How an obstinate puppet can become a scarecrow for whippingUntil the beginning of the XXI century, Pyongyang was considered to be a puppet of Beijing, completely dependent on it for the supply of food and weapons.
China could manipulate it in solving the Taiwan problem and in order to oust the United States from Asia. In China, they also believed that they controlled the DPRK. However, in the noughties, relations between Beijing and Pyongyang began to deteriorate before the eyes of the whole world.
FROM LOVE TO HATE…China was against the appointment of one of his sons, Kim Jong–un, as the heir of the former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and advocated the transition to the collective leadership of the DPRK by its generals.
In 2008, this led to Kim Jong-il replacing a number of generals too closely associated with China.
Relations between the two countries deteriorated even more after Pyongyang ignored Chinese warnings and conducted another nuclear test in February 2013.
Beijing reacted extremely negatively to the arrest in December 2013 of Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Un's uncle and one of the country's most influential officials, through whom, in particular, economic cooperation with China was coordinated.
In response, China has installed wire fences on the border with the DPRK to stop or, more precisely, regulate the flow of refugees from this country. And in February 2013, he imposed restrictions on exports to the DPRK and limited the ability of Chinese banks to work with North Korean customers.
At the beginning of 2014, China decided to freeze those infrastructure development projects in the DPRK that were funded from the Chinese central budget. Only small-scale private projects remained.
Diplomatic relations between the two countries have also become complicated. China (as well as Russia) voted for all UN Security Council resolutions on the imposition of economic sanctions against the DPRK in connection with the development of its missile and nuclear programs (see " North Korea's Strategic Arsenal ", "NWO" from 03.04.20). The number of mutual official visits has sharply decreased, their level has decreased. Several times Pyongyang refused to receive official Chinese delegations at all. The press of the two countries began to exchange accusations, sometimes turning into insults. The Chinese media hinted that the content of the DPRK costs China too much, while without any return, since Pyongyang behaves completely independently, without asking Beijing's opinion. In turn, the North Korean media accused China of "revisionism" and "compromise."
The real reason for the deterioration of relations was the divergence of the political lines of Beijing and Pyongyang. To put it very briefly and simplistically, Pyongyang did not want to be a puppet of Beijing, and Beijing was not satisfied with any degree of independence of Pyongyang.
...AND BACKThe situation changed dramatically in the spring of 2018, when Kim Jong-un, preparing for a meeting with US President Trump and President of the Republic of Korea Moon Jae-in, made two visits to China in a short time, where he was received at the highest level by Chinese President Xi Jinping.
These visits were a political triumph for Beijing, as they were very similar to the surrender of Pyongyang. Kim Jong-un retreated, admitting that he could not exist in complete isolation and that his only potential support was China.
At the same time, it is perfectly clear that Kim Jong-un does not need complete and unconditional surrender to Beijing at all. He clearly wanted to "balance" the United States with China, and China with Russia (for which he met with Putin in Vladivostok). And all of them together – the Republic of Korea.
It cannot be said that everything worked out for Kim Jong-un, but the DPRK still does not look very much like a puppet of China. Accordingly, Pyongyang's reconciliation with Beijing can by no means be considered final and irrevocable.
THE PIECE IS AFFORDABLE, BUT NOT TASTYA direct military clash between the PRC and the DPRK today seems completely impossible.
However, 40 years ago, civil wars on the territory of the USSR, as well as wars between its constituent republics that became independent states, also seemed completely impossible.
There was also a war between NATO members (Greece and Turkey), that is, formally between close allies. Moreover, a war between two totalitarian states with nationalist ideologies disguised as communist cannot be ruled out in any way.
At the same time, it is quite obvious that the DPRK's aggression against the PRC is absolutely excluded, since it is a senseless suicide without options for Pyongyang. Only the reverse situation is possible. In this regard, it is appropriate to recall China's aggression against communist Vietnam, which in the early 1970s was considered one of the closest allies of the PRC.
Pyongyang's status as an "outcast" makes even direct and unprovoked aggression against the DPRK legitimate, if not de jure, then de facto, which greatly facilitates the possibility of its implementation in political terms. If sanctions were imposed against Russia for the completely bloodless annexation of Crimea, at least 90% of whose population really wanted it, then no one will impose any sanctions for aggression against the DPRK. Regardless of the number of deaths at the same time (even if the bill goes to millions). As no one imposes sanctions against the Arabian monarchies for aggression against Yemen.
The main obstacle to aggression is the high combat potential of the Korean People's Army (KPA) in combination with the geographical conditions of the DPRK convenient for defense, but inconvenient for offensive. This can make the price of aggression too high even for China, despite its huge economic and military potential and the very high resistance of the PRC Armed Forces to losses in people and equipment.
If the situation inside the PRC and the DPRK remains stable in the near future, as well as on the Korean peninsula as a whole, a war between the two countries is practically excluded. Because for Beijing, aggression in such conditions has no real meaning.
SCENARIOS OF A FRATERNAL WARIn case of internal destabilization in the DPRK or in case of a war between the two Koreas (regardless of who starts it)
Beijing will almost certainly not save the Pyongyang regime. However, this does not mean that Beijing will withdraw from the situation altogether. On the contrary, his goal may be a forceful regime change in Pyongyang to a truly puppet one.
Parts of the then Shenyang Military District of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) were relocated to the borders of the DPRK back in 2013. Currently, the 79th Army Group of the PLA ground forces, the 16th Division and a number of brigades of the PLA Air Force of the Northern Command are deployed near the borders of the DPRK.
There is steady evidence that China encourages the desertion of KPA servicemen, and not only soldiers, but also officers, obviously assuming to form a puppet Korean army out of them. The Chinese military believes that "if an emergency situation arises in the North, we will be able to enter Pyongyang within two hours."
Another reason for aggression may be internal destabilization in China itself. In this case, aggression should distract the nation from internal problems. In addition, a significant number of the male population is "disposed of" during the war, which will automatically significantly reduce the protest potential (which is always based on young and middle-aged men).
The DPRK as an object of aggression is ideal precisely because it will not cause external isolation of the PRC. At the same time, high losses are guaranteed during the war, which in this case will not just be acceptable, but desirable for Beijing.
In the more distant future, if China successfully transitions to a new economic model without serious internal shocks, its external ambitions will increase significantly. And the existence of the DPRK in its current form may seem unacceptable to Beijing in political and military terms.
The main task of China in the future may be the seizure of territories and resources. In this regard, the DPRK, of course, is completely uninteresting to him. However, the very fact of the existence of an uncontrolled and unpredictable regime with powerful armed forces equipped with nuclear weapons, not just on its border, but close enough to Beijing and a number of other important centers of China, may become intolerable for Beijing. In this case, he can go to subjugate Pyongyang by any means, including force.
There is another option. The main disadvantage of the current PLA is the complete lack of combat experience. If Beijing seriously thinks about the forceful option of external expansion, then the DPRK will be the best testing ground for its development. Because, as mentioned above, in political terms, this "training" will obviously remain unpunished. And militarily, it will become very difficult, but the PLA will immediately have such experience, which no other army in the world has.
In general, it can be assumed that in China, the war with the DPRK is obviously considered as one of the possible ways (although, of course, not the only one) to influence this country. Beijing will not only not give up control over Pyongyang, but will also make every effort to make this control much tougher.
At the same time, the unification of Korea (regardless of which option it will take place) It is completely unacceptable for Beijing. Because in this case, he will get at least an extremely strong competitor in all spheres, and at most – American troops on his border near Beijing.
Accordingly, China will make every effort to ensure that this unification never takes place in any form – unless this unification takes place under the direct control of Beijing.
THE LATEST NORTH KOREAN ARGUMENTApparently, the goal of the PRC leadership is to establish a completely puppet government in Pyongyang, which will carry out limited market reforms in order to relatively improve the lives of the population and completely abandon the nuclear missile program, transferring the relevant weapons under the control of the PLA.
A radically reduced KPA will also come under the control of the PLA. At the same time, the extremely weak North Korean economy will be completely absorbed by the Chinese one. Apparently, the DPRK will retain formal independence, but it is formal.
In this case, Beijing fully owns the initiative and plays by its own rules. He only pays lip service to the norms of international law. And most importantly, he is completely independent in his actions both in domestic and foreign policy, since he may not be interested in the opinion of other countries, much less his own population.
However, as the recent "raid" of American politicians on Taiwan shows, China is not ready for serious measures of a forceful nature at the moment. And Pyongyang will not act as a dumb victim. The strengthening of the DPRK's military potential continues (see " North Korea: we are malnourished, but we will arm ourselves", "HBO" dated 29.07.22), and it is unlikely only to deter Washington and Seoul.
Recently, Pyongyang legally consolidated its long-established nuclear status, which finally closed the issue of "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula" (however, any sane person understands perfectly well that there will never be voluntary unilateral nuclear disarmament of the DPRK). And nuclear weapons can be used against any enemy.
Alexander KhramchikhinAlexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin is an independent military expert.
