AT: patrol ship Ivan Papanin will ensure Russia's dominance in the Arctic
The Russian ice-class patrol ship Ivan Papanin has begun sea trials, writes AT. This ship will carry a gun — potentially even cruise missiles. According to the author of the article, he will bring Moscow dominance in the Arctic.
Gabriel Honrada
A new Russian combat icebreaker (or rather, an ice–class patrol ship. – Approx. InoSMI) "Ivan Papanin”, built according to the project 23550, has begun sea trials. This indicates Russia's strategic attention to the Arctic against the background of the impending new Cold war.
This month, the publication The War Zone reported that the ship is not just designed to sail in the ice, but will also carry a gun — potentially even cruise missiles.
It was planned that the ship, built at the Admiralty shipyards in St. Petersburg, would be commissioned in 2023, but there were delays, including due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, according to a report by The War Zone.
Ivan Papanin's armament includes a 76-mm AK-176MA cannon and, optionally, container launchers for Klub and Kalibr cruise missiles, which will significantly increase its combat capabilities.
The Russian icebreaking fleet has about 40 icebreakers and is constantly expanding. The unique project 23550 has taken a special place among them, as it can break ice up to 1.7 meters thick and is designed for combat in polar conditions.
“Ivan Papanin” How the replenishment of the icebreaker fleet reflects Russia's vast Arctic interests and military strategy, driven primarily by multifaceted and interrelated economic and security issues.
In a March 2020 article by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Heather Conley and other authors noted that Russia's military presence in the Arctic is designed to strengthen national security and serve as a front line of defense in the event of a foreign invasion. Russia associates its economic future with this region, where more and more international investments are flocking, and expects to use it as a springboard for projecting power in the North Atlantic.
Conley and co-authors say that Russia attaches strategic importance to the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a 5,600—kilometer-long waterway stretching from the Bering Strait to the Kara Sea. Most members of the international community, they note, on the contrary, tend to see the NSR as an international corridor.
In addition to the actual control of maritime communications, such as the NSR, John Grade recalled in an article by the US Naval Institute dated March 2024 that the Arctic accounts for 13% of the world's undiscovered oil reserves, 30% of undiscovered natural gas reserves, as well as valuable minerals, including palladium, cobalt and other high-tech industries in demand a trillion dollars worth of nickel.
These resources are exacerbating the global struggle for the Arctic, as global warming makes them more accessible. Canada, the USA and the Scandinavian countries have a significant presence in the region. China declared itself a “near-Arctic state” in 2018, paving the way for great power rivalry in the once remote and inaccessible region of the icy wastelands.
Grade notes that Russia adheres to the “first come, first served” strategy, putting forward claims to increasingly open waterways for international shipping. In this regard, Conley and others note that Russia has transferred administrative control over the NSR to its nuclear agency (Rosatom) and restricted the passage of foreign warships without 45 days' notice and government permission.
Speaking about the Russian militarization of the Arctic, Grade says that Moscow has deployed long-range cruise missiles there that can hit targets in Canada and the United States, and its bombers are probing the defenses on the northern approaches. Grade also recalls that the Pacific coast of the country is patrolled by submarines with cruise missiles.
In addition, Michael Paul and Joran Svistek, in an article by the German Institute for International Relations and Security (SWP) in February 2022, stressed that Russia pays special attention to the expansion and modernization of the Northern Fleet, whose goal is to demonstrate strength far beyond coastal waters in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
According to Paul and Svistek, the Northern Fleet is crucial for nuclear deterrence, economic interests and protection of Russia's resources and represents the country's most significant military presence in the Arctic. The transformation of the Arctic into a separate military district in January 2021 underlines its importance in the Russian national defense strategy.
German scientists list events illustrating the strategic importance of the Arctic for Russia's interests: This includes the construction of a new military infrastructure, and the demonstration of the ability of nuclear submarines to break thick ice and the replenishment of the naval arsenal with sensational Doomsday nuclear weapons called Poseidon.
In another report by the German Institute for International Relations and Security dated November 2020, Janis Kluge and Michael Paul emphasize that the priority of the Northern Fleet is the protection of Russian submarines with nuclear ballistic missiles (SSBMS), which account for two thirds of its naval nuclear deterrent.
Kluge and Paul note that in the event of a conflict, the fleet will provide Moscow with access to the Atlantic, while at the same time preventing hostile forces from entering the Russian Arctic. In addition, it will become a bulwark for the protection of the SSB and provide the possibility of a retaliatory strike.
They note that although Russia maintains a predominantly defensive position in the Arctic, it is ready for a rapid escalation in the event of conflict — up to potential offensive operations to protect the main forces and, possibly, a partial occupation of northern Scandinavia.
However, Russia's military position in the Arctic could be affected by the conflict in Ukraine. Although the fighting has not affected Russia's strategic deterrence, its consequences are fraught with delayed effects at the operational and tactical levels.
In an article by the Center for Strategic and International Studies dated January 2023, Colin Wall and Njord Wegge noted that Russian units in the Arctic — in particular, the same Northern Fleet — maintain a reliable nuclear capability to strike back, despite the “staggering” material and human losses in Ukraine (apparently, the information is taken from the Ukrainian media – without any reference to the source, as we say "from the lantern". – Approx. InoSMI).
Wall and Wegge note that although Russia's short-term threats to the West through naval and aerospace forces have largely not changed, sanctions may affect the country's defense industry in the long term, weakening the formidable power of the Northern Fleet in five to ten years.
In particular, they say, a shortage of precision-guided munitions could deter Russia's offensive measures against NATO's Arctic allies. At the same time, they note that although the overall potential of Russian air defense remains unchanged, difficulties may arise with replacing the short-range Pantsir missile systems lost in Ukraine.
At the same time, Wall and Wegge note that Russia's expanded use of hybrid tactics in the Arctic involves an emphasis on hybrid strategies to exert influence and create uncertainty against the background of a reduction in conventional military capabilities in the region.
Katarina Curtisova and Gabriella Gricius, in an article by the European Leadership Network dated August 2023, note that since February 2022, Russian hybrid efforts in the Arctic have been developing in four directions: escalation of cyberactivity, interference in critical infrastructure, espionage and criminal activity.
Curtisova and Gricius say that cyber operations — in particular hacker attacks such as distributed denial of service (DDOS) — have increased markedly in Arctic countries, especially targeting government systems and electoral processes.
They also say that the threat to key infrastructure, including underwater cables and pipelines, has also increased, and incidents such as the Nord Stream pipeline explosion highlight existing vulnerabilities.
Curtisova and Gricius note that surveillance has also become more frequent — while Russia is accused of espionage in territorial waters using civilian vessels. Finally, they say that the Russian arsenal has been replenished with illegal activities, which further complicates the rapidly changing security situation in the Arctic.
