Problems of military shipbuilding: import substitution and inaccurate forecasting Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decrees "On the approval of the Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation" and "On the approval of the Naval Charter of the Navy" on July 31, 2022, on the Day of the Navy.
Another important document is waiting for its turn – the Shipbuilding Program. This is required by both geopolitical events and the recently announced plans of the largest maritime powers.
PLANS OF THE USA AND CHINA In October 2020, Mark Esper, then the US Secretary of Defense, presented the program for the development of the US Navy until 2045, "Combat Force – 2045".
The ship composition of the US Navy is planned to increase to 355 units by 2034, and to 500 by 2045.
Among them are from 140 to 240 unmanned or partially inhabited surface ships and submarines. About 70 frigates and 50-60 amphibious ships, including universal amphibious ships (UDC) of the "America" type, will be inhabited, that is, with crews. Based on the UDC, six light aircraft carriers will be created. And the number of heavy aircraft carriers will be reduced from 11 to 8. By 2035, 12 new-generation strategic nuclear submarines (submarines) of the Columbia class will be built.
The number of multi-purpose submarines will increase to 80.
Beijing does not like to advertise its plans. The Pentagon does it for him. According to his report (2021), the naval composition of the People's Liberation Army of China is likely to bring up to 420 ships by 2025 and up to 460 by 2030.
By 2030, China will have up to six aircraft carriers and at least three carrier strike groups (AUG). China will have six UDC. The number of submarines will remain at the level of 65-70 units by replacing old submarines with modern ones.
SHIPS OF THE OCEAN ZONE What do we know about the plans for the construction of the Russian Navy?
In May 2014, President Putin approved a long-term military shipbuilding Program for the period up to 2050 (PVK-2050). According to Vladimir Kuroedov, at that time the commander-in-chief of the Navy, Russia refused to build large ships. Until 2031, ships of the near sea zone will descend from the stocks, and in exceptional cases – the far one.
And the inclusion of fleets in the composition of land military districts means that the Navy now performs tasks only in the interests of land groups of troops and forces. The exception is the Northern Fleet (SF), which by presidential decree became an "interspecific strategic territorial association of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation performing the tasks of the military district."
Serial construction of surface ships of the 1st rank will most likely begin no earlier than 2031.
Against this background, the laying of two UDC project 23900 at the Gulf plant in Kerch received a great resonance. Their construction was planned, but it is unlikely to be planned so soon. The economy intervened. Western sanctions have caused a reduction in port and maritime activities in Crimea. Local authorities requested and received the support of the federal Center.
TECHNOLOGICAL LAG We have factories where ships of the 1st rank were created – in the North, in the Baltic, in the Far East.
This list has been supplemented by Crimea. In the future, it may also grow into a shipbuilding center in Nikolaev: in Soviet times, cruisers, including aircraft carriers, were produced there.
What is missing in Russian shipbuilding? The most important thing is new technologies. For this reason, ships of even small classes have been built for decades.
It was not possible to complete the "marine part" of the State Armament Program for 2011-2020 (GPV-2020) in full and on time. The volume of its financing was 19 trillion rubles – 15 trillion more than the GPV-2015. And the result is more than modest.
Of the eight planned missile submarines of the project 955 "Borey", four were built. Of the eight multipurpose submarines of project 885 "Ash" – one. Out of 35 corvettes – five. Out of 14 frigates – five. Of the six BDK – one. Only the plan for the construction of small rocket ships (MRCS) was fulfilled and even exceeded.
Hopefully, the "marine part" of GPV-2027 will be performed more successfully. But no one promises that it will be easy.
The promising corvette "Daring" of project 20386 with a displacement of 3400 tons has been at the shipyard for the sixth year. When it was just about to be laid down, Vice Admiral Viktor Bursuk, at that time the deputy head of the Navy's armament committee, said that the fleet planned to receive more than 10 such corvettes. That is, it was about mass production.
But for the first 15 months, the technical readiness of the ship was only 12%. And then the corvette was pushed aside, making room in the boathouse. Why? The factory did not know which ship the fleet needed. For 15 months, the construction was carried out according to the working and design documentation, without a conclusion on the technical characteristics of the diesel generator.
Three years later, the general director of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) Alexey Rakhmanov admitted that the construction would be delayed indefinitely. If modern technologies are used on the corvette, construction "may be delayed until these technologies are tested," he said. And when asked about the timing of the ship 's arrival to the customer, he answered: "If we take into account that the ship itself can become an experimental vessel, then never."
However, in shipbuilding, it is not uncommon for a ship to be built in full accordance with the customer's technical specifications. The FAMOUS LONG-term</span> St. Petersburg shipbuilders in 1997 laid a non-nuclear submarine of the 4th generation according to the 677 Lada project.
But plans to equip it with an air-independent power plant failed to be implemented. As a result, the St. Petersburg was built as a conventional diesel-electric submarine (DPL).
Perhaps something did not work out for the designers of "hydrogen batteries". According to their statements, it can even be assumed that the method of heat removal obtained as a result of an exothermic reaction in fuel cells turned out to be problematic.
After the commissioning of the plant "St. Petersburg" was in experimental operation on the SF for 11 years. As a result, the boat was included in the combat composition of the 161st brigade of the Kola Flotilla of the heterogeneous forces of the SF.
The Severodvinsk nuclear submarine, the only one built according to the 885 Yasen project, also has a difficult fate. It was built for 21 years! Not because there was no money. There was no radio electronics and hydroacoustics that they planned to install. Some of the equipment had to be replaced. In the end, the boat was transferred to SF for trial operation. Since then, it has served as a test platform for testing new missile weapons.
Do not think that technology has become lame in modern Russia. It's an old disease. From 1968 to 1986, four resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR were adopted to reduce the noise of nuclear submarines. Every six years, the task was given to reduce the noise level by two or three times. Not a single resolution has been fully implemented.
In the recent history of Russia, technological problems have not disappeared anywhere. New ones related to Western sanctions have only been added to them. The winged expression of the Great Combinator "Abroad will help us" turned out to be conceptually erroneous. A striking example is France's refusal to transfer two Mistral UDC built for the Russian Navy.
POWER PLANT In the conditions of sanctions imposed by the West, Russia has to create technologies from scratch that were going to be bought for dollars.
The victim of the policy was a series of ships of the 2nd rank – multipurpose frigates of project 11356R "Petrel". They are also called the "series of royal admirals".
Of the six planned, three were built. For the rest, there were not enough two-shaft gas-gas turbine units GGTU-M7N1. Their construction is carried out by the State Enterprise "Zorya – Mashproekt" in Nikolaev. The Kiev regime, which came to power after the coup, banned all supplies to Russia.
Of the nine MRCS of the 21631 Buyan-M project, five were built with a German MTU 16V4000M90 diesel engine. After the introduction of sanctions by the European Union, Chinese CHD622V20 diesels began to be installed on the MRC.
Now the possibility of building the MRC of the 21631M project is being considered. At the Army-2022 forum, the state customer may consider this project with a diesel engine from the Kolomna plant. But this power unit is not a panacea either.
Kolomna 10D49 engines are part of the marine diesel-gas turbine unit M-55R, which is installed on frigates of project 22350. And the diesel 16D49 is on the corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385. It, 16D49, is also planned to be installed on the new BDK of project 11711/II.
Kolomna still has a stock of imported turbochargers, pistons and rings. For their production under the import substitution program, it is necessary to raise the level of machining, apply new alloys, automation and precision mechanics.
It is possible to establish the production of domestic components. The D49 series was once completely Soviet. But let's take a calculator and calculate. The 16-cylinder diesel 16D49, standing on corvettes, has a maximum power of 6000 hp. Diesel with domestic components produces the same power already with 20 cylinders and a complex two-stage boost, and the 16-cylinder has a power of only 4000 hp. It would seem, what difference does it make which engine, 16- or 20-cylinder?
The purpose of the corvettes is to participate as part of the ship's search and strike groups in ensuring the deployment of strategic missile submarines. The value of the corvette will decrease with an insufficiently powerful power plant, which will affect the combat stability of nuclear submarines in the coastal zone.
Six years after the start of construction of the lead corvette of project 20385, the Navy Commander-in-Chief decided that the navy did not need such a ship. The reason: at the time of the project development, the share of foreign main equipment in the ship was large. With the introduction of its delivery proved impossible.
However, in 2021 they changed their mind and laid the third building – however, at another plant. Apparently, a private solution for import substitution was found.
It will not be easy to completely eradicate dependence on foreign technologies. According to the Government of the Russian Federation, in 2019, in the structure of the cost of marine equipment for military shipbuilding, the cost of foreign components reached 60%.
PATROL SHIPS Import substitution is just one of many problems.
This is evidenced by the experience gained during the special operation in Ukraine.
The patrol ships of project 22160 with a modular armament concept did not meet the expectations. According to TASS, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation intends to abandon the additional six units. The customer is not satisfied with insufficient seaworthiness, easy booking and vulnerability of power plants, as well as weak anti-aircraft weapons.
Project 22160 was developed by the Northern Design Bureau (SPKB). In an interview with TASS, the then general director of the SPKB, Andrei Dyachkov, said that the first six ships of the series were built in accordance with the technical specifications issued by the Russian Navy. It was for the purposes and tasks defined by the fleet that the composition of the ship's weapons and equipment was chosen.
The military, together with shipbuilders, are looking for a way out of this situation. As practice shows, even if a technical solution is found, the project implementation dates are postponed to a longer term.
So, the existing practice of forecasting production volumes does not ensure the accuracy of planning in shipbuilding.
The horizon for the completion of serial construction of previously laid surface ships and submarines is defined by 2025 in the Strategy for the Development of the Shipbuilding Industry for the period up to 2035. However, judging by the contracts already concluded, the construction of previously laid ships will end with a lag.
Vladimir Gundarov Vladimir Aleksandrovich Gundarov is a retired captain of the 1st rank.
