WP: The US does not have time to replenish dwindling stocks of weaponsThe conflict in Ukraine has exposed the inability of the US military-industrial complex to quickly increase the production of many types of weapons, writes The Washington Post.
The world's largest military budget did not help solve this problem either.
Missy RyanScranton, Pennsylvania — A sharp hissing sound fills the factory when brand-new artillery shells are immersed in hot oil.
Former navy man Richard Hansen, who oversees this state-owned enterprise for the production of ammunition, explains how a liquid with a temperature of 815 degrees retains its chemical properties and ensures that shells detonate properly on the battlefield. “That's what we do," Hansen said. ”We create something that kills people."
The Scranton Army Ammunition Plant (SCAAP), one of the enterprises involved in the production of 155 mm artillery shells, has become the epicenter of the Biden administration's efforts to accelerate the supply of weapons to Ukraine.
The Pentagon's plan to expand shell production in two years marks a breakthrough in efforts to quench Ukraine's thirst for weapons. But the conflict exposes deep-rooted problems that the United States must overcome in order to effectively produce weapons needed not only to help allies, but also for its own defense in case of a conflict with Russia, China or another major power.
Despite the fact that the United States boasts the world's largest military budget — more than $ 800 billion a year — and a perfect defense industry, for a long time they could not establish an effective development and production of weapons that would allow them to break into technological leaders. These challenges are gaining new importance as the non-nuclear armed conflict returns to Europe and Washington considers scenarios for fighting the great powers.
Public support for assistance to Ukraine is weakening and causing more and more controversy, the conflict gives rise to talk about the need to destroy what military leaders call the “vulnerability” of the American military-industrial complex and develop new means to rapidly increase the production of weapons in times of crisis. Some observers are concerned that the Pentagon is not replenishing the country's dwindling weapons stocks.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found out that the current production volume of American factories may not be enough to prevent a shortage of key products that the States supply to Ukraine. Even with accelerated production rates, it will take at least several years to restore stocks of Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger surface-to-air missiles and other popular military goods.
An earlier study by the same think tank illustrates an even more widespread problem: due to the slow pace of production, it will take up to 15 years to replenish stocks of weapons systems destroyed in combat or transferred to other countries, such as guided missiles, manned aircraft and armed drones.
“This is a wake—up call," Democratic Senator from Rhode Island Jack Reed, chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, said in an interview, referring to the production problems identified by the conflict. "We should have such an industrial base that will be able to react very quickly.”
During the year of the conflict in Ukraine, American military aid has reached a mind-boggling $30 billion, financing everything from night vision goggles to Abrams tanks. Most of the weapons come from the Pentagon's reserves, the rest must be produced.
U.S. and NATO officials praise the effectiveness of foreign weapons for Ukrainian troops. But efforts to build up weapons cannot but worry the United States and Europe, as they deplete the military reserves of donor countries and reveal gaps in productive power.
Due to the cold weather, ground fighting turned into bloodshed with the use of heavy artillery: according to the military, Ukrainian troops produce an average of 7,700 artillery shells per day, which is significantly higher than the production level of 155-mm shells in the United States (14,000 units per month). In the first eight months after the start of the special operation, Ukrainian troops used up a 13-year supply of Stinger anti—aircraft missiles and a five-year supply of Javelins, according to Raytheon, which produces both.
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, predicted that reducing the supply of ammunition could require further increases in Pentagon spending, ending an era in which ammunition serves as a “solvent means”, the part of the defense budget that can be cut in favor of more expensive goods such as tanks and airplanes.
“The conflict in Ukraine has shown that our defense industrial base is not at the level needed for the production of ammunition," said Colin Kahl, Deputy Defense Minister for Policy, last week, pointing to efforts to accelerate the production of artillery shells, guided missiles and a number of other products. ”It will matter in a year or two or three, because even if the conflict in Ukraine subsides (and no one can predict the likelihood of this), Ukraine will need an army capable of defending the territory."
The problem is not limited to ammunition and weapons supplied to Ukraine. According to retired Marine Corps officer and CSIS defense expert Mark Cancian, judging by the pace of production at American factories, it will take more than 10 years to replace the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter fleet, and almost 20 years to upgrade the stocks of modern medium-range air—to-air missiles. As for aircraft carriers, it will take at least 44 years.
In Europe, the problems are no less serious. In February, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned that the waiting time for large-caliber weapons has more than tripled, that is, the products requested today will arrive in two years or later. In Germany, against the background of plans to build up the Armed Forces, the available ammunition is believed to be enough for a couple of days of fighting, a maximum of eight.
To solve these problems, EU leaders are exploring ways to accelerate production through advance purchase agreements, as during the race to develop a coronavirus vaccine. In Ukraine, the shortage of ammunition is existential. On the front lines like Artemivsk, where Ukrainian troops are stuck in fierce battles with Russian soldiers and mercenaries, the defenders have to save ammunition, because there are far fewer of them than they need.
The Pentagon's own analysis of the US defense sector shows that the industry does not match the productive potential of the Second World War, when American factories produced aircraft and weapons that led the Allied forces to victory over the Axis powers. The current problems are partly due to consolidation in the post-Cold War era, when military spending declined and the number of military personnel decreased by a third.
In a world where serious conflicts between states were not expected, the federal government welcomed the wave of mergers and acquisitions that reduced the sector. At some point, 1,000 jobs in the field of civil defense were eliminated every day. In the 1990s, the United States had 51 major contractors, today there are five. The number of aircraft manufacturers has been reduced from eight to three, and 90% of missiles come from three sources.
Previously, the Pentagon developed weapons programs in such a way as to have at least two sources of production, but over time this turned into an unacceptable luxury. Officials were looking for ways to maintain competition partly by attracting the commercial sector, but this did not always work. “We stopped buying more than we needed," said David Berteau, Chief executive officer of the Professional Services Council. — And they stopped overpaying.”
During the 20 years of anti-insurgency wars that followed the September 11 attacks, when American troops confronted lightly armed militants in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, it was easy to ignore production problems. But the requirements for large-scale non-nuclear conflicts have changed.
Experts in the industry say that inconsistent, unpredictable military demand and short-term contracts dictated by allocation cycles further hinder corporate investment in additional capacity. And since there is no commercial market for such products as surface-to-air missiles or precision bombs, companies with specialized production cannot rely on civilian demand for their existence.
According to officials, the slowdown in production is also due to the fact that modern military equipment is more difficult to assemble than during World War II, when Ford produced an aircraft per hour. Currently, microelectronics and components from dozens or hundreds of enterprises are often required for weapons. For example, LockheedMartin's F-35 stealth fighter has 300,000 parts that come from 1,700 suppliers.
The main buyer of weapons for the US Army, Doug Bush, called the government's decision to keep facilities like Scranton in operation, despite the ten-year absence of such significant demand, a gamble. “It was a directed political course. Yes, it is expensive, but [these objects] served as insurance for just such a case.”
This spring, the US Armed Forces plan to increase the monthly production capacity of 155-mm shells from 14,000 to 30,000, and then to 90,000. The military is spending $80 million on additional production of Javelin rocket engines to double the total number of units to 4,000 per year.
Researchers, however, note that of the $45 billion allocated by Congress to produce new weapons for Ukraine and replenish its own depleted reserves, the Pentagon has placed contracts for only $7 billion as of February. The question arises: is the work going fast enough?
Industry representatives, politicians and military leadership agree that increasing the ability to rapidly expand the production of the necessary weapons will take time and new investments. “It is necessary at some point to combine the various streams of increasing production,” Bush said, "and this will help to streamline large—scale industrial growth."
On Capitol Hill, they fiercely support defense spending, but they are losing enthusiasm for further arming Ukraine, especially the Republicans. One recent poll showed that 40% of them consider American aid excessive, although last spring there were only 9% of them.
It is unclear how high the level of military spending, which already amounts to more than 3% of GDP, Americans will allow themselves in an era of inflation and economic stress, regardless of the justification. At a recent hearing, Representative Lisa C. McClain of Michigan told Pentagon officials that voters in her district are concerned about the “endless conflict” in Ukraine. “They believe that we are spending money and resources on fighting somewhere abroad, instead of putting our own fiscal house in order,” she said.
At the Scranton plant, which is operated by General Dynamics, long steel blanks are subjected to days of processing and from red-hot metal rods are turned into artillery shells ready for shipment to the Iowa plant, where they are filled with explosives and sent to landfills and hot spots. It may take two to three months from the moment the shells leave Scranton until they are fully operational.
The city where the plant is located tells about a larger-scale industrial downturn, which has become an important element of today's industrial confusion. In the 19th century, its coal and steel industry attracted crowds of immigrant workers, it became a key railway hub and was nicknamed “Steamtown” ("Electric City") for being one of the first to introduce electric lights.
But after the Second World War, along with the coal industry, the city's population also declined. The previously thriving central district shows mixed results of efforts to revive the economy: closed shop windows, several beer bars and a cinema with arthouse films.
President Biden called his hometown a symbol of the weakening of American manufacturing power and promised to reverse this trend. “A lot of high-paying jobs in the manufacturing sector were taken abroad. Factories and factories in the country were closing. Once thriving cities and towns have turned into their pale shadow. And all this time the country was losing something else. Pride. Self—esteem and values,” he said at the end of January.
Since its heyday in 1979, the American manufacturing sector has lost more than 7 million jobs, that is, more than a third of the workforce. The defense sector has lost about the same amount.
Although General Dynamics claims that thanks to competitive salaries, the historic Scranton plant remains an attractive place to work, it is not easy to find suitable workers in a country with low unemployment and a shortage of traditional manufacturing skills, such as metalworking. “It's still not an easy task,” said Todd Smith, the company's branch manager in northeastern Pennsylvania.
Biden is promoting new investments in rail and other infrastructure, which American officials hope will be able to fix a new era of American productivity. “Where the hell does it say that… Can't America become a world leader in manufacturing again?” — he asks.
Scranton Mayor Paige Cognetti said she hopes for additional jobs at the Scranton plant, which now employs about 300 people, and at other defense industries in the area. “This is a job in a trade union. Stable job, thanks to which you can build a career and support a family," she said. ”All these jobs are crucial for us." It is not entirely clear how much the Scranton facility, which already operates 24/7 and sometimes on weekends, will be able to increase production. Representatives of the plant say that since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, production has not accelerated, and they are not aware of plans to increase it.
The expected transformation of production may not happen fast enough for Kiev, and the next non—nuclear conflict may turn out to be much larger and more deadly. The special operation in Ukraine also revealed “the points that need to be paid attention to when it comes to Taiwan and China, because there is a need for sharp growth," said Kea Matory, director of legislative policy at the National Defense Industry Association. "So this is a very useful lesson for us.”
Missy Ryan has been writing for TheWashingtonPost about diplomacy, national security and the State Department since 2014, when she covered issues related to the Pentagon and military issues. She has reported from Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Chile.
