Military cooperation between Russia and China has gone through different times
The Armed Forces of the People's Republic of China have practically no real combat experience. Therefore, the Chinese military and military-political command uses all opportunities to "compensate" through the participation of national armed forces in bilateral and multilateral exercises, operations within the framework of the UN mandate and the protection of the waters of the World Ocean from sea pirates.
Under the conditions of an actual embargo on arms exports from Western countries and sanctions from the United States, China's military-technical cooperation with foreign countries is difficult. But such cooperation is considered by the Chinese leadership as the most important measure capable of increasing the combat capabilities of the national armed forces to a world-class level.
Against this background, when considering the international cooperation of the People's Republic of China in the field of security, cooperation with the Russian Federation should be highlighted first of all. In the period 2017-2021, China and Russia carried out arms trade, conducted joint operational and combat training (OBP) events, as well as meetings of senior officials of the military departments of the two countries. At the same time, the focus of military cooperation between Moscow and Beijing was of a pronounced anti-American nature.
Since February 2022, that is, after the start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine, military-political contacts between the PRC and the Russian Federation have continued at least with the same intensity, as well as joint military exercises.
Military-technical cooperation is also developing, although the focus here is gradually shifting from arms sales to the sale and joint development of military technologies. "As for China, we are ready to cooperate in all areas, we have no restrictions. By the way, this also applies to military technologies," Russian President Vladimir Putin said at the Russia Is Calling! forum on December 7, 2023.
But cooperation of this kind is delicate and confidential, and its volume and dynamics cannot yet be estimated. And in any case, it is too early to sum up the results of the last two years. But some conclusions and generalizations about the previous stage of cooperation can be made.
AREAS OF COOPERATION
The main areas of joint work in the military sphere include:
1. Cooperation in the field of military-industrial complexes (MIC). China continues to acquire the latest technologies from Russia, allowing it to build up military power and increase the combat capabilities of weapons and military equipment (IWT). So, in May 2018, China acquired S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia. China has become another state armed with these technical means, in addition to Russia, India and Turkey. In addition, a contract was fulfilled for the supply of 10 more Su-35 aircraft (previously 10 machines were purchased in 2017 and 4 in 2016).
2. Participation in bilateral and multilateral OBP events, the main of which was the strategic command and staff exercise Vostok-2018, in which the Chinese Armed Forces were involved for the first time. Subsequently, the Chinese military took part in the exercises "Center-2019" and "South-2020". In addition, the PRC took an active part in the Army International Games (ArMI), held from July 28 to August 11, 2018. At the same time, four competitions were held directly on Chinese territory. From the Chinese side, H-6K strategic bombers and Y-9 military transport aircraft were involved in the events. In addition, both countries have agreed to hold a joint naval exercise "Maritime Interaction - 2018" in the waters of the Yellow Sea near the city of Qingdao. In 2019 and 2020, the parties conducted joint patrols of long-range bombers over the waters of the Japanese and Yellow Seas.
3. Meetings of senior officials of the military and foreign ministries of the two countries held on a regular basis. In particular, in 2018, Chinese Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe made his first foreign visit after being confirmed in office, during which he visited the Russian Federation and held talks with his Russian counterpart Sergei Shoigu on the sidelines of the Moscow Conference on International Security. At the same time, he stressed that his participation in the event was dictated, among other things, by the intention to demonstrate to the whole world, and primarily to the United States, the high level of Russian-Chinese cooperation.
After that, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in Beijing, where he held a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, during which the parties confirmed the intention of the two countries to actively develop bilateral relations. In addition, the number of contacts between senior officials of the military departments increased, during which views were exchanged on regional and global security issues, as well as plans for holding events of the OBP were agreed upon.
The next Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, Li Shangfu, also made his first foreign visit to Russia in April 2023, shortly after his appointment. However, already in October, Li Shangfu was removed from his post for domestic political reasons. But there is no reason to doubt that the course of deepening cooperation between the two military departments will be continued by his successor (although, perhaps, in this case, it is more correct to say – a replacement).
It seems possible to agree with Russian political scientist Vasily Kashin. He argues that Chinese elites view the Russian Federation as a militarily strong country shaping a new balance of power in the world. Largely overlapping geopolitical interests determine the interest of the two countries in cooperation.
The interest in joint actions with Russia for China is also due to the views of Chinese military experts on potential US attempts to destabilize the situation inside China by analogy with the color revolutions in the Middle East. In these circumstances, military cooperation is becoming one of the priorities of bilateral relations.
At the same time, an analysis of the activities of military cooperation between Russia and China in the period 2015-2020 allows us to characterize it as not fully implemented. The general decrease in the scale of Russian-Chinese military exercises and the intensity of military-technical cooperation, as well as the rather weak elaboration of bilateral programs for renting, repairing equipment, and developing dual-use technologies, provides new opportunities for diversifying military cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.
A BRIEF HISTORY
Military cooperation between Moscow and Beijing as a whole developed steadily, although it knew both recessions and ups, or even stopped altogether for 20 years.
From 1949 to 1969, military equipment worth about $4.1 billion was supplied to China from the Soviet Union. In the period from 1951 to 1960, military facilities were jointly created for a total amount of about 439.3 million dollars. About 650 licenses for the production of military equipment were also donated.
Soviet specialists and engineers helped the Chinese military to master the transferred weapons. According to experts, more than 5,300 military advisers and specialists were sent from the Soviet Union to China. More than 1,600 Chinese military personnel were graduated from universities of the USSR in various training programs.
After a break caused by well-known political events, military-technical cooperation between Russia and China resumed only in 1990. Both countries pledged to develop strategic cooperation in the military sphere: in the event of a military danger, the military and political leadership of the two states promptly conducts consultations to eliminate the threats that have arisen.
The greatest development of the military-technical cooperation between Russia and China was in 1992-2004. More than 100 combat aircraft and helicopters for various purposes were delivered from Russia to China. At the request of Chinese customers, domestic specialists participated in the development of Chinese Jian-10, JF-17 fighter jets and the L-15 combat training aircraft.
After receiving design documentation from Russia, licensed production of Su-27SK fighters under the Chinese designation "Jian-11" was organized in the Chinese city of Shenyang, starting in 1998. Later, on the basis of the submitted documentation and taking into account the developments of the Ukrainian aviation industry, Chinese Jian-15 short take-off and landing fighters were designed to be based on the aircraft carriers of the People's Liberation Army Navy of China (PLA) Liaoning and Shandong.
Rosoboronexport JSC has signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense of the People's Republic of China for the supply of AL-31F aircraft engines for installation on Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, AL-31FN engines for equipping Jian-10 fighters, as well as D-30 KP-2 engines to replace outdated engines on Il-76 transport aircraft and Hun-6 bombers. The issues of exporting multipurpose diesel-electric submarines of Project 677 Lada from Russia to China were discussed. Short- and medium-range air defense systems and complexes "Tor", "Buk", "Tunguska", and S-300 were delivered to China.
The second half of the noughties in China was held under the auspices of the scientific and technical revolution, which consisted in the development of Russian and Western technologies. In this regard, the Chinese leadership has made a fundamental decision to arm the PLA "with self-reliance."
We can explain this circumstance for two reasons. First, due to political differences with the Soviet Union, until the 1990s, the PRC was forced to purchase military equipment exclusively from Western exporters. After the collapse of the USSR, Chinese military specialists had access to the time-tested developments of Soviet and then Russian designers. And the second reason: the change in the vector of military-technical policy was caused by the disagreement of the Chinese side with the pricing policy of arms exports of the Russian Federation.
Technologies of the Smerch jet system transferred to the Tula NGO "Splav" helped the industry of the Celestial Empire to create its own samples with an increased firing range. Photo by Vladimir Karnozov
INTERIM RESULTS
The military-technical cooperation of the People's Republic of China with the Russian Federation at the present stage of development is an important component of Russian-Chinese relations, carried out on the basis of the intergovernmental "Agreement on Military-technical cooperation" dated November 24, 1992. As part of it, Russia has already supplied or is supplying China with the following military equipment:
– military aviation equipment: Su-25, Su-27 fighters (they also received a production license), Su-30MKK, Su-35; Mi-171, Ka-32 and Ansat helicopters; Il-76 transport aircraft; Il-78 tanker aircraft; guided aerial bombs; M807 cruise missiles; engines for Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets and Il-76 transport aircraft;
– air defense systems: S-300PM1 and S-400 long-range anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs); Tor-M and Tunguska short-range anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), Buk medium-range air defense systems;
– naval military equipment: diesel submarines of the Varshavyanka and Lada classes, missile destroyers; Mosquito anti-ship missiles;
– armament and military equipment for the ground forces: T-80U tanks; guided shells for tanks; guided artillery shells "Krasnopol"; guided shells "Bastion".
Under Russian licenses, China produces long-range radar detection and control (AWACS) aircraft, L-15 training aircraft. 152-mm self-propelled howitzers "Msta-S" are produced without a license.
Currently, the People's Republic of China is generally satisfied with the achieved level of development of military-technical cooperation with the Russian Federation. In this regard, Beijing positively assesses the possibilities of progressive expansion of the bilateral military-technical cooperation. This is also due to the implementation of intergovernmental agreements on the supply of the S-400 Triumph air defense system to China, 24 Su-35 multifunctional fighters, the fulfillment of contracts for the adaptation of this type of aircraft to the local control system, and the creation of a mathematical model of a non-strategic missile defense system in the interests of China. Engineers from the two countries are designing a new diesel-electric submarine (DPL) with an air-independent power plant based on the Russian Amur-1650 project.
POSSIBLE CONTRADICTIONS
At the same time, Beijing is striving to gradually abandon the procurement of large quantities of Russian military hardware and transfer military-technical cooperation to a qualitatively new level. This new level, as hoped in China, should be characterized by close scientific, technical, industrial and technological cooperation for the joint development of new models of military hardware, in the creation of which Chinese specialists face difficulties (air defense / missile defense systems, DAPL, surface ships of the ocean zone).
In some cases, China is trying to use the results of the military–technical cooperation with Russia to expand the market for its own military products, including at the expense of countries traditionally focused on importing Russian military equipment. These are the states of Central Asia, Algeria, Venezuela, Egypt, Ethiopia, etc.
As Russia's economic potential increases, contradictions may arise in Russian-Chinese relations related to the mutual desire to expand the spheres of their own interests in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) and Central Asia. Such a scenario could lead to targeted actions by the PRC to contain Russia in the arms markets, the formation of Russian-Chinese competition, which would lead to the emergence of factors that pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.
CAPABLE STUDENTS
The adoption of a significant number of samples of Russian military equipment made it necessary to send Chinese mid- and senior-level officers to the Russian Federation for training.
The Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation regularly hosts advanced training courses, which are attended by about a dozen PLA officers with the rank of brigade commander aged 35 and over, as well as division commanders aged 38 to 40 years. This category of military personnel studies the peculiarities of the organization of national defense. PLA servicemen also improved their qualifications within the walls of the Military University of the Ministry of Defense in the direction of "linguistic support for military activities" and the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the direction of "training officers with higher professional education".
The deployment of Russian military specialists to China is mainly limited to improving the level of linguistic training of translators at the PLA Institute of Foreign Languages located in Luoyang.
The pace of shipbuilding achieved in China allowed the PLA Navy to abandon obsolete projects of frigates and destroyers of Soviet designs. The last of the Type 051 destroyers (a copy of the Soviet project 41) was withdrawn from the Northern Fleet of the PLA Navy in August 2020, and the Russian-made guided missile destroyers of the Modern type are now inferior in number (only two units in 2020), missile armament and electronic equipment to new Chinese developments – destroyers of the URO project 056 D.
The capabilities of the Chinese air defense were strengthened by the supply of a second set of long-range S-400 Triumph air defense systems from the Russian Federation. The first C-400 regimental set is deployed in one of the brigades located in the vicinity of Beijing. In 2019-2020, the Hongqi-9B and Hongqi-22 long-range air defense systems of national production were produced and deployed in China. Presumably, the Hunzi-9B is a modification of the Hunzi-9 complex in service with the PLA with an extended range, with capabilities corresponding to the Russian S-300PM2 air defense system.
JOINT EXERCISES
In 2015-2020, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China continued meetings of senior officials of military departments. At the same time, the orientation of Russian-Chinese cooperation had, as already mentioned, a distinctly anti-American character. The main direction of military cooperation in this time period was the holding of Russian-Chinese military exercises of various scales.
Strategic Command and Staff Exercises (CCS) in the period from 2015 to 2020 were conducted on a regular basis. The Vostok-2018 maneuvers with the participation of Chinese military personnel became the most ambitious. SKSHU was conducted under the personal supervision of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. About 300 thousand military personnel, more than 1 thousand aircraft, 80 warships and support vessels took part in the exercises, which took place in the waters of the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. The PRC has sent about 1,600 military personnel, more than 300 pieces of equipment, 30 aircraft and helicopters to the Vostok-2018 and Center-2019 training schools. Taking into account quarantine measures due to the new coronavirus infection COVID-19, only 100 PLA servicemen and 18 pieces of equipment were involved during the Caucasus 2020 School of Medical Sciences.
Naval exercises "Maritime Interaction" are planned and coordinated by the PLA command with specific political tasks facing the People's Republic of China. Joint Russian-Chinese naval maneuvers, organized annually since 2015, have been conducted in the waters of the South China and Baltic Seas. According to the PLA command, the diverse geography of the exercises is a way to indicate the growing military power of the two countries.
In 2019, Iran, China and Russia held three-day trilateral naval exercises in the waters of the Gulf of Oman. The maneuvers demonstrated a high level of coordination of joint actions at sea against the background of heightened tensions between the United States and Iran.
Anti-terrorist exercises have become a new direction for strengthening military ties between the PRC and the Russian Federation in the fight against the "three forces of evil": international terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. This activity is carried out on a bilateral basis and in a multilateral format within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Considerable attention is paid to the anti–terrorist exercise "Peace Mission", which is attended by the SCO member states. This exercise has a stabilizing effect on the regional situation and prepares the armed forces of the participating countries for counter-terrorism actions on the territory of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China. In 2019, the exercise of the troops of the Russian Guard and the People's Armed Militia of the People's Republic of China "Cooperation-2019" took place in the Novosibirsk region, where actions to combat international terrorist groups were practiced.
It should be noted that the anti-terrorist exercises of the PRC and the Russian Federation differ from similar Chinese-Pakistani or Chinese-Thai events in that they work out the interaction of battalion-tactical groups, while similar Chinese-Pakistani and Chinese-Thai exercises involve units of the PLA airborne troops and Navy marines numbering up to 250 soldiers.
Joint air patrols by Russian and Chinese strategic bombers are becoming a new way to achieve political goals in the Asia-Pacific region. At the end of 2019 and 2020, the PLA Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Forces conducted joint air patrols. Air groups consisting of TU-95 MS strategic bombers (from the Russian Federation) and Hong-6K (from the PRC) carried out air patrols over the waters of the Japanese and East China Seas. During the patrol, the aircraft adhered to the provisions of international law without violating the airspace of other countries.
The computer command and staff missile defense exercises "Aerospace Security" are considered in China as a response to the creation of the US THAAD missile defense system in South Korea. Their goal is to demonstrate to rivals in the region a high level of relations with the Russian Federation.
A special feature of the Russian-Chinese exercises launched in 2017 is the use of computer simulation of a joint missile defense system. It is not possible to work in real conditions due to the high level of closure and prohibition of access to the facilities of national missile defense systems. In modern conditions, engineering problems do not allow Chinese specialists to create a national missile defense system. This is evidenced by the interest of Chinese military specialists in the Russian S-400 and S-500 air defense/missile defense systems.
In October 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin named data exchange for the creation of a missile attack warning system (SPRN) as one of the priorities of military cooperation with China. It is known that this system allows you to record the launch and flight path of enemy ballistic missiles. It consists of two echelons: space and ground. Since the 1970s, Beijing has conducted its own research and development (R&D) in the interests of creating this system. In the 2010s, construction was intensified in China, and later information appeared about work on the space echelon of the system.
The very fact of cooperation between the Russian Federation and China in the field of strategic missile defense is politically significant: Only the USA and the Russian Federation have their own SPRN systems, such systems are the most complex and classified. The issue of the mode of interaction between the two countries' SPRN in the future remains open. If there is a system of automated data exchange between them in real time, the capabilities of the two countries to warn about a missile attack will increase dramatically.
The international competitions "Army International Games" ("ArMI") are considered by the Chinese command as a new form of military cooperation proper. However, there are some contradictions with the Russian side in their organization.
Thus, the Chinese side expects to use the project of the Russian Ministry of Defense in the interests of strengthening the prestige of its own Armed Forces. To do this, the PLA command is trying to increase the number of "ArMI" contests held in the territory of the People's Republic of China. This makes it possible to amend the rules of the competition with the granting of the right to make a final judicial decision by the commission of the host country. During the "ArMI-2018" and "ArMI-2019", four of the 29 contests were held on Chinese territory.
In 2020, the military departments of Russia and China extended the notification agreement in the event of the launch of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles for a period of 10 years. The second important event was the joint air patrol of the strategic aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Chinese Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite the restrictions associated with COVID-19, the military departments of Russia and China jointly held a series of military competitions, which ended with the Caucasus 2020 School of Sports with the participation of PLA servicemen.
conclusions
Thus, Russian-Chinese military cooperation has developed significantly in the period 2015-2020. At the same time, military-technical cooperation was mainly focused on the unilateral purchase of Russian equipment by the Chinese side. On the other hand, bilateral relations in the military-political sphere were characterized by a high intensity of delegation exchanges, which was facilitated by the special nature of personal contacts between the leaders of the states.
At the same time, the Chinese leadership does not abandon the key principle of its foreign policy strategy, which is to position China as an independent center of power, not bound to anyone by any allied obligations.
Vasily Ivanov
Vasily Ivanovich Ivanov is a journalist.