Political decisions of the authorities slow down the expansion of the German military-industrial complex
The German military industry has a rich tradition. But the modern German military-industrial complex has its roots in the times when there were two German states: Germany and the GDR. It was in the old FRG that its core was formed.
CONTINUITY AND CONTROL
In the military-industrial landscape of the united Germany, the legacy of the old FRG is preserved in the following positions.
1. Form of ownership. The presence of the state in the ownership structure of military-industrial complex enterprises has always been less than 10%. For comparison: in my native Belarus and Russia allied with it, the state acts as a monopolist in this structure.
2. The role of the Federal Economic Service, the Federal Ministries of Economy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, the Federal Security Council in the decision-making process on the export/import of weapons of Germany. All these services and departments at different stages issue reviews or permits to arms exporters.
These stages follow from the regulatory framework laid down in 1961 - the year when the Berlin Wall was erected. It was then that the "Law on Gun Control" was adopted in Germany and the "Law on Foreign Trade" acquired legal force. Over the past decades, these laws have been amended, but their essence has not changed. There are no countries in the world where there would be stricter control over arms exports than in Germany.
3. The nomenclature of the final products of the old and new FRG coincides in the part relating to armored vehicles, artillery systems, ammunition, ships, ships, communication systems, control systems.
4. The traditional areas where state-owned enterprises are concentrated are closed to the repair of VIVT. First of all, weapons and equipment of the Bundeswehr are being repaired. The subjects of the foreign military presence on the territory of Germany also give their VIVT to state-owned factories and workshops for the entire cycle of repair work.
5. The purchase of military products (PVN) for state institutions completely excludes any decentralization. This rule applies to all products manufactured both in Germany and abroad. And again, it makes sense to compare Belarus and Russia with Germany. In all three countries, the PVN procurement system is of the same type in terms of centralization.
6. Continuity is maintained in providing most of the needs of the Bundeswehr in ViVO with domestic products.
7. Economic considerations are not the main ones when deciding on the export of VIVT. VIVT export is traditionally perceived as a security policy tool. It should be noted that there is a ban on the export of military products to countries where human rights are violated.
8. In both the old and the new FRG, there are very few military-industrial companies focused exclusively on the production of PVN.
9. The presence of Germany in the segment of the global VIVT market, which coincides with the EU and NATO space, is the number one priority.
10. The German military industry has always been tied to concentration processes.
11. The military industry is subject to a program-targeted approach to budget planning. This is a German exclusive. There is no similar practice in any other country. In my opinion, the German experience in this matter is quite applicable in the post-Soviet space.
SALE AND RENEWAL
If the development of the military industry in the united Germany is considered in a meaningful way, then there are no less updates than continuity.
Large-scale changes in this segment of the German industrial sector have led to the formation of a strictly corresponding to all the classic features of the military-industrial complex. And not that mythical military-industrial complex of Germany, which appeared to be a kind of monster under the pen of ideologists who served the political regime of the GDR.
The contribution of the former GDR to the all-German military-industrial piggy bank cannot be overestimated. But it is also unfair to put it out of brackets. In the GDR, devices and electronics of fairly good quality were produced. Independent experts positively assessed the East German military shipbuilding. The GDR received most of its weapons from the USSR and other Eastern Bloc countries, but it played a very prominent role in military cooperation within this bloc.
The military industry of the old FRG at the initial stage of the history of the united Germany had a share in the export of military equipment of no more than 40%. Over 60% of exports accounted for the sale of reserves. The fourth and fifth cabinets of the first Chancellor of the united Germany Helmut Kohl promptly disposed of everything valuable that remained of the National People's Army of the GDR. These weapons were mostly sold to foreign partners – both for business reasons and for ideological reasons.
Alexander Khramchikhin writes: "After the absorption of the GDR, the new Armed Forces of the united Germany formally achieved enormous military power: 7 thousand tanks, almost 9 thousand. BMP and APC, 4.6 thousand. artillery systems, more than 1 thousand combat aircraft. At the same time, Germany demonstrated a unique pace of eliminating this power by recycling it and selling it "in all azimuths", which automatically closed the idea of revenge" (" How a united Germany squandered its military power ", "HBO", 03/23/2013).
The breakthrough years in terms of export orientation were the years when the country was ruled by cabinets headed by Kohl's successor, Gerhard Schroeder. In 2002, the share of the German military industry in the export of military equipment was 65%, in 2005 – 85%.
FRAU MERKEL'S EXPORT MIRACLE
On November 22, 2005, the first female Chancellor, Angela Merkel, took over from Schroeder. With it, the share of the domestic military industry in the export of VIVT has crossed the mark of 90%.
Already during the reign of the first cabinet of the Bundeskanzlerin, the export of VIVT increased by 80%. If we compare the final figures for 2005 and 2017, we will get a threefold increase in arms exports.
On the naviny website.by reading: "Arms exports approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Germany in 2019 reached a record value of 7.95 billion euros in price terms. Compared to 2018, the growth was 65%."
By the end of 2020, exports decreased slightly to 5.8 billion euros. And 2021, the last year of Merkel's rule, was remembered as the peak of the pandemic. But it was this year that a record was set: 9.35 billion euros. A real miracle. You can't say otherwise.
During the reign of Merkel's fourth cabinet, Germany accounted for 4.2% of global arms exports. Merkel left to her successor a country that occupied the fourth place in the list of arms exporters, carried out deliveries to 55 countries.
It is fundamentally important to have new markets where German exporters have firmly established themselves. The presence of the old FRG in that segment of the world VIVT market, which did not coincide with either the future EU or NATO, was negligible. After the unification of Germany, this presence has been increasing.
And Angela Merkel succeeded most of all in this regard. The record figure is associated with her third cabinet, which ruled the country in 2013-2017. Recipients of German military products not from NATO and the EU paid almost 15 billion euros for it. In 2017, the share of the corresponding space in German exports of VIVT exceeded 50% and has not decreased in subsequent years.
German manufacturers of VIVT have benefited the most from the expansion of NATO to the east. VIVT, which the USSR supplied to the Warsaw Pact countries, did not fit into NATO standards. There was a vacuum that had to be filled urgently. And the Germans were in the right place at the right time.
The Merkel era is also marked by Germany's multifaceted participation in international military-industrial integration. Bundeskanzlerin constantly kept her finger on the pulse, striving to bring to the logical end what Kohl and Schroeder were planning.
MILITARY INTEGRATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The formation of the new FRG took place at a time when the political elites of the EU began to seriously think about filling the military-industrial component of European integration. They rightly assessed it as a weak link in the integration processes.
Since then, the weak link has turned into a strong one. A single military-industrial complex within the European Union has become a reality. And the role of the German military industry in this matter was key.
The German handwriting in integration could be traced in the impressive range of weapons associated with the consolidation of the EU. The issues of financial support for the development of weapons samples, attracting the best design personnel, and directing their thoughts in the right direction were jointly resolved.
Germany has played a major role in achieving the impressive performance of the largest European aerospace corporation Airbus Group. This is evidenced by the development of multi-purpose fighters of the 4th generation Eurofighter, A-400 M transport aircraft, drones, light and cargo helicopters, and the Galileo satellite navigation system. As well as obvious progress in the process of creating the European MUSIS system (International Space Imaging System for Reconnaissance and Surveillance).
Bilateral cooperation has organically entered into the general integration field. The fruit of Franco-German cooperation is the NH-90 multipurpose helicopter. The Germans and the Dutch jointly developed Boxer multi-purpose wheeled armored vehicles.
A serious contribution of German companies to the development of European military-industrial integration is the expansion of the PVN at the expense of multi–purpose wheeled armored vehicles Puma, frigates of the Baden-Württemberg type (F125), MKS-180 Corvette, diesel submarine type U-212. The advantages of integration processes within the EU were most successfully used by such German firms as Rheinmetall, Krauss-Maffei Wegman, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, Heckler &Koch, MTU Aero Engines.
SCHOLZ'S POLICY
Since December 2021, Germany has been ruled by a coalition of three parties. The post of Federal Chancellor is occupied by the Social Democrat Olaf Scholz. The Free Democrats and the Greens are also represented in the Government.
Scholz's name is associated with a new stage of both national security policy as a whole and its military component. In the spring of 2023, the National Security Strategy was approved in Germany. The government has pledged to spend 2% of GDP on defense without any "buts" and "ifs". In 2022, at the initiative of Scholz, a special fund of 100 billion euros was created for additional financial support of the Bundeswehr. This spurred the national military-industrial complex.
Artem Lomakin came to this conclusion: "In the current conditions, the country intends to develop the entire military complex, simultaneously introducing a new model of modernization of the German military industry by increasing digitalization and implementing the latest technologies in the military-industrial complex. The German military-industrial complex strives to use the latest digital systems both domestically and jointly with its foreign partners and allies."
In the Old World, the idea of creating a European army continues to be discussed. This idea has been around for many years. Undoubtedly, the German military-industrial complex would benefit most from its implementation. Therefore, he is its main lobbyist. But the German military industrialists and their colleagues from other EU countries are well aware that the European army is a matter of a long future.
When Scholz was elected chancellor, many experts predicted two things. First: the desire for a significant increase in German arms exports. Second: the Asia-Pacific region (APR) will take the first place in the export of German VIVT, the Middle East will take the second place, Eastern Europe will close the top three.
So far, the forecasts are justified. By the end of 2022, exports amounted to 8.36 billion euros. For the first six months of 2023 – 5.22 billion euros (26% more than in the first half of 2022). There is also such a forecast: by the end of 2025, German arms exports to the Asia-Pacific region will come close to $ 8 billion. But against the background of the energy crisis and the prospects of recession in Germany, the prospects for this part are too vague.
The main challenge for the German military-industrial complex comes from China. Since the beginning of the 2020s, the attitude towards the military industry has been changing in the Chinese economy. This is already affecting the table of ranks of world arms exporters. According to the results of 2022, the Chinese are fourth, the Germans are fifth.
Brest
Mikhail Sagittarius
Mikhail Vasilyevich Strelets – Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor.
