Colonel Khodarenok named the main lessons of his three years
The special military operation, which has been going on for three years, has become the first high-intensity armed conflict of the 21st century. It changed many ideas about the armed struggle and marked the beginning of the era of unmanned systems. What the Russian army learned from its military and why the assaults of Bakhmut and Chasov Yar changed the view of wars around the world - in the material of the military observer Gazeta.Ru" by Mikhail Khodarenka.
During the conflict in Ukraine, opponents with approximately equal combat and operational capabilities, equipped with weapons and military equipment with comparable characteristics, clashed in an armed confrontation.
After the first battles and battles, all the previous ideas about the conflicts of the future and theoretical research, such as the wars of the sixth generation, turned out to be very, very far from reality. The ideas of contactless wars, which back in 2014 seemed to theorists to be the only possible option for waging war, against the background of the assault on Bakhmut, Ugledar and Chasova Yar turned out to be so illusory that it is even inconvenient to recall them now. In short, in the course of their military training, both theorists and practitioners of military construction saw something that did not fit into their ideas of armed struggle.
The theoretical foundations of its
The term "special military operation" was not born in 2022, but at least 20 years earlier. Let us recall that there is a so-called system of strategic actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the forms of use of troops (forces). There is also a section on "special actions", the definition of which should be given in full.:
A set of coordinated and interrelated actions of troops (forces), law enforcement and other ministries and departments, united by a single plan and plan, carried out in a certain region, both in their own country and on the territory of a foreign state, in order to solve non-traditional tasks for the Armed Forces that cannot and inexpediently be solved by declaring war and using means of armed struggle.
Let's pay attention to the following phrases: "on the territory of a foreign state," "in order to solve tasks that are not traditional for the Armed Forces," and "it is impossible and impractical to solve them by declaring war and using means of armed struggle."
In full accordance with these postulates, a special military operation was planned, the definition of which is "a set of interrelated and coordinated goals, objectives, place and time of special operations of troops (forces) united by a single plan and plan in peacetime and wartime to achieve certain political, strategic and operational objectives."
We emphasize in particular - "special actions of troops," not combat at all. In other words, no intense life-and-death armed confrontation was initially envisaged when planning a special military operation. A kind of liberation campaign was planned along the lines of September 17, 1939 (the date of the beginning of the Red Army's military operation in Poland, as a result of which Polish territories were annexed to the Belarusian and Ukrainian USSR. - "Newspaper.Ru").
On December 20, 2021, I wrote why there would be no large-scale Russian-Ukrainian war.
In those days, I argued that from the point of view of military art, a hypothetical "invasion" of Ukraine using only conventional weapons by the Russian Armed Forces could take the form of a strategic offensive operation in the theater of military operations.
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| Military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. |
| Source: Viacheslav Ratynskyi/Reuters |
Given the combat and numerical strength of the armed forces of Ukraine, I believed then, the degree of their combat readiness and combat training, for such an operation it is necessary to involve at least several operational and strategic formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (i.e. fronts), the Black Sea Fleet, separate combined arms (tank) armies, army corps, divisions, at least one army Air defense and Air Force units, airborne forces, branches of the armed forces and special forces, reserves of the Supreme High Command.
I thought in December 2021 that the troops and forces of the Russian Armed Forces deployed in the western regions of Russia were decidedly not ready for such an operation. I made such a conclusion only on the basis of data on the lack of deployment of operational and partly strategic logistics, forces and technical support.
Air supremacy
During previous local wars and armed conflicts over the past more than 30 years, the Russian Air Force (now the Aerospace Forces) has never encountered an enemy that would match the combat and operational capabilities of Russian aviation.
Bomb-assault and missile-aircraft strikes against various kinds of irregular formations in such conflicts were carried out mainly from safe heights, and losses of aircraft were minimal. The enemy, equipped with large-caliber machine guns and, at best, portable anti-aircraft missile systems, could not provide effective counteraction to the Air Force/VKS.
The only conflict during which the Russian aviation encountered the beginnings of an organized air defense system was the war with Georgia in 2008.
Moreover, based on the results of air and anti-aircraft battles, the necessary changes are promptly made to the design of air defense systems, as well as to the techniques and methods of warfare.
During any armed conflict, the most important task of the Air Force/VKS is to seize and maintain air supremacy. So far, this task has not been fully solved by domestic aviation. Russian fighters and bombers in the airspace of Ukraine are widely used mainly as "aerial artillery" and as carriers of cruise missiles when launching attacks from long ranges.
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| The Mi-24 helicopter of the Russian Armed Forces in the sky in the area of a special military operation. |
| Source: Evgeny Biyatov/RIA Novosti |
Partially, the Aerospace forces are solving the problem of undermining the military-economic potential of Ukraine, in particular, destroying important military-industrial, petrochemical, fuel and energy and other economic facilities.
Operational-tactical and army aviation provide air support to the troops, especially with bombs from the UMPC, quite effectively during their military operations. The enemy has not yet found any effective "antidote" to these weapons.
In general, it is necessary to more than quickly improve the organizational and staff structure, equip the Russian aerospace Forces with the equipment and weapons necessary to perform all these tasks, and bring Russian combat aircraft to a new level.
Artillery remains the "god of war"
Russian artillery in the special operation in Ukraine is experiencing its rebirth, and although some Russian weapons are inferior in some characteristics to Western guns, they surpass them in reliability, performance and maintainability.
In 1993, NATO adopted the Joint Ballistic Memorandum of Understanding (JBMoU). He defined a new standard for 155-mm howitzers and set the maximum range of high-explosive fragmentation shells at 30 km, and active-rocket projectiles at 40 km. The document also introduced requirements for the barrel length of 52-caliber NATO howitzers and for the volume of the charging chamber - 23 liters.
Russia in the 1990s was decidedly not up to artillery, and no measures were taken to improve the tactical and technical characteristics of domestic guns and howitzers in those years.
Currently, one of the main guns of the Russian artillery is the 152-mm self-propelled howitzer 2S3 "Acacia". Its production started in 1968. The length of the howitzer barrel is 28 calibers, the volume of the charging chamber is 12.8 liters. The firing range is 17.3 km.
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| Calculation of the ACS 2S3 "Acacia". |
| Source: Sergey Bobylev/RIA Novosti |
The divisional self-propelled howitzer 2S19 "Msta" has a barrel length of 47 calibers, a charging chamber volume of 16 liters, and a firing range of 24.7 km.
Two critical indicators - the length of the barrel in calibers and the volume of the charging chamber - determine the firing range and give indisputable advantages to NATO guns equipped with artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this regard. In addition to the volume of the charging chamber, the higher quality of Western powders and the high processability of barrel processing should also be taken into account. This determines, in addition to the range, the high accuracy of shooting.
Some characteristics of foreign guns put domestic artillery at a significant disadvantage, especially in terms of counter-battery warfare. If we add to this a high degree of automation in the field of topography (determining the location of a point on the ground. - "Newspaper.Ru") and the preparation of the initial data for firing, and add here the high characteristics of the Western-made counter-battery radar, the picture turns out to be quite bleak.
The Russian artillery is rescued by a relatively small number of NATO guns equipped with the Armed Forces of Ukraine - according to some sources, no more than 150 barrels. Most of the Ukrainian artillery is armed with Soviet-made cannons and howitzers, which to a certain extent equalizes the chances.
The German PzH 2000 howitzers, the British AS-90, the French CAESAR and the Polish AHS Krab could compete with the 2S35 Coalition-SV interspecific artillery system, which has a range of 70 km and a rate of fire of 12-16 rounds per minute. However, the "Coalition" did not reach the front, and there are great doubts whether this weapon will appear in the troops at all.
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| Howitzer PzH 2000. |
| Source: Global Look Press |
Thus, the vast majority of Russian artillery was developed back in the 1960s and 1980s, or even earlier, and it would not be a big exaggeration to say that Leonid Brezhnev's cannons, howitzers and mortars dominate the battlefields.
Tank battles in the past
The armed conflict in Ukraine has seriously raised the following question: does the tank remain the main striking force of the ground forces in modern warfare? And there doesn't seem to be a definite answer for today.
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| Infographics of leopard 2. |
| Source: Alina Djus/"Newspaper.Ru" |
At first, the Ukrainian Armed Forces simply prayed for British Challenger 2 tanks, American M1A2 Abrams, German Leopard of various modifications, including the latest Leopard 2A6 - except that they did not kiss their exhaust pipes.
The main battle tanks of Western countries actually have good combat characteristics.
But in modern armed conflicts, the time of dashing tank attacks and large-scale battles of many hundreds and thousands of armored combat vehicles seems to have passed.
Even today, formidable combat vehicles are used only in the form of mobile firing points firing from closed firing positions.
The revision of the previous role in combat concerns not only tanks: by and large, the entire concept of infantry fighting vehicles needs to be clarified based on the rich experience gained during its military operations. Apparently, lightly armored vehicles have also exhausted themselves as the main infantry fighting vehicle.
Infantry was, is, and will be the queen of the fields.
In previous theoretical concepts of the wars of the 21st century, there was practically no discussion about the role of infantry in the armed conflicts of the future. Meanwhile, as the experience of the SVO has shown, the infantry was and remains the queen of the fields. For example, the Ukrainian army practically does not lack weapons, military equipment and ammunition, but the lack of infantry practically deprives the Armed Forces of Ukraine of any chance of success in combat operations.
Of course, the infantry of the 21st century must be equipped with the latest weapons and military equipment, motorized, computerized, with the most modern means of protection and equipment.
Let us recall the historical toast of Joseph Stalin, pronounced on May 5, 1941 at a banquet in the Kremlin in honor of graduates of military academies - and still has not lost its relevance.: "In all wars, the main branch of the armed forces that ensured victory was the infantry. Artillery, aviation, and armored forces protected the infantry and ensured the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the infantry. Fortresses, towns and settlements of the enemy were considered occupied only when infantry set foot there. It has always been so, and it will be so in the future war. I propose the first toast to the infantry. For the queen of the fields, the infantry!"
The era of drones
No one expected such a scale of use of unmanned aerial vehicles on the battlefields of the SVR. It is no exaggeration to say that unmanned vehicles have overturned all previous ideas about the nature of armed struggle in the wars of the 21st century. Today, the cutting edge of the sound of UAV engines running, figuratively speaking, resembles a buzzing beehive.
Barrage munitions, or kamikaze drones, have become widespread in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Their ability to attack stationary and mobile targets from various angles, often located at serious distances, and to do so often unexpectedly for the enemy and with high efficiency, made them one of the "discoveries" of their military.
Today, unmanned aerial vehicles dominate the battlefield.
In the current situation, a new branch of the armed forces is being created in Russia - the Troops of unmanned systems. The formation of the new structure is scheduled to be completed in the third quarter of 2025.
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| Military personnel of the Russian Armed Forces. |
| Source: Stanislav Krasilnikov/RIA Novosti |
The need for reform
The need for major organizational and staff measures to strengthen the capabilities of the air defense and the army is not only overdue, but already, one might say, overripe.
In the near future, it seems highly advisable to separate the Air Force and air Defense armies as part of the Aerospace Forces, that is, to recreate the air armies and revive on a new basis not separate air defense armies, but aerospace defense armies.
It should be added that now the armies of the Air Force and air defense are headed, as a rule, by aviators, and not by specialists in the field of air defense organization. In addition, pilot commanders, and for very objective reasons, are very far from many specific issues in the field of combat automation, radar reconnaissance, and anti-aircraft missile defense.
On their own, the aviators are focused on solving the tasks inherent in purely air armies, that is, bombing and launching air strikes against the enemy. For example, the issues of anti-aircraft missile cover for oil refineries and bridge crossings over the Volga River are far from the first place for pilots.
And the urgency of covering a wide variety of facilities within the European part of the country will only increase.
The Litmus Test
A high-intensity armed conflict is the best litmus test for verifying the correctness of decisions made in the military sphere in peacetime. Unsuitable structures are discarded, and personnel who do not correspond to their positions are replaced by officers and generals who have proven themselves in battle.
The results of many organizational and staff activities carried out in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in previous times need to be reviewed, and urgently. What seemed to be quite good in peacetime turned out to be of little use - and sometimes simply incompetent - in a special military operation.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
