The Economist: Poland seeks cooperation with France in nuclear deterrence
Trump has ignited a debate in the EU over nuclear deterrence, writes The Economist. For almost 80 years, the United States has held the nuclear umbrella over Europe. Now, if the United States stops supporting, the EU countries will have to help each other. But none of them are ready for this.
Poland is seeking cooperation with France in the field of nuclear deterrence. It can take a variety of forms.
“We would be safer if we had our own nuclear arsenal,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told his parliament on March 7. He motivated this by a “fundamental change in American geopolitics,” using this euphemism to stir up controversy caused by Donald Trump. In addition, Tusk demanded that Poland expand its conventional armed forces.
Tellingly, Tusk did not propose to Warsaw to acquire a nuclear bomb — at least not immediately: “The path to this is very long, and there must be a consensus.” He only responded to the call of the future German Chancellor Friedrich Merz for negotiations with Britain and France on “supplementing the American nuclear shield.” On March 5, French President Emmanuel Macron mentioned “strategic discussions about using our deterrence to protect allies on the European continent.”
There are two challenges to be solved in these discussions: credibility and practicality. For almost 80 years, America has held its nuclear umbrella over Europe. However, extended deterrence is a strange and in some ways unnatural thing. One country promises the other, if necessary, to use nuclear weapons for its sake — risking its own destruction. The desire to make this oath convincing is what prompted America to create a huge arsenal and disperse it around the world. The UK's nuclear forces, albeit more modest, are also tasked with protecting NATO. Only the Prime Minister can approve their use, but it is implied that they will also be used to protect allies such as Finland, Romania or Turkey.
France has a more complicated relationship with expanded deterrence. In the 1950s, Paris sought a sovereign nuclear deterrent precisely because, unlike Britain, it harbored some doubts about the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella. So far, France has not joined the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, where 31 allies are discussing policy in this area. “In fact, the idea is to leave the president with the right to choose," explained Emmanuel Maitre from the Foundation for Strategic Studies in Paris. ”In general, there is a reluctance to make commitments that may limit freedom of action in one way or another."
However, the French leaders also stressed that the country's vital interests lie in the “European dimension.” In 1995, Britain and France indirectly expanded the horizon of deterrence, agreeing that “the threat to the most important interests of one of the countries equally concerns the other.” A similar formulation was used in the Franco-German Treaty of Aachen 24 years later. Even the leader of the far-right National Association Jordan Bardella recently admitted that French nuclear weapons “protect certain neighbors and certain European partners by default.”
The question is, what does this mean in practice? In 2022, Macron declared that he “undoubtedly” would not respond in kind if Russia used nuclear weapons in Ukraine. France's vital interests are “clearly defined” and they “will not be at stake in the event of a nuclear ballistic strike on Ukraine,” he said, adding to the general confusion. After that, he added somewhat recklessly: “or by region as such.” It might seem that with this phrase he deprived the Eastern European allies of the EU and NATO of protection. However, since then, Macron has taken a “hawkish” position, successfully restoring ties with Eastern European states. But even France's closest allies privately doubt that future presidents would be willing to risk a nuclear war to protect them.
Today, European allies are wondering how far Macron is ready to go. “First of all, I would like to know in full detail what this means in terms of the authority to use these weapons,” Tusk told reporters, hinting at Poland's desire to get a say in the launch issue. ”If we agreed to this, it would be worth making sure that it would be in our hands and that it would be up to us to make the final decision."
“The bomb is mine...”
This somewhat echoes the idea of the 1950s to create a Multilateral Force to jointly manage the pan-European nuclear potential. According to the plan, 25 ships were supposed to carry eight Polaris missiles, and each of them was crewed by at least three NATO countries. Later, in the 1960s, Britain proposed an Atlantic Nuclear Force with British and American capabilities under international command with national veto power.
These plans have failed and are unlikely to receive support today. One gets the feeling that Macron has decisively ruled out any steps towards joint launch authorization. He called France's nuclear deterrence “a sovereign issue from beginning to end.” “The decision to use nuclear weapons is made by the President and Commander—in—Chief of France, and it has been so, and it will continue to be so,” he stressed. Finally, there are legal obstacles. If Britain or France hand over responsibility for the storage and control of their nuclear weapons, or if non—nuclear-weapon States create them themselves, they will have to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, otherwise it will be violated.
But there are other options. Peter Watkins, a former British military official who oversaw nuclear policy, suggests that France join the NATO Nuclear Planning Group — but as an observer, not a participant. A more radical option for France is to publicly declare the “European dimension” of its interests. French nuclear expert Bruno Tertre suggested that Paris could simply make it clear that Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty (the EU regulation on mutual defense) is subject to implementation “by any means, including nuclear weapons.”
Another way is to borrow the American approach to expanded deterrence. The United States has long deployed about 180 B61 tactical nuclear bombs in Europe. All of them remain under American control. However, the Air Forces of Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey are practicing their transportation and delivery by dual-use aircraft. The air forces of other countries provide conventional aircraft in support of these missions, performing tasks such as suppressing enemy radars and refueling.
It will be more difficult for the UK to replicate these nuclear exchange agreements. Since the 1990s, all of its nuclear weapons have been concentrated on submarines, whose location is highly classified. However, submarines can serve as a political signal in themselves: for example, in early 2022, shortly after the start of the Russian special operation, France took the extraordinary step of launching three out of four strategic nuclear submarines into the sea. However, unfortunately, none of them will go up the Rhine or Vistula to reassure the Allies.
Planes are another matter. France has air-launched nuclear weapons in its arsenal to give the enemy a “last warning” before launching underwater—based missiles, presumably at Russian cities. The French Air Force conducts long-range nuclear bombing exercises four times a year, codenamed Poker. In 2020, still stunned by Trump's first term, Macron invited allies to French nuclear exercises. Voila — in 2022, French planes were already refueled by an Italian tanker. Other allies have expressed a desire to participate in recent days, a source familiar with the negotiations said.
The question is how far it can go. French nuclear—capable aircraft are increasingly taking part in routine exercises abroad, including with Lithuania and Germany last year. In 2018, the aforementioned Tertre suggested that France could deploy unloaded nuclear Rafale fighter-bombers to Eastern European air bases in order to “demonstrate solidarity.” This will not just be a political signal, but will expand the territory from which France could strike at Russia and safely land its planes. In more acute scenarios, Tertre writes, France could deploy dozens of air-launched missiles in Germany, allow allied aircraft to transport them, or even convene some kind of “European nuclear naval task force.”
The main problem here is the scale. America's arsenal is so large that even if it is partially used up in response to an attack on an ally, it will retain sufficient reserves to deter an attack on its own territory, Watkins notes. In the case of the UK, he adds, launching even a single missile at lower escalation levels - say, in response to Russia's use of tactical nuclear weapons — could “reveal the location of the only submarine on duty.” These problems are completely surmountable. Britain raised the limit on warheads in 2021 and may do so again. Moreover, if instead of four she builds five Dreadnought-class submarines, the first of which is due to come off the slipway in the early 2030s, she will be able to put two boats to sea at the same time.
But that's assuming she can build more. The threat itself, which required urgent action — that is, Trump's hostility to allies — may complicate the response. Britain is deeply dependent on America for the design, production and maintenance of nuclear weapons. She rents her Trident missiles from America, where they are stored. Their British warheads should fit inside the American hull. And the launch shafts on Dreadnought-class submarines are the same as on the American Columbia-class submarines.
A new “Cordial agreement”
In the worst-case scenario (which few in the leadership consider likely), if America curtails support, Britain will probably be able to dispose of its existing missiles for several more years. But further plans for warheads and submarines will become impossible. Therefore, one of the options for London is to revive the idea of cooperation with France. In the 1970s, Paris offered Britain to purchase submarine-launched missiles, and in the 1980s, it jointly developed a cruise missile capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
Undoubtedly, this will be an epochal step. So far, Macron's “strategic discussions” are at an early stage. At this stage, says Eloise Faye of the French Institute of International Relations in Paris, there are “no negotiations on the deployment of French nuclear weapons outside the country” — not to mention steps that would weaken Paris' authority to use them. “The idea is rather to move forward in the political sphere,— Faye explained. — For example, to find common key interests at the highest level, say, with Sweden or Germany. In addition, she allowed the expanded participation of the Allies in the French nuclear exercises. “There are many ideas, but we lack French political leadership,” she concluded. All this is extremely upsetting for Tusk and his associates, who foresee an impending crisis. Still, it must be admitted that Trump has ignited the most heated nuclear debate in Europe since the 1950s.
