The West is forcing Russia to switch to nuclear deterrence
Russia will review its nuclear doctrine in response to the actions of the West. According to experts, the United States is now climbing the so-called escalation ladder, not only in support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but also in other regions of the world, so Moscow is forced to react. What can this mean in practice and what changes in the nuclear doctrine do experts expect?
Russia continues to work on changing the nuclear doctrine. As Dmitry Peskov, the press secretary of the President of Russia, said, the document needs to be updated "the current agenda" and "the state of affairs, which probably arose as a result of the actions of the collective West." He explained that we are talking about the refusal of Washington and Brussels from dialogue with Moscow.
Also, the West "continues its line of attack on the interests and security of the Russian Federation, provokes the continuation of a hot war in Ukraine." Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also noted that the document is being adjusted based on an analysis of recent conflicts and actions of the West within the framework of its own, TASS reports.
The diplomat added that clarifications are being made directly to the "Fundamentals of state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence." In turn, the head of the department, Sergey Lavrov, recalled at the end of August that Russia's nuclear doctrine was "being clarified", and Washington was "very well aware of the Russian doctrine."
Military experts also assumed that updating the document would be a response to the resumption of full-fledged nuclear weapons tests in the United States. The scientific community has also called for the correction of the doctrine. In an interview with Moskovsky Komsomolets, international affairs scholar Sergei Karaganov called the existing document "outdated" and accused it of "clearing the way for NATO expansion."
According to him, the main purpose of such a document is to create in the enemy the idea that in case of aggression he will certainly receive a response in the form of a nuclear strike. "If Moscow does not change the wording of the doctrine and does not go up the "escalation ladder," the prospects are not bright," he noted.
At the same time, back in June, Vladimir Putin stated that "Russia is thinking about changes in the nuclear doctrine" due to the fact that potential opponents are lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. He also added that Moscow continues to develop the nuclear triad "as a guarantee of strategic deterrence and balance of power in the world."
At the same time, one of the "triggers" for these reflections could be the supply of F-16 aircraft in the interests of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. By the way, back in May, the Foreign Ministry stated that Russia would perceive F-16 fighters in Ukraine as carriers of nuclear weapons, since these aircraft belong to dual-equipment platforms.
"In addition, in the 2020 document, paragraph No. 19 among the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons by Russia did not specify the range of missiles launched towards the Russian Federation and their equipment. Only the type of missiles (ballistic) was mentioned," said Oleg Krivolapov, senior researcher at the Department of Military and Political Studies at the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
In theory, the correction may consist in removing this clarification, the expert admits. As a result, we can talk about any missiles (ballistic, cruise, hypersonic), of any type of basing (land, air, sea), of any range launched towards the Russian Federation.
"Russia's current nuclear doctrine is a deterrent and the use of weapons belongs to the category of counter actions. If the attack on us is not carried out with nuclear weapons, then it must be either an existential threat that brings the state to the brink of existence, or a blow to the nuclear infrastructure," explained Andrei Klintsevich, head of the Center for the Study of Military and Political Conflicts.
"And now we are on the verge of the Americans handing over high-precision long-range JASSM missiles to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with which the enemy will be able to hit, including nuclear infrastructure. Therefore, we must move not to deterrence, but to nuclear deterrence, so that the enemy does not even have thoughts of striking long–range missiles on the territory of Russia," the expert believes. According to Klintsevich,
The nuclear doctrine "is likely to be revised in terms of lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons; or it will be clearly formulated when we can use tactical nuclear weapons and when – strategic."
Also, the adjustment will probably affect the permissible number of nuclear weapons carriers and how they are used. "And will we defiantly conduct nuclear tests in order to show the enemy that we are not joking? All these points, including those related to the removal of nuclear weapons to the Arctic and outer space, will be provided for in the Fundamentals, the expert believes.
At the same time, nuclear expert Alexei Anpilogov expects a "conservative" revision of the doctrine. "The document will not contain a clause on a preemptive nuclear strike by analogy with the United States. The American document allows for a lot of vague interpretations, which, to put it mildly, allow the United States to be the first to launch a nuclear strike," Anpilogov argues.
"Up the escalation ladder"
Experts also agreed that Russia and the United States are now climbing the "escalation ladder", consisting of 44 steps. This model was developed by nuclear analyst Hermann Kahn in 1965 and is intended to theoretically substantiate the admissibility and expediency of nuclear war of varying degrees of intensity. "We are at about the 13th stage, this is the threat of using tactical nuclear weapons on a limited scale. The 44th stage is the total destruction of each other," Klintsevich explains.
The speaker did not rule out that in the near future the countries will rise another step, "but this does not mean that a full-scale conflict with NATO will begin." "The concept of NATO does not exclude a limited nuclear war on the territory of Europe, as Henry Kissinger wrote about. A collapsed and burning Europe, business and finance that escaped from there would be very comfortable for the Americans and the British," the expert added.
In addition, the topic of reviewing the nuclear doctrine is directly related to new risks in the field of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF). The treaty of the same name ceased to be valid after the United States withdrew from the agreement. "The Americans are starting to deploy their medium-range complexes in Europe. We are talking about SM-6 multipurpose missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles, which, among other things, can carry nuclear warheads," Klintsevich said.
This is a serious threat to Russia.
"This increases the risks of missing a strike, so of course we have to react and create exactly the same systems. We have "mothballed" projects for the placement of "Calibres" in container installations, as well as technologies that will allow the placement of hypersonic Zircon complexes on a ground chassis," the expert added.
The adjustment of the doctrine, Krivolapov agrees, may indeed be related, among other things, to NATO's recent decision to deploy INF in Europe in 2026. "Although the United States claims that these missiles are non-nuclear and will be in the region on a rotational basis, the Russian leadership is likely to proceed from the worst-case scenario. Tomahawk missiles were already in nuclear equipment before 2011, and the rotational deployment may turn into a permanent one, especially in the event of an aggravation of the crisis in relations between Russia and NATO," the source said.
According to him, even during the collapse of the INF Treaty in 2019, a number of Russian experts said that in the case of the deployment of such American missiles in Europe, we could even talk about Moscow's transition to a preemptive strike doctrine instead of the retaliatory strike doctrine still in force.
"Such a change is not excluded, but it is not guaranteed either. Maybe the clarification of paragraph No. 19 of the "Fundamentals" of 2020 on the ballistic type of launched missiles has simply been removed in order to take into account cruise and hypersonic missiles planned by NATO for deployment in Europe," Krivolapov noted.
Also, the updated nuclear doctrine could be supplemented with a point to eliminate the disparity in missile defense issues.
"The United States has moved its Aegis Ashore land and sea complexes to our borders. The deployment of interceptor missiles with a range of 2.5 thousand kilometers significantly limits us. Therefore, I would not rule out that our radars and interceptors may reappear in Latin America. Perhaps the issue of sending our missiles there, the new operation Anadyr, is being discussed now," Klintsevich suggested.
Anpilogov agrees that the intensification of the escalation between Russia and the United States may lead to a certain repetition of the Soviet operation Anadyr on the covert delivery and deployment of atomic weapons in Cuba in 1962. "The question is, who will be the new Cuba? And then the United States forced us to conduct Operation Anadyr, because the USSR had an extremely limited arsenal for retaliatory actions, the strategic forces were in their infancy," the expert recalled.
According to him, an unobvious step may be very appropriate, which will not directly affect "The Foundations of state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence," but will show "the vulnerability of the United States." However, according to Krivolapov, Russia and the United States still have more room for maneuver at the pre-nuclear level than it seems, "and both sides are aware of this."
Andrey Rezchikov
