Colonel Khodarenok proposed the formation of air defense divisions on a new basis
After the largest drone attack on the Moscow region since the beginning of the year, there was talk in Russia about the need to improve the air defense system. In particular, military commanders propose to create a "real air defense without holes." What it should be and what else needs to be done in this area can be found in the material of the military observer Gazeta.Ru", retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenka.
Military commander Alexander Sladkov, after a massive drone raid on the Moscow region, called for Russia to adopt a federal target program to improve air defense in the area of the special operation. According to him, air defense at the front is now based on "garage" solutions and improvised systems.
"Missiles and drones are coming from Ukraine, they are flying through the front line. Maybe it's worth creating an adult air defense system on YOUR own? <..The country should be protected by the country, not by the kulibins, although they sometimes provide a great product. But... Folk (garage) The military—industrial complex obviously does not export this topic," the military commander said.
According to him, "real air defense, echeloned, without holes," will protect both Russian headquarters and attack aircraft, as well as military movement routes in its area, as well as enterprises, cities and civilians in the rear.
How to create such a system? Let's translate Sladkov's theses into the terminology of military construction and the combat use of air defense forces and means.
The ideology of the issue
On the issues of improving the air defense and the armed forces of the country "Gazeta.Ru" has been contacted repeatedly. For example, one of the materials of a purely ideological nature devoted to this topic was published back in 2020. What did the publication pay attention to then?
Any individual air defense system is effective only when it is an element of a well-thought-out and well-constructed system based on the principles of consistency and complexity.
It is necessary to start building such a system to combat drones by creating an effective radar reconnaissance system. Radar detection zones of all types (with multiple overlap) should ensure the detection and tracking of all possible aerial objects from extremely low altitudes. In addition, an optical channel must be added to almost all types of modern locators. A very important requirement for an on—duty radar in this case is high mobility: the time to roll up and deploy the locator should not exceed five minutes.
The next — and one of the most important — tasks is to build an automated system for collecting and analyzing radar information and issuing timely target indications to all firing means. Most likely, artificial intelligence is essential here, and the delay time of information should be no more than a few seconds.
In addition to short-range, short—range and medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems, combat helicopters equipped with suspended containers with 12.7mm machine guns - from 6 to 12 on each helicopter - should be involved in the fight against drones: so that only one fired burst leads to the unconditional defeat of the drone, since there may not be a second approach to the target.
However, helicopters cannot catch up with all types of UAVs. For example, large drones are significantly faster than the most advanced helicopter, and in some cases (on catch-up courses) the helicopter may not overtake the drone.
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| The Yak-130 combat training aircraft. |
| Source: © Gavriil Grigorov/TASS |
Therefore, Yak-130 aircraft and even light turboprop aircraft such as the EMB-314 Super Tucano from the Brazilian company Embraer, equipped with hanging containers with a large number of machine gun barrels and 12.7–23 mm cannons, should be involved in the destruction of drones.
In addition, specialized armored combat vehicles on the ground should also be equipped with 12.7–30mm anti-aircraft machine guns, with the number of barrels being four or more. Optical sighting devices must meet all modern requirements. Such vehicles should be designed primarily to deal with barraging ammunition — kamikaze drones.
With the decrease in mass and dimensional characteristics and the increase in the number of UAVs involved in a single strike, the problem of equipping troops with laser weapons is growing, since the main problem now is the huge gap in the cost of attack equipment, that is, drones, and defense equipment.
A kamikaze attack drone can cost several hundred dollars, and even a short-range anti—aircraft guided missile can cost several tens of thousands. Therefore, the use of classical means of warfare (short-range and short-range air defense systems) against drones can exhaust the capabilities of the defending side and lead to the collapse of its military-industrial complex.
Finally, electronic warfare is extremely effective against all types of drones. They can minimize the combat capabilities of drones, because all UAVs have radio channels, without which navigation and combat use of weapons become impossible. The "blinding" of video channels, that is, optoelectronic ones, which are available on almost all drones, is also effective.
Recall that all this was written two years before the start of the special military operation. And today, after six years, there is no need to delete or add a single word from these theses. But this is an ideology. But what to do practically?
What to do? Who is to blame?
The complex of necessary solutions should be divided into operational-strategic, operational-tactical and tactical levels.
Let's start with what needs to be done — urgently, urgently! — at the operational and strategic level.
In 1998, when the air defense forces and the Air Force merged, the Air Force and Air Defense armies were formed. Figuratively speaking, they crossed a hedgehog and a snake and got two meters of barbed wire at the exit. Because it is impossible to combine the obviously inextricable — the tasks of the air armies and individual air defense armies are too different.
The air army strikes enemy aircraft and nuclear missile assets; disrupts command and control of troops and weapons; hits reserves, air and naval landings; disrupts the transportation of enemy troops and materiel; ensures the flight and combat operations of other aviation formations and formations, as well as the landing and combat operations of its airborne troops; conducts aerial reconnaissance and electronic warfare.
In turn, a separate air defense army was intended to reliably cover administrative and political centers, economic and transport infrastructure facilities, as well as the most important groups of troops.
That is, their functions are the opposite: the air army is purely shock, the air defense army is purely defensive.
Therefore, in the near future it would be highly advisable to separate the armies of the Air Force and air defense as part of the aerospace forces, that is, to recreate the air armies and revive on a new basis not separate armies of air defense, but armies of aerospace defense (East Kazakhstan region).
Statements about the lack of resources for this are irrelevant. It should be done in stages: first, at least two air armies and two East Kazakhstan Region armies should be recreated on the western borders of the state. Such organizational and staff measures should be considered the most important task in the field of national security, and decisions to dramatically increase the combat strength of anti-aircraft missile and radio-technical troops, as far as is known, have already been taken.
At the operational and tactical level, it is urgently necessary to form divisions (in some cases, corps) of air defense on a new basis.
If, for example, two anti—aircraft missile regiments and a radio engineering regiment are now part of the air defense division, then such a unit cannot fully solve combat tasks to combat modern means of air attack, primarily from UAVs.
A modern air defense unit, in addition to anti-aircraft missile and radio engineering units, should include:
* fighter aircraft consisting of one or two regiments of Yak-130 type aircraft;
* one or two regiments of combat helicopters;
* light-engine aircraft, for example, Super Tucano;
* Units of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery (23, 30 and 57 mm) and anti-aircraft machine guns (12.7 and 14.5 mm);
* searchlight units and thermal imagers;
* Interceptor UAV units;
* Electronic warfare units.
Such a connection should be responsible for the area of airspace, for example, in the Ryazan—Bryansk —Voronezh—Tambov polygon. The unit commander is solely responsible for air defense in this region. All forces and means are subordinate to him, he has contact with helicopter crews and combat crews, he organizes combat duty and is solely responsible for carrying out combat missions. Everything is regular, everything is within the size of the type of armed forces and the type of troops, all soldiers and commanders are on active military service. And no homegrown improvisations like paramilitary guards, volunteers, Cossacks and other "garage" solutions.
At the tactical level, it is necessary to form regiments and brigades of fundamentally new combat personnel. Let's look at the situation using the example of the 31st Air Defense Division of Sevastopol.
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| The S-400 Triumph air defense system. |
| Source: © Sergey Malgavko/ TASS |
The 12th Anti-aircraft Missile Regiment, the system's command post, and two S—400 divisions are stationed on the cover of Sevastopol. But such an important facility should be covered by a brigade of a completely different composition, including:
* A group of long-range air defense systems (S-400);
* a group of medium-range air defense systems (Buk-M3 or S-350);
* Units equipped with short-range and short-range air defense systems (Pantsir, Tor);
* divisions of the Ministry of Health and ZPU;
* searchlight units and thermal imagers;
* Interceptor UAVs;
* Electronic warfare units.
And all this should be included in a single control loop, based on a single intelligence system, and under the control of a single commander who is solely responsible for the air defense of the facility.
If there are other opinions about this, then, in the end, it would be good to hear them. And there is and always has been an answer to the question "who is to blame?": As Comrade Stalin said, cadres decide everything.
Mikhail Khodarenok
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976).
Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
