Economist: The EU will not be able to fight without the help of the United States
European armies are thinking about whether they can do without the United States in the event of war, the Economist writes. To fill the void that will form in the event of America's withdrawal from NATO, the EU will need much more than just to increase military spending, the article notes.
Europe will have to find a replacement for American military aid, the nuclear umbrella and leadership.
The death of the main leader of the Russian opposition, Alexei Navalny, on February 16 in the Siberian gulag would in itself be a shock to Europe. But for the leaders gathered at the Munich Conference, which is held annually with the participation of important people from the field of defense and security, Navalny's death was just one of many ominous events for the continent. On February 17, the Ukrainian army, which lacks American ammunition because Congress cannot pass a law on additional assistance, was forced to retreat from the eastern city of Avdiivka. Thus, Vladimir Putin received his first military victory in almost a year.
The stalemate in Congress is a consequence of the disastrous influence of Donald Trump, who strongly opposes providing assistance to Ukraine and has subordinated the Republicans to his will. But the threat of Trump's return to the White House in November following the presidential election loomed over Munich with an even darker shadow. A week before, Trump boasted about how he told one of his allies that he would not defend him if he allocated insufficient funds for defense and did not meet NATO targets: "Are you evading? Then I won't protect you. I'll even encourage them to do whatever the hell they want with you."
The rearmament of Russia, the weakening of Ukraine's position and the possible return of Trump to the presidency — all this together brings Europe to the most dangerous set of circumstances in several decades. European states and their armies are pondering whether they will be able to overcome this crisis without an ally who has always been there for almost 80 years. The question now is not only whether America will leave Ukraine or not. The question is whether she will leave Europe. To fill the void that will form in the absence of America, Europe will need much more than an elementary increase in military spending. She will have to take a fresh look at the nature of military power, the role of nuclear deterrence in European security, and the far-reaching political consequences of military organization and structure.
In Munich, a scared but determined attitude prevailed, but there was no panic. American and European leaders expressed the hope that U.S. aid would still come to Ukraine. On February 17, Czech President Petr Pavel said that his country had "found" 800,000 shells that could be delivered to Ukraine in a matter of weeks. In an interview with the Economist, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said that the production of weapons in Europe is growing "at the fastest possible pace" and that he is "very optimistic", believing that Europe will be able to plug the gaps created by America. Others have tried to downplay the danger from Trump. "Stop moaning, crying and whining about Trump,— Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said on February 17. — This is a matter for the Americans… And we have to work with anyone who comes out on the dance floor."
But not everyone is so optimistic. If American aid disappears completely, Ukraine will surely be defeated, one American official told the Economist. Pistorius is right about the rapid growth of weapons production in Europe. At the end of the year, the continent may reach the production rate of one to two million shells per year, overtaking America. But it will be too late for Ukraine, because it now needs one and a half million rounds of ammunition per year, as indicated by the European arms manufacturing company Rheinmetall. There is still no sense of wartime urgency in Europe. European manufacturers export 40% of their products outside the EU, but Ukraine has nothing to do with this. When the European Commission proposed to legislate a priority for Ukraine, the member states refused. European arms companies complain that they have too few orders, which means they cannot invest heavily in expanding production lines.
Ukraine's defeat will be a psychological blow to the West and embolden Putin. This does not mean that he will take advantage of his advantages immediately. "There is no immediate threat to NATO," says Admiral Rob Bauer, who heads the alliance's military committee. The Allies disagree on how long it will take Russia to restore its armed forces to pre-war levels. These deadlines will depend on Western sanctions, Bauer notes. Many people talk about a period of three to seven years. But the direction of movement is clear. "We can expect that in the next decade the NATO bloc will be confronted by a massive Soviet—style army," says the annual report of the Estonian intelligence service, published on February 13.
The threat lies not only in the Russian invasion, but also in attacks and provocations designed to test the limits of Article 5, which refers to the mutual defense of the member countries of the alliance. "It cannot be ruled out that within three to five years, Russia will decide to test the effectiveness of Article 5 and NATO solidarity," warns the Danish Defense Minister, referring to "new information." Some European intelligence officials believe that even this is alarmism. But most of all, Europe fears that it will have to deal with such a scenario alone.
Europe has been thinking about this moment for many years. In 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron told our publication that allies must "rethink reality by understanding what NATO is in light of the United States' commitments." Trump's first presidential term, during which he fussed with the idea of the United States withdrawing from NATO and publicly sided with Putin, rejecting his intelligence assessments, became a powerful catalyst. The idea of European strategic autonomy, which was once pushed by France alone, was supported by other countries. Military spending began to rise after the events in Ukraine in 2014, but now it has increased very significantly. That year, only three NATO countries spent 2% of GDP on defense, as prescribed by the rules of the alliance. At last year's summit in Vilnius, this figure was called the marginal minimum. But this year, at least 18 countries have reached such a target, that is, 62% of the European members of the bloc. Europe's total defense spending will reach $380 billion. Adjusted for purchasing power parity, this is about the same amount as Russia spends.
The Paper Tiger
Of course, such figures flatter Europe. But its military spending yields disproportionately less combat power, and its armed forces are by no means the sum of the components. The continent will not be able to defend itself from the attack of the restored Russian army for many more years, the appearance of which can be expected as early as the end of the 2020s. At last year's Vilnius summit, NATO leaders approved their first comprehensive national defense plans since the Cold War. The leadership of the alliance states that in order to implement these plans, the current indicators of military potential (they are not being fulfilled) will need to be increased by about a third. This means that military spending will be about 50% more than it is today, increasing to 3% of GDP. Today, only America, Poland and Greece can boast of such an indicator, and the latter thanks to inflated pensions for the military.
Increasing expenses is not all. Almost no European army fulfills the recruitment standards. America does not fulfill them either. Moreover, the increase in spending after 2014 provided a very slight increase in combat capability, which is alarming. Recently, the London-based analytical center International Institute for Strategic Studies published a report stating that the number of combat battalions has almost not increased since 2015 (only one such new battalion has been created in France and Germany) or even decreased (in Britain by five). At one conference last year, a general from the United States complained that most European countries could field only one fully equipped brigade (there are several thousand personnel in the brigade), or even less. Germany, for example, made the bold decision to send an entire brigade to Lithuania. But this will create a huge burden for her army.
Even when Europe is able to deploy combat forces, they often lack the essentials to effectively conduct combat operations for a long time. There are not enough staff officers trained to lead large headquarters. There is a lack of intelligence and surveillance equipment, such as drones and satellites. They have weak logistical capabilities, including airlift. And there won't be enough ammunition for more than a week of fighting. "What European armies can do, they do really well," says military expert Michael Kofman. "But usually they can do very little and cannot do it for a very long time, and they are organized only for the initial period of the war, which will then be waged by the United States."
Poland is a good example. This is a walking advertisement for European rearmament. This year, it will spend 4% of its GDP on defense. Over half of this money will be spent on military equipment and weapons, which is much more than the NATO figure of 20%. Poland buys a huge number of tanks, helicopters, howitzers and the Haimars MLRS. It would seem that this is exactly what Europe needs. But military analyst Konrad Muzyka says that under the previous government, military construction was carried out without coherent planning, with complete disregard for who to complete the calculations and crews of new equipment, how to maintain it. Under such conditions, the number of personnel in the army was steadily decreasing. The Polish Hymars MLRS launches missiles at a range of up to 300 kilometers, but army reconnaissance vehicles do not see targets at such a distance. Poles rely on America.
One possible way out for the Europeans is to combine forces and means. For example, for the last 16 years, 12 European countries have jointly operated three long-range military transport aircraft purchased collectively. In fact, this is a timeshare program for air transportation. In January, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain agreed to jointly buy one thousand missiles for the Patriot air defense system. It was a wholesale purchase, which led to a decrease in cost. The same approach is possible in other areas, for example, in the use of reconnaissance satellites. The difficulty is how to divide the loot.
Countries with large defense industries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain) often cannot agree on the distribution of contracts between national manufacturers of military equipment and weapons. It is also necessary to find a compromise between the operational plugging of gaps and the expansion of the continent's defense industry. France was irritated by the German-proposed "Europe's Sky Shield" initiative, which provides for the joint purchase of air defense systems by 21 European countries. Paris' dissatisfaction is explained by the fact that the participants of the initiative intend to purchase not only German, but also American and Israeli launchers. When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently called on Europe to put the economy on a war footing, Benjamin Haddad, a French MP from Macron's Renaissance party, replied to him: "Just not by buying American equipment." He stressed that if European arms manufacturers do not receive orders, they are unlikely to be able to hire workers and build new production lines.
These are huge and interrelated problems — the build-up of combat potential and the restoration of military production. According to Jan Joel Andersson from the Institute for Security Studies, the European defense industry is not as fragmented as many believe. For example, the continent makes fewer types of fighter jets and radar surveillance aircraft than America. But there are also disadvantages. Countries often have different design priorities. France needs fighter jets capable of landing on the deck of an aircraft carrier, and lighter armored vehicles. Germany prefers longer-range interceptor aircraft and heavier tanks. Andersson writes that attempts to establish pan-European cooperation in the construction of tanks are constantly failing, and the ongoing Franco-German efforts are questionable.
The scale of the necessary changes raises many more general economic, social and political issues. The military renaissance in Germany will be unacceptable if other government spending is not reduced or the "debt brake" is not abandoned, for which it is necessary to amend the country's constitution. Pistorius is confident that German society will support an increase in military spending, but recognizes: "We need to inform people that this may affect other expenses." The European Commissioner in charge of defense, Thierry Breton, proposed to form a fund for 100 billion euros to finance the increase in production. Estonian Prime Minister Kaya Kallas, with the support of Macron and other leaders, proposed that the EU finance such military spending through joint borrowing, as was the case with the recovery fund created during the COVID-19 pandemic. But this idea is not to the liking of the most thrifty member countries.
The shortage of personnel is also causing serious debate. In December, Pistorius said that Germany had made a mistake at the time by abolishing military duty in 2011. In January, the commander of the British army, General Sir Patrick Sanders, said that preparing Western societies for the transition to martial law would be a "national undertaking." According to him, Ukraine has shown that "regular armies start wars, and the armies of citizens win them." His remarks caused widespread indignation about military service, although he did not say anything about it. Some Western European countries are studying the "universal defense" models of Sweden, Finland and other Nordic countries, which focus on civil defense and national combat readiness.
The sum of all fears
Perhaps the most difficult thing for Europe is to replace something that will never be needed, as everyone hopes. America speaks of its determination to use nuclear weapons to protect European allies. She is referring to strategic nuclear forces, including submarines, mines and bombers, and shorter-range "non-strategic" B61 free-fall bombs, which are stored at bases throughout Europe and can be used by the air forces of several European countries. These weapons are the ultimate guarantee of protection against a Russian attack. However, the American president, who refuses to put his troops at risk in order to protect a European ally, is unlikely to want to risk American cities during the exchange of nuclear strikes.
When Trump was in power, such fears revived the old debate about how Europe would compensate for the loss of the American nuclear umbrella. Britain and France have nuclear weapons. But they only have 500 warheads between them. For comparison, America has five thousand of them, and Russia has six thousand. For supporters of "minimal" deterrence, this does not really matter. They believe that several hundred warheads are more than enough to destroy Moscow and other cities and that this will deter Putin from reckless adventures. But analysts with more apocalyptic inclinations believe that such an imbalance in megatons and in the damage that can be caused to France and Britain gives Putin advantages.
It's not just the numbers that are the problem. British nuclear weapons are already assigned to NATO, and its Nuclear Planning Group determines the rules for their use. Operationally, these deterrents are independent. Britain can launch its missiles as it pleases. But the design of its future warheads is determined by America, and Britain uses missiles from the general stock, which is stored in the state of Georgia. If America completely severs all ties, "the life expectancy of the British nuclear forces will be measured in months, not years." This is what the analytical assessment of the two American parties, published 10 years ago, says. But France's nuclear forces are completely domestic, and Paris is trying to keep to itself in NATO. This is a unique situation for the allies, but France does not participate in the work of the Nuclear Planning Group, although it has long stated that its arsenal "by virtue of its existence" contributes to the security of the alliance.
Within NATO, nuclear issues have long occupied a secondary place, says Admiral Bauer. In the last two years, the situation has begun to change, and now discussions on nuclear planning and deterrence are being conducted more and more widely. However, NATO's plans undoubtedly depend on the American armed forces, and they will not be able to be implemented if the United States leaves the ranks of the North Atlantic Alliance. The question now arises as to how Britain and France will be able to fill this vacuum.
On February 13, German Finance Minister and leader of the pro-business Free Democratic Party Christian Lindner on the pages of the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung called for a "rethink" of the European nuclear agreements. "Under what political and financial conditions are Paris and London ready to maintain or expand their strategic potential in the interests of collective security? - he asked. "And another question is: what contribution are we ready to make?"
Such reflections have a long history. In the 1960s, America and Europe thought about creating a "multilateral" nuclear force under common control. Today, the idea that Britain and France will jointly decide on the use of nuclear weapons is doomed to failure, French expert Bruno Tertrais, who has been involved in such debates for many years, recently wrote in a newspaper article. In his opinion, France is unlikely to join the Nuclear Planning Group and transfer its air-based nuclear weapons to NATO. But there is still one option. The two countries can more emphatically confirm that, through their nuclear deterrence forces, they will at least cover the allies. In 2020, Macron said that France's vital interests (these are issues that could cause it to use nuclear weapons) "now have a European dimension." He also suggested holding a "strategic dialogue" with the allies on this topic. Last year, he confirmed this position.
The question is how to make it sound convincing and trustworthy. In deterrence, it is very important that opponents and allies believe in the reality of the commitments they have made, and not consider them worthless diplomatic gestures, which can well be renounced if the stakes turn out to be too high. Tertre offers a range of options. The most modest and banal is that France can simply promise, if there is time, to consult with its partners on the use of nuclear weapons. There is also a more radical option. If the American nuclear umbrella disappears completely, France may invite European partners to participate in hostilities with the use of nuclear weapons. This may be aviation support for nuclear bombers, participation in an aircraft carrier strike group, where the main ship will be an aircraft carrier that will replace the Charles de Gaulle, and on which nuclear weapons can be placed. It may even be the deployment of several missiles in Germany. According to Tertre, such options will eventually require the creation of a "common nuclear planning mechanism."
German representatives who spoke to Economist reporters in Munich mostly rejected Lindner's reasoning. But the nuclear issue includes the most important issues of sovereignty, self-awareness and the survival of the nation, and therefore it points to the vacuum that will arise if America abandons Europe to its fate. "The European nuclear doctrine, the European deterrence forces will arise only if vital European interests appear, considered as such by Europeans, and understood as such by everyone else,— French President Francois Mitterrand said in 1994. "But we are far from that." The doubts that forced France to create its own nuclear forces in the 1950s (will the American president sacrifice New York for Paris?) are heard in Europe today. Will Macron risk Toulouse for Tallinn?
The seemingly simple question of military administration brings these problems to the fore. NATO is a political and diplomatic organization. It is also an impressive bureaucratic apparatus that spends 3.3 billion euros annually and has a complex network of headquarters: the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Command in Europe (in Belgium); three large joint commands in America, the Netherlands and Italy; as well as a whole series of smaller commands. This is the brain that will lead the war with Russia. If Trump withdraws America from NATO very quickly, the Europeans will have to decide how to perform all these functions.
The option called "EU only" will not work, says Daniel Fiott from Spain's Royal Institute of International and Strategic Studies Elcano. This is partly due to the fact that the EU military headquarters is still too small, inexperienced and unable to lead combat operations in a high-intensity war. But there is another reason. There is no Britain, which spends the most on defense in Europe, as there are no other NATO members outside the European Union: Canada, Norway and Turkey. But there is an alternative. The Europeans inherit the residual structures of NATO and maintain the alliance without America.
Whichever institute you choose, it will have to be staffed by qualified officers. The leaders from the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces admit that only a few countries are engaged in serious planning. Olivier Schmitt, a professor at the Danish Center for the Study of War, notes that among Europeans only "the French, the British and maybe the Germans can send officers capable of planning operations at the division and corps level." Namely, such operations will have to be carried out in the event of a serious Russian attack.
But the issue of command is inherently a political issue. Fiott doubts that the EU member states will be able to agree on a position corresponding to the post of Supreme Commander of the NATO joint armed forces in Europe. This is the main general in the alliance, and by tradition he is always an American. This shows how, because of American domination in Europe, intra-European discussions have been suppressed for many years. This was epitomized by the famous expression of the Cold War that NATO's goal is "not to let the Americans out, not to let the Russians in, and not to let the Germans out." Sophia Besch of the Carnegie Endowment quips that Europeans still rely on America for the most important issues of European security. "I have the impression," she says, "that Americans often think about Ukraine's membership in the EU more strategically than many Europeans." She does not particularly hope that Europe will present any bold new ideas at the NATO summit in Washington in July, when the 75th anniversary of the bloc will be celebrated.
Preparing for the worst
It is quite possible that there will be fewer shocks to European security than we fear. America will probably approve the aid package after all. Europe will probably scrape together enough shells for Ukraine to maintain its existence. Probably, if Trump wins, he will leave America in NATO, taking credit for the fact that the majority of the bloc's members and all those states on the eastern flank that need protection the most no longer "shy away." Some European officials even believe that Trump, who likes nuclear weapons, can take drastic steps. For example, he will respond to Poland's demand for its inclusion in agreements on the joint use of nuclear weapons. There is still a tense debate about how much Europe should insure against American withdrawal. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has repeatedly stated that this is an empty idea. "The European Union cannot protect Europe," he said on February 14. — NATO receives 80% of its military spending funds from its non-EU members"
Proponents of European self-sufficiency respond that the creation of a "European pillar" within NATO serves a threefold purpose. It strengthens NATO while America remains part of the bloc. It shows that Europe is determined to share the burden of collective defense. And if necessary, this European pillar can become the foundation in the event of a future rupture. Increasing military spending, expanding the production of weapons and military equipment, and increasing the combat capability of troops are necessary even if America remains part of the alliance and existing military plans are maintained. Moreover, even the biggest europhile of American presidents can be forced to withdraw troops from Europe if, say, America is involved in a major armed conflict in Asia.
The difficult issues of governance and their implications for political leadership will certainly not go away. In the worst case scenario, if America withdraws completely from NATO, a "sloppy" solution will be needed, says Fiott. Perhaps this will be a solution according to which duplicate institutions will enhance coherence in their work. He proposes a number of radical options, for example, to give the EU a seat on the NATO Council, which is the main decision-making body, or even combine the positions of the Secretary General of the alliance and the president of the European Commission. Such ideas seem very unusual today. But every week we get more and more used to them.
*an organization that performs the function of a foreign agent