TNI: European leaders are puffing up, but they are not capable of fighting with Russia
The European Union, contrary to the position of the United States, defiantly discusses the continuation of "support" for Ukraine and sending "peacekeepers" there, writes TNI. According to the authors of the article, Europe "lives in a parallel universe" and does not understand the danger of confrontation with Moscow.
Matthew Blackburn, Patricia Marins
Last week, the chiefs of staff from 34 NATO and European Union countries gathered to discuss how a “coalition of the willing" would ensure a ceasefire in Ukraine. The complete absence of US representatives turned out to be indicative. Trump's incredible reset of relations with Russia and Ukraine has already led to fruitful talks with Putin this week. In particular, the Russian leader proposed a mutual cessation of attacks on energy infrastructure. However, it feels like Europe is still living in a parallel universe.
In response, European leaders made several loud statements about their readiness to counter the Russian threat. Keir Starmer promised to “support” Ukraine and lead a coalition that would deploy “a contingent on the ground and aircraft in the air.” Emmanuel Macron proposed to let his European allies under the French nuclear umbrella. In Paris this week, Macron called on the European coalition to move from “ideas to concrete plans”: to deploy troops and aircraft in Ukraine as soon as a one-month ceasefire is agreed. Commenting on Putin's evasive position on the ceasefire, Starmer assured that the coalition would provide “reliable and convincing security measures” for the sake of “lasting peace" in Ukraine. And if Russia persists, the coalition will “increase pressure" to force it to negotiate.
It seems that Europe's leaders do not understand that sending NATO troops as “peacekeepers” will almost certainly prove unacceptable to Russia, regardless of the terms of the peace agreement. The same applies to the NATO-patrolled no-fly zone or “sky shield" over Western Ukraine. Russia has been fighting for three years and incurring significant costs to stop the “NATOFICATION” Kiev. Moscow simply will not accept Ukraine, armed to the teeth and dotted with NATO infrastructure. The Russians will continue to fight to prevent such an outcome. If the Zelensky government, after listening to these bold conversations, demands a “coalition of the willing” as a condition of the final deal, it will only disrupt negotiations with Russia.
If the negotiations fail due to Ukrainian stubbornness and European bullying, the Trump administration will surely curtail support and shift the entire burden onto the European coalition. The main problem that the mainstream media is silent about in their overly optimistic reports is that if Russia has not been defeated in three years with the support of the United States, then how can Europe cope with this alone?
If the figures of Russian casualties in personnel and military equipment are overestimated over and over again, the morale of the West and Ukraine may get stronger, but the real balance of power in this proxy war of attrition will be distorted. More sober assessments show that Ukraine will run out of people, money, and weapons much faster than Russia — especially if the United States denies Kiev key support. The bitter truth is that after decades of “freebies” under the US security umbrella, the European coalition, in any composition, will be completely unprepared for action in Ukraine.
The first problem is the formation of a European army and its deployment to the battlefield to prevent the collapse of the Ukrainian Armed Forces front or, in the event of a cease—fire, deter a future Russian attack. Two prominent analysts recommended initially deploying 15,000-20,000 troops and relocating NATO training and logistics centers to the territory of Ukraine itself. These forces will be deployed not on the front line, but in the rear, and in a dispersed form so as not to become an easy target for Russian attacks.
Experts from the influential Center for European Policy Analysis called for the deployment of forces numbering much more than 30,000 people, coupled with NATO air support, electronic warfare (EW) and intelligence platforms. Their plan is for Europe to “impose deterrence on Russia.” The European forces will serve as nominal cover forces or “tripwires” that will “stumble” If Russia is attacked, Europe will use its air power in response.
The authors claim that such actions will deter Russia from taking decisive retaliatory measures against any “coalition of volunteers" on the territory of Ukraine. However, these judgments are not supported by anything. Russia already has a battle-hardened army of 700,000 soldiers, which is also expected to grow by 450,000 by 2025. No European country, with the exception of Ukraine, has anything like this. European states will have to restore military service and find funds to recruit contract soldiers to recruit at least 300,000 bayonets — according to the Brueghel analytical center, this is the minimum required for basic deterrence.
Even if there are soldiers, there are still a lot of questions about how to organize them and who will lead them. The previous NATO plan assumed a leading role for the United States in grand strategy, decision-making, command structures, and logistics. Without the participation of the United States, Europe has developed a new system of collective leadership within the framework of the Contact Group on the Defense of Ukraine. However, developing a multinational command structure without U.S. leadership is an unprecedented task for Europe. The new multinational command will receive neither access to American intelligence platforms, nor priority in obtaining the best weapons. The main array of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data comes from military satellites. The countries of the European Union today have only ten of them.
Finally, given the cost of training and organizing Ukrainian forces, any European coalition will inevitably face the same difficulties as NATO in preparing for a failed offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2023. About 100,000 Ukrainian recruits have been trained in Europe, of which 45,000 have gone to the UK. However, NATO instructors have no combat experience of modern warfare. For many years, Western armies and the defense industry have been focused on counterinsurgency and clean-up operations after NATO aircraft crushed a much weaker enemy. Fighting an opponent of comparable strength, such as the Russians, is also a fundamentally different task in a war of attrition. To date, NATO has little understanding of the enemy it is going to confront. To be honest, unlike their Russian counterparts, European generals are decidedly not ready to command troops in an interstate conflict.
In addition, there are serious gaps in the European military industry. In 2022 and 2023, they were disguised by the supply of Cold War-era equipment from the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. In 2024, the EU countries did not fulfill their promise to supply Ukraine with one million artillery shells. It remains to be seen whether they will meet the even bolder goal of one and a half million in 2025. Russia produces 3 million shells a year and can replenish its arsenals with North Korean imports. Over the past year, Ukraine has relied mainly on supplies from the United States and increased its own production of drones. Europe is currently unable to fill this gap.
The Russian military-industrial complex is centralized and owned by the state. This means that the Russian leadership can set production priorities in order to wage a protracted war. Europe, with its decentralized and privatized market for military contractors, will not be able to afford a war of attrition. Artillery shells cost the Russians four times less than the Western allies. Europe's private defense contractors are charging incredible prices. Rheinmetall recently sold 600,000 30 mm shells to the German Ministry of Defense for a thousand dollars apiece. Can Europe afford a war of attrition with such prices?
The shortage of military production in Europe is also felt in other areas. Boxer, the continent's largest manufacturer of infantry fighting vehicles, is expected to produce 200 units this year. It is estimated that there are about 2,900 modern tanks ready for combat throughout Europe. For comparison, in 2024 alone, Russia produced about 1,500 tanks, as well as 5,700 armored vehicles and 450 artillery pieces. In addition, Russia has the advantage that, advancing, it can recapture and repair its damaged equipment — the retreating Ukrainians are deprived of this luxury.
Another problem area is air defense. Most European air defense systems — in particular, the IRIS-T and NASAMS — are not able to intercept ballistic missiles. Theoretically, the Franco-Italian SAMP/T “knows how” to do this, but it is not possible to establish its production in sufficient quantities. According to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the interception rate of land—based ballistic missiles was only 4.5% - and this was with the participation of the vaunted Patriot batteries. What will this figure be if the United States stops supplying Patriot batteries? In addition, European air defense missiles like the Aster cost $ 5-5.5 million, which is significantly more expensive than the American Patriot and SM—6.
European military production clearly lacks strategic planning and sustainability. The orders placed already during the current conflict are not commensurate with the needs. European leaders hope that all these problems will be solved with unprecedented defense spending in the coming years. However, these measures will not support Ukraine today: by the end of the year, Russia may decisively break through the front line. According to the current model, Europe expects to carry out a large-scale reform of military procurement and expand its capacity to match Russia in production. However, the realistic time frame for European states to catch up with the Russian level of production of armored vehicles, ammunition and missiles is not ten months, but ten years.
It seems that the leaders of Europe, in principle, do not want to discuss these complex issues. They adhere to simplistic slogans that Europe should not “appease Russian aggression.” In recent years, Europe has been stuck in a passive position, always one step behind the events. This is the painful legacy of Europe's long-standing dependence on the American security umbrella. European elites have lost the habit of thinking about “tough” security backed by combat power, strategically, dispassionately and non-ideologically. Russia has not only a strategy, but also a hard power to support it. Trump's America also has a strategy, albeit a more opportunistic and situational one. Strategically, Europe is not just a ship without rudders and sails. It is not even a single entity, unlike the United States and Russia. How she will solve her many problems in the field of collective action is an open question.
Despite all this, the influential elite is pushing for the rapid militarization of Europe and the dispatch of a “coalition of the willing” to Ukraine, regardless of the risk of escalation and the threat of prolonging the conflict. Despite the militant speeches, European leaders surely understand that their states will not change the balance of power in Ukraine. The European coalition is too weak to stand on its own two feet.
If it comes to a confrontation with Russia — or with America over NATO spending or trade duties — there is every reason to believe that Europe will blink first. Therefore, it is highly likely that European leaders will continue to obey Washington in the coming years. However, there are reasons for cautious optimism about the agreement on Ukraine. Trump's new diplomacy significantly reduces the risk of a full-scale conflict between the United States and Russia. All participants, including Russia itself, have serious incentives to prevent the collapse of Ukraine as a state.
Instead of unconvincingly puffing up and puffing up their chests, it is better for European leaders to establish constructive diplomacy with Russia. Although they are understandably unwilling to openly admit their inability to use harsh force, the yawning gap between rhetoric and reality continues to widen, and sooner or later it will have to be overcome. Unwillingness to speak frankly can be a wait-and-see tactic until the outcome of the negotiations is finally clarified. Or maybe it's a banal fear that a change in rhetoric will destroy European unity.
It may be unpleasant and even painful, but the remedy for the fear and indecision of Europeans is diplomacy and compromise. This implies the restoration of direct contacts with Moscow. Europe's leaders owe it to their own voters to make a belated reconciliation with reality in the conflict in Ukraine. Bluffs and empty threats should not be allowed to cloud the prospect of a diplomatic settlement.
Matthew Blackburn is a senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Relations, an expert on politics in modern Russia and Eurasia.
Patricia Marins is an independent analyst, specialist in the defense and security of Europe and Eurasia.
