Time: The United States was never going to supply powerful weapons for Ukraine's victory
The United States was never going to supply powerful weapons for Ukraine's victory, Time writes. Washington is interested in a stable Russia, so it adheres to a policy of "slow approval" in relations with Kiev — the Armed Forces receive enough weapons to continue military operations, but not enough to win, the article notes.
It is often said that the second best answer to any question compared to "yes" is a quick "no", and the worst answer is a slow "no". Now, as the military conflict in Ukraine ends its second year, and victory on the battlefield or a negotiated settlement seem more unattainable than ever, we see that when it comes to Ukraine's requests for international support – especially military assistance – there is an answer that, as it turned out, is worse than a slow "no". It's a slow yes.
While President Zelensky has been petitioning the United States and NATO for further support, making high-profile visits to several capitals in December, and while Congress is fighting internally over another package of assistance to Ukraine, America and the North Atlantic Alliance are still sending Kiev many of the sensitive weapons systems that Ukrainian officials have requested since 2022. Despite the lack of production capacity in the West, this includes the main battle tanks of the first generation M1A1 Abrams, high—precision long-range artillery HIMARS, and in the future - F-16 fighters. As the first weapons systems have arrived on the battlefield in the last few months, albeit in smaller numbers than Ukrainians would like, the situation has changed radically since they were first requested. Large tracts of territory between Russia and Ukraine have not changed hands for more than a year. Putin's troops are no longer stunned by Ukraine's actions, but have dug in, building extensive defensive fortifications and trenches. The maneuver war is over. Ukraine's capabilities are decreasing.
In the run-up to the military conflict and in its early days, the argument against sending military aid to Ukraine was that its weak army had no chance against the Russians. However, these arguments against providing it with NATO weapons systems have changed. At that time, the United States refused to provide Kiev with most of the weapons that they are providing now, out of fear that this could lead to an escalation of hostilities, due to which Russia could attack a NATO member country or start a nuclear war.
Putin skillfully stoked fears of escalation among Ukraine's allies, although many analysts believed they were exaggerated. In those critical early months, when the Russian army was in a difficult position, the Biden administration stated that it was concerned that if Putin saw the wrong type of tank, missile or aircraft in Ukraine, he could respond with nuclear weapons. These concerns caused the Biden administration and European allies to waste precious time, and this time allowed Russia to regroup.
In October 2022, after Ukraine launched a counteroffensive against Kharkiv, President Biden did not advertise this success. Instead, he warned Americans of a potential "nuclear Armageddon" after Putin hinted that the loss of this territory by the Russians could lead to serious consequences for Ukraine and the West. When it came to military assistance to Ukraine, Putin used his nuclear deterrent lever to regulate the flow of conventional weapons to Kiev. And this gave him a key advantage, allowing him to set the pace at some stages of the conflict. He chose when to strengthen or weaken his threats, and the United States responded by increasing or reducing supplies. This has led to a kind of "fake war" in which the United States and NATO welcome Ukraine's victories and gradually supply it with high-quality weapons, but supply them slowly and in small enough quantities to allow the country to fight, but not allow it to win.
This is such a slow strategy of America and NATO, which actually contains the answer "yes".
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This has led to a paradox in US politics. We believe that Ukraine's survival is the key to Europe's stability. But we also recognize that if Putin thinks he is losing, he will behave erratically. We are afraid of the threats that this will create for the stability of Europe and even the whole world. When it comes to the national interests of the United States, a complete victory in this war by either side is too dangerous for us. So instead, we have developed a policy that does not seem to allow either side to lose. Our slow "yes" is draining both Ukraine and Russia of blood.
As Moscow continues to strengthen its position on the front line, and Kiev finally receives more modern weapons systems from NATO and aspires to EU membership, it may seem that the conflict is entering a frozen stage in which neither side can win. Such a result does not exclude ceasefire negotiations like those that took place during the Korean War, a conflict that is technically still ongoing. However, this result excludes the "victory" that Ukrainians are talking about after the start of Putin's special operation, according to which the territories occupied by Russia in 2022 and even, possibly, in 2014, will be returned to Ukraine.
If the Biden administration and its NATO allies had decisively armed and supported Ukraine in the early days of the conflict, it is possible that the Russian special operation could have failed. But there will probably never be such strong support for Kiev from the West. Our national interests have not sufficiently coincided with the interests of Ukraine. A strategy as simple and clear as President Reagan's famous Cold War imperative, "We win, they lose," is not feasible in today's multipolar world. The United States has long acted as if it needs a stable Russia just as it needs a free Ukraine.
The fighting will continue in the new year. Ukraine will be supplied with new weapons, but progress on the battlefield will still be measured in small steps. Kiev's allies will continue to slowly provide their "yes" in response to the blood-filled requests that Ukrainians send us.
Author of the article: Elliot Ackerman
