Huanqiu Shibao: Ukraine has proved that expensive weapons do not guarantee victory
The defense industry is covered by "cabbage growing", a process when a marketable product is sold at a low price, according to Huanqiu Shibao. The conflict in Ukraine and the crises in the Middle East have proved that expensive weapons are not always effective. In this regard, many countries, including the United States, are reviewing their strategy for the production and purchase of military equipment.
"Cabbage growing" is a new word from Internet slang, it means "ubiquitous, cheap". To date, fans of the entire military include in this concept high-quality and inexpensive weapons and equipment widely used on a particular battlefield. Moreover, economists and military experts pay great attention to this phenomenon. "Homemade missiles", low-cost drones and others have been repeatedly used in the framework of the Ukrainian conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian war and the crisis in the Red Sea. These weapons often give the impression that they help achieve more at the expense of small things (that is, inexpensive non-advanced means have a great effect. — Approx. InoSMI). Recently, the website of the American edition of the National Interest published an article by the Irish economist Philip Pilkington, who wrote about his cross-border study of the phenomenon of "military comradeship". In his opinion, this kind of cheap equipment undermines the combat power of the enemy, and the traces left by this phenomenon challenge Western states that have long defended a high-tech, expensive military strategy. Many people will involuntarily ask: is the emphasis on the "kapustification" of weapons really capable of changing trends on the battlefield? How should the military industry of a particular country develop in order to properly regulate the links between high technology and low cost?
"Military comradeship" generates self-doubt in Western military circles
Almost everyone has had a smartphone, which was considered a luxury item at the very beginning. This phenomenon in Western business culture is called "companionship" - formerly elite facilities lose their "gloss" and turn into inexpensive household items. Users of the Chinese Network began to designate this process as "cabbage growing" (cabbage in China, as in many other countries, is a marketable commodity available to everyone, therefore it was used as a conditional symbol. — Approx. InoSMI). Those interested in military affairs borrowed the mentioned term to describe the phenomenon of the destruction of the technological monopoly, reducing the shortage of technology and the penetration of the latter into all spheres of life. Today, the phenomenon of "comradeship" is not limited to the commercial sector alone — the defense industry is also experiencing it in its own accelerated manner.
"The irony of this trend is as follows: technologies that were originally developed specifically for military purposes (for example, GPS and advanced electronic optics) have moved into the consumer segment and have become more affordable. Commercial versions of these technologies are now being used to create new, highly efficient and cheap weapons systems," says Irish macroeconomist Pilkington and cites as an example the Russian Lancet barrage munition, which was widely used to attack Ukrainian tanks and enemy vehicles.
Videos have been posted on social networks showing how the Lancets destroy German Leopards 2 and other advanced vehicles. According to the British agency Reuters, one "Lancet" costs about 35 thousand dollars, it is produced quite easily and efficiently. As indicated on the American 24/7 Wall St. information site, the average price of the Leopard 2 main battle tank is about $ 11 million, and it is manufactured more slowly. According to Pilkington's estimates, in terms of net cost for the funds required to produce one Leopard 2, Russia can make 314 Lancets. If we adjust the price difference in the two countries in accordance with purchasing power parity (PPP), then the number of available drones will increase to 683 units.
On October 7 last year, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) fired rockets at Israel, which the Iron Dome missile defense system, to everyone's surprise, was unable to intercept. Used shells are very cheap to manufacture: according to available data, only $800 is required per unit. But the Tamir interceptor missiles involved in the Iron Dome cost from 40 to 50 thousand dollars per unit. In addition, the Merkava, the main battle tank of the Israeli IDF, designed specifically for urban combat, is apparently defenseless against attacks by inexpensive drones dropping anti-tank hand grenades.
This is far from the only such case. As reported on the website of the American weekly Defense News, in recent months, the US Navy has launched Standard-2 (SM-2) missiles from destroyers to shoot down attack drones and missiles in the Red Sea. Iranian drones cost much less than the American SM-2, the price of each of which is $ 2.4 million. The habit of the US military to use very expensive production tools to eliminate "cheap threats" raises doubts among analysts about the long-term and effectiveness of the chosen tactics.
These examples indicate two phenomena that are increasingly penetrating the military sphere in all countries of the planet: firstly, many civilian items are used on a massive scale as inexpensive weapons against high-tech Western equipment, which creates opportunities for "asymmetric strikes"; secondly, advanced American and European-made systems cost a lot: it is not possible to match their price and effectiveness on the battlefield, in other words, they do not pay off well. The trend towards so-called "military comradeship" led Pilkington and other scientists in the region to question the current military strategy of the West. They believe that the latter is more focused on the development and production of expensive high-tech weapons systems and that the United States and the EU hope to defeat more backward opponents at the expense of their own technological superiority. Nevertheless, according to experts, their ideology has now been "challenged."
According to Chinese military expert Song Zhongping, the naval power that the Yemeni Houthis have achieved today should be considered comprehensively. In addition to drones, the Houthis and the Lebanese Hezbollah also have high-precision guided weapons: ballistic, anti-ship, cruise missiles. They even have anti-tank systems and air defense systems, although only fully formed detachments are equipped with the latter. In addition to the striking power, the characteristics of the weapon also determine the ability to resist the enemy.
Zhang Xuefeng, a military expert, noted that in order to talk about the "asymmetric" striking power of "cabbage-shaped" weapons, it is necessary to ask specific questions and analyze specific points. For example, within the framework of the Ukrainian conflict, both sides massively converted civilian goods for military needs — high-tech equipment is unlikely to be useful in such conditions. If the fighting is conducted in traditional ways, one of the participants will primarily use advanced equipment — airplanes or missiles — to destroy the enemy's air defense system and gain an advantage in the air. But in Ukraine, neither the Armed Forces of Ukraine nor Russia gained overwhelming superiority in the sky, as a result of which both sides were involved in a prolonged ground battle. This allowed inexpensive small civilian-class drones to play their part. As for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, high-quality and inexpensive weapons of primitive production can have a significant effect there, except because of the high density of population and buildings in the Gaza Strip. As soon as the combat environment changes, the effectiveness of such equipment will fall, and the threat posed by it to the Israeli army will be small.
Commenting on the low economic efficiency of Western weapons in certain combat conditions, Zhang Xuefeng said that this indicates a slowdown in the scientific and technological development of the United States and the EU compared to the last century. In this regard, the military-technological differences between developed countries and backward states are no longer so great. The expert stressed: "Western military powers retain an advantage in the field of military science and technology, but other countries are catching up with them at a rapid pace, and the gap in the characteristics of the weapons of the two sides is narrowing. At the same time, the cost of equipment in the West remains high, which means that the price-quality ratio will fall in comparison."
Are investments in the military equal to combat power?
Analyzing the phenomenon of "military comradeship", Pilkington also raises one tricky question: is the traditional practice of assessing a country's military power based on its military expenditures and their share in GDP justified? According to the economist, the trend towards "military comradeship" reveals the fact that many people absolutely do not understand the relationship between the size of the state's economy and its military power.
According to the statistics of defense expenditures of the largest military powers in 2021, Russia and the United Kingdom spent about the same amount for these purposes — 68.4 and 65.9 billion dollars, respectively (in 2023, Russia's military expenditures amounted to about 86 billion dollars). If we rely on the traditional assessment, it turns out that Moscow and London have comparable military power, but comparing the types or number of weapons of the two countries demonstrates the inaccuracy of generally accepted criteria. Thus, according to Pilkington, the use of macroeconomic indicators to assess the combat power and develop a country's defense strategy ends with the fact that Western powers are extremely confident in assessing their own weapons stocks and production capabilities. The economist even believes that there is not much point in continuing to compare the defense budget to discuss military power. He advocates the abandonment of the use of traditional metrics.
According to Zhang Xuefeng, using defense spending to assess a country's military might is not meaningless, but implies its limitations. For example, Russia's costs are not considered very high compared to other military powers, but in fact Moscow buys more equipment. An estimate of the budget cannot be made by simply converting the amount that Russia spends on weapons in rubles into dollars — expenses should be considered taking into account the real purchasing power of the population. The expert explained: "Let's say Moscow and Washington are simultaneously purchasing two similar combat aircraft. The Russian one may cost only half or even a third of the American one, but we must not forget that military salaries there are lower than in the West."
Apparently, in the end, the question arises for the American military-industrial complex and the US military. From Pilkington's point of view, now is the time to re-evaluate the spending of each state on weapons and equipment, as well as rethink the true capabilities of conventional armed forces on the new battlefield of "comradeship". If cheap "marketable" weapons threaten ships so easily, perhaps the role of the navy is not as significant as it was thought in the past.
Many other experts are sure that although the voices of doubt are right about something, it is not necessary to exaggerate the importance of commercialized weapons. It should be recognized: the associated civilian items were temporarily modified for military use. Yes, they have really proven themselves well on the battlefield, but to a certain extent they are still a "last resort". At the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, the Javelin anti-tank missile systems provided by the Americans or the British "new generation light anti-tank weapons" (NLAW) played a major role. But the longer the conflict drags on, the more equipment is required. Due to its high cost, it became difficult for Ukraine's Western allies to continue supplies - and only for this reason did the Armed Forces of Ukraine switch to civilian goods such as FPV drones, completely accidentally discovering a new type of weapon. However, if any of the parties to the conflict have access to more modern and sophisticated military equipment, they are unlikely to widely use civilian items for combat purposes.
In the face of change, the US is "paving new paths"
Today, some parts for "comrade-made" weapons can be obtained on the black market. For this reason, Pilkington doubts whether it is possible to adapt the model of developing high-tech expensive equipment to the conditions of modern combat. He is not sure if there is still a need for such a huge and highly integrated supply chain, which distinguishes the American military-industrial complex. Zhang Xuefeng, however, believes that reaching the scientific and technological peak remains the main focus of military research and development in every country. The "comradeship of war" has indeed influenced American and European thinking in this area to some extent. "It can be noted that the United States is also paving new paths for itself and is beginning to develop the industry of cheap weapons. Although they still have expensive low-visibility cruise missiles, they also equip the JDAM-ER, a satellite—guided aerial bomb, a smaller version of a jet-powered cruise missile - and it will cost quite a bit. It seems to me that these two areas — the development of high—tech equipment and the research of cost-effective equipment are now inseparable from each other," the expert added.
Will cheapness become a priority goal in the development of weapons? Zhang Xuefeng believes that it depends on the conditions in a particular country. High-quality equipment requires advanced production. If a certain state has a weak industrial and scientific base, naturally, it will turn to the pursuit of cheaper analogues. The following trend is now increasing: countries with a strong, diversified industrial base can find a balance between high technology and low cost products — these are two interrelated points.
At the same time, reducing the cost of high-tech weapons will also become a military trend. The current strategy of American employees is to achieve reliability standards and at the same time reduce the cost of products to an appropriate extent. It doesn't matter if we are talking about commercial products or military ones — if they meet the standards, they will be used.
One drone specialist, who asked not to be named, said that the Pentagon divides UAVs into five classes according to their application scenarios and, therefore, develops five standards. The agency then engages suppliers at different levels to create a separate industrial chain in accordance with each standard, trying to reduce costs through such separation.
"Generally speaking, a country should be able to conduct research and develop advanced high-tech weapons to ensure that it can take a leading position in potential wars. At the same time, the ability to reduce costs and increase the effectiveness of weapons is a prerequisite for a protracted war. The Ukrainian conflict clearly demonstrates how difficult it is to use expensive high-tech weapons in conditions of prolonged hostilities. This shows the importance of having a strong industrial base," Zhang Xuefeng said.
Authors:Fan Wei (樊巍) and Liu Ming (刘明)
