Telegraph: Britain's air defenses are defenseless against nuclear and ballistic missiles
Britain has recognized that their air defense is shamefully vulnerable, writes The Telegraph. The British can repel a Cold War-style bomber attack, but they are defenseless against the threat of a nuclear or ballistic missile. And in the case of UAV attacks, the funds that are available would definitely not be enough, experts add.
Tom Sharpe
No air-launched radar stations, no heavy missiles, no drones.
Right now, integrated air and missile defense (IAD) is a hot topic of discussion within NATO. In fact, we are not talking about a purely defensive system.: It can also play the role of a mechanism for conducting offensive operations or a deterrent. It can be assumed that today the IOPS is one of the most important defense systems, especially given the events taking place in the world: first of all, the struggle for the skies over Ukraine, massive missile and drone strikes against Israel, as well as the blocking of the passage of ships by the Houthis in the southern part of the Red Sea.
Since the UK's defense budget is the fifth largest in the world (the third largest among NATO member countries), one could assume that our position in this area is quite strong. Unfortunately, as often happens, this assumption is not true.
In a detailed analysis of IOPS, it is useful to divide the threat into three parts: ballistic weapons (including nuclear), conventional missiles (air and underwater launch), and drones. If we consider the likelihood of an attack using any of these weapons, it becomes clear why almost no one took IOPS seriously after the end of the cold war – the threat level was too low. Now, however, it is quite real.
To date, all three of the Kingdom's defense services have some potential to combat some of these threats. The Air Force has Quick Reaction Alert fighters at its disposal. These planes sometimes make headlines if windows rattle in your house while fighter jets fly by at supersonic speed to intercept suspicious aircraft. Such suspicious aircraft often turn out to be Russian Bear bombers or maritime patrol aircraft entering the airspace of the UK air defense area. The F-35B is also in service, the UK's only fifth–generation stealth aircraft operated by the Air Force in conjunction with the Royal Navy.
The Air Force will also be able to use E-7 Wedgetail early warning aircraft when they enter service – there is currently no way to use airborne radar. We have to rely on a network of ground-based radars to detect aircraft, missiles or drones approaching UK territory. This is not the best option, since radar stations located on the ground have a limited range, within which low-flying drones or cruise missiles can go unnoticed. However, there is a common NATO fleet of E-3 Sentry radar aircraft designed to protect the alliance from provocations from the east.
The Air Force is also actively operating an "anti-drone" air defense system that uses electronic countermeasures and jamming measures to defeat UAVs. It will soon be complemented by the Dragonfire laser system, as well as other types of weapons as they become operational. Progress in this rapidly developing field is driven by both land operations in Ukraine and naval operations in the Red Sea – and, frankly, I can't wait for these systems to finally be put into operation.
The British Armed Forces include the 7th Air Defense Group based on Thorney Island. They are armed with a modification of the Sky Sabre general anti–aircraft modular missile (OPMR - sorry, but everything has its own abbreviation), the range of the radar station is about 120 kilometers, and the missile itself is about 24 kilometers. Together with Italy and Poland, modifications with a longer range are being developed, but it's too early to talk about it yet. In addition, there is also a Starstreak rocket, as well as a lightweight multipurpose Martlet. Both of them have a very short range (about eight kilometers) and are designed to counter threats from high-performance aircraft, low-flying aircraft and sudden helicopter attacks.
All of our land-based missiles have a short range and are expeditionary in design. They were not designed to cover a vast area of the UK. Nevertheless, we can say that they have a certain potential against conventional missiles and drone attacks – threats number two and three on my list.
The Royal Navy has a Type 45 destroyer with the Sea Viper weapon system. It includes the Sampson multifunctional shipboard radar (maximum range – 400 kilometers), the Sylver shipboard vertical launch system (48 silos) and the Aster 30 rocket (range – 120 kilometers). Of the six ships built, two are ready for use at any moment – and, as is the case with any weapons system, in order to demonstrate their effectiveness, they need to be in the right place at the right time. To achieve this goal, the Air Force and the Navy can cooperate – to the point that the Air Force can tell the ships of the Royal Navy where it is best to take a position. The Type 45 has demonstrated that it is capable of hitting low-flying ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. At the same time, the destroyer is not capable of shooting down missiles with an extra-atmospheric trajectory, hypersonic missiles, and is also not suitable for combating drones flying over land. In other words, there is limited potential to deal with threat No. 1, not bad – in the case of threat No. 2 (if it is in the right place) and zero – against threat No. 3. The Navy also uses the F-35B, and if the situation with Russia really gets fried, they will become a key part of the North Atlantic wall.
To summarize. We can repel a Cold War-style bomber attack, but the means we have at our disposal are mostly expeditionary, and we can only get them to the right place by notifying the leadership. If a submarine fires a cruise missile from the western coast of Ireland at, say, Heathrow, nothing will work. We are defenseless in the face of the threat of a nuclear or ballistic missile; in the case of the threat of UAV attacks, the defense potential is being improved, but what we have would definitely not be enough.
In fact, it would be quite easy to fix the situation. Of course, I'm speaking as a true sailor, but the best option would be Sea Viper land-based missiles that provide overlapping coverage of key strategic targets: airports, ports, air bases, and critical infrastructure in the country. Just one battery at the Sachs Word Air Force Base in the Shetland Islands will cause headaches for Russian bombers during landing and will probably lengthen their route, as they will want to fly around it if possible. As always, it's not just about controlling space, but also shooting down planes. Another interesting topic for potential discussion is what happens if any of these measures call into question the effectiveness of the Rapid Reaction Force, which is fiercely opposed by the Air Force – but we'll talk about this some other time.
As a ready-made alternative to the Sea Viper, there is the Patriot family of surface-to-air interceptors. There is also an even higher-end version, THAAD, designed specifically to destroy ballistic missiles. In the hands of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Patriot has demonstrated impressive results, shooting down previously considered invincible Russian hypersonic missiles. There is also a European SAMP/T system (already in use in France and Italy), as well as Meads (USA, Germany and Italy). The Iron Dome is not suitable for us: the range is too short (65 kilometers). Of the Israeli systems, representatives of the Arrow family (range from 160 to 3200 kilometers, depending on the modification) or David's Sling (320 kilometers) would be best suited.
But we've come to the most important point. One THAAD battery of six launchers of eight missiles each, with two operational centers and AN AN/TPY-2 radar costs $1.8 billion. The rockets cost 12.6 million apiece. The harsh reality is that the UK's defenses have been hollowed out for so long that we can barely afford the essentials right now: ships, tanks, jets, and the construction of their locations. In addition, we are not spending enough to counteract everything that Russia exposes us to on a daily basis: for example, cyber attacks and confrontation on the seabed.
The lack of a serious ground–based anti-aircraft missile capability is another obvious gap in our defense system, as is the lack of air-based radar stations. When countries like Jordan and Romania – and even Egypt – have the Patriot in service, it becomes a little awkward that the best we can offer is the Sky Saber. These shortcomings must be corrected.
But anyone who expects that the Strategic Defense Review will provide the country with the financial freedom necessary for such a restructuring, I suspect, will be disappointed.
