How the anti-missile "shield" of the American fleet was conceived From ancient Greek, the name "Aegis" translates as "storm" or "whirlwind".
Photos from the website www.navy.mil Today, the name "Aegis" is strongly associated with the missile defense system (ABM) of the US Navy, which is an integral element of the US global missile defense system.
This element is officially designated as the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System ("Aegis Missile Defense System"). However, another variant of the name is often used – Sea-Based Midcourse Ballistic Missile Defense System ("sea-based missile defense system for intercepting missiles on the main (middle) section of the flight path").
However, initially, Aegis was created for the US Navy as a ship-based multifunctional weapon system, designed on the basis of extensive use of specialized automated combat control systems to integrate in a single circuit all the ship's means of lighting the air, surface and underwater environment, as well as the appropriate means of control and destruction.
According to the customer's plan, this system was supposed to increase the capabilities of an individual ship and, most importantly, a ship group (compound) to conduct defensive and offensive combat operations during the solution of various combat tasks.
The ship's anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) "Standard" also became part of the multifunctional weapon system (MSO) or, as it is also called, the multifunctional weapon control system (ISMS). The latter, as it is known, initially also did not have "anti-missile ambitions", but was an ordinary standard means of air defense of a surface ship.
And only over time, thanks to the emergence of new threats and the development of technology, the US military and developers were able to create a new class of system based on these two components – an integrated missile defense system, which got its name from the name of the main component (which, as you can understand, is the MSO "Aegis") and eventually became the naval segment of the global US missile defense systems.
Here we will look at the issues related to the first stage of the creation of "Aegis": setting the task, working out the concept and the first steps in designing various elements of the system. At the same time, we note this. In the Russian literature, "Aegis" is often referred to as a combat information and control system (BIUS). But this is not entirely true, since American naval specialists define "Aegis" as a broader set of systems and subsystems than is the case with a typical BIUS. Therefore, it is correct to use the terms "multifunctional weapon system" or "multifunctional weapon control system" in relation to Aegis. In this publication, the first of the options is selected.
THE WAR AT SEA: NEW REALITIESIn the first half of the 1960s, naval specialists with advanced thinking eventually managed to convince the command of the US Navy to launch a large-scale program for the maximum possible integration of naval combat and technical means into a single ship-wide multifunctional weapon system.
It had to be distinguished by a high degree of automation of the functioning of all its components and have a single "electronic brain" capable of redistributing the information and computing resources of individual components of the system in accordance with the current changes in the tactical situation.
The background of such a decision was quite simple: starting from the 1950s and 1960s, a distinctive feature of the war at sea was a significant expansion of the combat space in which a warship (submarine) was able to use its weapons. Warships and ship groups for various purposes were required to be able to conduct combat operations in various environments (at sea – on its surface and under water; in the air, and in some cases even in space, as well as on land), as well as at various ranges, heights and depths. A ship without such abilities was doomed to become a victim of the enemy, and often very simple.
In addition, modern warfare at sea is characterized by a constant reduction in the time available to the commander of a warship or a detachment (group, compound) of warships to make a decision on the use of weapons or maneuver. As well as rapid massaging of the means of destruction.
At the same time, since the Second World War, aviation and guided missile weapons of various types of basing (aviation, shipboard and coastal) began to have a serious impact on the course of hostilities at sea. Which required equipping warships with modern, long-range detection means of lighting the air situation. As well as highly effective means of defeating enemy means of air attack, the distinctive features of which are high speed and maneuverability characteristics, as well as short flight time. The latter, of course, required a significant increase in the degree of automation of combat control processes, without which it became impossible to ensure victory in battle.
Taking into account all these features of modern naval combat, as well as taking into account the factor of limited ammunition of shipboard weapons systems (especially guided missile weapons), the above-mentioned decision was made in the US Navy.
In November 1963, at the direction of the US Navy Command, a number of conceptual studies and research works began to be carried out in order to determine the possibility of creating a highly automated weapon system capable of providing surface ships with reliable protection against massive attacks by aircraft and enemy anti-ship missiles, as well as to determine the main characteristics of such a system.
In the course of these works, American naval specialists and weapons developers used the results of numerous previous projects and programs. In particular, the developments obtained during the program for the creation of an integrated anti–aircraft missile system "Typhon" (Typhon), the main contractor for which was the American company Bendix Corporation (existed as an independent business unit in 1924-1983).
This system, for which the names "Typhon Combat System" (Typhon Combat System) or "Typhon Weapon Control System" (Typhon Weapon Control System) were also used, was created for arming frigates, destroyers and cruisers of the US Navy equipped with a nuclear power plant.
It included a multifunctional radar station (radar) with a passive phased array AN /SPG-59, as well as two new anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM): RIM–50 "Typhon" - a long-range missile in the size and weight of missiles SAM "Terrier" (RIM-2 Terrier), and RIM-55 Typhon is a medium–range missile in the size and mass of the Tartar SAM missiles (RIM-24 Tartar).
This system got its name in honor of Typhon – in ancient Greek mythology, the mighty dragon was so called, spawned by the earth goddess Gaia and was the personification of the fiery forces of the earth, which brought and still bring devastating consequences to humanity.
It should be especially noted that the AN/SPG-59 was the first ship radar with a phased array antenna in the history of the United States, as well as one of the first radar stations of this class in the world as a whole. Its creation, which began in 1958, was due to the appearance of a serious enemy in the face of the naval missile-carrying aircraft of the USSR Navy, whose aircraft were armed with anti-ship missiles with powerful warheads. As well as new Soviet combat surface ships of the far sea and ocean zones, which also became carriers of guided missile systems designed to combat the naval armadas of the American fleet.
The ship's air defense systems that existed at that time – both means of lighting the air situation and issuing target designation data to anti–aircraft weapon complexes, and the anti-aircraft weapon complexes themselves - could not effectively cope with a massive raid of anti-ship missiles, especially if they had a low-altitude profile and high flight speed. And it was on such anti–ship missiles that the command of the Soviet Navy made a bet in the fight against American armadas, primarily aircraft carrier strike groups.
NEW RADARS AND MISSILESBased on the results of the analysis of alternative options, American naval experts came to the conclusion that the surest way to protect themselves from a swarm of Soviet low-flying high–speed anti-ship missiles is to create a new high-tech ship-based anti-aircraft missile system, which will implement a different method of control and guidance from those used before - directly through an anti-aircraft guided missile.
Moreover, the latter was equipped with its own receiving antenna and repeater, and the processing of target data received by the homing system and the production of guidance data on it was carried out on a carrier ship, where sufficient computing and energy capacities were available for this.
This method, combining elements of semi-active missile homing and radio command control of it, is known as "tracking through a rocket" or as "second-kind remote control", and in English-language literature the designation "Track-Via-Missile" is applied to it.
This method had several very important advantages.
Firstly, unlike a missile with an active homing system, in this case, a missile flying towards a target does not detect itself by its own radio emission, and the enemy can only detect the operation of the ship's radar – but at the same time will not know whether there is an interceptor missile in the air and what purpose it pursues.
Secondly, unlike missiles with active and semi-active homing systems, in this case there was no need for an onboard computer on the rocket (calculations were carried out on the carrier ship). This made it possible to reduce the mass-dimensional and cost characteristics of the missile itself, as well as to ensure that it was aimed at the target along the optimal trajectory and provided the operators of the SAM combat crew with the opportunity to send the missile "on the right path" even at the final stage of its flight.
The Mk 7 Aegis system should reliably protect US Navy ships from enemy air attacks. Photos from the website www.defence.gov There were other advantages to this method, although there were certain disadvantages.
But in general, as they say, the sheepskin was worth the dressing: the SAM built according to this scheme made it possible to significantly increase the effectiveness of the air defense of a single ship and a ship group (compound) from attacks by modern means of enemy air attack. The AN/SPG-59 phased array radar, which became a kind of "heart" of the entire weapon system, was supposed to ensure the effective operation of the new ship-based SAM, built on such a guidance system for its missiles.
Structurally, this radar was built on the basis of a hybrid headlight with a Luneberg lens, which made it possible to convert a spherical wave of a point emitter into a beam with flat wave surfaces. The phase pattern was captured by receivers and, after amplification, transmitted via waveguides to the radiating elements of the radar antenna, which, in turn, reproduced the phase pattern in space, forming a narrowly directed beam.
At the same time, depending on the class of a particular carrier ship, this radar had to have phased array antennas with a different number of emitting elements - emitters. In particular, for ships of the "cruiser" class it was about 10 thousand emitters, for ships of the "destroyer" class – about 7 thousand (this version of the headlights was called "intermediate"), and for ships of the "frigate" class it was about 3.4 thousand emitters at all.
Subsequently, however, the intermediate version was abandoned, leaving the radar only for nuclear cruisers (2.7 thousand power amplifiers, 10.2 thousand emitters, 400 simultaneously accompanied targets) and nuclear frigates (900 power amplifiers, 3.4 thousand emitters, 120 simultaneously accompanied targets).
According to the plan of American specialists, the new SAM, which had truly unique characteristics for its time and allowed, according to the calculated data, to provide with sufficiently high efficiency the cover of ships from enemy aircraft within a radius of up to 110 miles (about 204 km), was to replace three ships of the US Navy that were in service with the fleet at that time anti–aircraft missile systems - the so-called "3T": "Terrier", "Talos" (RIM-8 Talos) and "Tartar".
All of them at that time, as the American admirals believed, could no longer provide an effective solution to the problem of repelling a massive attack by enemy air attack means. And especially low–flying anti-ship missiles - the main weapon of the Soviet navy, with which the command of the latter intended to deliver a crushing blow to the dominance of the US Navy in the oceans.
We emphasize that only ships with nuclear power plants were considered as carriers of the complex. Because, according to calculations carried out by American naval specialists and industry representatives, only they at that time could supply the amount of energy that was necessary for the normal operation of a powerful radar with AN/SPG-59 type headlights.
MCNAMARA VSHowever, in December 1963, the Typhon program was closed by the decision of the then US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
The reason is the high cost and the presence of a number of technical problems that were difficult to solve at that time. Moreover, this program was closed even despite the fact that, according to calculations based on the results of the first tests performed on board the experimental vessel "Norton Sound" (USS Norton Sound, AVM-1), the Typhon system was supposed to provide interception of enemy aircraft and missiles at their flight speeds up to M= 3, and unguided short-range missiles at all at flight speeds up to M = 4. In addition, the combat means of the Typhon system were also capable of hitting small-sized surface targets with sufficiently high efficiency.
At the time of Minister McNamara's decision to close the Typhon program, the Norton Sound experimental vessel was undergoing conversion at the Baltimore shipyard of Maryland Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., where it arrived in November 1962. The conversion, including the installation of the only released AN/SPG-59 type radar, was completed in early 1964.
According to the data provided by Ryan Creary in an article on the Alternate Wars website and dedicated to the AN/SPG-59 radar and the Typhon weapon system, the AN/SPG-59 variant of the station, which was tested at Norton Sound, had the following main tactical and technical characteristics: operating frequency range – With, the maximum peak power is 200 MW, the average power is 8.7 MW, the accuracy of obtaining the coordinates of the target by range in the survey (search) mode is 20 feet (6.1 m), the accuracy of obtaining the coordinates of the target by range in the tracking mode is 2 feet (61 cm). Examples of target detection: a target with an effective scattering surface (ESR) equal to 1 sq. m was detected at a range of 165 nautical miles (about 305.6 km) with a probability of 50%, whereas a target with an ESR of 0.5 sq. m. m was detected at a range of 37 nautical miles (about 68.5 km) with a probability of 90%.
On June 20, 1964, the experimental vessel "Norton Sound" was again accepted by the fleet, and then for several months took part in a series of those very tests that had very promising results. But even a miracle could not save the Typhon program then. Therefore, the ship was soon returned for refitting – during a three-month stay at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard in the spring and summer of 1966, all equipment related to the Typhon system was removed.
But soon the American navy, for which the task of combating a massive air strike that could be inflicted by Soviet naval aviation and ships and submarines with anti-ship missiles was still relevant, made a second attempt to create a ship-based radar for detecting aerial targets with a phased array antenna.
This eventually became the SCANFAR complex, which consisted of two radar stations – AN/SPS-32 and AN/SPS-33. In fact, it was a significantly simplified version of the AN/SPG-59 station intended only for lighting the air situation, from which a number of tasks were removed, including the guidance of anti-aircraft guided missiles (for the latter, this complex issued only primary targeting). At the same time, however, the customer's requirements for ensuring an appropriate level of noise immunity from the effects of enemy electronic warfare have increased.
But although the SCANFAR radar complex was significantly simpler technologically than the AN/SPG-59, its developers also could not rid their brainchild of a number of serious shortcomings. Therefore, as a result, the SCANFAR complex was installed only on two warships: on the world's first nuclear strike aircraft carrier Enterprise (USS Enterprise; CV(A)N-65), accepted into the fleet on November 25, 1961, and on the nuclear cruiser URO Long, commissioned on September 9, 1961 Beach" (USS Long Beach; CLGN-160, then CGN-160, and from July 1, 1958 – CGN-9). The latter, by the way, became the world's first combat surface ship, originally designed to equip a nuclear power plant and received it.
However, in the 1970s and 1980s, these complexes were removed from both of these ships and replaced with more traditional ones with conventional radars. Although, interestingly, the nuclear cruiser URO "Long Beach" was at one time on the "short list" of combat surface ships of the US Navy, which were proposed to be converted into a multifunctional Aegis system. But, as they say, it did not grow together…
However, despite the not particularly successful experience of the American navy in equipping its ships with phased array radars, a number of design and technological solutions, as well as components of systems developed under the Typhon and SCANFAR programs, primarily a new multifunctional radar with headlights, were recommended by specialists for use in the future the weapon system, which later became known as "Aegis".
THE WORK GOES INTO THE ACTIVE PHASEAfter bringing together the results of exploratory work and conceptual research, a special report was prepared in May 1965 addressed to the Navy command and the leadership of the US Department of Defense, which outlined the main results of these works and views on the creation of a "Promising Surface Ship Missile Weapon System" (ASMS – Advanced Surface Missile System).
The latter meant an anti-aircraft missile system (SAM), which was to include small-sized high-speed and highly maneuverable anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM), characterized by modern highly effective homing systems and high noise immunity.
The report was generally received positively, and RCA Corporation (Radio Corporation of America, existed as an independent company in 1919-1986) was chosen as the main contractor for the implementation of the new ambitious naval program.
More precisely, its Missile and Surface Radar Division was chosen as the main contractor, which after 1986 was transformed into the Government Electronic Systems Division of General Electric. The latter sold it to Martin Marietta in 1992, where it was listed under the same name, until in 1995 Martin Marietta became part of Lockheed Martin. After that, the mentioned division initially bore the same name, but a little later it was reorganized into Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems – Surface Systems. And finally, since 2003, it has been called Maritime Systems and Sensors.
In December 1969, after some preparatory work, the Missile and Surface Radar Division received a state contract worth $ 252.93 million from the US Department of Defense for the development of a promising anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense system for surface ships. Note that by missile defense here we mean anti-ship missiles, and not intercontinental, medium or shorter-range ballistic missiles, which the missile defense system is designed to combat in its modern sense.
At the same time, initially, the developer and the customer relied on the widest possible use of digital technologies, as well as on a comprehensive reduction in the weight of equipment and the level of energy consumption of the system – first of all, of course, radar. In the same month, the ASMS system received its current name "Aegis", which was proposed by the former chief observer from the US Navy for the Tartar air defense system program by Captain L.J. Stecherom.
This name was selected during a competition specially organized within the framework of the US Navy. At the same time, Lockheed Martin historians note that Captain Stecher suggested using the word Aegis also in a variant of the abbreviation AEGIS – from the name Advanced Electronic Guided Interceptor System ("advanced electronic controlled interception system"). However, this abbreviation has not caught on in the American Navy.
As for the etymology of the name itself, this is how the legendary shield of Zeus is called. From ancient Greek, the name Aegis translates as "storm" or "whirlwind", and in Russian-language literature it is customary to transfer it as "aegis". So it would be more correct to use the "Aegis" variant in the Russian-language literature in relation to the weapon system we are considering, and not "Aegis".
According to legend, this shield, in the center of which the severed head of the gorgon Medusa was reinforced, was made by Hephaestus from the skin of the mythical goat Amalthea and was used by Zeus to create powerful storms. The name "aegis" is also attributed to the armor-the shoulder of Athena, also with the attached head of Medusa.
By the way, the expression "to be under the aegis" means "to be protected" (by someone). It is precisely this meaning – "protection" or "patronage" – that the word aegis has in English. This is probably why such a name was chosen for the Mk 7 "Aegis" multifunctional weapon system. After all, it was supposed to reliably protect the US Navy warships from any modern and promising means of enemy air attack.
What came out of this in the end, we will tell in subsequent publications.
Vladimir Shcherbakov
Deputy Executive Editor of HBOVladimir Leonidovich Shcherbakov is a military expert, historian, and writer.
