For the first time in history, the naval forces of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA Navy) are conducting exercises with the participation of both their combat aircraft carriers. And these ships, and many of the planes on them, are to a large extent the heirs of Soviet military-industrial power. In a sense, the Chinese show what the Soviet Navy could create. And this is really a real power capable of challenging the aircraft carriers of the US Navy.
In September, the PLA Navy began a large series of naval exercises. An aircraft carrier group consisting of the Liaoning aircraft carrier, as well as the Anshan destroyer of Project 055 (one of the largest missile ships in the world), the Urumqi, Chengdu and Huainan destroyers (all of Project 052D) and the Hulonghu integrated supply ship went to sea. Such a group has both the most powerful air defense and its own strike capabilities (anti-ship missiles, anti-ship missiles). And the presence of an aircraft carrier and naval aviation makes it many times more powerful than if it consisted only of missile ships.
As part of the naval air group on the Liaoning, there were not only multi-purpose fighters, but also J-15D jammers, without which it is almost impossible to strike ships with combat-ready air defense. Such jammers can provide not only a carrier-based aircraft strike, but also conduct reconnaissance for surface ships and "clear" the way for their RCC.
In addition, such a detachment can deliver a combined strike by aircraft and ships, synchronized in time and supported by jamming. It is impossible to repel such an attack.
Operating east of Taiwan, the carrier group performed a wide range of training tasks, including flights. In 12 days (from September 20 to October 1 inclusive), the Chinese air group carried out 630 sorties, of which 380 were aircraft sorties. The average is 31.6 departures per day.
This may not be the limit. Working at full capacity requires special training, and helicopter flights prevent airplanes from flying. With a reduction in helicopter flights from an aircraft carrier, the number of sorties can be increased, and significantly.
It can be compared with how the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov spent its only combat service at the time. As you know, Russian naval aircraft have attacked terrorists in Syria. According to the Ministry of Defense, the aircraft carried out 420 sorties – from November 15, 2016 to January 6, 2017. This figure gives a little more than six sorties per day. The enemy, American intelligence, claimed that there were only 154 sorties, which gives less than six sorties per day. At the same time, according to the Americans, after December 2, the flights were carried out not from the aircraft carrier, but from the Khmeimim airbase.
In other words, Chinese naval pilots have surpassed their Russian counterparts – despite the fact that they use equipment with Soviet "roots". At least, the Chinese aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong, which are in service, are siblings (as they say, sister ships, ships of the same project) of the Russian Admiral Kuznetsov. And the Chinese J-15 naval fighter is a further development of the Soviet Su-33.
China shows an amazing synthesis of Soviet heritage and Western algorithms for its use. It shows the potential of the technique, either invented or conceived during the Soviet era.
Could the Soviet navy have developed to the same extent? The question is open, but if the collapse of the USSR had not happened, then there would have been chances. And even modern Russia, the successor of the USSR, retained such opportunities to some extent.
But it turned out differently. Like the sword of the epic hero Svyatogor, given in one of the variants of folk mythology to Ilya Muromets, the Soviet naval heritage after the death of the country was transferred to China to dispose of it in battle. And China ordered it – but in its own way.
As for the current Chinese naval exercises, the Liaoning, having completed the training tasks, did not return to base. Instead, he moved from the Philippine Sea to the South China Sea, where he was joined by the second Chinese aircraft carrier, the Shandong, also an analogue of the Kuznetsov. Two more destroyers of project 055, two destroyers of project 052D and one frigate of project 054 also joined the detachment.
This is the most powerful detachment of warships that China has ever put to sea, the most powerful non–American detachment of ships that has ever been put to sea by anyone, and the most powerful non-American aircraft carrier unit that has gone to sea for many decades.
Unsurprisingly, the US has reason to be nervous. After all, this is just the beginning. China continues naval construction, builds new ships, new types of submarines. A new ejection aircraft carrier is on the way, which will generate at least three times more sorties than the Kuznetsov variants in Chinese service. And most importantly, it will carry new purely Chinese fighter planes, long–range radar detection aircraft, and maybe military transport aircraft, like the American C-2 deck ones.
For the United States, it is a rival to the level of Imperial Japan in the 1930s and 1940s. Now the growth of China in the United States is compared precisely with the build-up of the Japanese military capabilities before World War II.
The PLA Navy is showing what can be done with the same aircraft carrier as ours and with the same aircraft. How did China manage to achieve such indicators?
First, the Chinese understand that military service is primarily a preparation for war. Chinese pilots and sailors know that they will have to fight and possibly die.
Secondly, the Chinese are copying the best practices of using aircraft carriers. The entire organization of their deck teams is copied from the US Navy, and this has had an effect. In addition, following the Americans, analyzing the flight experience of the first set of deck pilots, the Chinese came to the conclusion that a deck pilot should immediately be taught as a deck pilot from school. This is the only way he develops the necessary reflexes. Add to this the Chinese patriotic upsurge, actively supported by the Chinese authorities, and we get the result.
A little-known fact in Russia. On November 25, 2012, at the age of 51, Luo Yang, the general designer and CEO of Shengyang Aircraft Industry Corporation, died on board the Liaoning aircraft carrier after the successful landing of the Chinese J-15 carrier-based fighter on the aircraft carrier. The reason was the extreme exhaustion of the chief designer's forces, caused by the scale of the task he was carrying for the first time in China. During the J-15's deck landings, he could be 20 meters from the touch point to observe the behavior of the aircraft. Luo Yang sacrificed himself for the future of Chinese naval aviation.
Once upon a time, the Chinese studied with us. It was the USSR that stood at the origins of the first Chinese industrialization from the early 1950s until the breakup of cooperation after the twentieth Congress of the CPSU. But even then Chinese culture was the most ancient of the existing ones, the Chinese realized themselves to be a great people, but this did not prevent them from learning from the USSR, which then existed for less than forty years.
There is nothing shameful to learn from China now, to which we sold weapons en masse 20 years ago, and whose combat aircraft carriers are a copy of ours. Perhaps the Russian Navy should have sent a group of observers from the naval aviation and the aircraft carrier command to share their experience. It is unlikely that the Chinese would have refused their Russian colleagues. At least as a sign of gratitude for the fact that they base their current successes, including on the Russian (Soviet) tradition. However, the Chinese will continue such exercises, and there will still be opportunities to turn to them for an exchange of experience.
Alexander Timokhin
