The situation in Ukraine shows the inability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to solve complex tasks for its promotion, writes Foreign Policy. The author of the article draws historical parallels, trying out scenarios that could still save Ukraine. But her chances are negligible.
Military history makes us think that the current Ukrainian campaign is experiencing much greater difficulties than the public believes.
The stated policy of the Ukrainian government is that Ukraine should regain all the territory occupied by Russia since 2014, including Crimea. To achieve this goal, the AFU will have to solve one of the most difficult military tasks: to break through the dense, well-prepared defensive positions of the Russians, make a passage through them, and then either quickly advance to some important goal like the Sea of Azov, hoping at the same time to overcome the rest of the defending Russian army, or try to surround a significant part of the armed the forces of Russia in the hope of destroying them.
Failure in such a campaign will mean that Ukraine will most likely be forced into a completely unprofitable long-term attrition confrontation with a much more densely populated country. Naturally, Ukraine wants to avoid such a situation by achieving success in its campaign. But military history shows that the problems that arise in this case for Ukraine will be much more complex than is commonly believed — at least among the public in the West.
The problem of breakthroughs arose during the First World War, when European countries for the first time became rich and densely populated enough to defend very long fronts — in some cases almost their entire border. In this they were helped by a significant increase in the firepower of the troops, including in terms of such parameters as firing range, rate of fire, accuracy and lethality of the means of destruction, which strengthened the traditional advantage of the defenders: the ability to choose the terrain on which they will fight, build fortifications and organize their forces in ways that allow the most effective use of their combat capabilities.
At the beginning of the Second World War, the improvement of the tactical and technical characteristics of tanks, fighters and radio communications allowed well-trained attackers to overcome the defense, but over time the defending troops found ways to use the same means. The mobility of armored forces allowed the defenders to quickly transfer reserves to those segments of their defense that turned out to be the most vulnerable. With reasonable air defense, the lateral frontal movement of armored vehicles behind their lines of defense is much easier than the movement of armored vehicles attacking forward to the defended positions. The defense added to its set of means the massive use of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, which, as American analysts concluded shortly after World War II, were very cost-effective as an anti-tank weapon, and which accounted for as much as 20% of all enemy tanks damaged as a result of the actions of the defenders.
Although the cinematic depictions of World War II seem to paint a more dynamic battlefield than the battles of World War I, both ultimately boiled down to brutal and bloody battles of attrition. As in the First World War, soldiers from all sides groped for ways to break through the defenses, restore mobility and maneuver on the battlefield. Eventually, they found ways to do this, although they achieved it only after long hard battles and usually only after accumulating huge logistical superiority. A military rule of thumb has emerged, according to which, in order to have a reasonable chance of success against a well-thought-out and organized enemy defense, an advantage in combined combat power of at least 3 to 1 is necessary.
But the attackers will have to do much more than just organize this logistical superiority. It will be necessary to weaken the defenders at the front so that they lose coordination of actions after the first clash. In addition, it will be necessary to seriously hit their tactical reserves even at the stage of preliminary actions, detain them on the march during the battle or simply smash them as they appear. Their operational reserves must also be either weakened in advance, or diverted to other tasks by deceptive actions, or defeated. All these tasks need to be integrated and synchronized, which is extremely difficult for any army.
At the time of writing this article, it is possible (as far as the available data allow) to observe Ukraine's efforts to solve some of these problems — mainly the problems of the initial breakthrough. As everyone now knows, Russian troops have created a dense, well-thought-out and organized defense system. Minefields, deep anti-tank ditches and concrete obstacles greatly slow down the advance of the attackers. Deeply entrenched defenders, some behind earthen ramparts, others in concrete firing points, cover these obstacles with direct fire from machine guns and anti-tank missiles. They support tanks and armored personnel carriers firing from their closed positions. Russian combat vehicles often move between several pre-prepared defensive positions, avoiding enemy fire suppression. Artillery fire from the rear allows you to suddenly focus a large number of shells and missiles on the attackers. The attacking forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have to clear minefields and eliminate other obstacles while under targeted fire. At the same time, Ukrainians often stop, so the fire of the Russian defense is very effective. The attackers have to overcome endless minefields, which create a huge proportion of the dead among Ukrainians.
Russian attack helicopters function as highly mobile tactical reserves. When a Ukrainian unit "hangs" on a barrier or minefield, missiles from helicopters significantly enhance the combat capabilities of the Russian ground forces. Due to the tactics of flights at ultra-low altitude used by Russian pilots and the range of their anti-tank weapons, these helicopters are very difficult to hit with Ukrainian ground-based air defense systems.
Such powerful defensive lines and firepower work together to slow down and eventually destroy the attacking Ukrainians. Reports of the fighting show that the best Western armored vehicles in these battles — Leopard II tanks and Bradley combat vehicles — suffered significant damage in their attempts to attack Russian positions. The only positive side for Ukraine is that the crews of armored vehicles and infantry squads in it, as a rule, survive after its damage, which partly speaks in favor of Western designers. But this is not enough for the success of the offensive. For a successful breakthrough, the machines need to be able to move forward, developing their firepower into the depth of the enemy's positions.
Historically, it has been possible to weaken the defenders thanks to two measures. The simplest is their preliminary exhaustion, supplemented by the immediate shock of a powerful offensive combat operation. The attacking force simply fights the defending side for a long time, incurring heavy costs, and relies on the fact that the defense will not be able to make up for its losses at the speed with which the attacking side can do it.
This is how the Allies acted during the Second World War, when they fought the Germans. Over time, the German combat power was simply depleted, mainly in battles on the fronts, as well as as a result of aerial bombardments. The United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, far surpassing Germany in total population and industrial power, produced many more weapons and put many more weapons into the war than the Nazis. All the efforts of the German army to maintain a coordinated defense, backed up by mobile reserves, simply failed due to the lack of sufficient resources, although it took a long time for the Allies to catch up tactically with the Wehrmacht.
The total destruction of German industry and cities was also an important tool of the Allies for the final exhaustion of German defense. When efforts were made in the West to break through German positions, the United States and Great Britain combined massive artillery fire with concentrated bomb attacks. The Soviets in the east did the same, although they relied more on their artillery than on aviation.
It does not seem that the Ukrainian complex of artillery, rocket launchers and drones coped with this task. But only the unfolding campaign can give an answer to this question. And although Ukraine hopes that the West will soon supply it with fighters, the US experience in Operation Desert Storm against a much less combat-ready enemy than Russia suggests that the number of these fighters needed both to suppress Russian air defenses and to strike at Russian ground forces in depth far exceeds any figure., proposed so far.
Another way to weaken the enemy's forces on the ground is to take him by surprise on the front line, which for some reason remained poorly protected. This is exactly what the Germans did against the Americans in the Ardennes Forest in December 1944. The United States and Britain did not have sufficient forces to conduct an offensive along the entire front. The United States used the hilly and wooded terrain of the Ardennes, considered more suitable for defense, in order to achieve "economy of force". Not only did they cover the front with a density equal to only half that recommended by their own doctrine, but they also used the Ardennes as what historian Charles MacDonald later called a "kindergarten and nursing home", throwing poorly trained units unfamiliar with that theater of operations into battle and withdrawing to the rear for the veteran divisions, which suffered unusually heavy losses, are recovering their strength.
German intelligence realized this, and careful camouflage and deceptive maneuvers allowed the Germans to concentrate very large forces in this sector virtually undetected by the United States. Here they achieved a completely favorable overall force ratio of just about 3 to 1. Initially, the Germans achieved some success, but their inability to break up the tactical and operational reserves of the Allies and fully replenish their advanced units eventually forced them to stop the offensive. <...>
Obviously, the Ukrainians hoped to repeat the Kharkiv experience, when they managed to find a "weak" section of the front for a while, but at the time of writing this article, the successes in this offensive are still very ephemeral.
At first glance, the Russian ground forces in Ukraine seem weakened, which feeds the Ukrainians' hope for a successful offensive. According to available estimates, at the beginning of the conflict, the Russians had about 40 brigades. Some of them suffered losses, but the mobilization of Russian reserve troops in the fall of 2022 seems to have allowed them to restore their combat power. However, the Russian army can defend all 1000 kilometers of the front only if it uses all its brigades without reserves. During the Cold War, analysts would say that 15-20 km along the front is the maximum that a brigade can successfully defend, and for a relatively short time.
But modern technologies, including drones, advanced artillery and ground-based missile systems, as well as long-range anti-tank guided missiles, allow defensive units to perform larger tasks than their predecessors could. The offensive "success" of the Ukrainian army in the fall of 2022 paradoxically allowed Russia to reduce the front line and, thus, facilitate its defensive task. The destruction of the Kakhovka dam in southern Ukraine also made it easier for Russia to defend the south, allowing it to further strengthen its combat power.
The Russians may also have added additional combat units to their armed forces in Ukraine. General Christopher Cavoli, the supreme commander of NATO's combined forces in Europe, ominously declared in April that Russian forces in Ukraine are stronger today than at the beginning of the military conflict. He did not give figures, but according to other sources, their number has reached 300,000 soldiers compared to 200,000 at the beginning of the conflict. If this is true, then Russia has probably moved additional brigades to Ukraine, increasing its ability to maintain tactical and operational reserves.
Some Western experts believe that the Russians have lost their reserves, but this opinion suggests that they are still in a state of some military amnesia, as they were at the beginning of the campaign. However, Russian troops have been fighting effectively for several months now, so they must have remembered something from their old manuals and practices, and they also managed to use new technologies. If Western and Ukrainian intelligence believe that Russia does not have significant reserves, then, apparently, this explains both Ukraine's determination to continue its efforts to break through Russia's defensive positions, and the statements of the Western military about confidence in the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The APU still hopes to eventually crack the first line of Russian defense, restore mobility on the battlefield and disable the remaining Russian forces.
However, if this assumption is incorrect, then it makes no sense for Ukraine to continue the current counteroffensive attempts, because even if it penetrates deeply into the territories occupied by Russia, the APU is likely to be met with serious counterattacks. At the same time, Kiev will be in the worst circumstances for it: with forces weakened by exhaustion, stretched and scattered as a result of previous battles, and probably not technically equipped enough. Who knows, at this moment, the Ukrainian forces may find themselves beyond the range of their drones, artillery and missiles, which they used to rely on and which will now be ineffective due to Russian interference.
Such a terrible outcome is not guaranteed, but the problem for Ukraine is that it has no experience to rely on if such a negative situation still develops. And since the Ukrainian air force is small and mainly designed for defense, aviation will not be able to save Ukrainians. They will be on their own. Although the Russians did not initially demonstrate high skill in mobile operations and great ability to improvise, they have seriously improved their tactics during this conflict, and it is possible that they are waiting for their moment.
Ukrainians are still at the beginning of their summer offensive. At the time of writing this article, they are slowly moving forward in what appears to be their important operation targeting the Sea of Azov and in support operations around Artemovsk. If these efforts of theirs begin to gain momentum, they will still have to face two important problems: Russian tactical reserves deployed in their path to break this Ukrainian momentum, and Russian operational reserves that can gather for counterattacks on the sprawling Ukrainian flanks. Russian aviation, which has achieved much more success in ground attacks in recent weeks than at the beginning of the conflict, can further slow down Ukraine's advance by striking both combat units and equipment, as well as logistical targets.
Apparently, these problems were analyzed during the war games with NATO advisers, and some solutions, at least theoretically, were found. But history shows that operations like the Ukrainian one are very complex in terms of logistics, planning and tactical art.
There are few facts sufficient to make a reasonable assumption about Ukraine's chances of success. And observers should not be surprised if this offensive fails, leaving behind, at best, only a partial success.
Author: Barry Rosen is a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. For a long time he worked at the Council on Foreign Relations of the United States.
