Recall, improve and apply
It seems that the special operation in Ukraine is entering a protracted phase. The Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to implement a strategy of capturing civilians of cities as hostages and, hiding behind them, to slow down the advance of the Russian army.
At the same time, such a slowdown in the pace of progress allows for a number of technical and organizational measures aimed at improving the effectiveness of their own armed forces.
TANKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES
The situation turned out to be similar to the preparation of the second stage of the Soviet-Finnish campaign of 1940 or the Berlin offensive of 1945. In both of those cases, the Red Army was forced to take a "time-out" to reform, pull up human reserves and equipment, and change the direction of the main strikes.
This time was spent, among other things, on training the troops, equipping them with special weapons adapted to the tasks assigned, as well as on upgrading the weapons available in the troops for these tasks. Large-caliber artillery and heavy tanks were urgently supplied to the troops, their armor was strengthened. Once again, the need for special assault weapons was manifested, the requirements for their accelerated design were outlined.
So, for example, already at the first attempts to break through the Mannerheim line, the command matured an understanding of the need for a heavy tank capable of fighting pillboxes, hollows and other fortifications.
In connection with this task, it was necessary to immediately create a specialized KV-2 tank to defeat concrete fortifications.
The project of the new machine was developed at the Leningrad Kirov plant in just two weeks, which is considered a feat of Soviet engineers. They managed to install a turret with a large-caliber artillery piece on the body of the new KV-1 heavy tank. The first samples appeared at the front already in January 1940. The non-standard design solution allowed the tank to approach the firing points and destroy them from a distance of 200-400 m . The car turned out to be unsightly, but its disproportionately high tower made it possible to place a cannon, which solved the task. At the same time, the tank's reservation turned out to be invulnerable to anti-tank fire.
Five years later, ISU-152 self-propelled artillery units, which bore the slang name "St. John's Wort", were used to solve similar problems on the streets of Berlin. In the Wehrmacht, they received another nickname that accurately characterizes their purpose: "Dosenöffner" ("can opener") – for the possibility of opening fortifications.
Judging by the Syrian war, as well as the very recent experience of storming Mariupol, Azovstal and the Donetsk defensive line, the tasks of breaking through the system of long-term fortifications again urgently require the use of 152 mm siege high-explosive shells. History never tires of teaching those who neglect it. For four years, starting in 2009, a series of articles was published in specialized publications about the need to create an armored assault vehicle based on the main tank with a 152-mm howitzer ("Defense Equipment", 2009, № 1-2, 2011 № 8; 2013, № 3-4).
The main author of these proposals is the oldest authority in the theory of explosion, a scientist of broad, truly encyclopedic views Leonid Orlenko. However, his authority at that time was not enough to initiate early and comprehensive preparation for events that had long been predicted from the point of view of methods of conducting armed struggle.
Today's understanding of the situation, which revealed the delay in our reaction to the changed reality, gives us a chance to catch up. There are many examples in Soviet history when the production and technological tasks of military problems were solved within one or two months. Therefore, it is quite possible to organize the creation of the proposed armored assault vehicle in a time comparable to the time of the creation of the KV-2.
As initial components, the body of the T-72/90/80 tank and a 152 mm howitzer with a shortened barrel are needed. Even the barrels of obsolete guns from the Great Patriotic War would be suitable for such a purpose. It should be added that towers with such weapons should receive reservations no worse than those of the main battle tanks.
According to the authors, the implementation and verification of other characteristics (for example, tightness, climatic requirements, railway restrictions depending on the size of Western European tunnels, etc.) should be postponed for a subsequent, more favorable period. Do not be afraid of unsightly design solutions. To date, the developed machine should "be able to shoot", "hold the blow" ATGM and move tolerably in positions. Following the example of the KV-2, its tests should be carried out in real combat conditions.
There is a legend in the design environment that the first tactical and technical task for the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb was written by hand on one piece of paper and immediately agreed. During the Great Patriotic War, in military design bureaus, a new technical solution, as a rule, was laid on the drawing board during the day, at night it was embodied in "iron", and in the morning it was tested at the landfill. And today it's time for just such an approach to business.
Quite an expected problem was the flooding of the enemy army with homing means of destroying armored vehicles from the upper hemisphere into the roof of the tower and hull. The flows of ATGM and attack drones supplied by Western countries to Ukraine at the expense of future phantom payments (and in fact gratuitously) have no analogues in history. Moreover, the combat capabilities of such robotic systems make it possible to reduce the influence of the "human factor" associated with psychological stability or professional training of the shooter-operator.
In such conditions, the main thing for "laymen gunners" is not to make a mistake by directing the robot at their own. But here, too, the amateurish factor characteristic of this situation is largely compensated for by the direct participation in hostilities of Western mercenaries, technical specialists and advisers, and often with the least risk to them – remotely.
Among the measures taken to protect armored vehicles, noticed at least a year ago, light lattice canopies over the towers of a certain number of tanks are discussed in social networks. It is believed that such canopies, complete with an infrared trap suspended outside the contour of the machine, make it possible to reduce optoelectronic visibility when materials absorbing thermal radiation are installed on them. The effectiveness of such measures is limited. However, in the case of optimizing the shape of the canopy with the installation of one or two rows of dynamic protection, the cumulative jet of diving "Jewelins" and drones can be significantly weakened. And in the option of installing a large-diameter anti-border grating above the tank tower in the form of a crown, the combat capabilities of the British NLAU complex will also be reset.
In addition, while the fighting is going on, it is extremely important for the future to collect and analyze as much statistical information as possible on the conditions of the shelling, the number and coordinates of hits in our armored vehicles, the specifics of its damage.
MORTARS, HIGH-EXPLOSIVE BOMBS, TEAR GAS
In similar military situations in history, similar measures are traditionally used to combat the enemy.
For example, over-caliber multiple launch rocket systems were adopted at the end of the Great Patriotic War. They were created based on the experience of breaking through the enemy's long-term defense.
More recently, the lack of technological capabilities did not prevent Syrian terrorists from organizing mass production of primitive large-caliber mortars, including systems with super-caliber mines, for fighting in urban conditions.
Today, the assault units of the Russian Federation have similar combat tasks. Creating a line of fairly primitive over–caliber mines for standard systems will more than double the power of ammunition by reducing the maximum firing range and, to a lesser extent, the accuracy of hitting - which is not relevant when destroying fortifications of a blocked enemy.
At the same time, for example, the damaging high-explosive impact of a 120-mm mortar over-caliber munition will exceed the impact of a standard 160 mm caliber mine. It would be appropriate to recall here that the first mortars at the dawn of their appearance used exactly super-caliber ammunition.
The Syrian war at some point showed the possibility of using barrel high-explosive bombs dropped from helicopters. The use of such bombs with a howling siren could have an additional psychological effect on the defending enemy – together with old and time-tested propaganda leaflets. Such barrel bombs filled with chemical components of tear action, in certain cases, make it possible to create conditions favorable for the transition of an army assault operation into an event of a police nature.
At the same time, it is necessary to dismiss the accusations of the use of chemical weapons in advance. Police special equipment (tear gas) is the most humane means of countering a cornered, blocked enemy who wants to die together with the hostages. Its skillful use makes it possible to reduce the losses of the parties and the civilian population by an order of magnitude. The fact of the use of police gas can be confirmed by specially invited experts from neutral countries.
The accusation of Russia in the use of chemical warfare agents has already been made one way or another after the use of a smoke screen by assault groups in Mariupol, and the Ukrainian command demonstrated as evidence three fighters who fainted during this attack. This story was replicated by all Western media.
Such excesses are inevitable in the information war. However, we repeat that this is the most humane way of waging war against the enemy and the civilian population. By the way, it is worth recalling the recent use of tear gas and tear water cannons by Polish servicemen against peaceful refugees from Iraq and Syria.
ASSAULT GROUPS
If you do not limit yourself to heavy weapons only, you should consider equipping infantry with at least a limited list of useful auxiliary combat equipment accessories.
Among them, you can list removable barrel flame arresters and luminous paint of sighting devices for night shooting. Infantry periscopes to provide a view of the battlefield from a trench or from around the corner of the house. Electronic security systems, etc. The possibilities of supplying such systems cannot be compared with the equally necessary saturation of the front line troops with more expensive "intelligent" laser and acoustic systems "antisniper", individual light reconnaissance drones, targeting, etc.
Almost all of these methods of improving the methods of conducting siege warfare have been known for a long time. They only need to be revived and improved if possible.
Everyone knows the Suvorov traditions of erecting training models of enemy fortifications to train their own troops. It is advisable to revive this practice by creating a temporary training ground on the territory of, for example, "Azovstal" (after its cleansing from the Nazis) for practicing the skills of interaction of assault groups with tanks, artillery, optical and aerial reconnaissance. At the same time, the experience gained in battles should be summarized in the methods of preparing reserves. It is advisable to develop, so to speak, a modern encyclopedia of an ordinary fighter.
The times have long passed when such an experience could at best be transmitted orally, when veterans of the trenches who had gone through more than one war were invited to the lessons of primary military training in a secondary school. They told in simple language how important it is in a shooting battle to be able to orientate, detect a real threat, find protection from it, plan your actions correctly, choose the right direction of movement on the battlefield – and at the same time always remember about antipersonnel mines and tripwires hidden in the grass or in the snow. They told how important it was, having jumped into an enemy trench during an attack, to quickly move along it to the nearest bend and, without sticking out, clear the space behind it with an automatic burst or a grenade. They told how important it is not to shoot long bursts of fan at the enemy, wasting ammunition, but to "cross out the target", firmly leading the barrel of the machine gun along a vertical line, and at the same time try not to hold on to the machine gun magazine with your hand, etc. And similar useful truths should be brought to every fighter of assault replenishment today and fixed by them in practice.
And finally, about the creation and implementation of an officer's electronic field tablet, which is familiar in everyday life, but so necessary at the front. The most detailed maps of the battle area can be uploaded to his memory. In this case, any coordinates are easily determined on it, allowing you to adjust your own shooting or remotely cause artillery and aviation fire. It can serve as a screen for controlling the drone and be a reference for additional information on equipment repair, a video recorder of events and documents.
Curfew services can upload arrays of photographs, fingerprints, interrogation results, information from social networks on prisoners and detainees into his memory. This will help to carry out analytical work to identify experienced personnel of those categories who should not be released or exchanged as a result of negotiations until the end of hostilities. First of all, such prisoners should include specialists with combat experience and foreign mercenaries. It is advisable at the same time to create an analogue of the Ukrainian site "Peacemaker" (which published lists of unreliable), formed, however, more professionally.
So, systematic analytical work should be carried out to identify and collect relevant recommendations for the urgent modernization of existing weapons and methods of armed struggle in order to effectively destroy the enemy and reduce their own losses.
The issue of optimizing the pace and timing of a special military operation remains painful.
In this regard, we can compare the battle of the allied coalition forces under the leadership of the United States to capture the Syrian city of Raqqa, which lasted five months, with the two-month operation of the army of the Russian Federation and the Donetsk republics to liberate Mariupol. As we can see, the pace of the Russian offensive turned out to be much higher. However, temporary delays that do not play a special role for the coalition forces in our case constantly increase the strength of the Armed Forces, territorial battalions, mercenary formations and a contingent of foreign military specialists and advisers.
Accordingly, the flow of military, financial, informational and ideological assistance to Ukraine is increasing. Such actions by the authorities and the West prolong the agony of the country, lead to unnecessary civilian casualties and, in fact, are criminal.
Thus, based on today's experience, it is impossible to determine whether the pace of implementation of the special operation in Ukraine is the best. It looks like they are close to optimal. However, it's too early to calm down and go with the flow.
Today it is often repeated that one cannot follow the advice of the West, and this is true. But it is necessary to act exactly as the Americans themselves did. In difficult times for the United States, President Theodore Roosevelt urged his compatriots: "Common sense tells us that we need to take some method and try it. If it doesn't work, admit it to yourself openly and try another one. But the main thing is: try at least something."
Andrey Galchenko
Andrey Vasilyevich Galchenko is a leading design engineer of JSC "NPK "Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering", Vladilen Alexandrovich Tegin is a Candidate of Technical Sciences.
