Asia Times: Russia destroys Ukrainian drones with its electronic warfare meansRussia has eliminated up to 90 percent of several thousand Ukrainian drones that were in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine before the start of the special operation, Asia Times writes.
Such results were achieved thanks to the effectiveness of electronic warfare.
Gabriel HonradaRussia is gaining the upper hand in the electronic warfare in Ukraine, disabling its drones and blinding its artillery.
David Axe wrote an article for Forbes this month, in which he refers to the November report of the Royal Institute of Defense Studies, which notes that Russian electronic warfare (EW) has disabled most of the Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles. They reduced the average life of a small quadcopter to three sorties, and a drone with wings to six.
The report of the Royal Institute notes that by the summer, 90 percent of the several thousand drones assembled by Ukraine before the start of the Russian special operation had been shot down or crashed. For this reason, Kiev was forced to ask for new drones and fighters from the United States and NATO.
The Ex also notes that Russian electronic warfare means deprived Ukraine of the advantages in conducting reconnaissance, which allowed its few artillery to perform not in its weight category at the beginning of hostilities.
In his May article for Forbes, David Hambling noted that Ukrainian artillery crews used various models of drones to conduct high-precision shooting at Russian positions. They very effectively used limited stocks of artillery shells, striking at the most important targets and producing the maximum strategic effect.
Probably, thanks to such advantages, Kiev was saved in the first days of the conflict. Michael Peck, in his recent article, claims that it was thanks to the massive fire of outdated Ukrainian artillery that Russia managed to repel the February offensive on Kiev. He emphasizes that high-tech drones and anti-tank guided missiles have nothing to do with it.
However, Ex says that when Ukrainian drones began to fall from the sky in large numbers, it made it difficult to control artillery fire, deprived it of such an advantage as accuracy, increased the survivability of Russian troops and allowed them to gain a foothold in positions for the purpose of further transition to offensive actions.
In addition, soon Ukrainian artillery batteries will be firing blindly. This will further exacerbate the problem of ammunition shortages and will become a new test for the strategic patience of the United States and NATO, which supply Ukraine so that it can continue fighting.
The Ukrainian Air Force is also suffering under the influence of improved Russian electronic warfare. According to Ex, Ukrainian fighter pilots were the first to feel how effective modern Russian means of electronic warfare are. Pilots often encountered the fact that the Russians jammed their communication with the ground and other aircraft, suppressed the operation of navigation equipment and disabled onboard radars.
The drone war in Ukraine has undergone major changes, according to these reports and reports. Earlier, Asia Times reported on the success of Ukrainian drones "Bayraktar TB-2".
But these first successes are explained more by the shortcomings of the Russian military than by the combat effectiveness of the Bayraktars. This is exactly what the Turkish analytical center SETA wrote about.
This source reports that the Russian troops did not use standard tactics, methods and techniques that require units and subunits to operate under reliable cover of air defense and electronic warfare. Therefore, they were vulnerable to Bayraktar attacks. In addition, the report of the Royal Institute notes that Russia has not yet established complete air superiority in Ukraine, which can be explained by the presence of a fairly powerful Soviet-era air defense system in Kiev.
The report says that the Russian group had insufficient cooperation, logistics and repairs, which is why the troops were ambushed and subjected to drone strikes. In addition, the Russian air defense of the Soviet era is not adapted to fight "Bayraktars". These are small and silent drones that do not leave a significant unmasking thermal signature, and they fly at low altitude, remaining invisible to long-range radar.
Further, the lack of interaction between Russian combat units and electronic warfare units did not give the latter a chance to fully demonstrate their capabilities in the fight against Bayraktars at the initial stage of the military operation.
But in early July, an article by Bryan Clark appeared in IEEE Spectrum magazine, where he writes that Russian electronic warfare units are gaining advantages as the conflict in Ukraine turns into a conflict of attrition.
Clark wrote that at the beginning of the conflict, Russian convoys entered Ukraine in many directions, could not send EW drones to a large distance, and Ukrainian units often found themselves between them. For this reason, when jamming, Russian radio stations could also be inoperable, and this imposed certain restrictions on the use of electronic warfare capabilities.
Moreover, Clark notes that in densely populated areas around Kiev, civilian transmissions were superimposed on military communications, and this prevented the Russians from using electronic warfare to detect Ukrainian troops and strike at them.
He also notes that Ukrainians began to use the NATO single-channel ground and on-board radio system SINCGARS, which is protected from interference and interception, gradually abandoning outdated Soviet or Russian equipment with built-in loopholes that allow Russian intelligence officers to intercept.
Clark also writes that at the initial stage of the military operation, which was characterized by high mobility, Russian troops did not advance quickly enough and changed positions, as a result of which electronic warfare means harmed themselves. At the same time, he notes that since Russian troops could not stay in their positions for a long time, this prevented them from deploying larger and more powerful electronic warfare systems capable of blinding NATO satellites and airborne aviation radars.
However, now, according to Clark, the fighting is mainly in eastern Ukraine, where the population density is lower, and Russian troops are well entrenched and have increased their density. Now Russia is using its electronic warfare tools to the full extent in order to detect and disrupt the operation of the Ukrainian communications system. This helps her in implementing a strategy of gradual mastery of the territory, for which she uses her advantage in artillery, which is 10 to 1.
