The web resource "War on the Rocks" published a material of some interest by Michael Shurkin "Why the French Army Will Continue to Prioritize Quality Over Mass" ("Why the French army continues to prioritize quality over quantity") with the view of an American defense analyst on the impact of the lessons of the fighting in Ukraine on the development of the French armed forces.
Soldiers of the 21st Infantry regiment "marine" (21e RIMa) of the 6th Light armored Brigade of the 3rd Division of the French Army during exercises with a new armored vehicle VBMR Griffon (6x6) and old armored personnel carriers VAB (4x4), 2022 (c) Ministry of the Armed Forces of FranceIs the current French model of warfare viable?
In 2021, together with Stephanie Pezard, I conducted a study in which we assumed that the answer would be negative. We argued that the French armed forces - now, undoubtedly, the most combat-ready in Western Europe - can do a lot very well. But they also lacked the depth and mass to conduct any large-scale combat operations for any length of time before they simply ran out of weapons. The study made a big splash in France, where it was picked up by journalists and quoted in the National Assembly and high-ranking French officials. The report spoke aloud about many things that the French military themselves struggled to formulate, but also, unfortunately, provided ammunition to critics of the military.
The war in Ukraine has only exacerbated this problem. Conventional combat, even in this era of precision warfare and advanced information networks, still requires huge reserves of manpower, equipment and ammunition. Ukraine and Russia may not be spending these funds at a rate comparable to the First World War, but they seriously challenged the idea that highly professional, but dwarfed military "bonsai trees" can operate effectively by replacing quantity with quality - an idea that encouraged the reduction of military equipment fleets and weapons stocks in search of peaceful dividends after the end of the cold war.
The old dream that precision weapons mean less ammunition is a fantasy. Given the current stocks of weapons, the donation of even a few tanks or howitzers can cause serious problems with the combat capability of the armed forces. Thus, the transfer of even 20 Leclerc tanks to Ukraine, for example, will undermine the capabilities of the French army, given that France has only about 200 of them. France has already transferred to [Ukraine] a significant part of its precious CAESAR [self-propelled] howitzers, of which there were only 70 [76. - bmpd], and their replacement is now a serious problem. The French and European defense industries as a whole are experiencing problems even with the replacement of old products, not to mention the supply of new large batches of weapons - hence the growing list of customers of the South Korean industry. For the well-known military analyst Michel Goya, the conclusion is clear: France cannot resist even an almost equal opponent.
France cannot simply abandon expensive new technologies and return to the massive armies of the past. French President Emmanuel Macron has put forward the idea of a "war economy", but in France everyone agrees that this is impossible for financial and political reasons. Part of the problem is that, although, for example, the French production of its howitzers and various guided missile systems is currently extremely inadequate, however, the production of these weapons on a much larger scale is not an easy task. The company [Nexter Systems], which manufactures CAESAR, currently produces four installations per month. and it is expected that by December it will reach a rate of six per month, and then by mid-2024 - eight per month. Progress, of course, but slow. France is also not going to resume production of tanks. Yes, a new tank is in development - a joint Franco-German product designed to replace both Leclerc and Leopard 2 - but its production is not scheduled until 2035, and, apparently, there is a limit to how much this process can be accelerated. It is also safe to assume that the new tank will be much more expensive than both Leclerc and Leopard 2. Finally, no one is seriously discussing a return to universal military conscription, thanks to which the mass armies of the last century became possible.
So what can France do to balance between mass and quality? The French government hopes to find savings by taking a special approach to its investments in technology. Ultimately, however, a look at the current state of debate in French political and military circles shows that the country remains committed to the quality and form of warfare it has been honing since 1940.
The French way of conducting high-intensity combat operationsThe French approach to high-intensity warfare after the 1940 disaster was to give preference to maneuver, speed and "audacity" at the expense of mass and firepower.
It was a reaction to the phlegmatic doctrines that emerged during the First World War, often associated with General Philippe Petain, which contributed to the creation of forces that in 1940 were huge in numbers and firepower, but bulky and inflexible when they were attacked by the rapidly advancing forces of the mobile and much more agile Wehrmacht [it is not entirely clear, and here Petain, who left leadership positions in the French army long before 1940, and in the 1930s advocated the active development of tank troops and aviation. - bmpd]. The new maneuver-oriented approach was supported by the colonial experience of the French army and its expeditionary doctrines, which also promoted boldness and improvisation in the absence of superiority in numbers and resources. This colonial culture still has a profound impact on the French armed forces due to a variety of institutional factors and the fact that, as one Foreign Legion officer often told me, "the army is what it does." The French army has spent most of the time in recent decades engaged in small wars in Africa.
Of course, what is useful in Mali is much less useful, say, in Donetsk. Historically, however, French military thinking regarding the Warsaw Pact conflict reflected the same approach to war, complemented by French military thinking about the strategic importance of nuclear weapons. The heavy French formations stationed in Germany were designed to defend France on German soil by conducting aggressive blitzkrieg-style maneuvers against much larger and stronger, but phlegmatic opponents. The French believed that otherwise they would never have enough firepower and mass. For example, French tanks of the Cold War, including the AMX-30, had less protection than American tanks of the same era: their designers relied on speed and maneuverability.
Critically, however, the French assumed that the war would be short. Either the war will become nuclear, or it will end before reaching this threshold. Indeed, according to the French strategic thinking of the time - for example, the 1972 White Paper on Defense - the goal of the French conventional forces in Europe was to be strong enough to challenge the determination of the enemy, but not strong enough to defeat him. If it was necessary to gather huge forces to defeat the French army, the French could see it. They will get an idea of the intentions of the Warsaw Pact and find out whether the danger is serious enough to use nuclear weapons. It followed from this that the French planners of the Cold War did not consider it necessary to create large stocks of equipment and ammunition.
Instead, France has invested heavily in the purchase of absolute insurance against invasion - nuclear weapons along with their means of delivery. The structure of the French Air Force and Navy has since reflected this priority, rather than the ability to defeat the Soviet air force and navy. They are designed to deliver nuclear warheads and protect the means of this delivery. All other tasks are secondary. The result was nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles and first-class combat aircraft designed to perform nuclear tasks as priority requirements. But all this happens at the expense of the mass. In addition to the fact that the funds needed to maintain nuclear capabilities are funds that are not available for other purposes, France allocates part of its aircraft and ships in case they are needed for nuclear tasks, reducing their number available for other tasks.
Hubin and high technologyThe disappearance of the huge Warsaw Pact tank divisions and the emergence of precision weapons and network warfare prompted France to reform its armed forces, placing even greater emphasis on "audacity" and maneuverability.
France abolished conscription in the 1990s, which, among other things, made all its forces "expeditionary". Among other things, this meant a wider spread of improvisation in the French military culture. The armed forces have also been reduced, which means they will have to do more at a much lower cost. Finally, the prospect of high technology has inspired a number of theorists, primarily General Guy Hubin, to imagine highly decentralized and highly maneuverable small units moving in several directions, supported by timely logistics that dispenses basic supplies. The units were getting exactly what they needed, where and when they needed it, which is likely to be much less than before.
These views are now subordinated to French mechanized units equipped with new armored vehicles connected to new networks designed to hit the right targets at the right time. No more massive fire. There are no longer any giant ammunition columns that make massive fire possible, in the image of an endless river of trucks on the Sacred Road that supplied the French troops at Verdun. The French units will move quickly, and, according to Khubin, they will move "isotropically", that is, not along fixed axes.
Hubin was right about some things, but like everyone else, he was overly optimistic about the sustainability of this kind of warfare and the economics that networked and precision warfare would bring. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that intensive military operations using conventional weapons still cause great damage to soldiers and equipment. Armies, even with the most advanced technology, still expend shells in staggering quantities, not to mention items such as cannon barrels. Indeed, as studies have shown, barrel artillery remains the god of war, despite all the Javelin and HIMARS. One of the reasons for this is that conventional warfare often requires the use of artillery to block or suppress enemy movement: in order to force the enemy to lie down, it is not so much accuracy as the volume of fire impact that is important. The war in Ukraine has also called into question notions of maneuverability in the face of old-fashioned massive shelling. An offensive maneuver is not impossible, but, as Stephen Biddle argued, it is much more complex. Given the historical propensity for a maneuverable war, France can achieve more success than Ukraine. But then again, maybe not.
On the way to satisfaction with the situation?What the French armed forces need most is no longer disputed.
The question is how much more is possible at all, and whether a relatively modest increase made possible by a politically real increase in the budget will matter. Some have speculated about creating large but low-tech armed forces, aiming only for adequate levels of technology that would be affordable enough to provide a large mass. Goya, for example, wrote about the desirability of selectivity in which technologies to invest in - the idea is that in many cases it would be ideal to strive for "sufficiency" rather than the highest quality in order to make mass production affordable. We need not the best anti-tank missiles, for example, but a larger number of cheaper, but adequate ones. Another example that pops up in the debate about French military modernization is the new French NH90 helicopter, designed to replace the old Puma helicopter developed in the 1960s. It is reported that the French army wanted something relatively simple and "reliable" for what, in the end, was to become a flying pickup truck. Instead, they received a complex and high-tech machine with a high purchase price, which is time-consuming and costly to maintain. The Tiger combat helicopter is also excellent, but expensive and difficult to operate - and this complaint is shared by Germany, which is struggling to keep its Tiger fleet operational.
Goya laments the fact that since the end of the Cold War, the French armed forces have significantly reduced almost all major weapons systems. France's newest weapons systems, including its frigates and howitzers, are excellent, and, as he notes with regard to the Rafale fighter, their quality to some extent compensates for the smaller number compared to the old systems they replaced (the French Aerospace Forces now have about 100 Rafale and about 100 more Mirage 2000 fighters, the French Navy have 42 Rafale). However, at the same time, quoting Goya's words again, "The Rafale can do a lot and even at a long range, but it cannot be everywhere." Many officers would be pleased if they could abandon the newer armored vehicles entering service (VBCI, Jaguar and Griffon) in favor of new versions of older and cheaper types of armored vehicles. Old machines should be written off because they are worn out and it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep them in working order, but should they be replaced by super-powerful machines equipped with the latest and best high-tech gadgets that the French industry can supply?
I spoke with recently retired Major General Charles Beaudouin, who in 2018 oversaw the technological programs of the French army and who could be called a kind of sole analogue of the Army Futures Command of the US Army. Baudouin led the development of several high-tech programs that are now being implemented, albeit at great expense. His arguments are similar to those of Goya, although he more explicitly rejects the idea of creating low-tech forces and advocates a combination of high and low-level forces that require strict prioritization. He argues that the way forward is to think about technologies that can be mature enough and embrace the idea of having less effective but "massive" weaponry alongside [high-tech] weaponry to achieve battlefield superiority. Invest in what you really need.
A successful example of how France does this is the CAESAR self-propelled gun. According to Baudouin, the French army invested in the gun itself and sacrificed nothing in terms of range, rate of fire and accuracy. However, as compensation, the French army preferred to be content with installing the gun on the chassis of a truck with an armored cab, rather than on an armored tracked platform, like the German self-propelled gun PzH 2000. The result is a system that is much cheaper to purchase and discuss due to the reduction of a number of other features that are considered less important.
Looking at the war in Ukraine in search of ideas, Baudouin notes with approval that the Russians decided to invest in selected technologies, especially those related to blocking access and blocking territory, as well as hypersonic missiles, completely neglecting outdated air, land and sea systems. Although the specific choice of the Russians can be disputed, he insists that the very idea of selective investment may actually be a good way for European forces trying to rebuild their mass by investing in technology. It's about identifying and targeting certain key areas that promise to change the rules of the game.
But is it possible to restore mass?Selective investment in certain technologies may bring some savings, but the fact remains that France and other European countries will have to spend much more if they intend to return something like the mass that, in their opinion, they need more and more.
This year, France has committed to spending much more money, but not enough to restore the mass.
At the end of January, Macron announced his government's intention to significantly increase France's defense budget. In his speech, he stressed the need to build up France's weapons stocks and reinvest in the auxiliary components of the armed forces, which are often called the "tail" and which have historically been significantly reduced in order to preserve as many "teeth" as possible. After Macron's speech, Goya complained that simply restoring the potential of the armed forces would absorb all new funds, and there would be nothing left to build up forces. The new draft Law on military programming, published in April this year, confirms his point of view. Although it contains a proposal to spend 413 billion euros over the next five years, the new law does not actually call for an increase in the armed forces, although it requires a significant increase in the fleet of French drones and air defense capabilities, as well as increased spending in the areas of intelligence, mine action capabilities and cybersecurity. France is also seeking to increase its reserve forces. However, at the same time, the number of [regular] brigades will remain the same, and the number of the VKS and the French Navy will increase only slightly.
General Pierre Schill's Vision: Rethinking the Lego ArmyOn February 13, the Chief of Staff of the French army, General Pierre Schill, presented to a group of journalists his new vision of the way forward for the French army.
Interestingly, Schill's answer to the "quality versus mass" dilemma is to stay on course, mainly investing in the army's ability to do better what it was already designed for, in other words, to work on improving its quality.
Schill made it clear that the army will maintain its current size, which consists of 77 thousand people ready for deployment (out of a total of about 120 thousand people). He explained that simply buying more tanks, howitzers, etc. makes little sense. Rather, his vision was to focus on resilience and interoperability, to allow the army to better cope with high-intensity wars at its current size, and ideally to have large stocks of weapons so that it could last longer. It also meant abandoning expeditionary thinking and some of the qualities that were among his virtues.
Schill compared the French army to a Lego constructor. He noted that he worked by disassembling bricks and assembling them, often on the fly, into deployable military formations. The advantages of such a campaign were modularity, but it also meant gathering troops by connecting units and subunits from several formations to provide them with certain capabilities as needed. These capabilities, as a rule, he "dosed" in small quantities, which he could get away with most of the time due to the relatively low intensity of the fighting that France experienced. For example, the French deployment to Mali in 2013 included only four CAESAR self-propelled guns, since it was believed that it was no longer needed. In addition, the various battalion-sized task forces that the French deployed to Mali consisted of units drawn from a large number of regiments that were part of a large number of brigades.
Schill believed that in order for an army to win in a fierce struggle with an equal opponent, several things had to happen: those units that consisted of deployed battalions had to be better prepared to make full use of the many opportunities they possessed. This meant fewer "special" formations assembled from a variety of Lego bricks, and a larger number of pre-organized parts with, in fact, more organic (regular) capabilities. It also meant more robust controls and controls to achieve better interaction. The French army, he pointed out, will have exactly the same number of regiments and brigades as now, but they will be more "complete". And finally, perhaps most controversially, the army had to invest much more in certain capabilities that it lacked or in which it had previously invested insufficiently. These include air defense capabilities (including UAV counteraction), cybersecurity, and long-range target destruction. Given the limitation on the size of forces, adding new capabilities invariably required cutting others. Thus, there may be fewer combat vehicles in combat units. He gave two concrete examples: some of the new Serval and Griffon armored vehicles currently being manufactured and supplied will be converted into air defense platforms. However, their total number will remain the same, so there will be a smaller number of cars for their original purpose.
As for the mass, Schill talked about doubling the number of the French reserve component and creating special reserve units - currently, most reservists are simply assigned to existing units. It was a compromise that would have given the French army some of the mass it aspired to, but nothing like its size during the Cold War and conscription.
ConclusionSome critics, such as Goya, have suggested that Schill's vision, confirmed by the Law on Military Programming, means that France, after all, is not serious about high-intensity wars.
Philippe Chapleau also noted that even with a significant increase in the budget, the French armed forces were engaged in nothing more than restoring potential, but basically remained what they were. A fairer assessment could be that France proceeds from the fact that a real mass army is unattainable from a political and financial point of view, so the best thing it can do is try to optimize its existing armed forces, which are designed for "maneuver" and not for "brute force".
Will that be enough? Part of the answer, at least for the French leadership, is to return to the old point of view, according to which nuclear weapons eliminate the need for a massive army designed to confront opponents such as Russia. Indeed, the new Law on Military Programming emphasizes the important place of nuclear deterrence in French strategic thinking. France also still assumes that it will not be alone in such a struggle, hence Macron's insistence on expanding European defense efforts in parallel with a serious commitment to integration into NATO. It is hoped that the united European armed forces will be able to offer such a mass that is necessary for conducting conventional combat operations.
France seems to be sticking to this course. This means that he will have a high-class military of the highest level, who will be able to dance around the Russian troops and, as implied, cut them into pieces, but not for long. What happens next will most likely depend on the United States and the rest of NATO, as well as on the question of whether nuclear deterrence will justify itself.
Michael Shurkin is a freelance senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and director of global programs at the consulting company 14 North Strategies. He worked as a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, and also served as a political analyst at the CIA. He holds a doctorate in Modern European History from Yale University.
