Disguise is not a fashionable whim, but the most important type of combat support
As RIA Novosti recently reported, Russian military equipment participating in a special military operation in Ukraine has received a new type of camouflage, significantly reducing the visibility of vehicles in the infrared and radar range.
At the moment, it is mainly used to disguise the Iskander operational and tactical missile systems and T-90M tanks. How exactly does it work and how important is it to increase the invulnerability of military equipment in combat conditions?
"IF THERE'S A WAR TOMORROW..."
Today, no one doubts the need for camouflage measures to shelter personnel, ensure the effective use of weapons and military equipment. The practice of armed conflicts has shown how important a type of combat support for troops is disguise. It prevents enemy intelligence from detecting the location and actions of our troops, and also allows us to mislead the enemy about where and in what quantity our units are located, what their true intentions are. Disguise facilitates the achievement of surprise actions of troops and reduces their losses in manpower and equipment. Underestimating disguise, neglecting it in battle means jeopardizing the fulfillment of a combat mission, incur unjustified losses.
In the pre-war years, and especially during the Great Patriotic War, the issues of camouflage were among the priorities in the activities of the engineering troops. This is clearly seen if we analyze the expenses of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army for 1940. The share of expenses for the purchase of camouflage equipment was more than 14% of the total amount of centralized expenses for the purchase of engineering weapons.
Despite the measures taken, on the eve of the war it was not possible to create a sufficient level of security for the Red Army with means of disguise. As of August 1940, it was 50-70%. The main reason for this was the weakness of the industrial base, since the manufacture of these funds was mainly carried out by small enterprises: industrial cooperation artels and local industry enterprises. That affected both the quality of the supplied products and their quantity.
Therefore, it is no coincidence that three days before the Great Patriotic War, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0042 "On masking airfields, military units and important military facilities of the districts" was issued under the heading "Top Secret". The order was signed by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General Georgy Zhukov.
The order gave a negative assessment of the carelessness shown by commanders and superiors when masking airfields and other important objects. In particular, it was noted: "The airfield glades are all sown, the take-off strips are not painted to match the color of the terrain, and the buildings, standing out sharply in bright colors, attract the attention of observers for tens of kilometers. The crowded and linear arrangement of aircraft in the complete absence of their disguise, poor organization of maintenance with the use of signs and signals finally unmask the airfield."
The highest military leadership of the country noted that a similar carelessness to disguise was shown by artillery and motorized mechanized units. The locations of their parks were not only excellent objects for observation, but also targets advantageous for air strikes. Tanks, armored vehicles, commander's and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops were painted with paints that give a bright reflection and are well observed not only from the air, but also from the ground. The order noted that "nothing has been done to disguise warehouses and other important military facilities."
THE LESSON IS POORLY LEARNED
Years have passed, the country has changed, modern science has reached a new qualitative level. The technologies and capabilities of the domestic industry have changed dramatically, including in the development and production of modern means of disguise.
One thing has remained unchanged: the needs of the army in means of disguise are not always fully satisfied. Which, in turn, entails the presence of shortcomings and omissions in matters of their application.
For example, consider satellite images taken by our opponent, one of the bases of the Russian Aerospace Forces, allegedly located in the Voronezh region. There are plenty of such pictures on social networks and messengers now. The presented images show at least 32 Su–30/35 fighters, one Il-76 transport, two Su-24, one Mi-26 and Mi-8/17 and one An-26.
Does this remind us of anything? It is very similar to the situation described in the NGO Order No. 0042 of June 19, 1941.
Recall that from Kharkov to Voronezh – about 300 km. And this distance, for example, the Su-24 bomber overcomes in ten minutes.
The presence of such easily identifiable targets – combat aircraft – is, in fact, just a godsend, the "cherry on the cake" for our enemies. It seems that, counting on the notorious "maybe", the issues of disguise are sometimes simply ignored, and the presence of regular means of disguise is remembered only during exercises or when preparing objects for the arrival of high authorities. According to the footage of the TV broadcasts, we can see that serious camouflage on Iskander cars during the special operation appeared only recently.
But in the conditions of the enemy's active use of space and aviation intelligence, unmanned aerial vehicles, the issues of camouflage become, again, paramount. And commanders should deal with these issues not on a case-by-case basis, but constantly.
TODAY'S OPPORTUNITIES
In order to provide the army with highly effective means of camouflage, providing comprehensive concealment of weapons, military equipment and objects, regular camouflage kits have been adopted and supplied to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: MKT-2L, MKT-2P, MKT-2C, MMK-2, MKT-3L, MKT-4L, MKT-4P, MKT-4S and MKT-5L. At the same time, camouflage kits of the fourth generation (for summer backgrounds MKT-4L and MKT-5L, for desert-steppe backgrounds – MKT-4P, for snow backgrounds – MKT-4S) are effective not only in the visible, but also in the radar wavelength range.
As for the new disguise, which was discussed at the beginning, it is covers or coverings made of a special synthetic material and worn on top of the equipment. The case can be painted in various colors of camouflage, thereby reducing visibility in the visible range. And most importantly, it significantly reduces the thermal visibility of armored vehicles, hiding it from UAVs and other means of enemy reconnaissance. The detection range of equipment in the radar range is also being reduced.
We are talking about the "Cape" – the development of Russian scientists from the Research Institute of Steel specifically for the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Its upper layer quickly takes the temperature of the air, thereby merging in the thermal range with the environment. The fabric is incombustible. It completely neutralizes the four channels of object identification by the homing head. If you go into details, the thermal radiation of armored vehicles simultaneously neutralize radiothermal rays and radar reflection. And several times – the perception of the target in the infrared range.
TODAY'S REALITY
However, the production of the "Cape" is only getting better. As for the supply of the main part of the regular camouflage kits to the troops, it is carried out within the framework of the state defense order through their centralized purchase at industrial enterprises.
Despite the fact that in recent years, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has significantly increased the volume of purchases of this type of product, it is still very, very early to talk about meeting the needs of troops, especially in fourth-generation camouflage kits. Moreover, the existing system of requesting, receiving from storage bases and using camouflage kits by the end user directly at facilities or samples of weapons and military equipment is stretched over time and involves a number of bureaucratic procedures.
This is a particular problem in the conditions of hostilities, when the rear units and technical support services are at a considerable distance from the advanced units. In such conditions, it is difficult to create the necessary reserves of camouflage equipment and carry out appropriate camouflage measures in advance. For this, the commanders have neither the strength nor the time.
FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE OF FOREIGNERS
The way out of this situation is seen as follows.
Experience in the supply of military equipment in the interests of foreign customers has shown the existence of certain conditions and principles that they follow when concluding contracts.
When ordering weapons and military equipment with high combat potential, foreign customers, as a rule, set a requirement to equip the supplied samples with individual means of disguise, taking into account the peculiarities of their combat use. For example, when delivering tanks, aircraft, air defense systems, etc. they ask to include in the delivery package for each sample the appropriate camouflage coatings.
And such requirements seem quite logical. Especially when you consider that the cost of purchased individual camouflage equipment is thousands of times cheaper than the cost of basic samples. For example, the cost of the latest Russian combat aircraft such as the Su-34, Su-30 and Su-35, the Mi-24 attack helicopter, the Pantsir S1 ZRPC is more than a billion rubles. Which is incomparable with the cost of the means of disguise used for them.
Such approaches to manning the samples of military equipment purchased in the industry with regular means of camouflage are already being used today in the Strategic Missile Forces and in the Office of the Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, where the relevant administrative documents defining this procedure have been issued. As far as we know, these issues are not regulated in other military administration bodies.
It is precisely because of the lack of standard camouflage equipment on the samples of military equipment supplied to the troops that some crews lack not only the skills to carry out camouflage measures, but also the appropriate possibilities for their implementation.
Therefore, the solution of the issue of completing samples of military equipment with standard means of disguise should be carried out at the time of issuing the technical specification for their development and included in the technical specifications for the products. Moreover, training in the rules and basics of camouflage must necessarily be included in the basic training programs for all samples of military equipment supplied to the troops and take into account the specifics of their operation and combat use.
We are confident that solving these simple but very important issues will allow us to preserve personnel, increase the survivability of weapons and military equipment, and in general will contribute to a more effective solution of the tasks facing the Armed Forces.
Oleg Falichev
Oleg Valentinovich Falichev – military observer Igor Vladimirovich Enya – colonel of the reserve.
