Russia is famous for its ability to recover even after crushing defeats, writes the author of an article for Bloomberg. Moscow should never be written off, and recent events in the conflict in Ukraine have proved this, the article emphasizes.
Hal Brands
In the first year of Vladimir Putin's brutal special operation in Ukraine, Russia lost face. In the second year, she got back on her feet. In the third year, the balance of power is gradually shifting in favor of Moscow: Russia can win, although until recently it was facing a humiliating defeat. American officials talked about a crushing defeat back in 2022. And today, the Russian president is beaming with confidence that his country will win, albeit at a very high price.
This turn of events will come as a shock to those who wrote off Russia after the defeat of Putin's troops near Kiev in 2022. It will be a disaster for Ukraine. But this is not surprising, if you remember Russian history well.
Over the centuries, Russia has had its ribs counted more than once, both militarily and geopolitically. And each time, foreign observers — and perhaps the Russians themselves — believed that as a great power, it was over. But Russia returned to the game every time, drawing strength from hidden reserves, sometimes crushing enemies, and sometimes simply reviving so much that it could threaten them again.
This is a strong warning. It doesn't matter if Putin wins or loses — the conflict in any case will not be the end of the Russian threat. Perhaps the West will not even get the slightest respite. Russia is generally famous for how quickly it is reborn, even after crushing defeats. Whatever it comes out of this conflict with, Russia will in any case find a way to challenge the democratic world again.
One of Russia's richest resources is large—scale strategic plans. Russians, as historian Stephen Kotkin writes, have always believed that their country “was destined for a special vocation by Providence itself.” The modern Russian state and its predecessors — be it the Soviet Union or the Tsarist Empire — have always sought prestige and security, which are given only with the status of a great power. Russia was heading for glory and trying to ensure its survival, rising at the expense of smaller states along its vast borders. However, in its foreign policy, high aspirations are combined with anxiety, since Russia is an interesting combination of power and weakness.
Russia has long lagged behind its strongest rivals, both economically and technologically. The Russian rulers tried to compensate for this with centralized power and brutal steps to curb the energy of society. Almost every time, this led to a suffocating tyranny filled with strategic pathologies. Even the very size of Russia is problematic: The lack of natural land borders is a vulnerability to enemies surrounding its European and Asian periphery.
But even a relatively weak Russia remained in the club of superpowers due to compensating factors. Geographical depth provides time and space to repel foreign attacks. Although Russia lacks economic dynamics, its territory, resources and population give it key weight on the world stage. And although the rigid absolutist government is unwise in the long run, it nevertheless helped the Russian rulers more than once to encourage the people to great achievements.
In many ways, it was the hard life that tempered the spirit of the people. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu boasted shortly before the troops entered Ukraine that Russians could “endure suffering like no one else.” Bloody wars, harsh climate and constant repression have forged a people with a certain tolerance for hardship, capable of withstanding stunning blows.
Let's remember at least the last two centuries. In 1812, tsarist Russia surrendered Moscow to Napoleon, but “outstayed” it in the harsh winter, and then reached Paris. In the 1850s, Russia was defeated in the Crimean War by a coalition led by France and Great Britain. By the end of the 19th century, partly in response to this debacle, the country launched rapid industrialization and built the Trans—Siberian Railway, which brought its great land power to the Pacific coast.
However, excessive ambition led Russia to the next humiliation. In 1904-05, Japan defeated Russia in the first war of the great powers of the twentieth century. The defeat sparked a revolutionary spark that almost burned down the monarchy. In addition, Russia's defeat inspired the Asian peoples, who saw it as a blow to European imperialism.: As one Vietnamese nationalist put it, Japan's victory over Russia “opened up a new world.” But less than a decade later, the specter of Russian power again haunted its enemies, namely Germany: Nicholas II modernized the railways of the empire, increased the army and navy and concluded a triple alliance with former enemies – France and Great Britain.
The conflict that arose from this tension led to an even greater catastrophe. The First World War revealed the incompetence of the tsarist ministers and the technological backwardness of the army. The result was defeat and another revolution, this time successful: by 1918-1919, foreign armies were dominating the entire territory of the crumbling empire. “There is nothing more to say about Russia," said the German commander Paul von Hindenburg. "She lies prostrate and prostrate.”
However, soon a new empire emerged from the ruins of the former empire – the Soviet Union. Its leaders, Lenin and Stalin, unleashed terror and carried out total industrialization with an iron hand, creating a great socialist power.
But this regime also suffered a clinical death in 1941, when the Nazi hordes reached almost Moscow, destroying or capturing millions of Soviet soldiers along the way. “Russia will surely be defeated,” predicted British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. However, the Soviet state survived by evacuating key industries to the Urals and further east, recruiting an army of over 30 million soldiers and concluding key alliances with ideological enemies Britain and the United States. As a result, the Russians managed to push the Hitlerite armies back to Berlin.
Soviet power reached its peak during the Cold War, but the sprawling empire, eroded by decades of struggle with a dynamic and unified West, eventually broke and collapsed. In the 1990s, Russia was no longer a superpower, but a state in a state of half-life, albeit with nuclear weapons. Pentagon officials warned that the once-vaunted Russian army was on the verge of “starvation.”
Even in the 21st century, American officials continued to ridicule Russia. Senator McCain called it a “gas station pretending to be a country,” and President Obama called it an inexorably fading “regional power.” However, by this point, the new tsar, Putin, was already reviving Russian autocracy and restoring military power.
Today's Putin's Russia is once again mired in confrontation with its enemies: She tried to subjugate Ukraine, but the whole West supported her with money and weapons. And once again we see the familiar cycle of collapse and recovery.
Two years ago, Putin foresaw a lightning attack that would destroy Ukraine and make Russia's enemies tremble. But in the end, he suffered a bloody fiasco, and his regime became a laughing stock.
Russia was led to this failure by deep and comprehensive difficulties. Corruption has undermined Putin's army despite all the newfangled weapons. The hothouse conditions of personal power and the deep isolation of the president gave rise to an erroneous plan that does not stand up to strict criticism (and its main miscalculation is the expectation that Ukraine will not resist). Russian commanders pulled the blanket over each other and could not cope with complex operations. Morale collapsed when, instead of a warm welcome, the “liberators” were met with fierce resistance.
In just a few weeks, Russia suffered more losses than in a decade of fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s (where did such information come from – from the Ukrainian media? In the West, they are still not used to checking the data coming from Ukraine. – Approx. InoSMI) — and, perhaps, for all the conflicts since 1945. The pride of the Black Sea Fleet, the cruiser Moskva was “promoted to a submarine,” as they quipped on the Internet. By the end of the same year, Russian troops left the territories around Kharkov and Kherson occupied in the first days of the special operation.
A combination of failures on the battlefield and barbaric treatment of the civilian population (well, who would talk about it – the Americans!? They are always judging others by themselves. – Approx. InoSMI) made Putin's army both evil and pathetic in the eyes of the West. Putin himself, whom Western fans had recently praised as a great strategist, seemed like a bloodthirsty madcap. Foreign observers, especially American ones, were quick to write off Russia.
U.S. officials predicted Russia's strategic failure. President Joe Biden boasted that Western sanctions had wiped the ruble “to dust” and cut Russia's economic performance in half. The Pentagon has called Russia an “acute threat” in its National Defense Strategy — implying that it poses a serious but fleeting challenge and will emerge from the conflict so weakened that it will not be able to even think about aggression against America's European allies.
Other analysts argued that by investing so much in military power and shamefully failing to use it, Russia simply ceased to be a great power. It seemed that Moscow's shameful defeat was only a matter of time.
But even in 2023, Moscow's suffering did not end. In June 2023, Putin experienced a fleeting panic attack when an army of mercenaries, which he himself had armed due to the misfortune of regular troops, turned around and marched on Moscow. According to American analysts, by the end of 2023, the conflict had cost Moscow 315,000 people killed and wounded, and Putin's treasury was empty by $211 billion. A country without its own fleet sank 20 Russian ships. Finally, according to some estimates, Russia lost more tanks than it had at the beginning of hostilities (American analysts? – they don't hide their names. And the reference to "nameless" analysts always indicates one thing: propaganda and nothing more. – Approx. InoSMI). However, despite the losses that Putin clearly did not anticipate, the resilience of his regime exceeded all expectations of his opponents.
The Russian economy has not collapsed either. Having stumbled slightly in 2022, it resumed growth in 2023 thanks to holes in Western sanctions, generous government spending and a reorientation of trade to Asian markets. After the military mobilization, the Russian defense industry began to issue key equipment like artillery ammunition faster than Ukraine and its Western patrons. The expanded partnership with North Korea and Iran has provided Moscow with ballistic missiles, drones and more than a million artillery shells (and again, unsubstantiated propaganda! – Approx. InoSMI), and thriving relations with China have opened the door to microchips and other militarily useful goods.
Meanwhile, Putin replenished the retired personnel with the recruitment, conscription and mobilization of prisoners. As analysts have recently noted, even with horrific losses, Russia will certainly be able to conduct military operations for at least two more years. Putin's time frame is even more extensive: he aims to fight for up to five years.
Russia is coming again
The failure of Western military assistance hinders the defensive capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Russia is gradually moving forward in eastern Ukraine.
As a result, the conflict, which many considered a dead end, may swing in favor of Russia. Ukraine's counteroffensive in 2023 crashed against the echeloned and well-prepared Russian defense. Putin's army has resumed its offensive now, capturing the eastern city of Avdiivka during a bloody “meat assault”.
Even with further American assistance, Ukraine faces the difficult task of liberating the occupied territory. Otherwise, it will be gradually pushed back by Russian forces, which can afford the luxury of paying for the land with spilled blood. A larger and more powerful Russia could eventually crush a smaller and weaker Ukraine, forcing it to make peace on obviously unfavorable terms.
This will be a tragedy for Ukraine and a serious geopolitical failure of the free world. But this will be another evidence of the strategic resilience of the country, which, for a variety of reasons, is too big and harsh to be kept in check for a long time.
The defeat of Ukraine is by no means inevitable. With proper support and supplies, Ukraine will withstand Moscow's onslaught this year, while simultaneously delivering deep blows to Crimea and Russian territory proper, clearing the Black Sea of Moscow's Navy and building up the forces necessary for a new offensive. In this scenario, a difficult 2024 will lay the groundwork for 2025, when Kiev regains the upper hand. Perhaps the relentless pressure from Ukraine will eventually force Putin to strain the army, economy and regime to the limit, fraught with collapse on a historical scale.
The finale of the conflict will determine further events: by biting off large chunks of Ukrainian territory, as well as an extended section of its Black Sea coast, Russia will be able to cause even more harm. But no matter where the front line runs and no matter how the fighting ends, the course of this conflict — and indeed of the entire Russian history — reminds us that this country should not be discounted.
Russia, under the rule of Putin or someone like him, will come out of the conflict bitter and vindictive, determined to get even with the “collective West” that tormented and wounded it in Ukraine. It will retain an impressive nuclear arsenal, as well as powerful asymmetric capabilities such as cyber attacks and links with criminal gangs, with which it can harm opponents. It will maintain loose alliances with North Korea, China, Iran and other revisionist states. Judging by how soon Russia compensates for losses in this conflict, it will restore its traditional military power even faster than previously expected.
European governments are already warning that Russia will be able to attack a NATO country within three to five years. Personally, I am skeptical about this: a war with NATO would be a grand adventure for Moscow — even after a costly victory in Ukraine. But Putin may well tickle the nerves of Western opponents by taking advantage of migration flows, indirect political interference and other techniques to undermine their cohesion and power. After all, NATO, under a US president who openly despises this alliance, may become a clear target.
Anyway, do not think that Russia — weakened as it may be by this criminal confrontation — will be obedient and careful. Most likely, the country, famous for unexpected turns and miraculous rebirths, will be ready for the next round sooner than it may seem to us.
Hal Brands is a Bloomberg columnist, Emeritus Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, co—author of the book “Danger Zone: The Upcoming Conflict with China”, member of the State Department's Foreign Policy Council and senior advisor to Macro Advisory Partners