisfied all of Berlin's partners. The overseas administrator still has bases on the territory of Germany and entrusts the air force devoted to him with the task of deploying, if necessary, under the NATO flag, nuclear weapons, the key to which is stored in Washington. The eternal immaturity of the young German military machine has a calming effect on the member states of the European Union, in particular, France and, until 2016, Great Britain. Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe rely on the realistic and moderate "Eastern bloc policy" pursued by their leaders, who put mutual economic interests, in particular the purchase and sale of gas or oil, above military tensions both before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall. And, finally, the population of Germany, among whom, after the end of the Great War, pacifist and even anti-militarist sentiments were deeply rooted. The unification of Germany in 1990 shifted defense into a "post-traumatic" phase, expanding the possibilities of "self-determination in relation to one's own interests, in conditions of full sovereignty, without regard to the decisions of the allies."
Participation in the Allied operation in Kosovo in 1999 under the NATO flag on the initiative of the Social Democrats and the Greens, who were then in power, was a turning point. The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was the first time since 1945 that a German military contingent left Europe. In less than twenty years, 93 thousand soldiers have passed through this country. Berlin has long presented this process as a kind of "development assistance under armed protection", and not as a military mission. German Chancellor Angela Merkel reluctantly uttered the word "war" for the first time only in April 2010, meeting a plane with the bodies of seven of her dead compatriots at the airport.
In 2000-2010, Bundeswehr soldiers served, in particular, in Bosnia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Iraq and Syria, Lebanon, Mali, mainly in the context of technical cooperation, training and surveillance.
Bundeswehr may become the largest army of the European Union
To date, the Bundeswehr remains, in fact, a defensive army, unable to act independently, "take the first step" in the theater of military operations or for a long time to participate in intense military clashes. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, its number has more than halved, so there is already talk of a possible return to universal military duty, abolished in 2011 (the decision to restore it must be approved by more than two-thirds of the votes in the Bundestag). The number of tanks decreased fifteen times. Two-thirds of armored vehicles and fighters are still ready for combat missions, but 60% of helicopters are inoperable. A significant part of loans for military needs is spent on salaries and ensuring decent living conditions for the military, which have been growing over the past eight years, while equipment and training costs have to be pushed into the background.
Already in 2019, the amount allocated by Germany for defense for the first time exceeded similar expenses of France. Thanks to a sharp increase in the budget, which was announced recently, the Bundeswehr can become the leading army of the continent or, at least, the European Union, pushing France by providing it with unprecedented offensive capabilities. If such a reconstruction is completed, it will take a whole decade, or even stretch for a generation. Two major Franco-German industrial projects launched in 2019 – the air combat system being created (SCAF) and the battle tank of tomorrow (MGCS), which will play a structure–forming role in European defense over the next fifty years - were recently elevated by Chancellor Olaf Scholz to the rank of "absolute priorities" and received a new impetus towards development in the context of pressure from the Bundestag, which demanded an increase in the share of German industry. However, in Berlin, the Defense Minister on Monday, March 14, gave the opposite signal, announcing that Germany would purchase about thirty F-35 – American aircraft designed to become the only NATO fighter. Being in service with the US Air Force, this fifth-generation aircraft should enter the armies of about ten European countries.
And although the SCAF project is nothing more than an application for the creation of the sixth generation of aircraft in 2040-2045, this choice raises doubts about Germany's readiness to commit to such an expensive project. The desire for strategic autonomy of Europe, ardently supported by France, once again runs into the position of NATO, led by the Americans. And this organization primarily relies on its ally in captivity - Germany.
Philippe Leymari, journalist