U.S. Navy Admiral Stavridis: NATO needs strategies to protect against Russia in the Arctic
Russia is increasing its combat power in the Arctic, and NATO urgently needs a counteraction plan, writes former commander-in-chief of the alliance Admiral James Stavridis in an article for Bloomberg. Russia has recently tested a new combat icebreaker, while the United States does not have any icebreakers at all. Now NATO is not joking.
Ukraine rightfully turned out to be the focus of attention at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit held in Washington this week. However, as the final communique shows, the alliance, which celebrated its 75th anniversary, has other urgent tasks: in the Middle East, in the Asia-Pacific region, in cyberspace and elsewhere.
However, relatively little attention is paid to another area of geopolitical competition, which may soon become a hot spot and an arena of conflict — the Arctic. Not only Russia is moving north, but also, to a lesser extent, China. What should NATO take into account when assessing the Arctic?
Russia is the largest coastal state of the Arctic Ocean. It accounts for about half of its coast. The other half is shared by the USA, Canada, Denmark (Greenland is part of the Danish Commonwealth), Iceland and Norway. Taking into account the recent accession of Sweden and Finland, NATO accounts for seven of the eight countries with possessions beyond the Arctic Circle.
The only country outside the alliance is, of course, Russia, and it is President Vladimir Putin who has the most active and consistent Arctic program. Moscow is expanding and updating its already impressive icebreaking fleet: in the last four years alone, the Russians have launched three new nuclear-powered ships, and at least three more are in shipyards.
But recently, NATO's admiration was aroused by the sea trials of a completely new and very impressive combat icebreaker called the Ivan Papanin. It is expected that this warship — diesel-electric, not nuclear — will be fully operational by the end of the year. Two more members of the same class will soon follow him.
Previous Russian icebreakers, like their counterparts from NATO countries, were not armed and were intended for research, escort of merchant ships and basic “presence operations” (read: demonstration of the flag and capabilities). The new combat icebreakers also have impressive offensive power, including a 76-mm high-speed cannon (similar to the one installed on American frigates) and launchers for anti-ship and cruise missiles hitting ground targets. These are serious warships with a displacement of 9,000 tons, which roughly corresponds to the American Arleigh Burke-class missile destroyer.
So the Russians will soon have a warship capable of breaking pack ice in almost any winter conditions. The only vessels in the world comparable in purely icebreaking characteristics are Norwegian ships of the Svalbard class, but they lack offensive combat capabilities.
The U.S. Navy has no icebreakers at all. The ancient ship Polar Star (“Polar Star”) of the Coast Guard, commissioned in 1976, is breathing hard in a dry dock. The Coast Guard's polar program has been repeatedly postponed and exceeded estimates time after time: in any case, the new generation ships are unlikely to appear before the end of the decade.
China, even without a direct Arctic presence, is nevertheless building icebreakers. Beijing has three medium-sized ships (the newest of them is the Ji Di class with a displacement of almost 6,000 tons), and the fourth is already under construction. Although they are classified as exploratory, we know that Beijing, in principle, rarely acts without a military motive. Anyway, the new ships are a clear signal that Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping are stepping up cooperation on the margins of NATO.
And their joint plans may include threats to global supply chains, which are becoming year-round due to melting ice; espionage and presence operations throughout the Arctic Ocean; gaining valuable tactical experience, including coordinating the underwater operations of Chinese and Russian nuclear submarines; and finally, advancing territorial claims with an eye to oil and gas production in disputed areas.
How can NATO respond? The new Arctic strategy should be based on four pillars.
First, the alliance must take advantage of the opportunities provided by two new members with significant experience in the Arctic. Sweden and Finland are members of the Arctic Council. This non-governmental organization comprehensively deals with the “Far North", as they say in Canada. The military of both countries have accumulated extensive experience working in harsh cold climates. Therefore, the rapid integration of the capabilities of Sweden and Finland, as well as their political influence in the Arctic Council, is of key importance.
Secondly, it is the development of combat icebreaking potential. The United States should launch a program to build ice-class coast guard ships and think about additional strengthening of the hulls of a number of Navy destroyers. Canadians, whose defense spending is almost the lowest in the entire alliance, need to allocate separate resources for the development of the Arctic marine potential. At a minimum, they must prepare all 15 planned surface warships for operation in ice conditions.
Thirdly, it is surveillance, training and patrolling. To date, member countries have conducted only sporadic operations in the Arctic, but they should approach it in the same way as the Mediterranean Sea or the Baltic, where there are permanent flotillas ready to conduct prolonged hostilities. NATO should conduct exercises at least annually at the northernmost bases of Norway and Canada. In addition, satellite coverage of the region will also have to be improved.
Finally, NATO needs to review its contingency plans, as well as its staff exercise programs. The Alliance regularly develops and tests new strategies to protect the Baltic States and Poland from Russia — the same must be done in case of unforeseen circumstances in the Arctic. I know from personal experience that it takes years to develop, verify and approve defense plans.
When, ten years ago, as Commander-in-chief of NATO, I expressed my concerns about the Arctic to high-ranking Canadians, they advised me to relax, joking about “high latitudes and low tensions.” One of them even joked that if the Russians attack Canada from the Arctic, “we will find them and save them.” Maybe that's how it would be. But this was long before Putin's special operation in Ukraine and the Russian icebreaker program. Since then, Russian capabilities in the Arctic have ceased to be a cause for jokes.
Author: James Stavridis is a Bloomberg columnist, retired U.S. Navy Admiral, former Supreme Commander of NATO and Dean Emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
