Drone attack and how to deal with itUnmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are currently extremely widely used for a variety of purposes.
In this connection, the task of combating them is becoming more and more urgent.
The fight against UAVs can be carried out both by the traditional method of their physical destruction and by means of electronic warfare (EW). But only with the largest military-purpose UAVs (combat and reconnaissance), traditional air defense (air defense) can fight with traditional methods and means. The problem in this case is the low visibility of most UAVs, but this also applies to many modern combat aircraft and missiles.
NEW CHALLENGESHowever, the vast majority of military and civilian drones are small and low-speed.
Traditional air defense systems are not designed to detect and defeat such targets. Their reconnaissance means (radar, infrared and even optical) are capable of detecting small–sized UAVs only at minimal ranges - that is, there is a very high probability that the UAVs will not be detected at all or the air defense means will not have time to defeat them.
The means of destruction themselves most often have no chance of achieving a direct hit to such a small-sized target or at least an explosion close enough to it. Moreover, even an artillery anti–aircraft projectile, and even more so an anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM), often turn out to be more expensive in price than the UAV they hit.
And the enemy is quite capable of creating a situation where there are more attacking UAVs than the air defense system has shells, and even more so missiles. Thus, with the help of UAVs, it is very easy to achieve complete depletion of the air defense system without achieving real results.
Lasers can be used to combat UAVs. Firstly, they can be used in the traditional role of rangefinders-designators, facilitating the defeat of UAVs by traditional means. Secondly, they are able to "warm up" UAVs, thereby facilitating their detection in the infrared range. Thirdly, lasers can be used directly as a means of destruction.
It is already clear that lasers cannot be used as an element of strategic missile defense (that is, to hit targets at long distances) due to too strong scattering of the laser beam, its absorption even by a completely transparent atmosphere, and very large energy needs.
The use of a laser as a means of short-range air defense is quite realistic, since at short distances the factors of absorption and scattering of the beam are almost insignificant, energy needs are quite moderate. Also, the size and speed of the target do not matter, but the laser beam spreads, in fact, instantly (at the speed of light). At the same time, the "ammunition" of the laser complex is almost infinite (that is, the enemy will not be able to deplete the air defense equipped with lasers). Accordingly, lasers are very well suited for defeating small-sized UAVs, and not only single ones, but also attacking groups.
Much more often, electronic warfare is used against UAVs, since any drone carries a significant amount of electronics. These are an on-board computer, receivers of navigation satellite systems, devices for receiving and storing species information, information exchange devices, receiving and transmitting lines of command, species, and telemetry information.
The spatial orientation of the UAV is determined using gyroscopes. At the same time, fully autonomous drones practically do not exist, they are all controlled from the ground. In case of loss of communication with the earth, the vast majority of UAVs are programmed to automatically return to the starting point.
Accordingly, if interference is introduced into the navigation system of the UAV, at least it will not be able to conduct reconnaissance and / or use weapons, and at most it will collide with the ground. If you interfere with the operation of the UAV communication channels, at least it will not be able to perform any tasks, at most it will also crash. If communication and navigation channels are suppressed at the same time, the death of the UAV is almost inevitable. Moreover, in both variants, it is even possible to intercept control over the drone (this is quite difficult for military UAVs, but very simple for commercial ones). The use of powerful electromagnetic pulses can lead to the complete destruction of electronic equipment on board the UAV, which is guaranteed to lead to its death.
UNCONVENTIONAL METHODSVery exotic methods of physical destruction of small-sized UAVs include catching them with a net (the net can be fired from the ground or from another drone) or even specially trained birds of prey.
In some cases, conventional small arms, primarily sniper rifles, can be used against small–sized UAVs.
Birds of prey have been tried against drones in the Netherlands and France; the effectiveness of this method, however, is not obvious even against commercial UAVs.
In the USA and the UK, devices have been created that shoot nets in the direction of the UAV, but their radius of action, as a rule, does not exceed 100 m. For example, the British Skywall-100 grenade launcher can "catch" a drone with a network fired at a range of 10 to 150 m. An American 40-mm grenade with a net for catching UAVs is fired from a grenade launcher or from an AGS Mk19. In the USA and Japan, devices have been developed that shoot networks not from ground installations, but from their drones.
All these systems are obviously applicable only against single small-sized commercial UAVs at short ranges and altitudes in peacetime. The same applies to Russian developments on installing a shotgun or a Kalashnikov assault rifle on their UAVs to combat enemy drones.
The Russian UAV "Wolf-18" catches UAVs (obviously, also only commercial small-sized ones) with firing nets (there are three such nets on board) or knocks them down with a ramming blow. Also, the Israeli Goshok UAV strikes enemy drones with a ramming strike, while its repeated use is implied. The American UAV "Coyote", also hitting an enemy drone with a ramming strike, is a one-time. Coyote is part of the FS-LIDS complex, which also includes electronic warfare equipment.
TRADITIONAL METHODSDuring the Syrian war, the air defenses of Russia and Syria used mainly traditional means against drones – S-125, Buk, Tor, Pantsir anti-aircraft missile and cannon complex (ZRPC), as well as, apparently, portable air defense systems and anti-aircraft artillery.
The Russian contingent used electronic warfare ("Resident", "Krasukha", etc., including the "Thunderstorm" system created in Belarus) against enemy drones in the defense of their bases.
In general, the effectiveness of air defense in this case was very high. However, apparently, this option of fighting drones is quite economically costly (many downed UAVs of Islamic militants and the Turkish Armed Forces are cheaper than the Russian missiles spent to destroy them).
In Libya, in 2019-2020, there were intense battles between Turkish combat UAVs and the Pantsir missile defense system of the UAE Armed Forces, the ratio of losses in these battles was approximately 2:1 in favor of the Pantsir. During the second war for Nagorno–Karabakh in the fall of 2020, the Armenian air defense, mainly consisting of the Wasp air defense system, could not seriously oppose anything to the Turkish and Israeli drones used by Azerbaijan, which largely ensured its success (" Armenia - Azerbaijan: 26 years later ", HBO, 11/27/20).
To a large extent, the 57-mm ZSU "Derivation" currently being created in Russia will be focused on the fight against UAVs. For the same purpose, small-sized cheap missiles are being developed for the Pantsir missile defense system.
In Israel, the main means of defeating small-sized targets is the Iron Dome air defense system, its Tamir missile defense system costs 40 thousand dollars. The Israelis themselves admit that this option is ineffective both from a military and economic point of view.
In the USA, a small-sized MNTK missile system is being developed (up to 60 such missiles are going to be installed on MML launchers). The MADIS air defense system is also being created, including a radar station (radar), optical surveillance equipment, electronic warfare, Stinger MANPADS, a 30 mm cannon and a 7.62 mm machine gun.
In Europe, anti-aircraft artillery systems are being created to fight against UAVs (German Mantis, Anglo-French Rapidfire, German anti-aircraft self-propelled gun on the chassis of the Boxer APC).
An experimental air defense system with an infrared laser AN/SEQ-3 Laser Weapon System or XN-1 LaWS is installed on the American amphibious windship dock "Ponce". The target is detected at a distance of up to 35 km and is hit at a distance of up to 1.6 km. The laser power reaches 30 kW. In low–energy mode, the laser can disable the optics of the UAV, in maximum - destroy it completely (it takes no more than 2 seconds).
The US Ground Forces are testing the Compact Laser Weapon System (CLWS) with a power of 2 kW (it is capable of hitting only very small drones at minimal distances). In the USA, a number of laser systems for short-range air defense (Vesta, LADS, MEHEL, HELWS, etc.) installed on various chassis are being tested.
The Israeli Drone Dom system combines a combat laser, radar and electronic warfare equipment to combat UAVs. The Iron Beam complex is a paired laser that strikes UAVs at a distance of up to 7 km. The NEL laser system is being developed (jointly with the USA). A laser air defense system to combat RLADS UAVs is being tested in Germany.
Several laser systems for UAV destruction are being developed in China at once (ZM-87, LW-30, LAG-2, Dikun Shouwei family). The range of destruction of a small-sized (less than 1 m) low-speed (less than 50 m / s) target is 1-2 km with a target detection range using radar of at least 50 km. At the same time, interference stations for UAV communication channels are also included in the systems.
Russia uses a number of electronic warfare systems ("Moscow", "Murmansk", "Krasukha", "Divnomorye", etc.) capable of suppressing communication channels and navigation systems of UAVs over large areas.
In the USA, the "Fizer" and "Tor" systems are being developed. The German "Ixpeller" system detects UAVs at a distance of up to 4 km using radar, IR systems and television cameras and jamms them with interference at a distance of up to 1.5 km. The Israeli Drone Guard system has three modes for detecting and suppressing UAVs of different ranges. Three different radars are used for this. After detecting the UAV, the system initiates the suppression of its communication channels and navigation systems in order to at least force the drone to return to the launch site, and at most – lead to its accident. Also, with the help of electronic warfare, the ReDron system suppresses enemy UAVs.
The Belarusian electronic warfare system "Groza" has several modifications, it is also capable of suppressing the signals of any navigation systems.
AND MORE GUNSA specific means of electronic warfare, created specifically to suppress drones, are anti-drone guns.
They have the form of small arms and are designed to interfere with navigation and communication systems of UAVs at short distances.
The American Drone Defender rifle has a mass of 4.4 kg, suppresses UAVs at a distance of up to 400 m with the possibility of continuous operation for two hours. The American-Australian Drone Gun Tactical rifle has a mass of 6.3 kg and is able to work continuously for no more than half an hour, but at once at four different frequencies. Suppresses signals from GPS and Glonass navigation systems and UAV control channels at a distance of up to 1 km.
The Ihasavar system has been created in Turkey to block remote control, data transmission channels and satellite communication channels. It also has the form of small arms, the weight is 2 kg, in addition, the backpack with batteries weighs 11.5 kg. The Polish anti-drone rifle operates at a distance of up to 1 km, while radar, acoustic and optical sensors are used to detect drones.
The Skywiper rifle (EDM4S) was created in Lithuania, it weighs 6 kg. The Italian CPM rifle suppresses the navigation, control and communication signals of the UAV within a radius of 700 m. The range of the Ukrainian KVSG-6 rifle is up to 3 km. An Orion anti-drone rifle weighing 2.5 kg has been created in Singapore.
The Chinese anti-drone gun UAV-D04JA is capable of operating at a distance of up to 1 km for an hour and a half, suppresses the signals of all known navigation systems (GPS, Glonass, Galileo, Beidou). The most original product of the Chinese military-industrial complex is the Shenzen anti-drone pistol, which has a range of 1.2 km.
The Russian anti-drone gun "Stupor" weighs 5.5 kg, can work continuously for four hours, suppresses up to five frequencies at once. Another rifle "Rex-1" weighs 4.5 kg, works continuously for three hours, suppresses all known navigation systems and mobile communication standards. Currently, the range of the Stupor has been brought to 2 km, and the Umbrella rifle has been created on the basis of the Rex-1. Another Russian development is the Stiletto rifle, which suppresses the UAV control channel at a distance of 500-700 m.
Lithuanian "Skywalkers" and Ukrainian KVSG-6 are actively used by the Ukrainian side during the current hostilities, the Russian side is no less actively using "Stupors" and "Stilettos". Thanks to this, commercial UAVs used by both sides for reconnaissance purposes are transformed into disposable products. For combat drones, traditional air defense works mainly (" Problems at the front cannot be solved with miracle weapons ", "HVO", 02.12.22).
Alexander KhramchikhinAlexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin is an independent military expert.
