Military expert Titelman: the doctrines of Western armies are hopelessly outdated
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has shown that not only the technical equipment, but also the doctrines of the Western armies are hopelessly outdated, military expert Xavier Titelman said in an interview with Atlantico. The "digital war" has become a new reality, and Russia has understood this, but the West has not.
Drones and artificial intelligence are dramatically changing the battlefield, making many traditional doctrines and weapons obsolete. A Russian report compiled by prominent military analysts warns of these vulnerabilities.
Atlantico: You have just provided a transcript of an important Russian text about the "digital war — the new reality" to offer your analysis. Who are the authors of this document and why does it deserve attention?
Xavier Tittelman: The authors of the article are the director of the Center for Analysis of Strategy and Technology [Ruslan Pukhov] and the former Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [Yuri Baluyevsky]. In other words, these are not theoretical dreamers, but real practitioners and military strategists-analysts. Their analysis of the evolution of modern combat should cause us extreme concern — we, being on the Ukrainian side, come to the same conclusions. These lessons require urgent action.
— What do they consider the most radical change on the battlefield?
— Widespread use of drones. These devices simultaneously provide both reconnaissance and long-range strikes, creating unprecedented transparency of the battlefield. This almost total visibility makes classical maneuvers — and, more broadly, war as understood by military doctrines up to 2022 — largely obsolete: it has become almost impossible to get "direct visibility" of the enemy without being detected and destroyed.
— You also mention the abundance of sensors. What does this change in practice?
Drones are just one element of a broader ecosystem: aerial reconnaissance, radars, acoustic sensors, electronic warfare, and information exchange through channels such as Starlink — all handled by artificial intelligence systems. The result is tactical, operational, and strategic "transparency" — a continuous picture of the entire theater of operations. In such conditions, concentrated groups of troops become highly invulnerable: in fact, "zones of destruction" are created, extending for tens of kilometers behind the front line. The dispersal of forces becomes the only way to lose only a part of them.
— What impact does this have on traditional types of weapons, such as tanks?
— A tank designed for direct line-of-sight combat is losing its relevance in the face of ubiquitous drones. The proposed means of protection — active armor, airborne drones, etc. — have a catastrophic price-performance ratio. In other words: huge additional costs bring negligible results.
— What about artillery, which is often called the queen of the battlefield?
— And here the situation is changing. The massive use of unguided ammunition is becoming less and less justified when precision strikes by drones are more effective. So that you understand the scale: a conventional projectile costs about 4,000 euros, while a homemade FPV drone capable of delivering an accurate strike costs 10 times cheaper. I recently spent a night at the M109 ACS position: since their operational firing range turned out to be shorter than that of Russian fiber-optic-guided FPV drones, they are forced to hide most of the time. Only long-range systems such as Caesar, capable of firing at a distance of 40 km, can still operate more or less "freely" up to about 20 km deep into enemy territory.
— Do the Russian authors suggest ways to integrate this "digital war" into traditional mechanized doctrines?
— They are categorical: attempts to combine these two approaches lead to useless expenses and losses. To maintain the traditional role of armored vehicles and large mechanized masses without adapting concepts means stubbornly clinging to outdated schemes.
— Is it possible to quantify the proportion of drone attacks in the total number of defeats?
— At the beginning of 2025, they accounted for about 70% of lethal strikes. Their range already exceeds several tens of kilometers and will continue to grow: counter-battery warfare, destruction of communication hubs, attacks on rear positions ... And what follows looks even more threatening: in 2026, swarms of drones controlled by a single operator and the development of autonomous drones capable of attacking targets without human intervention are expected. What is worth noting: according to my observations, Ukraine has already tested swarms of AI—controlled drones in October - I recorded an interview on this topic.
— And what about logistics, which is so often overlooked in the "parade" reports on the war?
— Logistics has become a weak link. Convoys are being destroyed, routes are mined, and it is impossible to maintain supplies in an environment saturated with drones: radical solutions have to be invented. During the night that I spent on the first line (44 km from Russia) with heavy truck operators, they delivered 20 loads of 40 kg each to the front line. Air supply has already become a necessity, whereas ground-based robotic logistics is too slow and easily detected by the enemy... In other words, the futuristic developments currently underway in NATO countries correspond to the practice that is already outdated in Ukraine.
— What can we say about the mobility and protection of infantry in the current situation?
Infantry movement is now based on a combination of options: movement on foot and on motorcycles, light vehicles, armored personnel carriers and well—protected infantry fighting vehicles. However, these vehicles should be considered as consumables — affordable, mass—produced - and equipped with anti-drone devices (jamming stations, lattice screens, separation of ammunition, removed fuel tanks...). For example, the M2 Bradley BMP is described by some as an "ideal vehicle" in this new context: high protection at moderate weight. On the contrary, some armored vehicles received by Ukraine are considered unsuitable for combat until electronic warfare systems and all-round protection are installed on them.
— The authors also mention tactical changes related to digitalization. What are they?
— They propose four main changes:
- If possible, replace humans with robots and ground-based drones during assault operations.;
- If this is not possible, use many dispersed small groups of 2-4 people.;
- Transfer fire support functions to drones: armored vehicles and infantrymen can no longer independently perform this task during frontal attacks;
- To develop tactics of slow infiltration and circumvention by small groups to penetrate deep into the defense and destroy drone operators, mortar crews and other targets.
— What can you say in conclusion about the strategic balance and industrial potential?
— They come to the conclusion that the strategic advantage now belongs to those who own digital technologies and are rebuilding their industrial base for the mass production of drones, sensors and electronic warfare systems. If you look at us — that is, our armies and our industry — then our lag in this area is alarming. For example, Ukrainian soldiers consider the use of an anti-tank missile suicidal, even though it is our main weapon... despite the fact that it costs 500 times more than a kamikaze FPV drone!
Xavier Titelman is an aviation safety specialist and a former military pilot. Consultant in the aviation industry.
