Why the strategic document may remain a formidable statement On July 31, 2022, President Vladimir Putin approved a new Maritime Doctrine.
Along with other measures, it provides for the intensification of maritime activities in the northern archipelagos, "increasing the combat potential and the development of the Northern Fleet's basing system."
The main threats to the security of the Russian Federation are recognized as the US policy of dominance in the World Ocean and the growth of NATO activity.
But are all the threats and problems of our Navy taken into account in the doctrine? What else could and should have been said in this most important document?
THE MAIN THING IS PROFIT?The main essence and the main thrust of the doctrine remained the same: the protection of Russia's maritime interests.
Which also meets today's challenges. Russia was, is and will remain a naval power, whether our enemies want to reckon with it or not.
At the same time, the Maritime Doctrine is a strategic planning document that defines the state policy of Russia in the field of maritime activities for a long time. It is not surprising that it contains many new provisions, fundamental attitudes and strategic goals for which the Russian fleet should be formed and developed.
Among the innovations, we note the provisions on maritime transport and inland waterway transport. And also such a relevant item as "The functioning of offshore pipelines" (the emphasis here is on the export direction). The "Antarctic regional direction" and shipbuilding/shipbuilding are singled out in separate provisions. Special attention is paid to environmental safety in the development of the World Ocean, as well as to solving social problems of citizens employed in marine industries.
The main threat to Russia's national security at sea is declared in the document "the desire of a number of states, primarily the United States and its allies, to dominate the oceans, including in the Arctic, as well as to achieve the overwhelming superiority of their naval forces."
Other threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, an increase in the number of states with powerful navies, pressure on Russia to weaken our control over the Northern Sea Route, territorial claims against the Russian Federation, terrorism and poaching.
The new document looks pragmatic and realistic. It is based on the awareness of the changed strategic situation in the world, primarily the significant deterioration of Russia's relations with the United States and NATO, which will persist in the long term. But naval sailors are primarily interested not in the general pathos, but in the specific norms of the doctrine.
Take, for example, this question: what is the role of the Navy in the implementation of Russia's maritime policy? In other words, what contribution the navy itself can make to this policy. There may be one answer here: until the Navy gets more independence on a par with the Russian army, all the pathetic words of the doctrine will add little to it.
In legal terms, the fleet today does not have sufficient independence. It is clear that we are talking about a military organization, not a cooperative for the sale of flowers. But anyway, the fleet today is under dual command: military districts (directions) and, to a lesser extent, the actual command of the Navy. Moreover, as the doctrine prescribes, now it will also be under the control of the regional coastal authorities. And seven nannies, as you know, have a child without an eye.
We will not parse the text line by line. Let's focus on the new, 7th, section, which was not in the previous naval doctrines. It is called "Mobilization training and mobilization readiness in the field of maritime activities".
According to the service of one of us at the headquarters of the Northern Fleet (SF) and the Central Command Post (CCP) The Navy had to deal with these issues. But today it is difficult to imagine how they can be solved – either in ordinary life or in special circumstances.
The first 10 points of the section seem to be correct, coherent in logic. But who and how will they be carried out in practice? You can't order a businessman to fulfill the Charter of the Navy, to provide the fleet with everything necessary. His profit is in the foreground, and his Homeland is later. In this regard, we can recall a major exercise of the rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which took place several years ago.
The main objectives of the maneuvers were to check the level of preparedness of the military authorities when planning and conducting regroupings of troops (forces) over long distances, organizing interaction between land groups and naval forces. During the exercises, the military and civilian sides of the military contingent were transferred to the Far East. But when the planes landed for refueling at Khabarovsk airport, local businessmen refused to refuel them: "First the money, then the chairs."
As we understand, the enemy in such cases will not wait and enter into the circumstances. And the relationship with business is not clearly spelled out in the doctrine. Although, perhaps someone will say that this is not necessary.
IN THE CASE OF A MILITARY THREAT, you will ask: how is this issue solved in other countries?
The answer is short: everything there is under the control of the government, and all the laws were written (and are still being written) in favor of business. Therefore, certain passages in the Maritime Doctrine can be perceived more as a wish for business, but not as a firm requirement.
While serving in the operational directorate of the SF headquarters, one of us had to develop a directive "On the protection of maritime navigation in the operational zone of the Northern Fleet", which indicated all the recommended routes of departure of civilian vessels, areas of their collection in case of a military threat.
Exercises of civil fleets on mobilization readiness were held annually – "Murmanseldi", the trawl fleet, the Northern Shipping Company, up to fishing collective farms. Their actions were checked in case of a military threat. I had to be an intermediary in these exercises. There was full contact between military and civilian sailors who were confident in their security.
And today? Will the mobilization documents be carried out? Alas, we have not yet heard about such exercises on the scale of the Navy and the civil fleet. Although a special operation is in full swing in Ukraine, which, in the face of confrontation with the West and the most severe sanctions, requires internal mobilization. Especially from sailors. And from civil officials and businessmen – the ability to act in an emergency.
But our population is relaxed, business is not mobilized. And even former civil defense facilities, such as bomb shelters, are still being rented out for car dealerships.
I remember a case at the exercises of the Arkhangelsk trawl fleet. At the final evening on the occasion of a successful exercise, the captain of an ocean trawler proposed a toast in honor of the Navy: "When we catch nototenia off the coast of Argentina, we know that no one will touch us. Because we are sure that if something happens, our submarine will immediately surface nearby." It was 1978. Such was the belief in the strength and power of our Navy.
In the 1980s, while on duty at the CCP of the Navy, we constantly had contact with ships standing guard over our fishing and shipping in various areas of the World Ocean. For example, off the African coast of Morocco, where our fishermen took sardines. Or in the Strait of Hormuz. Where is all this today?
Back in 1956, when the question of the "big fleet" was raised, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov spoke at a high-level meeting:
"We need a clear and precise program for the creation of a new fleet that would take into account the economic opportunities of our country, the trends in the development of fleets of major imperialist powers, as well as the experience of the war. In the atomic age, when designing and building a fleet, we must proceed from our doctrine, its defensive orientation and not copy the Western powers, go our own way, taking into account the capabilities of our industry."
Today, of course, the situation is different. But this does not mean that the role of the Navy should be reduced, figuratively speaking, to an appendage of the army. If this is not the case, well, time will judge.
The Maritime Doctrine APPLICATION DOCUMENT is a fundamental document for the development of programs in the field of maritime policy, including shipbuilding, navy development, etc.
But will they appear? After all, the construction of warships is included in the general State armament program. And this means that the ships will continue to be built according to the residual principle.
Apparently, we also refuse to build aircraft carriers. The doctrine doesn't say a word about it. At this stage, this refusal is most likely reasonable, since Russia does not intend to carry out gunboat diplomacy. But then what mighty fleet are we talking about?
And most importantly. The doctrine does not identify specific responsible performers in specific areas. This means that it remains for the time being a declarative, and not a directive document.
Perhaps that is why the adoption of Russia's new Maritime Doctrine did not cause a loud reaction in the West. Our sworn friends were much more puzzled and frightened by President Putin's statement about the Zircon hypersonic missile.
Vadim Kulinchenko Vadim Timofeevich Kulinchenko is a retired captain of the 1st rank, Oleg Valentinovich Falichev is a military observer.
