Possible conflicts at sea involving China
The most likely threat to China's security today and in the future until 2035 are local conflicts that may arise from maritime directions.
To determine the adequacy of the PLA Navy's response to external threats, it is necessary to compare them with the Navy of likely opponents. It is clear that the countries in question can also involve their ground forces (in amphibious and anti-amphibious operations) and the Air Force (in air-sea operations) for the confrontation.
There are not many naval forces comparable to the Chinese in both quantity and quality. These are the Navies of Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Japan, the USA and Russia.
The common features of the first three countries from this list are:
– geographical location blocking the PLA Navy's free access to the ocean;
– the existence of military-political agreements with the United States to provide assistance in case of aggression by third states.
The latter factor provides that in its actions against any of the parties, China will be able to use only part of its Navy. The forces not involved in the conflict will solve the tasks of countering potential threats from other countries in the region.
CONFLICT WITH TAIWAN
The Taiwan Navy has the following main tasks:
– preventing the dominance of the enemy Navy in the coastal zone of the island, the defense of bases and ports, providing air defense of the country together with the national Air Force;
– destruction of enemy naval groups in order to disrupt the invasion of the island;
– coverage of advanced islands in the strait zone and assistance to the ground group by landing troops, fire support and other actions;
– possible impact on the territory of mainland China by missile and bomb attacks.
A quantitative comparison of the forces of China and Taiwan indicates the clear superiority of the PLA Navy. The combat potential of their naval aviation is in principle incomparable. The PLA Navy aviation is a large-scale operational formation; the Taiwan Navy aviation is focused on patrol and anti-submarine service in the coastal and near-sea zones and is represented by 32 aircraft and 29 anti-submarine helicopters.
At the same time, it is obvious that only part of the forces and means of the PLA Navy can be involved in the operation against Taiwan due to the need to counter potential threats from the US Navy and the countries of the region. Their involvement in the military conflict of the "two Chinas" is not inevitable, but bringing their armed forces into full combat readiness in the event of an inter-Chinese conflict is beyond doubt.
A feature of the potential theater of military operations (Theater of operations) is the small distance separating the opposing groups. The width of the Taiwan Strait averages about 160 km, which is essentially an operational depth. This predetermines the involvement of the Air Force and ground forces (SV) of both sides in the conflict.
On the part of the People's Republic of China, units of the SV and the Air Force of the Eastern Operational Command are stationed in the adjacent areas, a high density of air defense has been created, mobile complexes of medium-range ballistic missiles "Dongfeng-11", "Dongfeng-15", "Dongfeng-16" and "Dongfeng-26" are deployed (to defeat US carrier strike groups).
Taiwan's CB is quantitatively much inferior to the PLA's CB. But the Taiwan Air Force has a significant strike potential: 427 fighters can carry 1,125 air-to-surface missiles and 1,176 air-to-air missiles. They are capable of providing local air supremacy and striking at ranges up to 1000-1500 km.
The specified operational depth determines the mutual fire damage of the territories of both Taiwan Island and mainland China. To do this, China can use the Dongfeng-11 and Dongfeng-15 missiles, and Taiwan can use both the potential of its air Force and the Xiongfeng–2A and Xiongfeng-2E cruise missiles with a strike depth of up to 300 km.
All this makes China's rapid success in a direct military solution to the "Taiwan problem" not obvious. And the role of the Navies of both states can be defined as a component in the implementation of a complex air-land-sea operation.
At the same time, the PLA Navy today and in the future until 2035 is able to block Taiwan's maritime communications beyond the effective range of its Navy. While the Taiwan Navy is not able to influence the maritime communications of mainland China or unblock its communications without resorting to the help of its allies.
COLLISION WITH THE USA
Although a direct armed conflict between the United States and China, according to most experts, is unlikely, its possibility is real enough to require effective deterrence measures.
Over the past decade, the range and capabilities of Chinese air and sea defense have continued to grow. Which made direct protection of US interests in East Asia potentially more expensive. As these trends continue, it will become increasingly difficult for the US to stand up to China in the region.
Neither the US nor China can use nuclear weapons. But even an initially localized conflict can quickly spread to the economic, cybernetic and space spheres, causing significant damage to both sides.
The military-political leadership of China is trying to use "soft power" for the gradual "peaceful reunification of the motherland." At the same time, despite the improvement in relations with Taipei after the Kuomintang Party returned to power on the island, the Chinese leaders do not rule out the possibility of a crisis scenario. Such a scenario is possible in the case of open interference in relations between Beijing and Taipei by foreign states in order to change the existing status. Or during mass riots caused by a sharp aggravation of the socio-economic and domestic political situation in Taiwan.
According to Chinese experts, the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) will be widely represented until 2035. Currently, an aircraft carrier strike group, a destroyer squadron, an amphibious group, a division of minesweeping ships (Yokosuka and Sasebo naval bases) and several patrol and reconnaissance air squadrons (Misawa and Kadena air bases) are permanently based only in Japan. The 15th Squadron of nuclear submarines (NPS) with its floating base and a connection of transports of the Maritime Transportation Command are stationed at the Naval Base on the island of Guam.
THE AMERICAN THREAT
The basis of the US military presence in the World Ocean is made up of carrier strike groups (AUG). Of the 12 AUGS of the United States, five to six formations are involved in combat service, of which:
– two or three augs as part of the 5th, 6th and 7th operational fleets (Persian Gulf, Mediterranean Sea, Western Pacific Ocean);
– three or four augs as part of the 2nd (East Coast of the USA) and 3rd (West Coast of the USA) operational fleets, ready to deploy to advanced areas;
– six to seven augs are undergoing repairs and restoration of combat readiness.
In wartime, two augs will be concentrated in the area southeast of Japan. The advantages of carrier strike groups are:
– high mobility, which makes it possible to strengthen the naval presence in the region due to reserve operational formations or the re-deployment of AUG from another theater, as well as to choose tactically advantageous positions in combat;
– versatility and massed combat use – for coastal, air, surface and underwater targets, which is achieved by the possibility of forming an air wing in relation to specific tasks, as well as the presence of sea-based cruise missile carrier ships in the AUG;
– depth of impact: on coastal targets – from 1200 km (carrier-based aircraft) to 1850 km (Tomahawk cruise missiles), on sea targets – up to 1000 km;
– depth of air defense: the range of detection of air targets – up to 1300 km, the range of interception of air targets by fighters from the position of "duty in the air" – up to 1000 km;
– the possibility of using geographically protected areas and areas protected by continental forces and air defense systems for combat maneuvering.
The weaknesses of AUG are the dependence on logistics vessels and the inability to use (or limited use) of the air wing in difficult weather conditions. AUG ships have stocks of weapons and materiel for four to five days of intense fighting. With a sea wave of 7 points, flights are completely stopped, and with less excitement or limited visibility, the number of crews allowed to fly is reduced.
Realizing its advantages, the US Navy, with the presence of AUG, creates a real threat to China's coastal economy, threatening a massive air-sea strike by carrier-based aircraft and CRMB from the waters east of the "South Japanese Islands – Luzon Island" boundary.
N-6K bombers act as the main carrier of long-range cruise missiles in the Chinese naval aviation. Photo by Vladimir Karnozov
CHINESE FORCES
According to a number of foreign political scientists, the reason for the military conflict between China and the United States may be primarily an attempt to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea by force. Chinese political leaders believe that military action can be avoided if Washington abandons its demands to Beijing regarding disputed areas of this water area.
The White Paper "China's Military Strategy" (2015) explains that the Chinese Navy will henceforth protect not only coastal waters, but also the interests of the country throughout the world Ocean.
In the event of an armed conflict between the US Navy and the PLA in the South China Sea, the Chinese will use Jianhong-7A fighter-bombers, whose crews are practicing launches of Air-to-Air 3-500 torpedoes and dropping Shen-3A depth charges. To combat the radar stations (radars) of enemy ships and their air defense/missile defense systems, Jianhong-7A pilots will use Yingji-91 anti–radar missiles, and SD-10 air-to-air missiles for self-defense.
The coordination of aviation actions will be provided by the Kunjing-200 long-range radar detection (AWACS) aircraft. The onboard radar of this aircraft allows detecting simultaneously 500 aerial and 500 surface targets at a distance of up to 400 km at a flight altitude of 10 thousand m. Thanks to the digital data exchange system of the 1553 standard, it is possible to transmit information about targets both to other aircraft and to ships and missile boats.
The destruction of US Navy destroyers equipped with the Aegis air defense/missile defense system has been identified as the main task for the strategic bombers "Hun-6". The main armament of Chinese missile carriers is supersonic anti–ship missiles "Yingji-12" (flight speed up to Mach 5.5), which allow the "Hong-6" not to enter the air defense zone of American ships.
To ensure the actions of the patrol aviation forces over the waters of the South China Sea, tanker aircraft of two modifications are designed: "Hongyu-6" (from the 17th regiment of the 6th Bomber Aviation Division) and Il-78 (built on the basis of Russian Il-76MD by Ukrainian specialists). The maximum capacity of the Hongyu-6 fuel tanks is 37 tons. In a real combat situation, the aircraft will be loaded with fuel in the amount of 20 to 30 tons, which will allow the crew to perform a 1000-kilometer flight to the refueling zone, service four Jian-11B fighters and then return to base. With the same range, the IL-78 can provide from 8 to 10 fighters.
According to experts of the Chinese corporation Norinko, ships of any class, including aircraft carriers, can be deployed on the naval bases of the artificial islands of Zhubi and Meiji. The depth at the berths allows receiving ships with a displacement of 20 thousand tons or more. Berths on the naval base of Yunshu Island allow the deployment of patrol ships ave. 054A, destroyers ave. 052C/D and landing helicopter-carrying ship dock ave. 071, as well as ships of smaller displacement. There are already several missile boats of the 022 Ave. on these three islands.
The development of a system of fuel depots and equipment repair and maintenance centers will allow the PLA Navy to deploy a search group of 30 surface ships, as well as mixed detachments of diesel-electric (diesel-electric) and submarines in the area of the Xisha and Nansha archipelagos.
A similar number of forces of the Southern Fleet is indicated in the requirements of the PLA Navy Command "Defense of the near zone and protection in long-distance campaigns". Chinese Navy ships patrolling in the South China Sea periodically expel US Navy ships from the 12-mile border zone.
According to Chinese experts, the ship search and strike groups (KPUG) of the Southern Fleet will be built according to the following two principles.
"Four steel faces". As part of the KPUG, destroyers of the 052C/D project provide air defense and escort enemy surface ships; patrol ships of the 054A Ave. and corvettes of the 056A Ave. perform anti-submarine defense tasks, as well as launch missile strikes against the enemy. The fourth element is the large reconnaissance ships of ave. 815A, which are equipped with electronic suppression systems.
"Eight steel faces". The KPUG will include both the above-listed surface ships, as well as the 039 Ave., 093 Ave., the Yun-8/9 anti-submarine aircraft and the Kunjing-500 AWACS.
On the above-mentioned islands there are circular-view radars, over-the-horizon reconnaissance stations and radio-technical reconnaissance (RTR) antennas. In addition, coastal launchers of anti-ship missiles (PKR) of various models and anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) "Hunzi-9" have already been seen here, which in the future will be replaced by more advanced "Hunzi-26". Near-range air defense systems are placed on stationary concreted positions, which provide protection for these air defense systems.
In general, the pace of construction of the PLA Navy indicates that in the medium term, dominance in the South China Sea will shift from the United States to China. And in the long term, the Chinese Navy will be able to control certain areas of the far sea zone and key points in the ocean zone.
MEANS AGAINST AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
The Soviet Navy had the most complete experience of anti-aircraft operations. The comprehension of this experience is facilitated by the training of Chinese officers at the Russian Naval Academy.
To prevent the actions of the American AUG, the Chinese fleet can conduct a combined operation using submarines, formations of combat surface ships (BNCs) and strike aircraft. Given the different levels of autonomy and mobility of these heterogeneous forces, we believe that their successful interaction is possible with the preventive deployment of BNK and submarines at the forefront in the mode of combat service characteristic of the Soviet Navy.
Proceeding from this, and also taking into account the modern combat personnel of the PLA Navy, we assume that the basis of the combat service of the Chinese fleet in the threatened period will be up to 10-12 DPLS located east of Taiwan Island, and two or three ship strike groups (two or three destroyers and frigates each) for direct tracking of AUG. The air component of the anti-aircraft carrier operation can be represented by a strike group of 24 Su-30MK2 fighter-bombers.
Managing these groups of heterogeneous forces will be a very difficult task. The flagship command post (KP), taken out to sea, has questionable combat stability, and the control signals of the coastal KP can be suppressed by enemy electronic warfare. This calls into question the coordinated and effective actions of heterogeneous forces in cases of retaliatory and counter-strikes.
It is also a difficult task to overcome the radar and anti-aircraft boundaries on the line "South Japanese Islands – Taiwan Island – Luzon Island" by the PLA Navy air strike group.
To solve the anti–aircraft task, China is developing a new anti-ship ballistic missile designed to strike at BNC, including AUG, operating in the Taiwan area. The basis of this complex will be the Dongfeng-21A ballistic missile with a firing range of about 2500 km and the possibility of homing in the final section of the flight. Nothing was reported about the nature of the basing of the prospective BR.
According to Asian military sources, China will be able to deploy a space targeting system that will be able to ensure the use of these missiles no earlier than 2009. It is also noted that for monitoring purposes, China intends to use over-the-horizon radars and unmanned aerial vehicles of medium and long flight duration.
Given that China does not have tactical nuclear weapons on sea and air carriers, it becomes obvious that when repelling a potential American aircraft carrier threat, at best we can talk about the disruption of a single AUG strike by the forces of the Chinese fleet.
The implementation of the anti-aircraft task can be carried out by the Chinese navy with the support of the PLA Missile Forces. Their task will be to give a potential military conflict the status of a manageable one in general and to increase the combat stability of individual Chinese warship detachments in particular.
CONFLICT WITH SOUTH KOREA
The Korean peninsula will remain a hotbed of potential large-scale armed conflict, due to the lack of effective security mechanisms in this region of the world.
Opposing groups of the armed forces of the DPRK, on the one hand, the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK), on the other, are deployed on the peninsula. A conflict may arise in the event of a sudden aggravation of inter-Korean relations or be the result of a planned provocation by one of the parties.
The United States, in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Kazakhstan, will directly participate in the war on its side. The PRC, provided that the DPRK is the object of aggression, will provide Pyongyang with material and military-technical assistance within the framework of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. It will also provide political support to the DPRK in order to prevent its defeat.
The Navy of the Republic of Kazakhstan is adapted primarily to solve the tasks of defending its coast. A quantitative comparison of the PLA Navy and the ROK Navy indicates the superiority of China – even taking into account the fact that only a part of the PLA Navy (the forces and means of the Northern Fleet) can be involved in the conflict.
As in the case of Taiwan, the proximity of the two countries (about 300 km along the 38th parallel of the Yellow Sea between them) determines the involvement of all the armed forces of these countries in the conflict, and the role of their Navy will be private as part of a complex operation. It will be difficult for the South Korean Navy to influence China's maritime communications without the help of allies. But Chinese forces will also not be able to completely block South Korea's maritime communications – due to the weak prospects of their penetration into the Sea of Japan or overcoming the continental air defense of this country. Thus, the Chinese Navy, in cooperation with the CB and the Air Force, is able to fend off potential security threats from South Korea – or independently fend off threats from the South Korean Navy.
SKIRMISH WITH JAPAN
Maritime Self-Defense Forces (ISSF) Japan is designed to solve the tasks of protecting sea communications, ports, naval bases and bases, to combat enemy ship groups, to blockade straits in the area of Japanese islands, to provide anti-amphibious defense, etc. The ISSOS are an example of a thoughtful organization of the Navy to protect national interests in a 1,000-mile maritime zone.
China and Japan are separated by the East China Sea. Comparison of the number of combat surface ships of China and Japan, capable of prolonged action in the maritime operational zone, indicates an approximate equality. But their division into classes shows the advantage of the Japanese side, and the anti-aircraft potential of Japanese surface ships is obviously higher than the Chinese.
The same can be said about the underwater forces. With an obvious quantitative advantage, the PLA Navy will be able to actually engage about 16-20 submarines in the conflict. This is due to both military and political reasons, and the time for covert deployment of submarines in positions remote from their bases.
Important advantages of Japan are the underwater lighting system, a large number of anti-submarine aircraft and the removal of advanced bases on the islands of Okinawa and Iwo Jima.
The PLA Navy aviation is represented by significant forces: 64 aircraft with a combined strike potential of 238 anti-ship missiles, which theoretically can be used simultaneously. But the nature of the impact of these forces will be short–term - the so-called flight to the injection. And the presence of air defense fighters with an operational radius of 300-500 miles at the Air Force Base of Naha (Okinawa) makes the combat stability of the PLA Navy air strike group questionable.
The aviation of the ISSO is represented by "simpler" P-3C Orion aircraft. But they have tactical advantages: the operational radius is up to 1,700 miles, the duration of the barrage is up to 14 hours. In the absence of an air enemy, the combat stability of these vehicles will obviously be high.
The advantage of Japan is the constant monitoring of the air and surface situation in the waters near the Japanese islands. This is facilitated by the AWACS system, consisting of 13 E-2C Hawkeye aircraft and four E-767 aircraft (Boeing 767 AWACS). These forces are quite enough for a round-the-clock patrol in several operational areas.
The PLA Air Force also has AWACS weapons, but with worse characteristics. Taking into account the factor of remoteness of patrol areas from their bases, China, unlike Japan, will find it difficult to implement constant monitoring of the air and surface situation beyond the waters of the East China Sea. China's capabilities in covering the situation with over-the-horizon radar stations have not yet been confirmed. So, despite the quantitative superiority of the PLA Navy as a whole, in its maritime operating area, the Japanese ISSS will have significant advantages.
TENSIONS IN THE INDIAN DIRECTION
According to Chinese experts, tensions on the border between China and India will continue in the future until 2035. The basis of the Indian Ocean Fleet of the PLA Navy will be the formation of the Southern Fleet (the area of responsibility by 2035 is the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the northern Indian Ocean). The Indian Ocean plays an important strategic role in ensuring China's national security. China's maritime communications are located in the northern part of the Indian Ocean, in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, at a distance of up to 2000 km from China.
Currently, their protection is assigned to the grouping of the surface fleet of the PLA Navy, which, according to Chinese military experts, is clearly not enough. In the future, until 2035, this grouping will be strengthened by an aircraft carrier and a submarine to achieve superiority in the theater.
conclusions
Concluding the comparison of the power potentials of the Navies of East Asian countries, we note that China, having one of the strongest navies in the region, is able to fend off small threats and exert force pressure in resolving territorial disputes – as it was, for example, during the Sino-Japanese conflict in 2005 over gas production in the disputed region of the East China Sea. With the escalation of hostilities, the current Chinese Navy is unlikely to be able to independently ensure the security of its state from sea directions.
On the one hand, the Chinese Navy is insufficient in the current military-political situation in the region. On the other hand, a change in the situation may make the Chinese fleet redundant for the region (with obvious consequences, for example, the Soviet Navy in the second half of the 1980s). But in none of these situations will the Chinese Navy be adequate. And in order to nominate the PLA Navy for the status of a world-class fleet, both significant geopolitical changes and China's economic position adequate to this task are needed.
Vasily Ivanov
Vasily Ivanovich Ivanov is a journalist.
