How the carrier of the multifunctional Aegis system was born
In the process of creating the Aegis multifunctional weapon system (MSO), the first stages of development of which were described earlier (see " First steps to Aegis ", "HBO" from 10.02.23 and " How Aegis became the US sea shield ", "HBO" from 31.03.23), one of the priorities was the definition of the appearance of promising combat surface ships – potential carriers of the new MSO.
As part of these works, not only the selection of specific types of the future Aegis carrier was carried out, but also the preliminary design of both the ships themselves and numerous individual systems and equipment samples designed to form a single contour of the future weapon system was carried out. At the same time, industry and the navy carried out a huge amount of research in order to determine the design types of promising ships (not excluding the modification of projects that already existed at that time), as well as in the interests of ensuring the effective integration of all necessary systems and equipment on board the new carrier.
FAMILY OF SHIPS
The first proposals for future carriers of the MSO, which so far existed only on paper, was called simply "Advanced Surface Missile System for Surface Ships" (Advanced Surface Missile System – ASMS), were contained in a research development carried out in 1965. As part of this work, in particular, a number of possible types of ships that could become carriers of the MSO were considered, and the main tactical and technical elements of such were determined - displacement, main dimensions, etc.
At the same time, the influence of these characteristics on the future MSO itself was considered in terms of the weight and size characteristics of its individual subsystems and elements. As well as the ability to ensure the volumes of electricity consumed, cooling system capacity and other important parameters necessary for the normal functioning of the MSO.
Two years later, in 1967, a large-scale study on a promising "escort ship of the main fleet forces" (Major Fleet Escort Study) was completed in the United States. Within its framework, it was proposed to create a whole family of interconnected and largely unified combat surface ships for a promising MSO. It included a destroyer (symbol DX), a guided missile destroyer (URO) (symbol DXG), as well as a nuclear destroyer URO (DXGN). This concept was called Family of Ships, which translates from English – "family of ships".
It is noteworthy that the ships designated as DXG and DXGN were actually supposed to become URO cruisers, and DX was an ordinary destroyer, without guided missile weapons. But there were disagreements between the Navy and the Pentagon.
"As part of the concept of creating a national strike force, the Navy wanted [to get at its disposal] a cruiser that was supposed to have the weapons it needed to solve problems in an uncertain future. On the other hand, the Office of the Minister of Defense considered it necessary to create only destroyers with weapons sufficient for hunting submarines," they point out in a work called Getting AEGIS to Sea: The AEGIS Ships, published in a special issue of the Naval Engineers Journal dedicated to Aegis (2009), participants in the development of this system Randal Fortune, Brian Perkinson and Robert Steiman.
As a result of a tough hardware struggle, the Office of the Minister of Defense won. In the 1960s, a program was launched to create a conventional destroyer-hunter for enemy submarines DX. However, with an eye to the future, it still had a reserve both in displacement and in internal ship volumes (spaces) for placing promising weapons systems on it.
This "simple destroyer" was the famous "Spruance" (USS Spruance, DD-963), the contract for the design of which the industry received in 1970. That is, at about the same time when the main contract for the development of the MSO "Aegis" was issued.
As for the non-nuclear destroyer URO of the DXN project, which later became the cruiser URO of the California type (USS California, CGN-36), plans to equip it with the Aegis were canceled. And in general, only two units of such ships were built.
A similar fate befell the nuclear destroyer URO of the DXGN project, which later became the nuclear cruiser URO of the Virginia type (USS Virginia, CGN-38). Despite the fact that it was he who was predicted to be the first carrier of the Aegis, he was finally and irrevocably deprived of this honor by the spring of 1971. Four such ships managed to be built, although it was originally planned to order a series of three dozen.
Thus, the concept of a family of ships with the Aegis turned into a phantom before our eyes: the American fleet was left without a full-fledged carrier of a promising MSO. But then Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, who was recently appointed to the post of Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy (this position generally corresponds to the position of Chief of Naval Staff, although in the Russian tradition it can be equated with the position of commander of the Navy with some stretch), intervened with his inherent energy.
A NO-FRILLS SHIP
The energetic admiral, who at that time became the youngest in this post in the history of the US Navy, proposed at the end of 1971 to create a separate version of the URO destroyer under the Aegis, which received the unofficial nickname "austere ship" (austere ship, which can also be translated as "simple ship", "ship without frills").
At the same time, it was assumed that the ship would be "sharpened" from the very beginning to solve the tasks of air defense (air defense). Such a ship, according to Zumwalt's plan, could have a displacement of at least 5 thousand tons and cost the budget about $ 100 million. In 1971-1972, a large-scale study of the promising appearance of the Aegis carrier, which was unofficially nicknamed the "Zumwalt ship", was carried out. At the same time, various projects of both the ship itself and a number of its most important systems were considered.
In particular, options with a single and separated superstructure were studied, in which the elements of the MSO "Aegis" and the systems providing its application were to be placed. The possibility and expediency of installing on a ship one or more guided single–beam deck launchers (PU) of guided missiles of the Mk 13 type - or double-beam deck installations of the Mk 26 type for a similar purpose. As well as the placement of self-defense systems (shipboard artillery installations, electronic warfare systems, etc.) and a ship-based helicopter.
According to one of the options, it was supposed to build an URO destroyer with a long continuous superstructure of a closed type – it was such superstructures that the Americans later used on URO cruisers of the Ticonderoga type and URO destroyers of the Arly Burke type. At the same time, the armament complex was to include two deck-guided double-girder Mk 13 type PU, placed in the bow and stern and designed for the use of guided missiles (anti-aircraft "Tartar" and "Standard" and anti-ship "Harpoons"). As well as two 127-mm artillery installations – also in the bow and stern. And also one helicopter, for which there was a covered hangar in the stern of the destroyer.
However, this project was criticized by a number of experts for the reason that in such a configuration, a helicopter performing an approach to the aft runway had to inevitably pass over a Mk 13 missile launcher located there. With the corresponding complications in a real battle.
After a comprehensive analysis of the mass of the proposed options, the choice fell on the preliminary design of a promising destroyer URO with the MSO "Aegis", which was supposed to have an estimated displacement of 5884 "long tons" (long, or English ton – previously used in the USA, Britain and a number of other countries, a unit of measurement equal to 1016.047 kg; today it is used only in the USA to indicate the displacement of ships and vessels).
The maximum length of the ship was to be 488 feet (about 148.74 m). And its main power plant (GEU) was planned to be formed on the basis of two also at that time promising marine gas turbine engines (GTE) of the FT9 type. They were supposed to rotate two adjustable-pitch propellers, which allowed, among other things, "to provide the ship with reverse gear."
It is noteworthy that the FT9 was a "superheated" version of a two-circuit turbojet engine (turbojet engine) with a high degree of double-circuit JT9D-70 manufactured by Pratt and Whitney, which was initially developed for the Boeing 747-100 airliner. The reason for this choice was the special approach that American admirals practiced at that time in relation to the creation of shipboard GTD.
FLEET PROPULSION PHILOSOPHY
The fact is that in the 1970s, the US Navy preferred not to create special marine GTE, but to refine the turbojet aircraft engines already available on the market for ship needs. There were several reasons for this, but the main one was that it significantly reduced the time, financial and labor costs necessary to create an engine suitable for use in the GEU of a warship.
In addition, the ship's "engines" created on the basis of aviation turbofan engines, due to the stricter requirements initially imposed on aircraft engines, differed from conventional marine "relatives" by a number of important advantages:
– lower specific fuel consumption (this made it possible to increase the cruising range "at one gas station", that is, without replenishing fuel reserves at sea);
– smaller weight and size indicators (this allowed saving in the displacement of the ship and the internal ship volumes necessary for the placement of the GEU);
– higher reliability (this made it possible to significantly increase the inter-repair resource of the GEU and provide it with higher reliability in peacetime and wartime conditions).
In general, as rightly pointed out in the FT9 Marine Gas Turbine Engine Development Program (Naval Engineers Journal, 1975, No. 6), the well-known American propulsion specialist John W. Fairbanks, "if the Navy had sufficient resources to develop a gas turbine engine using modern technologies specifically for ship power plants, then the resulting [as a result] the engine would probably resemble an aircraft engine in appearance, but would be about 20% heavier and would have only slightly improved performance."
In the part concerning the "warming up" of the JT9D aircraft engine, it was about removing the fan section, adding a power turbine, as well as making other changes to the engine design and replacing the structural materials used in order to ensure high resistance to corrosion in an aggressive marine environment.
The destroyer Gravely escorts a landing ship at last year's exercises in the Baltic Sea. Photo by Reuters
Particular attention was paid to the concept of "modular replacement", which implied the possibility of rapid replacement of individual, particularly important and "short-lived" structural elements of the ship's GTD being created (such as, for example, the hot part of the engine) without the need to remove the latter from the ship and send it to a repair shop. In addition, as part of the assignment issued by the Navy, the contractor company needed to develop a system for monitoring the current state of the engine. For which it was necessary to integrate a whole set of different sensors into the design of the latter.
However, all these worries paid off, because in the end, the work on "rejuvenating" the aircraft engine cost the fleet only $ 20 million. Whereas the creation of a similar marine engine "from scratch" would have cost $ 750 million – and, most importantly, four years of painstaking work.
The contract issued in 1974 to the Pratt & Whitney aviation division under the name Aircraft Division, which was part of United Aircraft Corporation, for the completion of the JT9D twin-circuit turbojet aircraft engine in the FT9 marine version provided to transfer three such "engines" to the customer no later than mid-1978. Moreover, at the end of 1977, it was planned to begin its sea trials.
"FT9 will give the US Navy the opportunity to get at its disposal the most advanced marine gas turbine engine, characterized by the best specific power among all analogues available [on the market] for power installations of combat surface ships," Fairbanks, who since 1971 has been a project engineer of the FT9 gas turbine engine development program at the Technical Center, emphasized in the article mentioned above. shipbuilding of the US Navy and at the same time – coordinator of the naval program for the development of materials for advanced GTE marine applications.
At the same time, it should be taken into account that such statements were made by American experts at a time when the Navy already possessed a marine gas turbine engine, which at that time was not only the best among all Western analogues, but in terms of a number of parameters, including purely economic ones (purchase price, cost of maintenance and repair, etc.), perhaps, and the best shipboard gas turbine engine in the world. Even despite the fact that it had one and a half times less power than the proposed FT9 – about 20 thousand hp versus 33 thousand hp.
ENGINE RIVALRY
Now let's talk about the American LM2500 engine, developed by General Electric on the basis of the TF39 dual-circuit turbojet aircraft engine. The latter was created for the strategic military transport aircraft of increased payload C-5 "Galaxy" (Galaxy) of Lockheed Corporation (today – Lockheed Martin). And subsequently served as the base for the CF6 aircraft engine used on the upgraded C-5M Super Galaxy, the Japanese C-2 military transport aircraft, as well as on a number of airliners, including European A300, A310, A330 and American Boeing 747, Boeing 767 and DC-10 and their military modifications, and other aircraft.
Structurally, the LM2500 was a two-shaft engine of a simple cycle, which included a 16-stage compressor, a small-diameter quick-release annular combustion chamber, a two-stage high-pressure turbine and a six-stage free power turbine.
The then existing modification of the engine was capable, under normal operating conditions (ambient temperature 15 degrees Celsius, pressure 1.03 kg / sq. cm) and under the condition of the calorific value of the fuel 10270 kcal / kg, of "giving out on-mountain" at 3400 rpm maximum continuous power of 24.7 thousand hp, and the specific fuel consumption in this case it was 181.9 g/hp h, and the air consumption was about 59-65 kg/s. According to a number of parameters, these were unattainable indicators for the first–generation GTE used in the Navies of other countries in those years - and even for a part of the engines of a similar purpose of the second generation.
The high reliability of the engine in comparison with the analogues that existed at that time was clearly demonstrated both during bench tests (during which the time of its trouble-free operation seriously exceeded the motor life of the first-generation marine GTE) and during sea trials on the special-purpose transport vessel Admiral U.M. Callaghan (GTS) belonging to the Naval Sea Transportation Command Admiral W.M. Callaghan); in the standard version, the power plant of the vessel, launched in 1967, included two LM2500).
During sea trials, as indicated in the article of captains of the 2nd rank – engineers G. Semenov and V. Sergeev "Shipboard gas turbine power plants" ("Foreign Military Review", 1975, No. 6), the engine operating time exceeded 15 thousand hours, of which about 5 thousand hours. work occurred in the power range of 19-21 thousand. L.S.
It is quite expected that the LM2500 was chosen for the destroyer of the "Spruance" type, to which it not only provided a high and fuel-efficient stroke, but also allowed to reduce the volume of the engine room on the ship by 33% and save 400 tons in weight when compared with a steam turbine power plant of comparable capacity.
Looking ahead, we note that in the end, supporters of the FT9 engine failed to overthrow the LM2500 from the "pedestal", and over the years it has been installed on surface ships of more than two dozen countries in various versions. They were received by the Ticonderoga-type URO cruiser and the Arly Burke-type URO destroyer, the operating aircraft carriers Cavour (Cavour, 550), Chakri Narubet (HTMS Chakri Naruebet, CVH-911) and Vikrant (INS Vikrant), as well as the already decommissioned Spanish aircraft carrier Prince of Asturias (Principe de Asturias). The total number of released engines of this family is already about a thousand units.
It was this project of a new warship that the American admirals decided to "move" to the very top for approval. Apparently, it seemed to them then that the fleet would finally be able to get a new "ascetic destroyer" in the foreseeable future. They even hurried to assign him the symbol DG AEGIS (literally translated – "destroyer URO with the Aegis weapon system").
However, it soon became clear that everything was not as simple as Admiral Zumwalt and his associates saw at that moment. Because another, no less famous admiral suddenly intervened in the matter. Hyman Rickover, the "father of the nuclear fleet" of the USA, decided to make all new American warships atomic!
ADMIRAL RICKOVER'S "CONTRIBUTION"
"Admiral Hyman Rickover and the atomic lobby intervened in the case," Randall Fortune, Brian Perkinson and Robert Steiman write in the work mentioned above. – At their insistence, Congress in August 1974 amended section VIII of the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1975, requiring that all new warships of the main classes henceforth have only nuclear power plants. This law put an end to the (destroyer) DG proposed by Zumwalt, and the program again focused on the nuclear–powered cruiser of the CSGN URO project."
The latter is the "URO atomic strike cruiser", which was considered very promising at that time, better known as simply the "Strike Cruiser" (Strike Cruiser / CSGN). This ship, which had an estimated total displacement of 17284 tons, was proposed in the second half of the 1970s by specialists of the US Defense Advanced Research and Development Agency (DARPA).
As stated in the document Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: The Navy, prepared by the Congressional Budget Office in December 1976, this "rocket monster" – you can't call it anything else – was supposed to carry one 203-mm artillery launcher, a lot of Tomahawk cruise missiles and anti-ship Harpoons. And on top of everything else, two short/vertical takeoff and landing aircraft.
The price of the lead ship was estimated by the military in an astronomical amount at that time – $ 1,239 million. And the cost of the life cycle of one cruiser, according to calculations by the Congressional Budget Office, ranged from $ 2.59 billion for the head to $2.43 billion. for each of the next 19 production ships! However, such sums did not confuse the congressmen. Without even blinking an eye, they decided to finance the construction of three ships at once – instead of one, as requested by the military.
Of course, the Congressional documents referred to "major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the United States Navy" (major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the United States Navy). However, this did not make it easier for the admirals, since the congressmen referred to them virtually all the large combat surface ships and submarines that the fleet could receive.:
"(1) combat submarines for strategic or tactical tasks, or for both;
(2) warships intended to participate in combat operations as part of aircraft carrier task forces (these are aircraft carriers, as well as cruisers, frigates and destroyers that accompany aircraft carriers);
(3) those classes of warships mentioned above in paragraphs (1) and (2), which are designed to solve tasks within the framework of independent combat missions, when the ability to develop a practically unlimited duration of high speed will be important from a military point of view."
Only the US president had the right to make an exception to this "atomic rule", who had to specifically notify Congress that the construction of a specific warship belonging to the listed classes with a non–atomic power plant was a vital condition for America's national security.
Moreover, the US Secretary of Defense was obliged to send a written report to Congress every calendar year on how things were progressing in equipping ships of the above classes with nuclear power plants. In this document it was necessary to list the contracts issued in this field of activity and other information.
By itself, such a statement of the question – to build virtually all large surface and underwater warships for various purposes with nuclear power plants – even today, after many decades, can cause not just surprise, but something more comparable to bewilderment. And here's why.
THE ATOMIC BOOM
In those years, nuclear energy was really considered as a kind of "rescue stick", with the help of which, as it seemed to many, it would be possible to solve at once the whole set of basic problems characteristic of combat surface ships and submarines of different classes. Especially the "atomic idea" came to court among American politicians and the military, and first of all – admirals.
Firstly, it allowed the ships to provide that considerable energy – steam, electricity, etc., which they needed for the effective functioning of all the latest energy-intensive weapons systems placed on ships and submarines.
Secondly, it made it possible to limit the activity of ships at sea in terms of fuel reserves an anachronism of the past: ships and submarines with nuclear power plants received virtually unlimited autonomy according to this indicator. Although such restrictions, of course, remained on the stocks of provisions and fresh water, as well as on the physiological capabilities of the crew members of surface ships and submarines.
Thirdly, due to the smaller weight and size characteristics of nuclear power plants, it was possible to reduce the in-ship volumes required for the placement of systems and equipment of engine rooms, etc. It also made it possible to significantly save in mass – due to the smaller mass of the structures of the nuclear power plant itself and due to the lack of need for large reserves of conventional fuel.
Finally, fourthly, the massive introduction of nuclear power plants promised admirals and a pleasant economic bonus - in the form of reduced costs for their purchase, subsequent operation and various kinds of preventive and repair work (at least, such "buns" were promised by the developers).
That is why a large number of shipbuilders and representatives of the American navy initially even believed that the first candidates for equipping with nuclear–powered GEUS should not be aircraft carriers, but their security ships - frigates, destroyers and cruisers. In this case, the commanders of the carrier strike groups were deprived of the seriously annoying need to constantly take care of replenishing fuel reserves in the sea by these "kids". While for the aircraft carriers themselves, this was a problem, but not so serious – thanks to the huge tanks with "fuel" available on floating airfields.
VICTORY IN BATTLE, BUT NOT IN WAR
Of course, shipboard nuclear power plants had very significant drawbacks. They were primarily associated with a higher degree of potential threat to personnel and the environment due to accidents or catastrophes. And also with the need to carry out special measures in relation to spent nuclear fuel and the actual nuclear power plants of those warships that are being withdrawn from the fleet.
However, by the mid-1970s, Admiral Rickover had already gained so serious, as they say, hardware weight, and there were already so many supporters of "cheap" atomic energy, especially from the point of view of its use in the navy, that it became a difficult task to win the fight against them. Even US President James Carter said of Admiral Rickover that he had a "profound influence" on his life– and perhaps "even more than anyone else did," excluding his own parents.
The current state of affairs is best characterized by the title of the article published on March 23, 1977 in the edition of Time. It was dedicated to the "father of the atomic fleet" of America and was called "Unsinkable Hyman Rickover" (Unsinkable Hyman Rickover). Besides, everyone knew about the admiral's difficult character.
Since no one wanted to quarrel with Admiral Rickover and the powerful atomic lobby of America, the project of the "ascetic" destroyer proposed by Zumwalt with the Aegis system and not an atomic, but a gas turbine GEU did not find support in the highest echelons of power and was eventually discontinued in development.
It's also a good thing that no one thought of giving the specified "atomic" provision of the law retroactive force and forcing sailors to put an atomic power plant on destroyers of the "Spruance" type. On the other hand, the navy already had to fork out very decently to pay for very expensive work on the design and small-scale construction of nuclear frigates and destroyers of the URO, later reclassified into nuclear cruisers of the URO.
Naturally, after an unambiguous instruction issued by Congress to the leadership of the Pentagon and the Navy Ministry about nuclear power plants, which were to be installed on virtually all new warships of the main classes, industry and navy specialists were again tasked to work out the possibility of placing the MSO "Aegis" mainly on nuclear ships.
However, the fleet eventually managed to repel this "hit-and-run", and the implementation of the Aegis program went in the direction it was originally intended by the Navy command. But it took time and extra effort.
Vladimir Shcherbakov
Deputy Executive Editor of HBO
Vladimir Leonidovich Shcherbakov is a military expert, and a storyteller, a writer.
