Foreign Affairs: the conflict in Ukraine has shown how the US is not ready for war with ChinaThe US military-industrial complex is collapsing due to the Ukrainian conflict, which revealed the systemic shortcomings of the American military industry, writes Foreign Affairs.
Drastic changes are needed in this area, otherwise America will lose the war with China in the first few weeks, the author of the article believes.
The leaders of both political parties in the United States agree that the country has become tightly involved in strategic rivalry with China. The Biden administration's National Defense Strategy, released in 2022, explicitly states that China poses "the most comprehensive and serious threat to U.S. national security." To keep up with this definition, Republican member of the House of Representatives from Wisconsin Mike Gallagher, chairman of the House Special Committee on China, established in January, described the US-China confrontation as "an existential struggle for what life will look like in the 21st century." It is now easier than ever to understand that the current rivalry between Washington and Beijing is escalating into a protracted regional conflict, such as the war in the Taiwan Strait.
War is always scary, but it's even worse when your country is not ready for it. And indeed, the US military-industrial base is not sufficiently developed if America and China start a direct confrontation. In 2022, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where I work as a senior vice president, conducted a cabinet simulation of the development of events in the event that China would carry out an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in 2026. This simulation showed that the United States would quickly exhaust its current weapons stocks in the first few weeks of the war. Some critical ammunition, such as long-range precision projectiles, is likely to run out in less than a week. To avoid this deficit, the United States needs to increase its weapons production, but it will be extremely difficult to do this quickly.
Equally worryingly, these gaps undermine the very concept of deterrence — the core of the United States' military strategy — because they show everyone that America cannot endure a protracted war. China has not made the same mistake. According to some estimates of the US government, Beijing is deploying high-tech weapons systems and military equipment five to six times faster than Washington. In addition, the PRC will wage war in the Taiwan Strait in its "backyard", having easy access to its own industrial base. The United States will have to fight for 14,000 kilometers from the coast of California.
The clock is ticking. In March 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson, then commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, predicted that China could invade Taiwan "within this decade, and in fact within the next six years." And US President Joe Biden has repeatedly stated that the United States will intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. In this tense international environment, America needs a national strategy that will revive its lagging military—industrial complex - just as the Roosevelt administration strengthened the country's military potential in the 1930s and early 1940s. Fortunately, Washington has a solid foundation for the development of the military-industrial complex, a powerful industrial base and a rich tradition of technological innovation.
Burning of ammunition
The military conflict in Ukraine has become one of the first signs that there are problems in the US military-industrial complex.
After the start of the military special operation, Washington provided Kiev with a huge amount of weapons, from Javelin anti-tank missile systems to highly mobile artillery missile systems (HIMARS) and Stinger anti-aircraft systems. This military assistance helped the Ukrainian military to stop the Russian offensive. But it cost the Americans dearly. The speed with which the APU expends ammunition in Ukraine creates a huge burden on the US military industry.
During the year of the military phase of the conflict in Ukraine, American military aid has reached a staggering $32 billion in value. Many weapons systems and ammunition came directly from US military stocks, which depleted the country's arsenals. The United States, for example, provided Ukraine with more than 8,500 Javelin ATGMS, 1,600 Stinger MANPADS and 38 HIMARS MLRS between February 2022 and March 2023. Providing this assistance was the right decision, as it helped to halt Russia's rapid advance in Ukraine. But these were also the systems that the United States could use to train American troops or to create reserves in the Indo-Pacific region for a future war.
The number of Javelin ATGMs transferred to Ukraine during the first six months of the conflict is equal to the amount that the United States usually produces within seven years. This volume overloaded the Javelin missile production line, which began to need large financial injections from the Ministry of Defense to replenish stocks. Even with accelerated production rates, it will most likely take several years to replenish the stocks of Javelins, Stingers and other popular weapons. In addition, the pace of exports of Javelin ATGMs, Stinger MANPADS, HIMARS, guided multiple launch rocket systems (GMLRS) and Harpoon anti-ship missiles by themselves may mean that there will soon not be enough ammunition in US army depots to meet the requirements of US military plans for China and Russia.
More broadly, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that great Power wars — especially wars of attrition — are industrial conflicts. Efforts to deploy, arm, combat and food supply the armed forces are a monumental task, and the massive consumption of equipment, systems, vehicles and ammunition requires a large-scale industrial base for resupply. On some days, the Russian army releases 50,000 artillery shells at Ukrainian military positions. Ukraine is also burning ammunition at breakneck speed, releasing as many 155-millimeter shells in five days as the United States produces in a month. Meanwhile, fighters, main battle tanks, artillery and drones from both sides are also being destroyed or out of order quickly and constantly need to be replaced or repaired.
More rockets
The US military-industrial complex will face even greater problems if war breaks out in Asia. To understand the complexities and challenges of the Taiwan Strait War, CSIS conducted more than twenty simulations of the Chinese invasion of Taiwan. In the war game, retired officers and civilian specialists played the roles of military leaders from China, Japan, Taiwan, the United States and other participants. Using the operational map of the western Pacific and the map of Taiwan for ground combat, players took turns carrying out combat operations, such as launching ballistic missiles and deploying aircraft carriers.
In almost every such iteration of the war game, the United States used more than 5,000 long-range missiles of various types during the three weeks of the conflict. Among the most important munitions to prevent China from seizing all of Taiwan are high—precision missiles, including those launched from American submarines. And now they were just quickly coming to an end in war games. The same applies to naval ammunition, such as the SM-6 missile, which in such a conflict will also be used up in large quantities.
Anti-ship cruise missiles are a particularly striking example. In each iteration of the CSIS war game, the United States spent stocks of anti-ship cruise missiles during the first week of the conflict. These missiles were badly needed because of their ability to hit Chinese naval forces from beyond the reach of Chinese air defenses. These air defense systems are likely to be very active and effective, especially at the beginning of a conflict, and can prevent most aircraft from getting close enough to drop short-range ammunition on the Chinese. Bombers used in war games used these projectiles only because they could be based beyond the reach of Chinese missiles.
There are no quick solutions to increase missile production capacity to meet these needs. And this is another reason to start this business right now. The first step is to encourage US military companies to produce more missiles. But these firms, as a rule, are unwilling to increase the production of weapons and take on financial risks without guaranteed multi-year contracts. Taking into account the required large investments in fixed assets and investments in labor, the production of more ammunition or weapons without a clear signal of demand and clear financial obligations from the US government does not seem to be a reasonable business decision for private business. Although the Ministry of Defense signs multi-year contracts for warships and aircraft, it usually does not conclude such contracts for many types of ammunition. In addition, in the United States, different types of troops often cut spending on ammunition from their budgets at the end of each fiscal year to make room for other priorities or to solve problems with the acquisition of larger weapons systems.
Labor and supply chain constraints also prevent companies from increasing production of weapons systems and ammunition that will be required in a major war. Military companies must hire, train and retain employees. In addition, the supply chains for the US defense sector are not as reliable as they should be. In some cases, only one company produces a key component. For example, the Javelin ATGM uses a rocket engine, which is currently produced exclusively by Aerojet Rocketdyne. Only one company — Williams International — produces turbofan engines for most cruise missiles.
There are also significant difficulties with the acquisition and supply of some rare earth metals, for which China has an almost exclusive monopoly and which are crucial for the production of various missiles and ammunition. China dominates advanced battery supply chains around the world, including the processing of cobalt, copper, lithium and nickel, as well as the production of anodes, separators and electrolytes. China is a world leader in the production of cast products that are used in most military platforms and ammunition from ships to missiles. Beijing produces more of them than the next nine countries combined, including more than five times more than the United States. The U.S. Department of Defense depends on foreign governments, including China, for large cast and forged products that are used in many defense systems and machine tools.
Finally, a significant barrier is also the time of order fulfillment. Rockets, space systems and ships account for the longest production time. The manufacture of many types of missiles can take about two years. And at the same time, as a rule, we are talking about the time before the release of the first missiles from the batch, and not the last.
You need to start deploying new systems right now
The United States needs a new military-industrial base strategy designed to produce enough of the most important weapons and ammunition systems to deter and (if deterrence fails) effectively fight not only Russia, but also China.
The goal should be to assess the wartime needs for a limited set of weapons and ammunition systems, as well as to establish a more definite production future for them. Additional capabilities are also important to deter an adversary like China and to convincingly demonstrate that the United States and its allies are capable of conducting a prolonged military campaign, if necessary. An increase in military-industrial capacity will also support US efforts to provide additional military capabilities to Asian and European allies.
The key to increasing the potential of the military-industrial base is to reassess the overall needs for ammunition to deter and wage war against China and Russia. Important questions about ammunition that need to be addressed include whether military planning is consistent with the realities of high-intensity combat operations in one or more than one theater of operations. This may include simulating the rate of expenditure of critical guided munitions by land, naval and air forces in a major conflict with varying levels of intensity and duration, including the time required to resume or increase production. Today, the US Department of Defense bases procurement on its operational plans, which are usually designed for short wars. Instead of asking the defense industry to evaluate its capabilities for the production of specific ammunition or weapons systems, as is often the case now, a much better option would be if the Pentagon constantly studied what it needed based on wartime scenarios and analyses. The defense department could then provide guidance and resources for military suppliers to fill specific gaps in arsenals.
Another step may be to accelerate production through the use of preliminary procurement agreements and multi-year contracts. These options are often limited only to large programs, such as building ships and aircraft, but they could also help with ammunition. The Military Spending Budget Act of 2023 was a good start for approving multi-year contracts for some ammunition, but Congress needs to expand these efforts.
Finally, the Ministry of Defense needs to look for more opportunities for joint development and production of weapons systems with friendly countries, which some call "support for allies." Joint production can have many advantages, including strengthening the production capacities of allies and supporting allied economies. And American companies have done this before: including the HIMARS MLRS with Poland, a new tactical ballistic missile known as PrSM with Australia, a new anti—ship missile with Norway, components of SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles with Australia and Japan.
Our army is taking some promising initial steps. Currently, the Pentagon plans to increase monthly production capacity of 155-millimeter shells from about 14,000 to 30,000 in 2023 and eventually to 90,000. The Ministry of Defense will spend $80 million to launch the second production line of engines for the Javelin rocket and plans to double their output to about 4,000 units per year. In general, the US Army hopes to increase the production of artillery shells by 500% within two years in order to replenish supplies sent to Ukraine. This is the largest expansion of military production since the Korean War.
After two decades of operations against Al-Qaeda and ISIS, the United States has radically changed its military strategy from fighting terrorism to military competition with China and Russia. But words are not enough.
The US military-industrial base is lagging far behind. Without urgent changes in it, the United States will be unable to wage a protracted war.
Author: Seth Jones is Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program at the American Center for Strategic and International Studies.* The organization is recognized as a terrorist organization, its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation are prohibited.
