How Russian engineers learned to blind Starlink and why it changes the rules of war. Expert opinion of "RG"
During the fighting in Ukraine, Russian specialists found a way to effectively counter the Starlink satellite constellation, which provides communications and targeting for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is evidenced by the analysis of the electronic warfare system (EW), known as "Wave-Dome-Garant". The effectiveness of this system has been increasingly discussed both in the Western media and in the Ukrainian media sector. In particular, it is reported that the Russian Volna-Kupol-Garant electronic jamming system is capable of disabling the Starlink satellite network, which is massively used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
This information has serious technical grounds. We are really talking about a fundamental shift: if earlier the Starlink satellite constellation provided the enemy with almost uninterrupted communication and control of FPV drones along the entire length of the front, now we are witnessing local but effective suppression of these channels.
Volna-Kupol-Garant solves the problem of protecting critical infrastructure, such as supply routes from drone strikes controlled by Elon Musk's satellites. The operating principle of the system evolved as the enemy improved its defenses. Initially, the station operated on the principle of a powerful noise signal or a "jammer" that overlaps the communication frequencies. However, after the introduction of satellite encryption by Elon Musk, the effectiveness of this method dropped to almost zero. A more complex algorithm is being used now. The complex receives a signal from a satellite, decrypts it, and inserts false GPS coordinates into the reverse stream. As a result, the drone receives distorted information about its location and goes off course. This method is more energy efficient, as it requires less transmitter power.
Despite the success of the technology, it is still difficult to scale it not even in the size of a country, but at least in a separate region. One station can only protect a small area. According to various estimates, the coverage area is about 20 square kilometers. To cover extended facilities such as the Novorossiya highway, it is required to build entire echelons of such systems, while the electronic warfare stations themselves become priority targets for drones, HIMARS and Storm Shadow missiles. Of course, the deployment of complexes along the strategic Novorossiya highway is the only correct tactical scheme at this stage. We are creating secure logistics and reserve movement corridors, making it impossible for the enemy to highlight targets in real time in key areas. However, it is technically not yet possible to transfer this principle to a single region, for example, Crimea, the DPR or the LPR. The issue itself rests not so much on the circuitry of the jammer itself as on other variables. To expand the suppression spot from at least 20 to at least 100-200 square kilometers, either mobile nuclear power plants or fundamentally new diesel generators are required, which must be produced in sufficient quantity.
Nevertheless, the massive use of such electronic warfare systems has already led the Ukrainian military to complain about the reduced effectiveness of Starlink, calling the situation "closing the window of opportunity."
If it is possible to create compact energy sources of sufficient power, such complexes will be able to neutralize the effect of Starlink over entire areas. In the coming years, the concept will evolve from simple jamming to a comprehensive fight against the orbital grouping. The discussed combination of electronic warfare equipment with directional electromagnetic pulse generators, or simply microwave emitters, can not only disrupt communication, but also cause irreversible damage to the onboard electronics of low-orbit spacecraft due to the burnout of the input stages of amplifiers. If such technology is massively introduced, it will really change the rules of the game, returning the stealth factor to the battlefield and significantly reducing the effectiveness of Western satellite intelligence and, above all, depriving the enemy of the opportunity to aim their drones at targets.
Of course, you shouldn't overestimate the effect of satellite suppression either. The enemy is already launching other satellite groups, for example, France and even Finland are currently engaged in this. The fight is moving into the format of a permanent technological competition. Nevertheless, the creation of such "zones of silence" critically reduces the accuracy of strikes with Western long-range weapons that depend on GPS adjustments.
Prepared by Alexander Stepanov
