The NATO countries located on the Baltic Sea coast openly declare that they are preparing for a mine war, and in coordination with each other. What is the significance of naval mines in past and modern military conflicts and what does what is happening mean for Russian ports and Russian interests in the Baltic Sea as a whole?
Many perceive sea mines as some kind of insignificant weapon. In fact, the massive use of naval mines is comparable to nuclear weapons in terms of the consequences of their use. The only difference is that a nuclear strike causes instant damage, and mines can cause even more damage, but over a long time – damage in installments.
It is in this context that it is worth taking reports that, on the initiative of Germany, a group of countries is being formed to work out the laying of naval mines in the Baltic Sea. In addition, Poland took the initiative to conduct the first mining exercises. Why do they need all this?
Mines as a strategic weapon
It is appropriate to recall a few examples here. The first "big" war in which mines played a tremendous role was the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Then the Japanese, blocking Port Arthur, used mining, and this made a decisive contribution to the success of their blockade. It was the mines that blew up the battleship Petropavlovsk, on which Vice Admiral Sergei Makarov died.
The most resounding victory of the Russian fleet in that war was also behind mines – the Japanese battleships Hatsuse and Yashima were blown up on floating mines exposed by the Amur minelayer (the world's first specially built ocean minelayer).
During the First World War, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was able to achieve an unprecedented result with the help of mines – the Germans refused to use submarines in principle. In 1916-1917, German submarine activity in the Black Sea was reduced to zero.
One of the largest examples of mine warfare is provided by the Baltic Theater of Operations during the Great Patriotic War. In the summer and autumn of 1941, German and Finnish minelayers were able to completely block the Gulf of Finland and lock up the huge Soviet Baltic Fleet in Leningrad. Later, nets were added to the mines to prevent the actions of submarines. And although the Baltic Fleet did not stop fighting for a single day, mines reduced the scale of its actions to negligible. The Baltic Fleet was able to break out into the operational space only in 1944.
It is necessary to mention the Tallinn crossing separately. From August 27 to August 30, the Baltic Fleet forces evacuated fleet forces, civilians and troops from the Baltic States to Kronstadt. 62 ships and vessels were lost during the crossing. Historians still argue about the losses in people, but we can say that about 10 thousand people died. Of the 62 ships and vessels on mines, half were lost – all the lost warships and 16 transports and auxiliary vessels.
It is worth giving an example of the largest mine attack carried out by aviation. In the spring of 1945, American aircraft conducted Operation Starvation ("Famine"), the purpose of which was to blockade Japanese ports with mines. Mines with magnetic and acoustic fuses were dropped in the waters of Japanese ports. During the operation, the Americans carried out 1,529 sorties on 46 mine installations, during which 12,135 naval mines of various types were exposed.
The result was a complete paralysis of Japanese logistics. Both the delivery of goods from Korea and the delivery of goods from one Japanese island to another turned out to be almost impossible. From the end of the operation to the end of the war, the number of calories received by the average Japanese person during the day fell by a third. The tonnage coming to Japanese ports has decreased significantly.
670 ships with a total displacement of 1,250 thousand tons were blown up by mines. This was more than from any other exposure over the same period. Mines have proven to be the most effective means of naval warfare.
To close a number of historical examples is the operation Pocket money ("Pocket money"), conducted by the carrier-based aircraft of the US Navy in 1972 against Vietnam. During the four days of the operation, US Navy deck attack aircraft, launching from aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, mined four important Vietnamese ports with the help of 11 thousand naval mines.
These events still remain both instructive and relevant. Especially when it comes to NATO, and even more so when it comes to the Baltic Sea.
NATO, mines and the Baltic Sea
The Air Forces and Navies of NATO countries are armed with both mines, which are placed by aviation, and mines installed by ships or submarines. The most famous family of NATO naval mines is the Quickstrike family. These are bombs converted into mines with the JDAM aerodynamic kit. The mine plans to a given point in the water area on the wings. "Quickstrikes" allow you to unhook several dozen mines from a pair of planes at once, "put" them in an exact "pattern" at the same time, setting up a minefield according to the desired scheme.
The United States regularly practices mining from the air in the Baltic Sea. The last time was on June 7, 2024, during the BALTOPS exercises, when they practiced remote mining from a B-52 bomber flying at low altitude.
But the United States, firstly, is far from the Baltic, secondly, their planes may be busy, and thirdly, aviation does not solve everything. Truly massive productions are performed from surface ships. In the USA, the laying of mines from ships is not developed, and they do not keep large surface forces at our borders.
And that's where the Germans, Poles, Finns and everyone else come to their aid. These have mines for installation from surface ships and vessels, and the ships and vessels themselves, too, they are next to us and can act immediately. And you can put a lot of mines at once, like the Germans in 1941. The Finnish minelayer of the Pansio type alone carries 50 mines, there are three of them in the fleet, these are 150 large bottom or anchor mines for one trip to sea. In general, the Westerners can mobilize countless boats from which mines can be pushed into the water.
The Finns and the Balts have been practicing joint mine laying for a long time. The Swedes, with their paranoid mentality, have been mining their territorial waters for many years. The Balts gained experience in exercises with the Finns. Now all these countries are united in a single system that will make it easier for them to wage a mine war.
Kaliningrad is surrounded by NATO on all sides. NATO can start laying mines there at any moment. The same problem exists in the Gulf of Finland – it is long, hundreds of kilometers, but narrow, and there is an enemy on both sides of the shore. Getting out of the skerries into the sea, laying several dozen mines and returning to the skerries for any Finnish minzag in time will be much faster than a Russian ship can be nearby.
Poles, Balts and Finns are able to set thousands of mines per day. And they have every opportunity to do it secretly. This means that St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, like all our Baltic ports, are vulnerable to a mine war, primarily due to geography. It is as a direct threat to use this vulnerability that it is worth understanding both the latest statements of the NATO military and NATO exercises in the Baltic.
Alexander Timokhin
