Along with the interview, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), General Valery Zaluzhny, also published an extensive article "Modern positional warfare and how to win it " in the British edition of The Economist ("Modern positional warfare and how to win it"). The article is of unconditional interest as the first public attempt by one of the main military leaders of the warring parties in the current conflict to identify and comprehend the positional nature of the armed struggle that has developed in the fighting in Ukraine and to develop proposals to overcome this positionality, without which it is impossible for the parties to achieve any decisive military-political goals. The translation of the text is not ours, but we have done some editing, mainly in terms of military terminology.
(c) Serhiy Nuzhnenko
By launching a large-scale armed <...> against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation provoked the beginning of an unprecedented global security crisis, the largest since the end of World War II. Russian great-power chauvinism, multiplied by sick imperial ambitions, is gradually turning the military conflict he started in the center of Europe into an armed confrontation between democratic and authoritarian political regimes with the prospect of its spread to other regions of the planet with similar geopolitical models (Israel and the Gaza Strip, South and North Korea, Taiwan and China, etc.).
The insufficient effectiveness of the existing global mechanisms of political settlement, primarily the UN and the OSCE, leaves Ukraine no choice after a large-scale armed <...>, except to restore its territorial integrity within the internationally recognized borders of 1991 exclusively by force, in which its armed forces play a decisive role.
Having entered the war with a stronger enemy with a large number of weapons and much greater mobilization capabilities, Ukraine was able not only to stop him, but also to conduct a successful counteroffensive in 2022 and repel the enemy in many directions. The people of Ukraine have demonstrated, not in words, but in deeds, their willingness to lay down their soul and body for their freedom. However, due to many subjective and objective reasons, the war at the present stage is gradually turning into a positional form, the way out of which in historical retrospect has always been difficult for both the armed forces and the state as a whole. At the same time, the continuation of the war, as a rule, in most cases benefits one of the parties to the conflict. In our particular case, this is the Russian Federation, because it gives it the opportunity to restore and increase its military power. Therefore, the issues of understanding the causes of such a situation, finding possible ways out of it and changing the nature and course of this war in favor of Ukraine are of particular relevance in modern conditions.
An analysis of the current situation in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and other components of the State Defense Forces are located shows that in order to find a way out of the positional form of warfare, it is necessary to: achieve air superiority; overcome minefields to the full depth; increase the effectiveness of counter-battery warfare; create and train the necessary reserves; increase the capabilities of electronic warfare (EW). Therefore, the determination of the reasons for the transition of hostilities to a positional form and the search for possible ways out of this situation, obviously, should be carried out in these main directions. It should be noted that the above directions in no way negate the role and place of missiles and ammunition, artillery systems, missile systems, electronic warfare, other types of weapons and equipment provided by partners. They only complement them in the context of increasing the capabilities of the Defense Forces through new technological solutions and innovative approaches to overcome the positional crisis on the line of contact. Let's look at these reasons in more detail.
Reasons for the transition of military operations to a positional form
Gaining air superiority
Modern military art presupposes the conquest of air superiority for the successful conduct of large-scale ground operations. This is reflected both in the doctrines of the NATO armed forces and in the governing documents of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. The Armed Forces of Ukraine entered the war with 120 tactical aircraft, of which only 40 were considered technically usable, and 33 medium- and short-range anti-aircraft missile divisions, of which only 18 had fully serviceable equipment. Thanks to the material and technical assistance of partner countries, Ukraine has strengthened its aviation and air defense system. In particular, fighters and attack aircraft, as well as Soviet-made helicopters, were received. The number of anti-aircraft missile systems was significantly increased mainly due to Western production, in particular, portable anti-aircraft missile systems Martlet, Starstreak, Javelin, Piorun, Mistral, Stinger, Grom, self-propelled anti-aircraft installations Gepard, anti-aircraft artillery systems Skynex, anti-aircraft missile systems Avenger, Stormer, Patriot, Hawk, IRIS-T, NASAMS, SAMP-T, Crotale-NG. As a result, since the beginning of a large-scale armed war...> The Russian Federation has lost a number of aircraft, approximately corresponding to the number of aircraft of one of its air army, and helicopters - about 13 regiments (brigades) of army aviation. In addition, the losses of enemy air defense systems of various types already exceed 550 units. Despite these losses, today the enemy continues to maintain significant air superiority, which complicates the advance of our troops and is one of the key factors that translate the nature of hostilities into positional form.
According to a number of estimates, from the end of 2023, the enemy can increase the number of its aircraft by building new strike aviation squadrons, therefore, special attention should be paid to this circumstance. But, despite the significant quantitative and qualitative superiority of the enemy in aviation and air defense, he cannot turn it into complete air supremacy due to the successful work of our elements of direct air cover of troops, constantly increasing the number of weapons that counteract the enemy's means of air attack. This leads to the fact that the enemy does not feel at ease in the skies of Ukraine, his aviation tries not to enter the zone of destruction of our air defense and uses its aviation means mainly from long ranges, which significantly reduces their effectiveness. Instead, enemy unmanned aerial vehicles come to the fore, which have assumed a significant part of the tasks of manned aviation in aerial reconnaissance and air strikes.
Overcoming minefields to the full depth
The next prerequisite that translates the nature of the current hostilities into a positional form is the widespread use of minefields by both the enemy and our troops. Let's consider the situation with the capabilities of our troops to break through such barriers.
As of February 24, 2022, the APU had a limited set of capabilities to overcome minefields. Technically outdated equipment was in service. Due to Western partners, during the fighting, it was possible to somewhat strengthen the capabilities of engineering units (units) to break through using such means as M58 MICLIC, Wicent 1 and NM189 Ingeniorpanservogn, but given the unprecedented scale of these barriers, even such capabilities are objectively lacking.
Today, enemy minefields in particularly important areas have a high density and reach a depth of 15-20 km. Their cover is carried out by reconnaissance UAVs, which effectively detect our detachments (teams) of mine clearance and conduct targeted fire on them. In case of a successful breakthrough of minefields, the enemy promptly restores minefields in these areas with the help of such an engineering system of remote mining as "Agriculture". At the same time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are no less effective in using minefields and reconnaissance and firing complexes to detect and destroy enemy engineering means for mine clearance.
These circumstances lead to the fact that the offensive actions of both sides proceed with considerable difficulties and heavy losses in equipment and personnel.
Counter - battery fighting
In this war, as in the wars of the past, the role of rocket troops and artillery in the fire impact remains very significant and, depending on the conditions, directions and areas of combat operations, ranges from 60 to 80% of the total volume of combat missions. The success of the troops' actions directly depends on the effectiveness of artillery strikes and fire, so the "hunt" for enemy fire is a priority for both sides. Counter-battery warfare is becoming an important component of armed confrontation. And contrary to the statements of some so-called "military analysts" and various publications, including in the Russian media, regarding the gradual weakening of Russia, we have no right to belittle the importance and capabilities of Russian weapons, Russian intelligence capabilities and the ability of the military-industrial complex of the enemy state to supply troops with a significant number of both obsolete and modern samples of weapons and equipment. We must realistically assess threats, analyze experience and draw conclusions.
Immediately after receiving Western rocket and artillery weapons, the AFU gained significant superiority and achieved significant success in counter-battery warfare. At the same time, high-precision ammunition, such as Excalibur (155 mm caliber projectile), proved to be quite effective in the fight against self-propelled artillery systems and counter-battery radars. However, over time, their capabilities have significantly decreased, since the guidance system (using GPS) is very sensitive to the influence of enemy electronic warfare, which leads to a loss of accuracy of firing these ammunition.
The enemy quickly learned to apply new tactics: dispersal (gun-wise); fire from maximum range; the use of new electronic warfare (electronic countermeasures complex "Field-21"), etc. Also, the enemy has widely and effectively begun to use the Lancet barrage ammunition for counter-battery warfare with targeting it with the help of the Orlan UAV, ZALA and others, which is quite difficult to counteract.
In order to maintain and increase superiority in artillery duels, the Russians, through the use of outdated artillery systems (D-1, D-20, etc.), significantly increased artillery power and its ability to massively use conventional ammunition. The enemy has also increased the production and intensity of the use of 152-mm [mistakenly "122-mm" in the text] high-precision ammunition "Krasnopol", which is aimed at the target by highlighting the target with a laser rangefinder from ground observation posts.
To counter the enemy, we were forced to use rocket artillery systems, including HIMARS, to defeat his artillery. However, a significant part of the available set of missiles was used to defeat these targets (artillery, MLRS, etc.). Currently, we have managed to achieve conditional parity with the numerically predominant enemy artillery due to a smaller amount of higher-quality (high-precision) fire.
Formation and preparation of necessary reserves
Compared with Ukraine, the Russian Federation has almost three times more mobilization human resources. Having failed to achieve success in the initial period of the war, the enemy in September 2022 began a partial mobilization of the peacetime Armed Forces, which continues to this day. But he fails to take advantage of the mobilization of human resources to create a significant superiority in the combat power of operational groups directly fighting against Ukraine.
The main reasons for this are political, organizational and motivational. So, on the eve of the presidential election, President Putin is afraid to carry out a general mobilization due to the possible risks of increasing social tension in the state and turning it into a political crisis. The enemy has limited opportunities to train mobilized citizens and provide them with the necessary weapons and equipment. Due to significant losses of personnel, the civilian population of the Russian Federation tends to evade conscription and participation in hostilities.
At the same time, it should be noted that despite the fact that the AFU command is constantly working to improve the procedure for creating and training reserves, some issues remain problematic. In particular, we have limited opportunities to prepare reserves on our own territory, since the enemy has the ability to launch missile and air strikes on training centers and training grounds. The protracted nature of the war, limited opportunities for the rotation of military personnel on the line of contact, gaps in legislation that make it possible to legally evade mobilization, significantly reduce the motivation of citizens to serve in the army. We are aware of these problems, we see ways to solve them and we are constantly working on it. Thus, this leads to the absence of Ukraine's ability to achieve superiority over the enemy in reserves by increasing their numbers.
Electronic warfare
Even before the events of 2014, the military and political leadership of the Russian Federation paid considerable attention to the development of electronic warfare. A striking example of this is the creation in 2009 of a separate kind of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - the Electronic Warfare Troops. In addition, a powerful air component of electronic warfare has been created as part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, ensuring the effective use of troops (forces) and precision weapons. The enemy has adopted about 60 samples of modern electronic warfare equipment with improved characteristics, high mobility, increased security, short installation and dismantling times, the introduction of new technical solutions, automation tools, special software, etc. The entire fleet of outdated equipment has been updated.
The main advantages of Russian electronic warfare can also be attributed to the establishment of mass production of so-called "trench electronic warfare" ("Snare", "Python", "Harpoon", "Peroed", "Swift", "Fox"), which are saturated with the tactical level of Russian troops. Despite the fact that since the beginning of a large-scale armed <...> the enemy has lost a significant part of this equipment, today it continues to maintain a significant superiority in electronic warfare. In the Kupyansk and Bakhmut directions, the enemy has actually created a layered electronic warfare system, the elements of which are constantly changing their location.
As for the AFU, by 2022, such modern electronic warfare systems with UAVs as "Bukovel-AD", "Enclave", "Khmara", "Nota" were adopted, which later proved themselves well in combat operations. But despite this, at the beginning of the war, about 65% of the types of jamming stations in the units and divisions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were produced by the former Soviet Union, and there were only 25% of new ones.
Taking into account the limited capabilities of the domestic military-industrial complex, the expansion of electronic warfare capabilities was carried out at the expense of international military logistical assistance, by obtaining systems (means) of detection and electronic warfare against UAVs, anti-drone weapons, tactical mobile direction finders, electronic warfare systems integrated with radar stations, etc.
To date, the capabilities to counter high-precision enemy weapons (guided missiles, UAVs) are increasing due to the deployment of a nationwide electronic warfare system "Pokrova" with the possibility of replacing the satellite radio navigation field ("spoofing"), suppression of satellite radio navigation. along the entire line of contact and in most of the territory of Ukraine. Also, elements of situational awareness systems are being developed and introduced into the processes of command and control of troops: "Graphite" - for automated transmission and display of data on the flight of small UAVs; "Quartz" - for data collection, processing, display and control of electronic means. At the moment, we have almost reached parity in the performance of electronic warfare tasks, which significantly complicates the possibility of achieving superiority both by the armed forces of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, when using weapons and troops in general.
Thus, relying on strategic superiority in military, economic, human, natural resource and scientific potential and relatively suitable conditions for its implementation, <...> The [Russian] armed forces are not yet able to fully implement the plans of the Russian General Staff. At the same time, it should be noted that, despite this, countering the enemy state in achieving its military-political goals is costly for Ukraine and its armed forces. This is especially acute in the current course of counter-offensive actions in the summer and autumn period. Thus, the de facto AFU and other components of the Security and Defense Forces involved in repelling the armed <...>, practically on the entire line of contact of the parties and in the border areas with the Russian Federation faced the need to overcome the problem of military parity. First of all, its existence is due to reasons related to parity in the air, minefields, counter-battery and electronic warfare, the creation of reserves.
Ways to overcome the positional nature of hostilities
The need to avoid the transition to a positional form of warfare, similar to the "trench warfare" of 1914-1918, dictates the need to search for new and non-trivial approaches to violating military parity with the enemy. The main idea of getting out of this situation can be illustrated in the picture.
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| Non-trivial approaches to the violation of military parity with the enemy. |
| Source: economist.com |
The main ways to overcome the positional nature of the fighting, which began to manifest itself on the line of contact in the summer of 2023, should be considered the following.
Gaining air superiority:
- simultaneous mass use of cheap simulators of unmanned aerial targets and attack UAVs in a single combat order in order to overload the enemy's air defense system, mislead the enemy about the number of real targets in the raid and expose elements of the enemy's air defense system;
- tracking down enemy UAVs with the help of their own UAV hunters with trap nets on board in order to directly eliminate the destructive threat to equipment and personnel on the battlefield from barrage ammunition;
- the use of radar simulators for detecting medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems in the immediate vicinity of the contact line in order to reduce the effectiveness of the use of planning guided bombs against our troops when going on the offensive (due to the fact that carrier aircraft will be forced to launch guided bombs from the maximum possible ranges) and reduce the intensity of manned aviation activities by refusal of its pilots to perform combat missions;
- blinding of thermal imaging reconnaissance and guidance of UAVs with stroboscopes at night in order to make it difficult (prevent) strikes on the positions of troops (weapons and equipment) at night using UAVs equipped with thermal imaging equipment;
- massive use of electronic warfare equipment (small and portable jamming transmitters, anti-drone installations, etc.) along the contact line of the parties to counter enemy UAVs in order to increase the protection of ground forces from enemy UAVs.
Counter-battery struggle:
- creation of local GPS fields to improve the operation of accurate ammunition navigation tools;
- an increase in the share of counter-battery warfare tasks that are solved by reconnaissance and firing complexes based on kamikaze drones;
- the use of counter-battery warfare in combination with measures to mislead the enemy;
- increasing the capabilities of artillery reconnaissance equipment provided within the framework of international logistical assistance through the use of non-standard settings.
Breakthrough of minefields in depth:
- the use of scanning lidar sensors to obtain situational information about violations on the ground;
- the use of ROSY smoke protection complexes to conceal the activities of detachments (teams) of the barrier from enemy reconnaissance and fire;
- the use [Apparently for mine clearance] of damaged equipment (without crews) that has retained mobility;
- the use of jet engines of decommissioned aircraft, carriage barrels (water cannons) or industrial carriage barrels, cluster artillery ammunition to break through minefields installed without digging into the ground;
- the use of a mini tunnel excavator with a Rapid Burrowing Robot (RBR) drill, empty hoses for pumping gaseous or liquid explosives, rockets with an air-fuel explosive mixture to break through minefields;
- the use of anti-drone guns to counter enemy reconnaissance UAVs, which will increase the level of masking of detachments (teams) of the barrier when breaking through minefields.
Creating your own reserves and fighting the enemy's reserves:
- introduction of the Unified State Register of Conscripts, Conscripts and Reservists "Obereg" into the activities of the governing bodies;
- attracting more Ukrainian citizens to the military reserve;
- creation of an automated system for monitoring and recording the preparation of Ukrainian citizens for military service and national resistance;
- expansion of the list of categories of citizens of Ukraine with whom training for military service and national resistance is carried out;
- introduction of the practice of combat training.
Electronic warfare:
- introduction of elements of situational awareness systems "Pokrova", "Graphite", "Quartz" into the processes of command and control of troops, as well as data exchange with other intelligence means (systems) of the armed forces;
- increasing the ability to control the current electronic situation in combat areas by using the capabilities of partner countries. In particular, we need to ensure the possibility of expanded access to data from air, sea and space means of electronic intelligence;
- increasing the capabilities of conducting electronic warfare against UAVs during amphibious operations of combined arms units;
- organization and implementation of measures to counter electronic warfare to detect, recognize, isolate and defeat enemy sources of electronic radiation;
- search for opportunities to increase the production of electronic warfare systems with the Bukovel-AD UAV in Ukraine and abroad;
- optimization of the use of means of "trench electronic warfare" coming to the troops from volunteer organizations, in order to exclude cases of suppression of their own UAVs ("friendly fire");
- improvement of existing and development of new domestic electronic warfare systems, taking into account the prospects of conducting "electromagnetic warfare" in the entire "electromagnetic spectrum", covering a much wider frequency range (from gamma radiation to terahertz radiation).
Command and control
Improving the effectiveness of command and control of troops is important in the process of implementing the proposed ways out of positional warfare. This can be done through the widespread use of modern information technologies in the command and control system, which will ensure: the formation of a unified information environment; the creation of conditions for information superiority; effective coordination of actions of subordinate troops (forces). As a result, this will allow you to get ahead of the enemy in matters of situational awareness and make decisions faster and, in general, ensure that the goal of the operation is achieved in a positional war. The key components that will influence the achievement of excellence in situational awareness are the processes of organizing communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
Logistics support
One of the determining factors that significantly affects the success of the implementation of the proposed methods of changing the nature of the war and achieving the set goals is the rational organization of the logistical support of the State Defense Forces. The reflection of a full-scale armed aggression of the enemy, the conduct of defensive and counter-offensive operations require a huge amount of resources: human, mobilization, financial, material, etc. At the same time, the experience of the current war testifies to the actualization, for example, of such almost forgotten concepts as the accumulation of stocks of missiles and ammunition, as well as other logistical assets. After the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states, this concept has lost its relevance, but today it has become important both for the enemy and for our state.
The Russian Armed Forces spend a large amount of missiles and ammunition, but it should be recognized that they conducted some preparation for war, so Russia currently retains and is able to maintain superiority in weapons and equipment, missiles and ammunition for a considerable time, while the capabilities of its military industry are increasing, despite the introduction of unprecedented sanctions by the leading countries of the world against the enemy state.
Extensive logistical assistance is provided to the Armed Forces of Ukraine by partner countries, however, given the increased intensity of the average daily consumption of missiles and ammunition, it is not possible to accumulate these funds in the necessary volumes, since large armed forces are deployed, therefore all the means of logistical support provided within the framework of logistical assistance are distributed among forces on the principle of priority. Partner states and NATO member states are currently dramatically increasing their capacity to produce weapons and ammunition, but this process is quite lengthy. According to various estimates, it takes at least a year to deploy large-scale production of weapons and equipment, missiles and ammunition, and other logistical means, and for some types - two years.
In order to continue the effective destruction of enemy warehouses, disruption of supply chains and increase the range of transportation of ammunition and other logistical means, the armed forces of Ukraine need to adopt extended-range missiles, preferably of their own production.
The main ways to increase the efficiency of logistics support are: development and capacity building of the Ukrainian defense industry; creation and development of an asymmetric arsenal of weapons and equipment in Ukraine; creation, production and introduction of new weapons. At the same time, when planning and organizing logistics, it is necessary to take into account the possibility of enemy fire impact on mobile and stationary components of the logistics of troops (forces).
Main conclusions
The transition of the war into a positional form leads to its prolongation and carries significant risks both for the armed forces of Ukraine and for the Ukrainian state as a whole. In addition, it is beneficial to the enemy, which is trying in every way to restore and increase its military power.
To get out of the positional form at the present stage of the war, first of all it is necessary to: achieve air superiority; overcome minefields to the full depth; increase the effectiveness of counter-battery and electronic warfare; create and prepare the necessary reserves. It should be borne in mind that the widespread use of information technologies in military affairs and the rational organization of logistics support play a significant role in finding a way out of the positional form of warfare. The need to move from a positional form to a maneuverable one dictates the need to search for new and non-trivial approaches to breaking military parity with the enemy.
