The publications of some Russian media about the development of a new hypersonic missile "Serpentine" attracted considerable attention of Western observers. Below we bring to your attention the article "Anti-ship ballistic missile of Russia", published by the War Zone resource. The author of the material conducts some analysis on the topic of the "Coil" and, to a certain extent, reveals the likely consequences of the deployment of this product. [As before, IVi's remarks are given in square brackets]
Author: Thomas Newdick is a columnist and editor with more than 20 years of experience covering military space issues and conflicts. He has written and edited several books, and participated in many of the world's leading aviation publications. He came to War Zone from the position of editor of AirForces Monthly.
Russian anti-ship ballistic missile
Reports from Russia suggest that the country has recently been developing an anti-ship ballistic missile, or PKB, a class of weapon popularly called the "aircraft carrier killer." The previously unknown missile project, designated by the Russian name "Serpentine", will potentially add a powerful new dynamic to the Kremlin's strategy of creating restricted access and maneuver zones (Anti-Access/Area Denial, A2/AD), which already includes various coastal defense missiles and hypersonic anti-ship missiles under development [PKR].
According to a report by the Russian state news agency TASS [dated July 12, 2022], based on two unnamed sources "close to the Ministry of Defense and the military-industrial complex," the Serpentine has been developed for parts of the coastal defense of the Russian Navy "for quite a long time."
The missile, which, according to the agency, is primarily designed to hit large surface ships, including aircraft carriers, combines a ballistic missile with the final stage of a maneuvering hypersonic glide aircraft (hypersonic glide vehicle, HGV).
One of the same sources reported that the Serpentine hypersonic missile is similar to the Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles DF-21D and DF-26B and that it will have a range of about 2,500 miles [4025 km].
Details about the current status of the development of the "Serpentine" are not reported, although TASS has asked for comments from NPO Mashinostroeniya [part of the Tactical Missile Armament Corporation], suggesting that it is most likely a responsible design agency. The company did not respond, but it is noteworthy that it also produces the Zircon hypersonic missile defense system for surface warships and submarines, the Avangard planning combat unit, which can carry intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and the Bastion coastal defense system armed with supersonic Onyx missiles.
Test launch of the Russian Avangard mine launch hypersonic missile:
The War Zone talked with Dmitry Stefanovich [Stefanovich Dmitry Viktorovich], a researcher at the IMEMO Center for International Security of the Russian Academy of Sciences, on the topic of his observations about the prospects of the "Serpentine".
«It seems that this project has really been in development for some time, although no tests were mentioned or observed, which, of course, does not mean that there could not have been a prototype test," D. Stefanovich said. «The creation of fast anti—ship missiles is a tradition for the USSR and Russia, and a ballistic missile is a good option."
«It seems that this project has really been in development for some time, although no tests were mentioned or observed, which, of course, does not mean that there could not have been a prototype test," D. Stefanovich said. «The creation of fast anti—ship missiles is a tradition for the USSR and Russia, and a ballistic missile is a good option."
However, D. Stefanovich pointed out some shortcomings of the concept, at least in relation to the Russian Navy.
"Given its range and speed, serious reconnaissance and targeting capabilities are needed, as well as terminal guidance[pointing at the final section of the trajectory]. Maneuverable warheads and hypersonic gliders, as their subtype, make sense to be the main type of payload in this case, but Russian intelligence capabilities have obvious gaps."
Similarly, there have been questions about how China obtains targeting data for its BRSD, although Beijing seems to be better served in this regard. One of the options for Russia would be to use its over-the-horizon warning and targeting systems, space sensors, as well as a fleet of long-range maritime patrol aircraft. Unlike China, Russia currently does not have a growing fleet of high-altitude drones with a long flight life that could help detect enemy fleets and transmit guidance information to missile units, although this may also begin to change in the future.
Il-38 aircraft of the Russian Navy Naval aviation
"It is noteworthy to pay attention to the coastal missile system as the main platform (unlike, for example, the Zircon, which will initially be carried by a surface ship)," D. Stefanovich continued. "Such systems have their own common radar capabilities and are probably easier to connect to a common situational awareness network over the seas adjacent to the coast of Russia, which includes, among other things, over-the-horizon radars, although this is just an assumption."
"In addition, the Russian Navy has already demonstrated the very real ability of its coastal missile systems (namely: "Bastion" and subsonic "Ball") for conducting attacks on ground targets, which may be relevant for the "Serpentine". Indeed, Russia has stated that it has used its Bastion-P coastal missile system to strike ground targets in Ukraine in the current conflict.
Video of the Russian Defense Ministry, in which it claims that the Bastion-P missile system strikes ground targets in Ukraine:
"Finally, the use of a ground-based missile with a range of thousands of kilometers hardly corresponds to the moratorium imposed by Russia on the non-deployment of medium- and shorter-range weapons after the collapse of this treaty," D. Stefanovich noted. "Of course, we do not know the actual deployment schedule, so it is quite possible that American weapons, such as the Long-Range hypersonic weapon (Long Range Hypersonic Weapon) Dark Eagle or the medium-Range and shorter-range complex (Mid-Range Capability, MRC) Typhon, will arrive in Europe or Asia earlier, but on this dynamic too it's worth paying attention."
Now it seems that Russia is also trying to put weapons of a similar category into service. Although there are no details yet about which launch platform the Serpentine will use, a highly mobile truck chassis used by Chinese BRSD and other Russian mobile coastal defense missiles seems very likely.
As for the aforementioned Chinese weapons, the DF-21D is a BRSD with a maximum range of 621 to 1,864 miles [1,000 to 3,000 km]. Meanwhile, the DF-26B is classified as an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), a category that includes longer-range weapons capable of hitting targets at a distance of 1,864 to 3,417 miles [3,000 to 5,500 km]. According to officials quoted by TASS, the range of the hypersonic missile "Serpentine" is more comparable to the DF-26B.
Video of the use of Chinese BRSD "Dong-Feng 21":
Like the DF-21D and DF-26B, the Serpentine will need its hypersonic gliding warhead [HGV, hereinafter GPBCH] to have sufficient maneuverability to hit large, relatively slow-moving ships, such as aircraft carriers, which, apparently, are one of the main targets of the missile. The GPBF will probably use a radar and/or infrared homing head for final guidance, although this is completely unconfirmed at the moment.
There is even a possibility that Russia may adapt the existing Iskander-M short-range missile system as the basis for the Serpentine, although it is a much shorter-range weapon capable of hitting targets at a distance of about 310 miles [500 km]. Nevertheless, the Iskander-M has already been used to create the Dagger air-based BR, the range of which is estimated to be from 900 to 1600 miles [from 1,450 to 2,575 km]. Meanwhile, China is increasingly studying the anti-ship tasks of the BRMD, while the SM-401 [Chinese RCC] also has a certain similarity with the Iskander-M in terms of size and appearance. Beijing is also currently deploying similar BRS on its surface warships, and they will most likely also have anti-ship capabilities or acquire them in the future. In the end, a derivative ship version may also become an option for the Serpentine program.
Intermediate-range DF-26 BR on parade
It is also important to remember that the Serpentine will not act alone, but will add another layer to the existing Russian A2/AD umbrella, which serves to protect its coastlines and the territory around them. In particular, the Russian A2/AD strategy focuses on particularly important maritime areas, creating so-called "super missile engagement zones" (MEZ), for example, in the Black Sea and around Kaliningrad in the Baltic Sea. They use various types of RCC — sea, land and air-based to counter NATO warships.
In addition to the well-established MEZ in the Black and Baltic Seas, Russia is also in the process of developing similar capabilities in the Arctic, as well as in the Far East, where special attention is paid to the disputed Kuril Islands. The relevance of long-range missile defense systems on both of these strategic theater is obvious. Russia has already focused on deploying new surface-to-air and shore-based missile defense systems, among other military equipment, at these outposts as part of its broader A2/AD strategy. In this context, PCBs would be all the more useful if they could also hit ground targets. Given Russia's tradition in developing dual-use RCC, this seems likely. Another possible location of the "Serpentine" is the Mediterranean Sea, where Moscow is showing increasing interest. Here there is an option to deploy a PKB in Syria, which Russia has already done with an air-based PKR.
Coastal missile systems "Bal" and "Bastion" of the Black Sea Fleet have worked out live firing at sea targets during the exercises "Caucasus-2020":
Long-range missile defense systems would allow the Russian Navy to hit warships at much greater distances, up to thousands of miles from the relative safety of the Russian mainland, where they would be less vulnerable to protection from preemptive or counterattacks. Unlike other coastal defense systems, the PKB will also be able to hit targets over a very large area without the need for prior movement.
At the same time, such weapons would help compensate for the relative shortage of modern long-range anti-ship weapons in the Navy's surface fleet, where ambitious programs to create new classes of warships have not yet been implemented.
Meanwhile, the existing classes of surface warships of the Russian Navy were developed primarily to defeat NATO aircraft carriers and other valuable warships. The cruisers of Project 1144, or Kirov, and the cruisers of Project 1164, or Slava, as well as their PKR, date back to the Cold War era…
Although the Zircon hypersonic missile should provide the Russian Navy with significantly improved anti-ship capabilities, this weapon is still not in service, despite extensive testing. Signs that this program might face difficulties appeared in 2020, when a senior Russian Navy official referred to unspecified "childhood illnesses" in development efforts. With this in mind, the development of the PKDB may be even simpler, especially taking into account the Russian experience of operating the Avangard and the possibility of using the existing BR as an anti-ship heavy vehicle. And even if the Zircon works without problems, it is a much shorter-range weapon, probably reaching the target at a maximum distance of about 620 miles [1000 km].
As for the protection against the attack of the "Serpentine", then everything is not so clear. Even BR detection can be difficult, and their interception is much more difficult than detecting and defeating low-flying cruise missiles with an air-jet engine. At the same time, at the moment we have no idea whether the Russian missile defense system has been tested at all, not to mention whether it will be able to reliably hit a target representing even a large moving ship, such as an aircraft carrier.
However, if the technology can be made to work, the advantages of PCBs for the Russian armed forces are obvious. Now that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to further ostracism and potential conflict with NATO and the West, the Kremlin's need for reliable A2/AD capabilities is likely to only increase. Whether in the Arctic, the Baltic, the Black Sea, or the Far East, the Russian Missile Defense System will increase the risk to any other navy that decides to operate in these areas. With this in mind, we will closely monitor the further development of the Serpentine hypersonic missile program.
According to the materials of the resource www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone
