Natalia Kotlyar, Deputy Director for Business Development at the Vector Research Institute, on the changing anti—drone solutions market
How the market for anti—drone solutions has changed, how threat models are evolving, how perimeter protection differs from carpet protection, whether grids solve all problems and whether there are objects that "cannot reach" - in the author's article by Natalia Kotlyar, Deputy Director for Business Development at the Vector Research Institute of the Roselektronika holding.
Over the past year, the Russian anti—drone security market has noticeably "matured" - it has become more professional. This is a key trend noted by the expert community. The professionalism of not only the manufacturers, but also the customers themselves has grown significantly.
The main trend
Analysts say that market participants have figured out the situation and have begun to understand more clearly what needs to be done to secure their facilities. Naturally, as manufacturers of electronic warfare systems, it has become much easier and more comfortable for us to work with professionally savvy customers who consciously and competently approach security tasks.
The professionalism of the customers, first of all, was reflected in a qualitatively different level of formation of technical tasks. For example, the queries that we've had to work with over the past three years have mostly been quite specific. They often reflected spontaneous aspirations to install an illogically large amount of equipment: take the number rather than the quality of the solution.
We, in turn, were actually engaged in educational training among such customers. We had to explain that, for example, it is impractical to install all the currently available equipment on one object. In addition to the fact that such a solution is expensive, it also involves the problem of technological lag, since any equipment becomes obsolete, and this is a completely natural phenomenon.
Despite our educational work, individual customers continued to insist on their point of view, which, unfortunately, was often unconstructive. It was not easy to work in such conditions.
The situation is different now. Most customers are now guided by the principle of reasonable necessity. There is a consensus among market participants that it is necessary to act in stages: complete one level of protection, then move up a notch, and so on. This approach is one of the most effective tools for leveling the problem of technological lag in the field of equipping facilities with anti—drone protection.
Innovations in the threat model
The threat model is evolving, and it is evolving continuously. The emergence of new types of drones automatically entails changes in the threat model. For example, entire families of mother drones, fiber-optic drones, medium-sized aircraft-type drones, drones with automatic guidance, and so on are now being actively marketed. Such a technological turnaround requires new approaches to building protection facilities.
A system that adequately responded to the threat model of the period 2023-2024 will require significant improvements today — we will have to purchase additional equipment, while upgrading existing ones. Since the installed system was designed for an outdated threat model, it would technically not be able to effectively counter the new one. At the same time, if the choice was made in favor of a phased scheme of "closing" the facility, then the situation turns out to be more advantageous. When, at the first stage, the customer "closes off" from one threat model and has the budget to develop updated protection, he is obviously in a strategically advantageous position.
I would like to emphasize once again that it is the step-by-step approach that makes it possible to minimize the very risk of technological lag, which can become critical for a number of enterprises.
As for the classical description of the threat model, it remains relevant. The attention of the security services focuses on the following points: the threat of seizure, explosion or destruction of an object, a threat to the health of personnel or others, the threat of exposure to dangerous chemical or radioactive substances, technical effects aimed at disabling power supply systems or disrupting production and technological processes. The threats themselves do not disappear, but the means by which they can be implemented are changing. Moreover, these tools continue to be modified.
The key protection paradigm
Despite the dynamics of the transformation of modern realities, there are still those who firmly believe that "it will not reach them." Personally, this situation scares me. The experience of Russian and foreign companies shows that calculations that "somehow will work out" are very short-sighted and dangerous. There is no guarantee that it will work, and besides, you need to be soberly aware that it is extremely difficult to predict the specific tactics of conducting the so—called drone attack planned by the enemy. There are no manuals describing the flight paths of attacking drones. Therefore, all critical facilities simply have to be "closed" from enemy drones in due order.
One thing can be stated with full confidence — if an enterprise is of strategic importance or in the event of an emergency it may pose a danger to people or the environment, then an "arrival" on it is quite likely.
There is still no universal solution, and the solution for each specific situation remains a unique task. Obviously, any defense must be serious and well thought out. In some cases, it will be multi-level, layered, with powerful equipment, and in others, relatively simple, mostly preventive measures will be enough.
At the same time, the conceptual essence of the approaches that we use to find solutions for "closing" facilities remains largely unchanged. We are talking about object protection — when only a few of the most explosive or most important components of the main facility are "closed". Protection can also be perimeter-based, when the entire perimeter of an object is "closed", and in a rather serious way. Protection can also be "carpet" — the entire object, regardless of the importance of its components, is "closed" completely. By the way, carpet protection is the most expensive. But, in my opinion, it is not the most effective: with sufficiently significant financial costs, it does not always ensure that there is no technological lag. For example, you have now built a super reliable "carpet" protection of an object, and tomorrow the enemy has changed one small means of executing the threat model — and you will have to supplement the entire cumbersome and already expensive system with serious financial injections.
Most of all, I am impressed by the concept of the so-called "zoo", that is, the combination of different protection systems. Of course, if you have carefully made mechanical protection, for example, put up nets, they will certainly be useful and one of the most effective means of "closing" dangerous areas at the facility. But the means of detecting and suppressing them still remain the basis of anti-drone protection. Despite the fact that the ideas of interceptor drones are becoming increasingly popular, there are no really working solutions in this direction. Nevertheless, I believe that we will see them in the near future, and in large numbers.
Along with new trends, our products remain in high demand — the SICKLE electronic suppression systems manufactured by the Vector Research Institute. They are, of course, one of the most effective means of protecting objects, both preventive and active.
Chatterbox is a godsend for a spy
Another important market trend at the moment is the maximum closure of information. Most of the leading experts prefer to speak at closed conferences with access to officially registered participants.
The fact is that it is absolutely unacceptable to broadcast the information we share with our clients to a wide media field. It is often necessary to oppose individual journalists who ask extremely inappropriate questions, for example: "How many of these products were made? How many of them were put in such and such a region?" and the like.
It is quite obvious that no sane person will publicly disclose which security systems and where exactly they use. For objective reasons, this is completely confidential data, and its disclosure is simply a crime. From the same series, the controversy surrounding the publicity of tenders. If they are completely open, they are the equivalent of a Polichinelle secret.
