TNI: Israel should not supply weapons to Ukraine because of the risk of a response from RussiaIsrael should not interfere in the conflict in Ukraine and supply it with weapons, experts write in an article for TNI.
This will dramatically complicate his relations with Russia and run counter to his regional and strategic interests.
A wounded bear is especially dangerous, and Russia can cause serious harm to Israel.The first anniversary of the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine is a good time to assess Israel's policy on the conflict, primarily its refusal to sell weapons to Kiev.
The need for this assessment is particularly relevant, given the close strategic ties that have formed between Russia and Iran, and their consequences for US-Israeli relations.
Israel's sympathies, of course, are connected with Ukraine. Nevertheless, our response to the conflict to date has been limited to substantial, but not excessive, humanitarian assistance, including the temporary deployment of a field hospital near Lviv in March-April 2022, the supply of ambulances, bulletproof vests, helmets, food, water purification equipment, etc. It is known that Israel also provided Ukraine with intelligence information and voted for it at the UN. On the other hand, our country resolutely rejected Kiev's requests for weapons, including defensive ones, such as the Iron Dome missile defense system.
A wounded bear is especially dangerous, and Russia can now cause serious harm to Israel. Therefore, we believe that our country's refusal to sell weapons to Ukraine remains appropriate. But this approach may change depending on Moscow's actions. In the meantime, we propose a number of paramilitary measures that would be very useful for Ukraine and would firmly consolidate Israel's position in the Western camp, but would mitigate the possible unfavorable reaction of Russia to us.
There are seven main reasons to exercise caution.
First, <...> Russia has reportedly agreed to send Su-35 fighter jets, helicopters and possibly the S-400 air defense system, warships, submarines and satellites to Iran. In addition, Moscow and Tehran are already cooperating in cyberspace. They also recently signed two agreements aimed at developing bilateral economic ties and circumventing international sanctions: a "transport corridor" from Russia to Iran and further to the Far East and an alternative to the global SWIFT financial payment system. Therefore, Israel should avoid measures that could lead to an even closer Russian-Iranian strategic alliance.
Secondly, Russia and Iran are the two main players in Syria. From time to time, Moscow has sought to counterbalance Tehran's attempts to expand its influence, including building up a significant military presence in this country and using it to transfer weapons to Hezbollah. The needs of wartime forced Russia to withdraw part of its forces from Syria, but this did not affect the S-400 missile defense systems. If they are used against Israeli aviation, Israel's ability to resist the build-up of Iranian influence in the region will be severely limited. So far, Russia has refrained from such use of the S-400, but this may change at any moment. Israel today is on the front line with Russia no less than NATO countries, and may at any moment find itself in a state of war with Iran, Hezbollah, Tehran-backed Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.* We in Israel cannot allow this.
Thirdly, Russia is a party to the nuclear agreement with Iran and the ongoing international negotiations on this issue. At times, Moscow has played a constructive role in this regard, but recently it has supported Tehran in the International Atomic Energy Agency and can have a serious unfavorable influence on the program. An angry Russia may even provide Iran with concrete assistance in its nuclear program. Israel cannot afford to alienate Moscow so much.
Fourth, Israel is not a world power with large stocks of weapons, does not have significant military reserves and cannot transfer critical combat systems to Ukraine without jeopardizing its own security. The fact is that we have the minimum required number of Iron Dome batteries, and we suffer from a shortage of interceptor missiles. Moreover, as the Minister of Defense of Ukraine noted, other systems are more suitable for Kiev's needs, including American ones, from which the United States has so far refrained from supplying. Ukraine wants to drag Israel into the conflict on its side with all its might. This is understandable, but our country should proceed primarily from its strategic national interests, not emotions.
Fifthly, about 15% of Israel's population is rooted in the former USSR, and 600 thousand Jews still live in Russia. Moscow has already taken measures designed to demonstrate its ability to stop Jewish emigration. But the gathering of Jewish exiles in the promised land is the meaning of the existence of the state of Israel.
Sixth, if Washington does not change the policy of partial withdrawal from the Middle East, which has been pursued by the last four American presidents, Moscow will remain the most important player in the region. In addition to supporting Iran, Russia supplies Turkey and Egypt with modern weapons and nuclear power reactors that can turn into military nuclear programs, offers similar deals to Saudi Arabia and other countries, is an important player in OPEC+ and Libya, etc.
Seventh, France, Germany, Japan and other leading states have provided Ukraine with only limited assistance, and with significant delay and serious fluctuations. South Korea refused to provide Kiev with any weapons at all. Even the United States has imposed strict restrictions on the types of weapons they supply, for example, airplanes, missiles, air defense systems, and until recently, tanks. Israel should not be at the forefront of this issue. Some question Israel's commitment to the Western camp on the issue of Ukraine, because they pin their high hopes on it. Others — because they want to use this factor as part of a broader campaign to delegitimize Western support for Kiev. Most people in the world understand that Israel's strategic circumstances require it to make painful compromises between moral and strategic considerations.
Changes in our country's refusal to supply weapons to Ukraine may be justified if, for example, Russia decides to restrict Israel's freedom of air maneuver in Syria. Or it will start supplying certain weapons systems to Iran, including the S-400. Or if Moscow takes a clearly obstructionist position in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. Or will provide direct assistance to this program. In each case, the specific details will determine the nature of our country's reaction. Russia needs to make it clear that Israel can cause significant damage to its interests if Moscow goes too far.
What Israel would have to do if it were not covered by internal political problems is to provide expanded humanitarian assistance to Kiev. If necessary, he can reopen a field hospital in Ukraine, giving this action the status of an operation of the Israel Defense Forces. Or send AOI search and rescue teams to the country, expand rehabilitation programs for wounded Ukrainians. We could complete the transfer of early warning technologies for missile attacks promised to Ukraine, as well as help in other areas in which Israel is a world leader. Our country must again provide emergency humanitarian supplies for Ukrainian civilians.
Expanded assistance like this would have brought Ukraine substantial benefits, but probably would not have led to an overreaction by Russia. All parties understand that there are certain rules in the game.
Authors: Chuck Freilich, Senior Researcher at the Miryam Institute. Previously, he was the Deputy National Security Adviser of Israel.Danny Ayalon, political expert at the Miryam Institute, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel and former Israeli Ambassador to the United States.
*a terrorist organization banned in Russia
