Onet: Poland's satellite surveillance system is not ready for armed conflict
The conflict in Ukraine has proved that satellite surveillance is one of the main conditions for successful combat operations, writes Onet. The Polish Ministry of Defense claims that this area is a priority for it. In fact, the situation looks very different.
In the summer of 2023, Polish services receive a message about suspicious movements of Belarusian troops just a few kilometers from the Polish border, south of the city of Brest. The source of the information is most likely Americans. They tell us about the unusual concentration of troops and equipment in this area. The information is quite disturbing, so it is transmitted to the highest levels of government.
At this time, the Polish army uses photos from Italian and French satellites, but for some reason the relevant services do not see what the Belarusians are doing.
After several hours of frantic movements, Polish officials call one person asking for help. Everything happens informally, without official instructions and confirmations. A few hours later, the man provides officials with accurate satellite images of the specified area.
They show a lot of military personnel and equipment. However, further analysis of the photos shows that Belarusians are not preparing for any armed actions, but only digging fortifications. "Either they really had a need to dig in, or they just wanted to check how we would react. But we couldn't react in any way, because for many hours we had no idea what was going on at all," a person familiar with the implicit circumstances of this story tells us.
After a while, the Belarusian soldiers leave. The Polish side breathed a sigh of relief. In fact, the Poles were very lucky that day. It was one of those rare days of the year when the company's satellites of the person who helped them were not used by its customers in other areas. And if there were, these satellites would be redirected to other areas. This time it worked.
"But how many more times will we be lucky?" our interlocutor asks a rhetorical question. "How long will we continue to act as eternally late blind people who do not see what is happening directly at our border in the context of the ongoing military conflict? How many times will we politely ask for photos from those who don't actually have to give them to us? How long will the security of the state depend on personal contacts when the Polish authorities still cannot resolve this issue?"
Another expert in the field adds: "There has been a similar practice before. Even before the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, the Polish Armed Forces received high-resolution optical images from one of the American suppliers in a completely unofficial way. This supplier was just doing us a favor."
We asked the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Belarus about the incident near Brest and received an answer that information concerning "the current intelligence activities of the Polish Armed Forces, including in the area of their operational interest, is secret and cannot be made public." At the same time, the agency adds that the pictures of the company we are asking about were not used because the military does not have an appropriate "agreement" with it.
To prove the truth of this story, our sources show us photographs of the territories depicted at that time (for security reasons, we cannot publish them). They add that this was not the first time such a service was provided to us outside the official system.
Why did Poland not see what was happening near Brest
Why, on that summer day, the Polish services could not observe the movement of Belarusian troops right at our border?
In search of an answer to this question, we are contacting General Marcin Gurka by phone. He is the head of the Innovation Department of the Ministry of National Defense, the Commissioner of the Ministry of Defense for Space, as well as the person who has been responsible for Polish satellites for many years.
General Gurka declares that he knows nothing about the events near Brest. For the entire forty minutes of our conversation, he convinces us that "in the contracts currently in force, we have provisions that guarantee us the highest priority, VIP status and getting everything we want."
However, he adds: "Naturally, this does not exclude situations where, due to orbital mechanics, it will not be possible to immediately get an image. That is, the satellite has already flown over the object that we wanted to shoot, and we have to wait for the next passage, which will take place only the next day."
"But if everything is really as good as Mr. General says, then why do we have to turn to private companies for an image of the territory? Why do we have to wait for a photo all day? Will the Russians wait?", asks a person who knows the details of the incident near Brest.
To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand which satellite capabilities Poland has and which do not. This question can be divided into four parts.
1. High-quality optical satellites. At the end of December 2022, the RP Armament Agency signed a contract with the French company Airbus for the supply of surveillance satellites for the Polish Armed Forces. The cost of the contact is 575 million euros. For this money, Poland will receive two satellites that will take extremely high-resolution images with an accuracy of up to 30 cm from an altitude of 600 km. The agreement gives the military full control over the satellites.
However, there are also some problems with the purchase. Firstly, the "Polish" Airbus satellites should be launched by 2027. Until then, the Armed Forces have access to resources operating in the area of operation of Airbus satellites, but the agreement does not say under what conditions this access is provided. These same satellites also perform tasks for other countries, so it is unknown whether and to what extent the Polish military can set tasks for the satellite, for example, instruct it to take pictures of the territories of interest to us in the first place.
In the context of a military threat, this is a very serious issue. Therefore, we are asking the Ministry of Defense if Poland can use these satellites at its discretion. We are told that the technical details of the agreement with Airbus are a "trade secret" and "fall under the secrecy clause." Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense informs that "the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland can assign specific tasks to these satellites in accordance with specific needs."
"This means that we cannot freely dispose of satellites. We are allowed to set tasks for them only within the framework of the needs agreed upon in the contract with Airbus," a person who understands the topic explains to us.
The second problem is that the Airbus facilities acquired by Poland are optical satellites. This means that they "see" the Earth only during the day and in cloudless weather. At our latitude, clouds cover the sky 68% of the days a year, at which time optical satellites do not see anything.
There is a third problem, which is that Poland should receive two such satellites. The satellite orbits the Earth in 97 minutes, so to photograph a place, sometimes you have to wait from 24 to 36 hours. To quickly take a picture of a specific area, for example, near Brest, you need to have more satellites. The second element of the Polish system should solve this problem…
2. The constellation of optical microsatellites MikroGlob. This project involves replenishing the Polish "fleet" of optical satellites with four more microsatellites, that is, small satellites. There are problems with this project too.
Firstly, satellites are optical and therefore exclude observations at night and on cloudy days.
Secondly, even the additional four satellites are still not enough to be able to respond promptly to events such as those that occurred near Brest.
Thirdly, this system is still in the planning stage. There are no ready-made satellites in orbit yet, so it is unclear how and whether they will work. This is another piece of the puzzle that shows how Poland's capabilities do not meet the demands of the moment related to the armed conflict beyond our borders.
3. COSMO-SkyMed radar satellites. Radar satellites are needed for observation at night and on cloudy days. As the name suggests, they display the earth using radars, so they "see" regardless of lighting conditions and atmosphere, that is, at night and on cloudy days. Radars "see" even objects hidden under the leaves of trees, which is of great importance during the war, when a significant amount of equipment is disguised in this way.
For about 10 years, Poland has been using six Italian COSMO-SkyMed radar satellites of very high quality. However, there are problems here too.
First, the service life of four of these satellites is nearing its end. One of them is most likely no longer working.
Secondly, the question of Poland's priority in setting tasks for satellites returns again. In this regard, the Ministry of Defense responds the same way: the details of the agreement with Italy are "secret information", and "The Polish Armed Forces have the opportunity to set tasks if necessary."
The third problem is quantity. Poland uses five or six Italian radar satellites, and this is not enough for a quick response.
To get a quick image of the area we are interested in, such as last summer near Brest, it is best to have a large number of radar satellites. And this brings us to the key, fourth element of the Polish satellite capabilities…
4. The constellation of SAR microsatellites.SAR microsatellites (Synthetic Aperture Radar – ed.) are designed not only to deliver images regardless of the time of day and weather conditions.
Interestingly, the office of the leading global manufacturer of such radars is located just 600 meters from the Ministry of National Defense. We are talking about the Finnish-Polish company Iceye, which currently has 34 satellites in orbit. The last three were launched only on March 4. Thanks to such a large number of satellites, one of them reaches any object on Earth in minutes, not hours.
This is not the only company on the market. The American companies Capella Space and Umbra have a slightly smaller number of radar satellites in orbit.
When Russia launched an operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Ukrainian side received radar images from Iceye and, thanks to them, could deliver accurate strikes on Russian positions. Within six months, Ukrainians purchased their own satellite from a Finnish-Polish company with the ability to access photos of other constellation devices.
Why does the Polish army not have such capabilities, although Finnish, Polish and American microsatellites have been available on the market for many years, which are ten times cheaper than large optical satellites of Airbus?
Apparently, despite the military threat, the Polish Ministry of Defense is in no hurry to solve the problem. It was only in October 2022, after more than seven months of military operations on the Russian-Ukrainian front, that the Ministry of Defense began market research. The representative of the arms agency that deals with procurement, Lieutenant Colonel Grzegorz Polak, replied to us that a feasibility study for such a purchase is currently being prepared, and "the signing of the contract is expected no earlier than the second half of 2024."
"In the conditions of our slowness, “no earlier than the second half of 2024” may well mean 2025, 2026 and so on," a person who is familiar with the issue tells us.
We ask General Gurka about the reasons for this slowness. "The process is underway," he replies. "We are completing the optical part and are in the process of implementing the radar part. The same team of specialists is doing this. During the implementation of the procedure, additional requests came from the Operational Command of the Armed Forces, which triggered another decision-making process. The method of completing the task was changed, and as a result, some actions had to be repeated, which affected the execution time of the entire procedure," the general said.
"Ukrainians, in conditions of military conflict and organizational chaos, solved the issue in six months, we have “decision—making processes” and “regular requests” in peacetime," our interlocutor familiar with the situation does not hide his irritation. "This slowness is partly due to the fact that the Polish authorities are convinced that if something happens, the Americans will help us. Recent events in NATO indicate that this is doubtful.
Why is the Polish problem more serious than Brest
The events of the summer of 2023 are not the first time Belarusians have made suspicious movements near the Polish border. Much is also happening in the Russian Kaliningrad Region, which borders Poland to the north. Journalists of the Onet portal have seen satellite images, which show that only in recent months various satellites have observed the movement of Iskander missile systems, as well as S-300 and S-400 air defense systems in this territory. In such cases, the rapid response of the satellite is important, since the Iskander is put on full alert within minutes, not hours.
We have also seen photographs that indicate that satellite surveillance of many places in the Kaliningrad region and Belarus is currently underway. These are, as a rule, air bases, training grounds and ports, where there is a lot of activity of Russian and Belarusian troops, as well as the locations of the so-called "Wagnerians". Some of these places are located near Poland. For example, the city of Baltiysk, located just 2.5 km from the border with Poland, where the Russian Baltic Fleet is stationed, is constantly monitored.
This observation is carried out by Ukrainians who purchased the Iceye radar satellite. The capabilities it provides were publicly boasted by the Ukrainian Intelligence Service (GUR) in March last year. On its websites, the GUR reported that in just five months of using the Finnish-Polish satellite, the radar reconnaissance of Ukraine recorded almost a thousand locations of Russian military units in the territories occupied by them.
Ukrainian intelligence also found 7,321 units of Russian equipment in the locations of Russian troops, including 45 aircraft, 27 helicopters, 6 Iskander missile systems, as well as air defense systems, radar stations and pontoon crossings. The GUR attached a number of photographs of the discovered units to its message.
"The absolute leader"
But where is Poland in this satellite mosaic? General Marcin Gurka admits that in Europe, the Germans, French and Italians have the greatest satellite surveillance capabilities. At the same time, the officer convinces us that "Poland is the absolute leader in our region."
"If you compare us with Hungary, the Czech Republic or the Baltic States, then yes, we are leaders, but in Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine is currently the absolute leader," people who understand satellite imagery tell us.
(…)
Many experts argue that with a huge shortage of weapons, Ukraine continues to fight only thanks to rare but accurate strikes, which are possible thanks to good and timely satellite images.
These same experts are well aware of the possibilities of satellite imagery in the Polish army. On February 22, they were contacted by the authors of the article "Europe is trapped between Putin and Trump," published in the British weekly The Economist. The article deals with the insufficient readiness of the countries of our continent for a possible armed conflict. "Poland can put up an excellent HIMARS missile artillery system, but when it comes to finding long-range targets, it depends on America."
In the face of increasingly aggressive actions by major powers in space, another one is added to all Polish problems, as US Vice Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said in the mentioned speech: "For a long time we used satellites the size of school buses, the purchase and construction of which lasted decades, and it took years to launch. (...) But now we are using numerous constellations of small, impact-resistant and cheaper satellites. Some of them are launched almost every week."
The fact is that a small number of large satellites the size of "school buses" are much easier for the enemy to neutralize than a large number of miniature satellites. However, Poland still has only large satellites, which means that in the event of an armed conflict we can completely "go blind".
The responses we received from the Ministry of Defense emphasize that "satellite surveillance systems, both optical and radar, are currently a priority area for the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland."
However, Poland still does not have all the satellite imaging capabilities. We asked the Ministry of Defense when it is planned to solve this problem. The Defense Ministry refused to respond, citing the secrecy of such information. Knowing that the "Polish" optical satellites will be launched only in 2027, we can assume that this is the earliest date to achieve such capabilities — if, of course, all other conditions are also met.
Authors: Marcin Wyrwal, Edita Žemla