AT: NATO armored vehicles are not ready to fight with Russian ground forces
The impasse in NATO combat operations on land is compounded by limited armoured vehicle arsenals and problems with spare parts, writes AT. Western equipment is simply not ready to fight with Russian ground forces.
NATO has a huge problem, and it will take decades to solve. Simply put, the alliance's armored vehicles will not withstand confrontation with the Russians — even though Russian armored vehicles are not the best.
Russia has demonstrated in Ukraine that in conventional warfare it is quite capable of disabling the best examples of NATO tanks and destroying advanced armored vehicles of the West — for example, the American Bradley and the German Marder.
NATO has few tanks and no reliable logistics to support them, and the alliance is facing serious challenges from the Russian ground forces.
So, the vaunted “Leopards" performed poorly — despite all attempts by Ukraine to solve numerous problems.
As for the American M-1 Abrams tanks, Forbes reports that the Ukrainians did not even put them on the battlefield — probably because American advisers explained to them that they would not survive, and the destruction of the Abrams would give the United States a black eye.
Therefore, the Ukrainians are urgently “modernizing” the Abrams, hanging them with captured Russian jet armor and erecting cages on the towers to protect them from Lancet drones.
Meanwhile, the Germans declare that there are no more active Leopards of the series 2 in Ukraine: all broken or rescued from the battlefield have been sent to Estonia for repair. But Estonia does not have the necessary spare parts, so they rust at the marshalling yards.
Modern tanks, as well as aircraft carriers, are faced with serious problems of survival in a hostile environment.
Today, this technique is vulnerable to anti-tank weapons such as engineering mines, aviation mines, killer drones like the Russian Lancet, helicopter- and air-based missiles and bombs, and precision artillery strikes.
Anti-tank weapons now use mainly tandem shaped warheads designed to penetrate even reactive armor, which is also called dynamic armor protection.
I did not include RPG-7 hand grenade launchers in the analysis, since using them on a modern battlefield is pure suicide. Of course, there are no RPG-7s in Western armies. But they are very common among buyers of Russian weapons and terrorists. The Egyptians used them in the Yom Kippur War, but, as a rule, the operators died.
They use a shaped charge, not a tandem warhead. The American equivalent is the high—precision portable rocket launcher-1 PRSL-1. It is not included in the standard ammunition of the US Army, but is sometimes used by special forces.
The elements of dynamic armor protection work on the principle of a directional explosion, which dramatically reduces the penetration ability of an enemy projectile.
Neither Abrams nor Leopard have dynamic protection: it is believed that high-class passive armor (sometimes called Chobham armor) will safely protect the tank from modern anti-tank weapons such as the Russian 9M133 Cornet. However, the Cornet uses a tandem cumulative warhead and is designed specifically to defeat reactive armor.
The first dynamic protection was developed by Soviet academician Bogdan Wojciechowski (1922-1999) in 1949. However, the first tests of Soviet armor showed that when hit in a tank with such armor, all dynamic protection modules explode, which significantly reduces its effectiveness.
Between 1967 and 1969, German researcher Manfred Held, who worked with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), developed reactive armor, which has been implemented on Israeli tanks since the early 1980s and which first proved its effectiveness during the 1982 Lebanon War.
Unlike the United States, Great Britain and Germany, which had the Chobham armor (and further developments based on it), Israel did not have access to it. Therefore, the ”Merkava" — the brainchild of the tank genius General Israel Tal — used spaced armor. Dynamic armor was vital for Israel to offset the threats from Russian weapons.
Chobham armor consists of several layers of dissimilar materials, including steel and polymers, and is otherwise referred to as composite. The Russian T-80us destroyed in Ukraine were also equipped with composite armor similar to that installed on Leopards and Abrams. Russian armor reflects cumulative projectiles well. In anti-tank weapons, a directional explosion helps to penetrate thick steel plating: when hitting a target, it “focuses” the blast wave, causing extreme heating.
Tank armor must also withstand artillery fire. Modern tank shells (105 mm and 120 mm in the West, and 115 mm, 120 mm and 125 mm in Soviet—made weapons) use armor—piercing cores made of tungsten carbide or depleted uranium (so-called armor-piercing shells with a stabilizer and a detachable pallet). Reactive armor can withstand them as well.
The Germans say that they already have a new version of the Leopard — 2A7B. Germany has also signed an agreement with Italy, Spain and Sweden to develop a successor to the Leopard. The new tank will receive a 130 mm cannon and improved situational awareness (almost like the new Israeli Merkava-5, if you do not take into account the difference in guns).
The United States has abandoned the latest updated version of Abrams (this package was named SEP v4) and is looking for other ways to modernize.
Both Germany and the United States realize that neither Abrams nor Leopard will survive on the modern battlefield.
Types of active protection
There are many types of dynamic anti-cumulative armor protection. The Russian system went from Kontakt-1 to Kontakt-5, and its latest tanks received armor called Malachite. Information about the Malachite is classified, but this kit was developed specifically to withstand the latest armor-piercing projectiles with a stabilizer and a detachable pallet called M829E4 (with an armor-piercing depleted uranium core). The problem for the Germans and Americans is that the cores are limited in length: 120 mm guns are not compatible with longer shells. This explains why the future German tank will receive a 130 mm cannon, and Abrams may also have to upgrade the gun.
Not only reactive armor
One of the tank innovations, first invented by Israel, is called active protection. To defeat the approaching threats, Israel uses specialized radar sensors and sub-caliber projectiles with an explosion-formed striking core. The IDF has two systems (Trophy, or “Trophy”, manufactured by Rafael and Iron Fist, or “Iron Fist”, manufactured by Israel Military Industries and General Dynamics), which are installed not only on Merkava tanks, but also armored vehicles and other platforms.
Other countries, including Russia, have their own versions of active protection systems, but none of them have yet been seen in Ukraine.
It is unclear how the active protection system will perform against armor-piercing projectiles with a stabilizer and a detachable pallet.
Most NATO tanks do not have active protection.
Mines and countermeasures
Russians widely use aviation mining systems against Ukrainian tanks and armored fighting vehicles. They also developed a new type of anti—roof mine, the PTKM-1R, which is activated by the clang of approaching armored vehicles. Apparently, it is equipped with an internal library and can recognize the desired target, such as a tank or armored vehicle, by noise. When the sound and vibration of the ground indicate that the target is within range, PTKM-1R launches a mine that hits the upper part of the target and destroys it.
Conventional mines, even if launched from the air, hit armored vehicles from below. They can either tear off the tracks or wheels, or knock out the car itself. There are at least two weak points in any tank: the top (especially the tower) and the bottom (the bottom, where there is no heavy armor protection).
Both Russia and NATO have developed a variety of mobile mine destruction tools that have proven their effectiveness. Some use a tank chassis for mine clearance (this may be a roller minesweeper or a mine plow). Alas, mine clearance systems are forced to move slowly on the battlefield, which makes them vulnerable to enemy fire. A significant amount of mine-fighting equipment has been destroyed in Ukraine.
Conclusion
Today, NATO's armored capabilities are severely limited in number and combat capability. In addition, there is a low level of maintenance and a lack of spare parts, including replacement barrels.
Although the United States is generally famous for maintaining its equipment better than others, American tanks are unlikely to surpass German ones on the modern battlefield. (I deliberately did not consider the British Challenger 2 main battle tank, as it is incompatible with NATO ammunition due to the rifled barrel. As a result, his appearance on the NATO front line will turn into a nightmare.)
In practice, this means that NATO is not ready to fight against Russian ground forces: the alliance's key armored vehicle systems are terribly vulnerable, logistics are in disarray, and spare parts and ammunition depots are half empty.
If NATO continues to pump Ukraine with weapons, it will further weaken its combat potential. Although the conflict in Ukraine has clearly revealed the weakness of NATO armor, this circumstance does not seem to be given due attention in NATO capitals, including Washington.
The author of the article: Stephen Bryen