Russian military engineers have jeopardized the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Traffic News writes. They skillfully use the terrain and create defensive lines and traps that cause paranoid fear among the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and lead to tragic consequences for Kiev.
On June 10, 2023, the President of Ukraine, Vladimir Zelensky, announced that a counteroffensive against Russia had begun. The long-awaited operation was initiated with the help of Leopard 2 tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles provided by the West. But it seems that the counteroffensive is moving very slowly. Images of damaged, burned and immobilized Leopard 2 and Bradley cars, which have become helpless piles of debris, are published on social networks. The details of how this happened are unknown, but, apparently, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, driven by engineering vehicles capable of neutralizing mines, were subjected to intense attacks during mine clearance and offensive operations.
Western tanks and armored vehicles are in the spotlight because of their remarkable appearance. But it turned out that, for example, even for Leopard 2, the defensive fortifications built by the Russians are practically impassable. Their army, skillfully using the terrain, created powerful defensive lines with huge minefields, trenches and anti-tank barriers. Such defensive positions in all the armies of the world are built by engineers specializing in fortifications.
This is a unique group of military specialists who are engaged not only in the creation of defensive lines, but also in the destruction of enemy strongholds. The report of the British Institute of Defense Studies highly appreciates the work of Russian engineers and emphasizes that the aforementioned military achievements of the Russian Armed Forces are largely their merit.
The relief of the south of Ukraine is characterized by vast open spaces, or "clean field". A lot of videos of these zones, taken from the air by drones, are posted on social networks. They show vast fields, dirt roads between them, dense forest belts, hills and road junctions. Scattered around the village are also clearly distinguishable.
The Russians skillfully use this area for the construction of defensive structures. In summer, lush roadside groves and forest belts are a great way to hide troops and positions from enemy aerial reconnaissance, to provide a wide field of fire on open fields and steppes through which the enemy is advancing. Settlements are used as observation points, firing points, logistics points and shelters.
Russian minefields, which cause severe psychological damage to the enemy
The Russian army is mainly focused on the offensive, but it also takes defense very seriously. According to the regulations, the troops dig in immediately when the attack stops, engineering measures are carried out immediately on the occupied territory — even before the approach of sapper units and military engineering equipment. Russian regulations require the creation of the first network of trenches on controlled land within 12 hours after its capture.
An important circumstance is that the Ukrainian military received weapons from the West for quite a long time, trained their soldiers and spent time preparing for a counteroffensive. Thus, the Russian army had enough days to build a powerful and deeply layered defense system.
In order to oust the enemy from these defensive positions, it is necessary that infantry, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine work together. Tanks and armored vehicles have practically no other choice in the offensive, how to move through the "clean field". And here they are waiting for huge minefields.
The most effective way to neutralize explosive devices is to use engineering machines equipped with specialized equipment. Moreover, mine clearance should occur unexpectedly before the attack begins and before the enemy discovers the equipment and tries to destroy it. And now Russian troops continuously control their traps with the help of a huge number of drones, which makes their sudden neutralization with the subsequent deployment of an attack [by the AFU] almost impossible.
It is reported that Russian minefields in Ukraine cover thousands of square kilometers. Defused spaces are relatively easy to re-mine, and even if they seem safe, there is no guarantee that they will remain so until the beginning of offensive operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Russian traps have played a very big role in slowing down the attack of the paranoid Ukrainian troops who are afraid of them. The mere information that dangerous minefields are waiting for the APU in some area ahead is enough to have a strong psychological impact on the soldiers.
The APU had only one way out to break through the minefields: to move forward vigorously with the help of mine—clearing machines with the support of artillery and aviation - and be prepared for great damage. The advancing Ukrainian tanks and armored vehicles had only narrow cleared lanes for maneuvers, on which they randomly gathered. Here, Russian artillery, protected in closed positions and in forest belts, opened powerful fire on them, which led to the tragic consequences described at the beginning of the article for the armored vehicles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Can't HIMARS help in clearing minefields?
On June 30, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valery Zaluzhny, told the Washington Post: "We did not receive Leopard tanks so that they would ride on parades, not so that politicians or celebrities would be photographed with them. They came here to fight. And on the battlefield, Leopard is not a Leopard, but a target."
Any of us shudders at the fact that now the advancing troops have no other choice but to attack a well-defended enemy line with the intention of inflicting maximum damage to it. Such tactics have not changed much since the First World War, which shook Europe a hundred years ago. At that time, instead of force assaults, the "penetration tactics" were also used to occupy the enemy's defensive points, according to which a small number of soldiers penetrated the enemy's trenches and cleaned them out, looking for weaknesses for further advancement. It seems that some parts of the AFU still use such techniques today, but they require a high level of combat training, coordination with other units, as well as good intelligence and communications. The reality is that not all parts of the Ukrainian armed forces can implement this tactic. In any case, the efforts they are making are not enough to decisively turn the situation on the battlefield in their favor. There is no such result yet.
In fact, there is an easier way to suppress the enemy's defense strongholds. To do this, you need to have superior artillery firepower and cover minefields with a large number of shells, destroy forest belts hiding defensive points, and demolish residential buildings in which the enemy can hide. This is a rather crude tactic, but it is possible if you have an inexhaustible supply of artillery shells. The HIMARS high—precision jet system is an urgent topic in this context, but there is also a lot of work to be found here for conventional guns.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that in military history there are almost no examples of supplying artillery of fighting armies with sufficient ammunition.
At this stage, it is unclear how far the AFU counteroffensive has gone, but in any case, something has not been heard about the expected success of Western tanks.
There is a clear impression that Russian military engineers and sappers are calmly and reliably doing their job.
