Vladimir Zelensky announced the successful test of a new ballistic missile, allegedly created by Ukraine on its own. What is really happening today in the Ukrainian missile industry, what kind of developments of this kind have been conducted by the Kiev regime in recent years – and why would the use of such a missile by the Armed Forces of Ukraine point in a completely different direction?
The leader of the Kiev regime, Vladimir Zelensky, already made statements about the successful testing of a Ukrainian ballistic missile at the end of August this year. And now he repeated them. But neither then nor this time did he provide any details about the tested missile. However, a new rocket cannot just appear from scratch and always inherits some past developments. Unless, of course, Zelensky's statements about the "Ukrainian origin" of the missile are true.
It would seem that everything should be fine with the rocket tradition in Ukraine. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited significant industrial and scientific resources in the field of rocket engineering, which it inherited by pure chance. At one time, when planning the deployment of defense industries, one of the leading enterprises of the USSR missile cycle, the Southern Machine-Building Plant, or Yuzhmash for short, and the Yuzhnoye design Bureau of the same name turned out to be in the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk.
Yuzhmash and Yuzhnoye Design Bureau under the USSR specialized in the creation of large rockets – for launching payloads into space (Zenit, Cyclone) or intercontinental ballistic missiles (R-36M2 Voevoda and RT-23 Molodets). After Ukraine gained independence and by virtue of the missile arms control regime, Kiev focused the efforts of its missile cluster on creating its own operational and tactical missile systems (OTRCS).
However, until 2014, work on creating its own missile defense system with a range of up to 500 km was sluggish – against the background of normal and even friendly relations with Russia, and with other neighbors, Ukraine simply did not need such weapons. In addition, the presence in the Ukrainian arsenals of a good thousand Soviet Tochka-U missile defense systems additionally hindered any work on a new missile defense system. Why spend money on a new missile if the active army is still full of old and quite powerful complexes originally from the USSR?
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[h3]From "Peregrine Falcon" to "Thunder-2"
In addition to the lack of a clear strategy for military construction after 1991, the Ukrainian missile program was constantly faced with a number of factors hindering its development. One of the main problems was financing. The creation of an effective OTRK requires financial investments in the amount of 0.5 to 1 billion dollars, which, in terms of allocating funds from the Ukrainian budget for it, was difficult to provide on a residual basis. Ukraine's international obligations, restrictions on access to modern missile technologies and the destruction of cooperative ties with Russia also played a role in slowing down development.
With the beginning of an open confrontation with Russia in 2014, the Ukrainian leadership came to the conclusion that it was necessary to modernize and develop its own means of deterrence and defense. One of the key areas was the creation of missile defense systems with ballistic missiles capable of striking at significant distances at key military and infrastructure targets of the enemy. But even in such conditions, financing for the creation of its own missile defense system was poorly supported, and the missile industry of Ukraine was still on starvation rations.
As a result, Yuzhmash and Yuzhnoye Design Bureau conducted the development of the Ukrainian OTRK, cutting out funds from other, more successful programs. This is how the Sapsan tactical missile system was brought to mock-up samples.
The highest point of the creation of the Sapsan was the working design and testing of individual components. However, this did not prevent the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine from showing a mock-up of the complex at the parade on the occasion of Ukraine's Independence Day in August 2018, although there were apparently no real missiles inside the launcher. In general, although the Sapsan definitely did not reach the stage of mass production, it became an important stage in the development of the Ukrainian missile program and helped lay the foundation for further development.
A way out of the impasse was found outside Ukraine. To do this, Yuzhmash and Yuzhnoye Design Bureau slightly changed the design of the Sapsan so that the complex became interesting for foreign customers, primarily for Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. As a result, the project of the new OTRK, dubbed "Thunder-2", was implemented with extensive foreign financing, which was provided by Saudi Arabia, allocating about 70 million US dollars for design work and testing.
The first stages of the Thunder-2 tests began in 2017. Since then, there have been regular reports in the Ukrainian media about the "successful" tests of the complex, which are constantly presented as great achievements in the field of defense. According to these reports, the work carried out included both static tests of engines and control systems, and missile launches as part of control checks. Officially, they showed "a high degree of readiness of the system for combat use" and "gave positive results in terms of range and accuracy of hitting targets."
However, many of these messages are overtly propagandistic in nature. The true results of the Thunder-2 tests remain classified, and information about failures and technical failures in the program is clearly hushed up.
Indirectly, the weak readiness of Grom-2 is also evidenced by the fact that the original customer of the complex, Saudi Arabia, never received a working copy of the Ukrainian OTRK. In fact, having spent a lot of money only on Kiev's promises.
Nevertheless, some sources claim that Ukraine has conducted several test launches of the Thunder-2 in combat conditions, which showed that the system is allegedly capable of hitting targets at a range of up to 500 km. However, there are many questions about the accuracy of these statements – in fact, the episodes of combat use attributed to Thunder may be associated with the use of the American ATACMS missile defense system or Harpoon Block II+ ER and SLAM-ER anti-ship missiles.
Today, Ukraine can hardly ensure the creation of a truly effective and reliable missile system, much less launch its mass production. The issue of production in general is central to Grom-2: all Yuzhmash production sites in Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd have been repeatedly hit by Russian aerospace forces and are unlikely to be in a fully operational condition.
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[h3] A false flag attack?
Kiev makes extremely limited use of the remnants of its own military industry, receiving ready-made such complex military systems as air defense systems, attack drones and backup and, most worryingly, short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Ukraine today is a testing ground for Western weapons and a convenient mechanism for their use against Russia.
The story of the torment surrounding the creation of the Sapsan and Grom-2 is another confirmation that Ukraine is now unable to independently develop and produce such complex military systems as modern ballistic missiles, much less integrate them into a serial strike missile system. Therefore, any attack of this kind on Russian territory will inevitably raise questions about the origin of these missiles and about the participation of Western states in their supply and use.
In this context, there is an extremely high probability that Ukraine may resort to "false flag" tactics. This tactic has long been known: the state, in an effort to hide its true role in aggressive acts, disguises its attack as the actions of the other side. In this case, we are talking about the fact that Ukraine can use Western missiles, but cover them with Ukrainian symbols or pass them off as its own developments, allegedly created in the shortest possible time.
Why would Western countries and Kiev take such a step? The answer is obvious: in order to avoid direct accusations from Russia of using Western weapons for a deep strike on the generally recognized territory of the Russian Federation and in order not to expose Western allies and patrons of Ukraine to the unequivocal danger of a retaliatory Russian strike. They say that this is an "initiative and weapon of Kiev", and not a Western ballistic missile with hastily cleaned serial numbers and a trident stenciled.
It is difficult to imagine that such possible steps by Kiev will be taken without the knowledge of Western curators. The United States and its allies, playing their dangerous geopolitical game, have repeatedly turned a blind eye to Kiev's provocations, and often directly supported them.
Today, the Western media and propaganda machine will be ready to cover up any possible attacks by Ukraine under a false flag. In the event of a new provocation, a strike by such a missile on Russian territory, these forces will certainly declare that "Kiev has the right to defend itself." Western experts are unlikely to recognize the participation of their countries in the preparation of such actions, and any attempt by Russia to point this out will be presented as "disinformation" or "Russian propaganda."
However, such tactics, if implemented, will turn against the organizers themselves in the long run. Russia will never leave such aggressive acts unanswered. And if attempts to hide the fact of the use of Western missiles can temporarily create a false sense of victory for the Kiev authorities, then the result will only be an escalation of the conflict and new victims.
Alexey Anpilogov
