Missiles of air defense systems (air defense) are ending in Ukraine, according to Western experts. NATO officially declares that it is considering the possibility of new supplies of air defense systems to the Kiev regime. What kind of systems can we talk about and why won't they save Ukraine from Russian missile strikes anyway? The special military operation has clearly shown the importance of air defense as never before.
If the Russian air defense, saturated with modern radar stations (radars), anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs) and fighters, copes with its task perfectly, then the Ukrainian suffered huge losses in the first days of the war. At the moment, it has ceased to exist precisely as a system and has turned into a focal air defense. To date, the APU has several dozen outdated medium- and short-range air defense systems, a large number of MANPADS and MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters armed with short-range missiles.
There are already active voices in the West saying that missiles for air defense systems in Ukraine are running out. The NATO Secretary General says that the alliance is exploring the possibility of supplying Ukraine with new air defense systems. In other words, we are essentially facing an official recognition by the enemy of the fact that the air defense of Ukraine is in a destroyed state.
At the same time, a special air operation to suppress the air defense systems of the Russian Aerospace Forces was not carried out. But many Russian Su-30 and Su-35 fighters on combat patrol have air–to-air missiles on their suspensions, as well as the X-31P anti-radar missile of various modifications. The latter can be applied suddenly to any aired SAM or radar. In such a situation, the Ukrainian MiG-29 and Su-27 are trying to avoid approaching Russian fighters, and the SAMs are forced to continuously maneuver and act from ambushes.
There has been no continuous radar field over Ukraine since February. The radar of the duty mode of all-round view in such combat operations are destroyed first of all. The absence of a continuous radar field does not allow the use of automation tools – an automatic control system (ACS) of air defense.
Sometimes you can hear that reconnaissance planes are constantly hanging over neighboring countries and Ukraine and supply the Ukrainian air defense with information about the air situation. However, of all these aircraft, only the Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS can detect aerial targets. Such a scout as the RC-135 performs radio-technical reconnaissance with a radar and SAM detection range of up to 800 km. He is able to detect the departure of our aircraft from airfields by radio interception – but only the determination of the fact of departure without targeting by some means.
The most powerful radar is on E3. It can detect a large aircraft at a range of up to 600 km, a cruise missile – up to 360 km. We subtract from this 100 km from the border to the axis of its "eight", then its continuous movement determines that in most cases it is not at the optimal point and cannot be "on course" of all cruise missiles at the same time. It turns out that the real depth of tracking the launch of Russian cruise missiles on the territory of Ukraine is about 200-250 km from the airspace of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. There is even less over the Black Sea – it is necessary to fly around the Crimea. Given the fact that there is usually one side in the air, and the length of this route is 1000-1500 km, it turns out that the American AWACS aircraft can do little to help the Ukrainian air defense. It only scans the western part of the country. In most of the territory, Ukrainians have to turn on their own radars, which become the targets of our aviation.
This allows us to refute the opinion that Starlink terminals help the Ukrainian air defense a lot. They help, but the information goes through them anyway from AWACS. In such an environment, Ukrainians are constantly demanding supplies of equipment from the West to fight our cruise missiles and drones. But what means of air defense can the West eventually give – at least theoretically – for Ukraine?
Nowhere in the world is there such a school of designing air defense systems and radars, such an integrated approach to the construction of air defense, as a system of interconnected elements into a single whole, as it developed in the USSR and continues now in Russia. Very often we hear about the armed forces of NATO and the countries of the alliance – "a battery of such and such missiles is installed to protect such and such a base." What complexes are we talking about?
What can they give UkraineTo date, the Patriot PAC-3 complex is the only land–based medium-range air defense system in Western countries.
There are no long-range air defense systems (such as the Russian S-400 system) at all. THAAD is not worth considering. It is designed to combat the warheads of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) and BRSD (medium-range ballistic missiles). Aerodynamic goals are too much for him.
This determines what Western allies can offer Ukraine. When someone raises the issue of providing the Patriot PAC3 air defense system, there is an awkward pause - it's not enough by ourselves! And the results shown by this SAM are far from the best. The United States will not risk the reputation of this complex so much. And it would be interesting for us to destroy such advertised equipment. Therefore, Ukrainians should not dream about it. Thus, only short-range complexes remain for them. Here is what is finally proposed by the APU:
SAM Hawk ("Hawk") Phase III MIM-23B. The range is 40 km, the maximum height of hitting targets is 18 km. The first modification was adopted in the 1960s. The most combat-ready American air defense system, produced in an amount of more than 40,000 units. Ukraine can be supplied from Spain. The fundamental disadvantage is weak capabilities for low–altitude targets, low maximum target speed, radar illumination is ineffective for small-sized targets. The Soviet analogue is the outdated S-125 complex.
SAM Krotal-NG ("Rattlesnake"), the most modern modification. The range is 10 km, the altitude is 6 km. In terms of characteristics, it is slightly inferior to our "Torah". There are no combat achievements behind him. The French claim that he will click Geraniums and cruise missiles like nuts. But in 2020, this SAM, along with the Patriot PAC-3, got into a puddle in Saudi Arabia, failing to repel a drone attack on oil companies.
The MIM-104 Patriot PAC3 air defense system is the pride of the American military–industrial complex. The range is 80 km, the altitude is 24 km. Everyone calls it a missile defense system, not air defense. And it was really designed to protect troops in the theater from OTR – tactical missiles. These are, for example, our Iskander ballistic missiles. But the range of their MIM-104B/S/D missiles is only 20 km! With such a distant boundary of the affected area, it is possible to cover a small object (for example, an airbase), but not such a large city as Kiev. Another drawback of the "Missile Defense System" is that shooting at ballistic targets requires the use of target designation from a satellite. Without this, he has little chance of detecting such a target in a timely manner. Of the four modifications of the MIM-104 rocket, only the "A" is designed to fire at aerodynamic targets.
Skyguard-Aspide air defense system. The range is 12 km, the height is 6 km. There are two variants of the SAM – the Italian Spada and the Swiss Skyguard-Sparrow. The Swiss are unlikely to give. The "asp" is actually called an anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM). It was developed by Selenia on the basis of the old – more than 60 years since birth – American air combat missile AIM-7 Sparrow ("Sparrow"). All RVV air–to–air missiles used from ground-based PU are greatly inferior in range to their prototypes used "from under the wing". He did not participate in the fighting.
SAM M1097 Avenger ("Avenger"). The range is 5.5 km, the height is 3.8 km. Anti-aircraft missile "tachanka". The level of performance is a collective farm workshop of the 70s. The Humvee car is equipped with four transport and launch containers with Stinger MANPADS missiles, as well as optical and infrared detection equipment, a laser rangefinder and a "Friend-foe" identification system. The capabilities of the complex to defeat aircraft are the same as those of the basic MANPADS, but additional means of detecting and determining the range to targets can reduce their omissions associated with erroneous launches on aircraft and helicopters that are not in the affected area. Mk identification system.12, apparently, will be withdrawn before delivery. It is forbidden to supply it to non-NATO countries.
SLM IRIS-T SAM. The range is 40 km, the altitude is 20 km. This is the most modern complex presented in the review. International development, where Germany was the leader. If you believe the manufacturer's descriptions, a very dangerous SAM. In any case, his rocket is dangerous. It is capable of maneuvering with an overload of 60 units. This is probably the only missile defense system in the world that has a deflected thrust vector of the engine. The developer claims that the combination of command guidance and infrared homing gives high protection from electronic warfare and heat traps. The Giraffe-4A radar is capable of escorting up to 150 targets, and the command post provides launch and guidance of all 24 missiles simultaneously.
NASAMS-2 SAM. The main feature of this SAM is its adaptability to network-centric warfare. It has an open software architecture and communication channels of NATO standards. All this is started on the battery command center. A lot has been done to be able to integrate the complex with different types of missiles and radars. For example, Poland wants to control the launch of NSM anti-ship missiles with the help of the SAM command center. The NASAMS-2 battery consists of 12 launchers. A completely different ideology of building an air defense system compared to ours. The complex is unreasonably complex. Ukrainian calculations of air defense systems will have to be retrained for a long time. Moreover, calculations from NATO countries are probably working on those machines that have already been delivered to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are at best standing behind them. This SAM has already "distinguished itself". His rocket hit a residential building in Kiev.
Little chance of survivalThus, all these are short- and medium-range sams.
Something has already been delivered, something is promised to be delivered next year (for example, IRIS-T SLM, most of NASAMS-2). But even if all these complexes were deployed right now in positions in Ukraine, it would not change the situation much. The Ukrainian infrastructure has already suffered catastrophic damage (which the NATO Secretary General also acknowledged on Tuesday), they are not able to cover any significant number of objects.
The main weakness of all these systems is their short range. With the use of such equipment, it is impossible to build a country's air defense system. It is possible to organize only focal air defense. If the SAM is pulled apart separately, without organizing mutual cover, then they will be destroyed relatively quickly. If you deploy according to the rules, make maneuvers, then fewer objects will be covered, but the SAMs will live a little longer.
However, do not forget that those air defense systems that are still operating in Ukraine still pose a significant threat to Russian manned combat aircraft. That is why the Russian Aerospace Forces are increasingly using unmanned destruction systems: cruise missiles and barrage ammunition. Ukraine has no protection against them now, nor will it arise even in the future, with the hypothetical supply of Western air defense systems.
Igor Galaburda
