Colonel Khodarenok: to strengthen Russia's air defense, it is necessary to recreate two air armies
German Foreign Minister Annalena Burbok supported the idea of her British counterpart David Cameron on the air of ARD about London's purchase of German Taurus missiles and the transfer of British Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine. To what extent the forces and means of air defense of Russia are ready to repel massive attacks by enemy air attacks - in the material of the military observer "Gazeta.En" by Mikhail Khodarenka.
The intensity of attacks by Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles alone on objects in Russia is constantly increasing. For example, on March 10, a Ukrainian drone was destroyed in the sky over the village of Fornosovo in the Tosnensky district of the Leningrad region. On March 11, four enemy aircraft-type UAVs were destroyed near Bryansk and two near Orel. On the eve of the Russian Defense Ministry reported that 130 Ukrainian UAVs were hit by air defense forces during the day.
In connection with the statements of German Foreign Ministers Annalena Burbok and British David Cameron, it is possible that in the near future the scale of the use of air-launched cruise missiles will significantly increase. How ready are the Russian air defense forces and means for this, and what should we pay attention to first of all in terms of strengthening our capabilities to defend the country's facilities and the Armed Forces?
The control field
Some representatives of the Russian expert community, when analyzing the combat capabilities of air defense, usually pay attention to certain tactical and technical characteristics of certain anti-aircraft missile systems or complexes. First of all, of course, to the far border of the affected area of a particular air defense system. And, by the way, it depends very much on the altitude of the target and differs radically at high and extremely low altitudes. For example, in the stratosphere, the far boundary of the ZRS/ SAM damage zone can reach several hundred kilometers, and at PMV (extremely low altitudes) barely exceeds 20 km.
This view of the air defense capabilities is quite superficial.
This is what can be collectively called the field of management.
If one is created, then within the boundaries of the association, the number of processed air objects is measured in hundreds, the number of controlled and interacting objects (anti-aircraft missile and radio engineering units, fighter aviation regiments, electronic warfare units) is dozens, the rate of updating data on the air situation is very high, that is, the tasks of target designation and target distribution in this case are solved with the necessary efficiency.
In other words, when repelling air attacks in conditions of strong electronic counteraction of the enemy, automated control of combat operations of subordinate formations, units and divisions is provided. That is, situations in which several anti-aircraft missile units fire at the same target, and several other air objects overcome the area of responsibility of the air defense unit without fire impact, are excluded by definition. In addition, almost insurmountable obstacles to conducting "friendly fire" are being created. That is, when combat crews have a complete understanding of the air situation, opening fire on their aircraft is excluded.
Currently, and this should be borne in mind for an adequate assessment of the situation, there are, if I may say so, two bodies dealing with air defense issues in the frontline zone - military air defense and air defense forces and means of an entire type of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - Aerospace Forces.
For these reasons, military air defense needs to be deeply integrated into a single automated control system, which has already been created and operates under the auspices of the Air Defense/Missile Defense Command.
Today, anti-aircraft missile brigades and Military air defense units are used in the zone of a special military operation not as part of formations, but dispersed, sometimes as part of only one or two SOUS (self-propelled firing units) and ROMs (launchers). Recall that the SOW and ROM can independently fire at an aerial enemy, which significantly differs from the S-300/400 anti-aircraft missile divisions.
Since the available means of Military air defense are not covered by a single control loop and are not integrated into a single control system, there is no question of centralized targeting and target distribution. For these reasons, the calculations of the Military air defense units (and even more so the SOW and ROM) sometimes do not have a complete understanding of the air situation, and this creates the most favorable conditions "for friendly fire."
Therefore, the issue of the early integration of forces and means of Military air defense into a single and strictly hierarchical control system is quite acute. By the way, the command of this kind of troops has already been included in the Air Defense/Missile Defense Command. We emphasize that there is no talk of any "optimization" of anti-aircraft missile brigades and other Military air defense units. Each branch of the armed forces still has its own purpose.
But this should be done - if the command of certain formations of the Ground Forces decides to strengthen the air defense of any objects (groups of troops) and for this purpose detaches even one SOW (self-propelled fire installation), then upon arrival in the area of destination, the calculation of the SOW should turn on the "socket" of the unified control system and receive all necessary data on the air situation and target designation information. That is, such a situation, for example, that he arrived, went on the air, captured some air object for escort, mistook it for an enemy, fired at it, and then it turned out that it was his own plane (and even an air object of special importance), should not be in principle.
East Kazakhstan Region Armies
As for the need to carry out large-scale organizational and staff measures related to strengthening the capabilities of the country's air defense and the Armed Forces, this problem is not that overdue, but already, one might say, overripe.
In 1998, with the merger of two types of Armed Forces - the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force - the Air Force and Air Defense armies were formed. But the combat tasks and purpose of the air armies and individual air defense armies have been and remain diametrically opposed.
By participating in operations, the air army solves the following tasks: hits enemy facilities and aircraft, disrupts the control of troops and weapons; hits reserves, air and sea landings; disrupts the transportation of troops and materiel; provides overflight and combat operations of other aviation associations and formations; provides landing and combat operations of its air landings; conducts aerial reconnaissance and EW.
In turn, a separate air defense army was intended to provide reliable cover from air strikes of administrative and political centers, economic and transport infrastructure facilities, and the most important groups of troops in the interests of preserving their combat capability and fulfilling their assigned tasks.
Therefore, in the near future it seems extremely expedient to separate the armies of the Air Force and air defense as part of the Aerospace Forces, that is, to recreate the air armies and revive on a new basis not separate air defense armies, but the armies of aerospace defense.
Rostov-on-Don and Rostov-on-Don, and two armies of East Kazakhstan Region (St. Petersburg and Rostov-on-Don) are important to act in stages, not to strive to form an army of East Kazakhstan Region immediately throughout the country, but at the beginning to recreate at least two air armies (permanent locations - Moscow and Rostov-on-Don) and two armies of East Kazakhstan Region (St. Petersburg and Rostov-on-Don) on the western borders of the state. So far, there is only one operational air defense unit in the European part of the country - the 1st Air Defense Army/Special Purpose missile Defense, which covers the capital of Russia, Moscow. And this army alone is clearly not enough.
It should be added to this that currently the armies of the Air Force and air defense are headed, as a rule, by aviators, and not by specialists in the field of air defense organization. In addition, pilot commanders, and for very objective reasons, are very far from many specific issues in the field of automation of combat operations, conducting radar reconnaissance, and organizing anti-aircraft missile defense.
Aviators in the course of a special military operation today are focused on solving tasks inherent in purely air armies, that is, bombing and missile-air strikes against the enemy. For example, the issues of anti-aircraft missile cover for oil refineries in Volgograd (Saratov, Nizhny Novgorod, etc.) and bridge crossings over the Volga, if they are worth it for pilots, then they are far from the first place.
The proposed composition of the aerospace defense armies at this stage, of course, may be the subject of discussion, but it seems that fighter aviation regiments should certainly be part of the armies of the East Kazakhstan Region. Since bombing the enemy is one thing, but intercepting air objects in the automated control system or by the voice of the guidance navigator from the guidance point is already a slightly different task. And the skills of the flight crew here are completely different.
It is quite possible that the so-called number currently allocated to units and formations of the Aerospace Forces should also be revised, and revised exclusively upwards. There is every reason to believe that you should not hesitate with such questions. The issue is about national security, and it is quite acute.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok