The Spectator: Europe will not be able to fulfill the plan to build up military power
The main problem of Europe is the complete lack of defense capability, writes The Spectator. Since the Cold War, the Old World has lived under the protection of the United States. Now that Trump can return to the White House, the future of this protection is unclear, and all the steps taken by the European Union to build up military power have not yet had an effect.
"You must understand that if Europe is attacked, then we will not come to your aid and will not support you," Donald Trump allegedly told senior European leaders when he was president of the United States. In the current situation, when an armed conflict of such a scale is taking place on the geographical territory of Europe (but not yet in the political space), which we have not seen since 1945. It is extremely important that the States of the region analyze their dependence on the White House, which they perceive as their ally and source of support since the end of World War II. This time, Europe will surely have to rely on its own reserves and stamina. Would she have enough of both? As NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoanã recently noted, the problem lies not only in money, but also in military-industrial potential: since the end of the cold War, Europe has been living on peaceful dividends, believing that this situation will continue in the future.
The picture in Russia today is completely different. After Vladimir Putin realized that conducting a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine would not be as easy and fast as originally planned, a way was found to circumvent Western sanctions imposed on military equipment components, and many intermediaries appeared who were happy to supply them.
By the end of 2022, military production in Russia had gained momentum again. Some enterprises, such as Uralvagonzavod (which produces combat vehicles), have started working around the clock. And the heads of companies who refuse orders from the Russian army face up to eight years in prison. A huge increase in defense spending is planned for 2024, which will amount to 6% of Russian GDP. Russia's military economy, as Joane put it, "meets today's needs." This is a clear hint that if needs change, Russia will have the opportunity to increase production — at least of such simple things in terms of technology as shells and tanks. And this is not to mention the drones, shells and missiles supplied to Russia from Iran and North Korea (allegations of arms supplies from these countries have no basis — approx. InoSMI). Currently, there is a clear atmosphere of optimism in the military industry. Sergey Chemezov, head of the main state industrial corporation Rostec, cited staggering statistics in a November TV interview. According to him, the production of tanks increased sevenfold in 2023, artillery guns more than doubled, and the production of some types of ammunition increased 60 times.
And Europe has a big problem in this regard. Accustomed to producing weapons in peacetime in relatively small quantities and without much haste, she must now change her approach. Since the start of the Russian military operation in February 2022, EU countries have pledged to spend more than 230 billion euros (200 billion pounds) to modernize their arsenals.
Some are more successful, others are less so. Poland almost doubled its spending in 2023, which is not surprising given its history and geographical location. Warsaw has signed a $10 billion (9 billion pounds) contract with the American firm Lockheed Martin for the supply of 500 Haimars missile launchers, upon completion of which there will be more Haimars missile launchers in Poland than on American soil. At the beginning of the conflict, the most senior military commander in Germany made a statement that years of inattention to the army had "bared it." After that, Germany also became more active. Its defense minister, Boris Pistorius, said that as Europe's largest economy, Germany has a special responsibility to protect the Western bloc. Although the German government has not yet reached the mandatory minimum defense budget of 2 percent of GDP, it has promised to reach this figure this year. The production of weapons there is clearly on the rise. By the end of 2024, the German automotive company Rheinmetall has planned a 33 percent increase in production of 155-millimeter howitzer shells, and in Sweden, which will soon join NATO, defense spending has increased by almost 30 percent.
But even despite the huge investments of the Swedes in high-tech military equipment, the resumption of conscription and the construction of new military bases, spending will not reach the required level of 2 percent of GDP until 2026. And although the Europeans' efforts are tangible and impressive, being unprecedented since the Second World War, they still lack two of the most important things: the modernization of their own defensive weapons systems and at the same time providing sufficient assistance to Ukraine. This is the case even in terms of interaction with the United States. What would have happened without such cooperation is not even worth talking about.
The specifics of all this are alarming. Last summer, Ukraine had a clear superiority in artillery fire: It could fire up to 7,500 artillery rounds per day, while Russia fired only 5,000 rounds. Now this figure has fallen to 2,000 rounds per day, and Russia has allocated additional funds and managed to increase ammunition consumption five times. According to the European Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton, the EU can currently produce 400,000 rounds of ammunition per year, but Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur notes that an annual figure of about 3 million is needed for the next 10 years. This is necessary to replenish supplies, ensure NATO's regional plans and support Ukraine in its struggle. Here, the United States has a clear advantage: if American shell factories are owned by the state, then in Europe they are private enterprises, and this slows down the production process.
Europe must pull itself together and act together. On January 16 of this year, Vladimir Putin made accusatory statements against the Baltic states, claiming that Russians there are "being pushed abroad, and this is a serious security problem for our country." It is alarming that he may well intend to test Europe's cohesion by "protecting" Russians in places like Latvia and Estonia. He is unlikely to use the regular Russian army for this purpose, but paramilitary rebel groups may well play the same role as in the Donbas in 2014 — in the hope that the Russian-speaking minority will support the invasion from within.
"Threats against the Baltic states, Georgia and Moldova should be taken very seriously," the German Defense minister warned. — It's not just saber rattling. By the end of the decade, we may face dangers." Meanwhile, the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO actually leads to the establishment of the bloc's control over the Baltic and Barents Seas. There is no doubt that Moscow will call this step a "security threat" with frightening consequences. In a recent address to the nation, the Supreme Commander of the Swedish armed forces, General Mikael Bydén, warned all residents of the country about the need for psychological preparation for war. I wonder if you can call this scaremongering?
Therefore, it's time to rethink a lot of things. Europe must abandon its market-based approach to arms production and bring most of the industry under state control. A more flexible approach is also needed to minimize costs and maximize output. Precision—guided ammunition is very good, but they are of little use when firing from a worn and unusable gun barrel. It takes the talent and will of a leader to distinguish between primary and non-essential needs to repel the attacks of Russian "human waves". As the year 2023 showed, Ukraine's occupation of new territories is impossible without air superiority. The country needs not dozens of F-16 fighters, but hundreds of aircraft of various types. If the West is still determined to return Ukraine to the borders of 1991, then it is high time for it to have a detailed and realistic discussion on how to achieve this. Otherwise, the country faces a split, and the aggressor may resume its hostilities in a few years.
Of course, the average voter in the EU does not want to hear bad news about the possibility of starting a new war or voting for an increase in military spending, but this should also pass. "Speak softly, but hold a big club in your hands," U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt said when asked about world peace policy. Europe is still talking about Ukraine's good war, but its accusations against Russia have remained unchanged. The time has come — it has come a long time ago — to consider the second half of Roosevelt's dictum.
Author: Sasha Lensky
