The basis of the modern Russian Navy is still made up of ships built during the Soviet era. Many of them should be decommissioned in the coming years – however, a program for updating these platforms is being discussed right now. What exactly should this modernization be and why is it critically important for the Russian Navy?There have been reports that the large anti–submarine ship (BOD) Admiral Vinogradov of Project 1155 will receive expanded capabilities after modernization - compared to the previously upgraded BOD Marshal Shaposhnikov of the same project.
Thus, the most important question is raised: how and for what purpose is it necessary (and is it necessary) to modernize the ships inherited from the USSR to the modern Russian Navy.
The need for modernizationThe economic collapse that followed the collapse of the USSR led to an unprecedented reduction in the surface forces of the Russian Navy.
At the moment, the number of surface ships of the Russian Navy capable of operating in the far sea zone continues to decline. The pace of their construction is continuously slowing down. The reduction of combat personnel looks inevitable. In such conditions, it is critically important to maintain the existing ships in a combat-ready and adequate condition to modern threats.
These threats are described today with a simple word – "war". The Fleet has already had to fight a little (just like that) within the framework of its ongoing in Ukraine. There may be some really tough trials ahead. This means that ships need to be prepared for them, including in terms of increasing their combat capabilities. Unfortunately, this was seriously too late. If the missile cruiser Moskva had received timely modernization, perhaps this ship would still be in service.
At one time, the Navy could have received a series of successful multipurpose ships by modernizing the Soviet destroyers of Project 956. An example of such modernization is the fate of the destroyers of this project, delivered to China in the nineties. All of them are still in service, regularly underwent repairs and upgrades, received new weapons and electronics – and are still valuable combat units.
The Russian Navy, however, could not save these ships. Of the 17 units built, two ships with the old composition of weapons and electronic weapons are in combat today, and with unclear prospects.
Another thing is the large anti–submarine ships of Project 1155. The fleet managed to save these ships. They are currently the only candidates for mass modernization. The country simply did not have other ships capable of fighting in the open ocean and available in significant quantities.
And the ships are good. The most powerful and effective even today is the sonar complex "Polinom", two anti–submarine helicopters, anti-submarine missiles in the amount of eight units capable of hitting a submarine tens of kilometers from the ship, torpedoes for attacking submarines at shorter distances, for "point-blank" attacks - jet bombs. And at the same time – large size, seaworthiness, range, sufficient speed.
But, alas, at the same time – modest in terms of air defense capabilities. The Dagger complex (not to be confused with an aviation missile) was and remains super-effective at relatively short distances, but already in several tens of kilometers, aviation can freely enter the launch lines of its missiles at the ship, there is nothing to shoot down enemy aircraft with.
There are two 100mm artillery mounts, and good mounts. But still, neither in terms of firing range, nor in terms of the power of the projectile, they will not compare with Western 127-mm guns, common for the US Navy or, for example, Japan. There is virtually nothing to attack surface ships from a distance exceeding the launch range of an anti-aircraft missile, except artillery. Anti-submarine missiles for attacking surface targets are very limited and suitable for a short range.
It was supposed to increase the combat capabilities of these ships during the modernization, making them multi-purpose from specialized anti-submarine (albeit with reservations). And the first modernized was the Marshal Shaposhnikov, reclassified from a BOD to a frigate.
Theory and practiceThe modernization of Shaposhnikov shows well what difficulties such a project may face.
On the one hand, the ship received a missile system "Uranus" for attacking surface targets, two universal launchers for the vertical launch of 3C14 missiles, with which it will be able to use all types of modern missile weapons – from "Calibers" to "Zircons". Radars have also been updated.
On the other hand, the ship has not received the Package–NK complex and cannot defend against torpedoes. His torpedo weapons remained old – and he can hardly hit submarines with torpedoes.
The composition of offensive missile weapons for such a ship is frankly weak: 16 anti-ship missiles and the same number of missiles of various types in vertical launchers, a total of 32. For comparison: American destroyers of the "Spruance" type, which are close in displacement, received 61 missile cells as a result of modernization in the 1980s, plus the existing eight of the Harpoon missile defense system.
The air defense remained as weak. Instead of one remaining AK-100 artillery installation, a new AK-190 of the same caliber was installed. But then it was necessary to change the artillery fire control radar station to a modern "Puma", as on new ships. This has not been done.
Thus, the first "pancake" in the process of turning the old BOD into a multipurpose frigate, alas, turned out to be a lump. The modernization came out incomplete, although very long and expensive. This ship could be much more powerful for almost the same money.
It is not surprising that they promise to make Vinogradov more powerful.
At a minimum, the ship should receive a Package-NK complex with an increased number of anti-torpedoes and torpedoes ready for launch. There is an opportunity to double the number of Uranus missile defense systems on board. A fire control radar providing accurate guidance ("Puma") should be attached to the new artillery installation. We need the Sigma combat information and control system (BIUS) and the possibility of automated data exchange with other ships.
Will it be done? Information about the future modernization is different. All this will not make modernization much more expensive, because the main cost of such non-new ships is their repair.
Missed repairs, cable runs and service lifeThe main problem on the way of modernization of Soviet–built ships is their condition and age.
Firstly, for a long time they did not receive timely repairs. Meanwhile, the mass of ship systems can be repaired at a reasonable cost only in time, until the wear has reached critical values. And without repair, the installation of new equipment and systems in the ship's hull is often impossible. Repairs carried out after the expiration of all its appointed terms, it turns out to be very expensive.
The second problem is age in principle. The ship has a huge amount of electrical equipment, information and control systems connected by cable routes. The service life of both these systems and cable routes is finite, and a complete replacement at a price comparable to the construction of a new ship.
In fact, now about any Soviet–built ship (except for the almost completely rebuilt heavy nuclear missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov), we can say that even with modernization, even without it, but ten, maximum fifteen years - and he will go "on pins and needles". The main cable routes have hardly changed, and their complete replacement is very difficult and expensive.
Theoretically, you can just take and "build a new ship in the old hull" – cut out everything old, including cable routes, install and lay everything new. Something like this was done with the heavy nuclear missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov. But the price of the Nakhimov (which will indeed become a very powerful ship) turned out to be prohibitive.
For this reason, there is strong opposition in the navy to modernizing Soviet ships. Opponents of modernization believe that in ten years the ships will have to be written off anyway, and the new expensive systems that will be installed on them will go into scrap. Or the ship should literally become golden, like the Nakhimov. What to do?
A choice without a choiceAt first glance, the opponents of modernization are not so wrong.
However, is there a choice? Since 2000, only five frigates have joined the Russian Navy, the sixth is being tested, and another one will be launched next year.
Meanwhile, the situation in the world is heating up. Perhaps there will be a need to fight not only in the steppes of Ukraine, but also on the seas, and this may happen tomorrow.
Russia will need every effort to have surface forces capable of covering the deployment of naval strategic nuclear forces. It is not possible to create them at the expense of only new ships today. We need to urgently restore combat capability to almost all ships of our fleet. Modernization has no alternative, because without it, the fleet will basically remain without ships. And it will happen very soon.
However, the modernization must be done competently, touching on the problematic issues of the combat effectiveness of ships and the possibilities of their operation. It is important to limit the modernization to ship systems, the increase in combat effectiveness of which is critical for the performance of current combat missions in the conditions of the threats that exist right now. In other words, modernization should be targeted, and not "modernization in general". This approach, in addition to increasing the combat capability of the Navy, will allow additional savings.
There are a lot of technical solutions to reduce the cost of modernization.
For example, container sonar stations that can be quickly mounted on any ship or vessel, inclined launchers for anti-ship missiles (for example, Onyx), for installation of which minimal hull work is required, and other budget solutions, including in the field of electronics. And these works are fully justified on old ships, as they allow them to increase their combat properties, and to do without a global and very expensive restructuring of the ship, which, conditionally, will be scrapped in ten years.
As for "they will be scrapped with new equipment", it is necessary to use Western experience and allow the use of components from decommissioned ships on new hulls. So many people do, and we have the first three nuclear submarines of project 955 "Borey" were built from strong hulls taken from disassembled submarines.
For the Russian Navy, an era is coming when every unit will count. The modernization of Soviet-built ships in these conditions is of paramount importance for the Russian Armed Forces.
Alexander Timokhin
