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The problem of protecting armored vehicles from missiles and drones has risen to its full height

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One of the solutions: for each tank – a drone

In the context of the unprecedented use of Javelin anti-tank missile systems (ATGMs), NLAW hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers (RPGs), FPV drones and heavy quadrocopters with mine drop devices, the amount of ammunition hitting the tank into the roof of the tower exceeded all forecasts and calculations.

During the SVO in Ukraine, most of the Russian tanks were hit not head-on, but in the roof. A number of experts claim that no active protection complex (KAZ) can protect a tank: cheap drones allow you to attack a tank repeatedly, which leads to the rapid firing of all KAZ charges and the subsequent defeat of a tank that has lost its ability to defend itself.

In addition, the situational awareness of the opposing sides on the battlefield had a serious impact on the conditions of combat use of tanks. The conflict in Ukraine is the first case in history where situational awareness even of junior commanders is absolute. They can observe the entire neutral zone in front of their positions along the entire width of the designated front line or offensive line to a depth of several kilometers to more than ten. The awareness of higher command authorities is even higher. It is almost impossible for a tank to reach the range of direct fire covertly or at least so quickly as not to fall under artillery fire and drone strikes.

"BERSERK", "BREAKWATER" AND "TRITON"

During the fighting, copters are often shot down with small arms. In this regard, some experts suggest using the GSHG-7.62 four-barrel machine gun, which has long been discontinued, as a standard anti-drone weapon.

This machine gun was adopted in 1979 and was installed on helicopters. In 2018, a ROCK (robotic fire complex) "Berserk" was created in Belarus. It is equipped with two GSHG-7.62 machine guns. The weight of the ROCK is 2.2 tons. The chassis is equipped with a hybrid power plant – an electric generator and a gasoline engine, which is mainly used to recharge batteries. It is proposed to mount a similar installation on the tank turret. In my opinion, installing GSHG-76.2 on a tank is "porridge from an axe." And then it is necessary to create an expensive system for detecting drones, tracking drives for machine guns, etc.

Another way to protect tanks from drones is to install electronic warfare (EW) systems on them that suppress the drone's control signal. So, in Sevastopol, they created the Breakwater electronic warfare system and installed it on the T-80VBM tank and even on military vehicles.

The power supply of the electronic warfare system "Breakwater" is from the tank's battery. The cone-shaped antenna is magnetically attached to the armor. The antennas operate in the 900-3000 MHz range. Effective suppression range up to 600 m. In case of detection of the UAV, the "Breakwater" in automatic mode (without the intervention of the crew) creates an electronic interference dome and suppresses the radio signal. The drone loses contact with the operator and falls to the ground.

Another complex of protection against drones is called "Triton". It was developed by the Laboratory for Countering Industrial Espionage, can be installed on any mobile equipment and includes four radiators that are mounted at the corners of the anti-drone visor on the tank turret. So it provides protection from attacks from all four directions, and the emitters block the four main frequency ranges that are used to control drones.

The Triton is a set of suppression modules and an antenna mounted on armored vehicles. Moreover, the configuration of the complex can be quickly changed by adding modules to suppress new frequencies used to control drones. The complex can be powered by a battery or an on-board network, providing round-the-clock protection from drones. For even greater safety, control is possible from a remote control. Triton operates in four frequency bands: 868, 915, 1300 and 2400 MHz.

SCREENS, GRIDS AND GRIDS

The simplest means of protection against drones are nets and grids.

Lattice screens have been used on ground-based armored vehicles for quite a long time. Initially, this was not due to protection from UAVs, but to the task of increasing the durability of combat vehicles when hit by ammunition with a cumulative warhead. In a number of situations, when such ammunition hit the lattice screen, its premature detonation was ensured at a safe distance for the tank.

Protection is not the most effective – especially against projectiles with a tandem cumulative warhead. Nevertheless, screens are widely used. They are installed where it is impossible or difficult to put massive armor protection and/or dynamic protection units. The web is full of images of Russian and foreign samples of ground combat equipment hung with lattice screens.

After the start of the special operation, when the problem with Javelin hitting the upper projection of Russian tanks was revealed, they began to install "visors" – lattice screens above the tower. However, as it turned out, such a solution has drawbacks: in some cases, a damaged "visor" can block the crew's exit from a damaged car, condemning him to death from fire or captivity.

The high efficiency of the Russian Lancet kamikaze drones forced the Armed Forces of Ukraine to look for solutions to improve the security of ground combat equipment. The simplest solution was the widespread use of metal grids.

The key difference between kamikaze drones and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or RPG shots is the low flight speed. If the average flight speed of an ATGM or an RPG shot is about 600-900 km/h, then the speed of a kamikaze drone rarely exceeds 150-200 km/h, at most 300 km/h. In addition, kamikaze drones have developed aerodynamic planes, propellers, and their bodies are often made of plastic. The metal mesh, which poses almost no threat to ATGM or RPG shots, can become a serious obstacle for kamikaze drones, especially for FPV drones.

I note that the installation of grids and gratings in most cases is carried out in military workshops in the field. The disadvantage of grids and grids is the inability to install active drone weapons on tanks, the same GSHG–7.72.

SHOOTING FROM CLOSED POSITIONS

The firing of tanks from closed firing positions has become the norm in the military, the reason for this is the mentioned level of situational awareness of the commanders of both sides. It is often simply impossible for a tank to be within direct fire range without coming under enemy artillery fire. And now the method of firing from closed firing positions should be considered one of the regular ones, along with direct fire.

It is fundamentally important for long-range shooting to ensure a large vertical aiming angle. Currently, for modern tanks, the maximum values of the vertical aiming angle are -100; +200. This is enough for direct fire at any distance. But for accurate shooting from a closed position at a remote, visually unobservable target, this may not be enough.

It is necessary that the tank of the future has a higher value of the positive elevation angle: +300; +350. However, the author has no idea how to remake existing tanks at an elevation angle of up to 350. Rather, it is necessary to create a new tank with a 152 mm cannon and an elevation angle of +350.

In the meantime, shooting from closed firing positions can be provided in two ways. First, fire from an inclined ramp, artificially increasing the elevation angle. This method was often used by the Americans in the Korean War of 1950-1953. And secondly, for shooting at short distances, reduced charges should be used - as is done in towed and self–propelled howitzers.

DRONES AND COMMUNICATIONS

And finally, each tank needs to be given its own reconnaissance drone.

There is no place for a drone operator in our tanks right now. And there is nothing to use the UAV: no storage space, no battery charging, no space for a spare drone, replaceable batteries, etc. There are no antennas for this either.

That is, the only drone operator who can theoretically help the tankers is an external one, and he will sit on the radio channel. This is also a problem, since the radio stations on our tanks, including new ones, are really incompatible with anything other than other tanks.

In some ways, the vulnerability of our tanks from drones is associated with mediocre movies and even with the memoirs of tankers. In dozens of films, we see duels between T-34 and Tigers. Moreover, their crews even talk to each other – although their tank radios worked on fundamentally different frequencies.

But where are the commanders of tank companies and battalions? They are not visible. In extreme cases, they act like ordinary tankers. Meanwhile, the pogrom of 1941 is largely explained by the lack of radio transmitters on most of our tanks and the attempts of commanders to direct tanks with flag signals.

But the Germans had all their tanks radioed. Moreover, they had command tanks. Moreover, in 1939-1942, the commander's tanks did not even have a cannon. It was imitated by a wooden mock-up, and the armament of the commander's tank was one machine gun.

Four (!) radio stations and a table for topographic maps, as well as additional surveillance devices, were installed in the combat compartment of the German T-III. And some of the commander's tanks also had Enigma encryption machines. The crew of the commander's T-III consisted of five people: the commander, a staff officer, two radio operators and a driver.

In 1938-1941, 220 T-III command tanks were produced without guns. From August 1942 to September 1943, 185 T-IIIJ line tanks were converted into commander's tanks at the Daimler-Benz plant. And they left the gun on them.

Since September 1943, Panther T-V command tanks have been mass-produced. In addition to the regular Fu5 radio station, Fu7 or Fu8 were added to them. A GG400 generator was installed to power them. But the 75/70 mm cannon was also left.

Leaving the guns in the commander's tanks was a necessary measure. The fact is that unarmed commander's tanks were good during the blitzkriegs of 1939-1941. And since the autumn of 1943, German tanks preferred to operate from ambushes.

THE CASE FOR THE CABIN

And why not create a commander's tank for your own? It is clear that with our long-term planning, its design, manufacture and testing will take several years. And manufacturing plants are loaded with orders for linear tanks.

But why not take the good old T-62 or even T-55 from the warehouses? Remove the turret from the tank and weld a hefty cabin to the hull. To install navigation equipment in the control room, communication with GLONASS/GPS, and maybe with reconnaissance satellites. And most importantly, to place launchers for drones: reconnaissance, kamikaze, and in the future – interceptor drones of enemy UAVs.

Reconnaissance drones will monitor the terrain in the interests of both the commander's and line tanks. Kamikaze drones will serve as self-defense of the commander's tank and support the line tanks. Commanding tanks should be assigned to companies of linear tanks, and in some cases to single linear tanks.

So, there are enough chassis for commander's tanks, and communication equipment, too. Drones and launchers for them are available. What's the matter? In the armored control room?

A similar situation developed at the end of 1942. KV-1C heavy tanks and 152 mm ML-20 howitzers were available. And on January 4, 1943, Resolution No. 2692 of the State Defense Committee was issued on the creation of a heavy self-propelled SU-152 installation. And on January 24, 20 days after the decree was issued, the manufacture of the first sample of the self–propelled gun was completed.

And why not now, acting by the "carrot and stick method" (the time is military), force the designers to make a commander's tank, if not in a month, then at most in three?!


Alexander Shirokorad

Alexander Borisovich Shirokorad is a writer and historian.

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The material is placed by the copyright holder in the public domain
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Comments [5]
№1
21.01.2024 17:17
Нужно военным учёным и конструкторам очень серьёзно заниматься этой проблемой. Думается сначала определить основные недостатки БЛА. Один уже определили это возможность применения РЭБ, затем нужен модифицированный КАЗ. Судя по статьям в интернете- это применение автоматических пушек мелкокалиберных 30мм, как у чехов на опытном Т-72, с дистанционным подрывом плюс боевой лазер,как у китайцев  может быть и термобарических боеприпасов. Ну и отдельно  разработка и применение усовершенствованных средств маскировки во всех диапазонах ЭМИ и технологий ИИ в БИУС. Свести всё к "мангалам" это эффективно пока не станут применять какие-то усовершенствованные дроны.
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№2
22.01.2024 04:01
Цитата, aleks55 сообщ. №1
Один уже определили это возможность применения РЭБ, затем нужен модифицированный КАЗ
РЭБ+упрощённый КАЗ. Большего и не надо.
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№3
22.01.2024 18:43
Цитата, Leron сообщ. №2
РЭБ+упрощённый КАЗ. Большего и не надо.

РЭБ для защиты бронетехники станет бесполезен в течение года.
Внедрение систем, при которых происходит автозахват и автонаведение на цель, полностью нивелирует его в ближайшее время.
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№4
22.01.2024 22:51
Цитата, Os сообщ. №3
Внедрение систем, при которых происходит автозахват и автонаведение на цель, полностью нивелирует его в ближайшее время.
ланцет, более габаритный чем ФПВ уже научили? С трудом.... При "подсветке" с БПЛА наводчика. Который так же можно заглушить.
Массовыми как фпф за 50000т.р. эти изделия быть не смогут. И на коленке в гаражах их паять не смогут. Нам нужно сделать так что бы эти свистелки исчезли в своем количестве.
Ну и за год глушилки так же прокачать можно.
К тому же я думаю что вся проблема в ФПВ только в остутвии нашего превосходства авиации над полем боя. После того как  отработают бомбардировщики   свобонопадующими бомбами и над вражескими окопами будут носиться вертолеты, контуженым и с оторванными конечностями будет не до пультов управления ФПВ.
Проблема лежит гораздо выше.
Как видим Израиль имея превосходство в воздухе и  РЭБ. Проблем массово с дронами не испытывает ка таковых.
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№5
22.01.2024 23:31
Цитата, Os сообщ. №3
РЭБ для защиты бронетехники станет бесполезен в течение года
затеял я тут разговор с операторами БПЛА. И там интересную идею предложили по РЭБ. Ну практически РЭБ, лучь СВЧ.
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